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Military And Security Developments
Oct 17.
* Prior to the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement on 9 October, there was a notable intensification in anti-Israel demonstrations across Western Europe, particularly in Italy, the Netherlands and Spain.
* If the Israel-Hamas ceasefire breaks down, we assess that this will almost certainly trigger significant public backlash across Europe, driving renewed threats of major supply chain disruption.
* Dockworker strikes will likely drive logistical disruption in southern European transport hubs, including ports in Genoa, Livorno (both Italy), Marseille (France) and Piraeus (Greece).
* The refusal by airport ground staff to handle Israel-linked cargo will disrupt commercial airline operations across European air traffic networks.
* A resumption of the Israel-Hamas conflict will increase the likelihood of further European punitive measures on Israel, elevating risks for defence and dual-use technology manufacturers.
Context
In recent months, there has been an intensification in pro-Palestine demonstrations across Western Europe, including industrial unrest. Developments in and around Gaza, most recently the Israeli Navy’s interception and detention of Global Sumud Flotilla (GSF) activists on 1 October, have acted as flashpoints for retaliatory industrial action and violent unrest, particularly in Italy and Spain. The ceasefire and hostage release agreement signed by Israel and Hamas on 9 October will likely mitigate immediate domestic unrest risks. However, there is a realistic possibility that the agreement will break down in the coming weeks; we assess that the resumption of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations in Gaza will almost certainly trigger significant public backlash. In this scenario, a wave of major pro-Palestine demonstrations will likely target the transfer of Israeli goods via European supply routes (primarily shipping and air freight), driving significant knock-on impacts for logistical operators. It remains unclear whether unions and activists are planning to stage coordinated action if the ceasefire holds; however, in this scenario, they are likely to continue posing periodic disruption in the coming months.
Forecast
Dockworker strikes will likely disrupt the movement of Israel-bound goods via southern European seaports, driving broader maritime supply chain delays
On 26 and 27 September, European dockworkers met in Genoa (Liguria region, Italy) to coordinate efforts to block perceived arms shipments to Israel. Several shipping unions attended this meeting, including France’s Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) Ports & Docks, Italy’s Unione Sindacale di Base (USB) and Spain’s Coordinadora; these unions wield significant influence over European shipping networks. Dockworkers have threatened to block all trade to and from Israel if the IDF continues its military offensive in Gaza. The unions have not publicly disclosed the details of their agreements; this is likely a strategic move to maximise the impact of any potential industrial action they may decide to initiate. While the meeting was held prior to the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement, we assess that the resumption of IDF activity following a breakdown in the peace agreement negotiations will likely trigger coordinated dockworker action.
On 2 October, there were blockades by Italian dockworkers in Genoa (Liguria region) and Livorno (Tuscany region) in response to the IDF’s interception of GSF vessels. This highlight unions’ commitment to follow through on their threats; multiple individual port blockades have demonstrated the logistical impact of union action. On 30 September, the Israeli-flagged Zim Virginia cargo ship was forced to depart Livorno without loading or unloading after workers refused to handle its cargo, prompting the Israeli shipping company ZIM to temporarily suspend operations there.
Temporary halts in port operations will drive knock-on disruption across the wider European shipping network. Delays in cargo processing will drive vessel congestion, shipment delays, container shortages and elevated transport costs. We assess that a co-ordinated wave of industrial action across key European and Mediterranean ports (such as Genoa, Livorno, Marseille and Piraeus) will cause significant delays and operational challenges across European and global maritime supply chains.
* Yemen: Houthi attacks are likely to subside in coming weeks in line with ceasefire agreement. On 16 October, the Iran-backed Houthis claimed that their chief of staff had been killed in August by Israel’s airstrikes in the capital Sanaa; the strikes also killed multiple ministers of the Houthi-run government, including the prime minister. However, the confirmed loss of a key Houthi figure is unlikely to provoke further retaliation against Israel. We assess that due to the Israel-Hamas ceasefire, the risks of Houthi attacks on shipping vessels in the Red Sea and on targets in southern Israel are likely to decrease over the coming weeks. This will moderate security risks for personnel and assets across Israel, as well as to vessels in the Red Sea, including from direct drone, ballistic missile strikes and shrapnel from Israeli interceptions. Additionally, the frequency of evacuations from offices, homes, and hospitality venues in Israel is likely to decrease, moderating business disruptions and threats of harm to personnel from crowd surges. A cessation of Houthi hostilities against commercial vessels in the Red Sea will likely reduce disruptions to key shipping routes, moderating operational and financial risks for businesses in the region.
Oct 16.
* Syria-Russia: Retention of Russian bases will elevate tensions between Damascus, West. On 15 October, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa held his first talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow (Russia). Al-Sharaa stated that he would honour all past bilateral agreements, indicating that Russia would keep its two main military bases in Latakia and Tartus governorates (both Syria). This comes days after a Syrian army delegation visited Russia, where it discussed potential weapons deals. This signals that Russia will likely try to assist Syria’s rearmament process. While retaining the Russian bases in Syria will help to reduce instability in the country’s coastal region (where insurgent Alawite cells remain active), the move will also likely elevate diplomatic tensions between Syria and the US/EU. These tensions will in turn elevate the risk of reduced Western investments and financial aid to help with Syria’s post-war recovery. Moscow also indicated its willingness to work on energy infrastructure projects in Syria. However, Russian energy companies are unlikely to enter Syria in 2026 due to Western sanctions imposed against Russia that would in turn elevate compliance risks for Syria. As such, we assess that Syria’s reconstruction efforts will continue to face impediments.
• Tunisia: Further protests against state-owned chemical plant are likely, raising domestic unrest risks. On 15 October, thousands of protesters marched towards the state-owned Tunisian Chemical Group (CGT) complex in Gabès (Gabès governorate). The police used tear gas to disperse demonstrators, who demanded the plant’s permanent closure over phosphate pollution concerns. Despite the growing protest movements, the government continues to operate the plant in Gabès; this will sustain the risk of further demonstrations in the coming days. There is a realistic possibility that the authorities will employ heavy-handed tactics such as tear gas and water cannons to disperse crowds, elevating the likelihood of sporadic clashes and escalating security risks for proximate personnel. Failure by the Tunisian government to respond to demands in the coming days will elevate the risk of further protests spreading and intensifying nationwide, including in the capital Tunis. We assess that the emergence of nationwide domestic unrest would elevate the risk of the security forces suppressing protesters and activist groups aggressively via more forceful means and by carrying out arbitrary arrests, elevating human rights concerns.
Oct 15.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
IRAN
• Despite positive statements from US and Iranian officials on the potential for a nuclear deal, negotiations are highly unlikely to progress demonstrably in the short-to-medium term.
• Iran has sentenced two French nationals to lengthy prison sentences for espionage, underscoring the increasing risks of long-term detention for foreign nationals as Tehran seeks sanctions relief.
• The US has sanctioned over 90 individuals and entities linked to Iranian oil exports, underscoring the increasing sanctions-exposure risks for firms engaged in regional financial, shipping and energy markets.
ISRAEL
• Hamas’ repatriation of the remains of only four (of 28) deceased hostages has elevated the risk of domestic unrest in Israel and a resumption of military operations in Gaza.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• GAZA STRIP: Amid ongoing disputes relating to Hamas’ release of deceased hostages, Israel will possibly restrict the entry of critical aid supplies into Gaza in the coming weeks, sustaining humanitarian concerns.
• GAZA STRIP: Strike risks remain heightened around the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF’s) abandoned positions.
• GAZA STRIP: Clashes between Hamas and opposing militias will sustain elevated crossfire-exposure risks for staff in Gaza; any such incidents are also likely to signal Hamas’ intention to remain active in the governance of Gaza.
• WEST BANK: The release of Palestinian detainees into the West Bank will elevate radicalisation and security risks in the coming months.
IRAN
• Despite positive statements from US and Iranian officials on the potential for a nuclear deal, negotiations are highly unlikely to progress demonstrably in the short-to-medium term. On 11 October, Iran’s foreign ministry announced that Tehran would be willing to strike a ‘fair and balanced’ nuclear and sanctions-relief agreement with the US, but that it had not received any such proposals to date. Subsequently, US President Donald Trump stated that the US was ready ‘to make a deal’ with Iran during a speech in Israel. Despite these statements, neither Iran nor the US have announced changes to their critical negotiating positions regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. Tehran continues to characterise its domestic enrichment of uranium as a non-negotiable component of its nuclear programme, while Washington DC has repeatedly stated that Iran cannot maintain its enrichment capabilities. These conflicting positions triggered the deadlock in negotiations that preceded the Iran-Israel war; talks have yet to resume. Barring substantial concessions from either party on the issue of domestic enrichment, negotiations between the US and Iran are unlikely to resume in the short term, sustaining deadlock and associated regional tensions. Iran’s continued efforts to resume uranium enrichment following the Iran-Israel war will also likely hamper progress towards an agreement, undermining prospects for sanctions relief and associated socio-economic improvement within Iran.
• Iran has sentenced two French nationals to lengthy prison sentences for espionage, underscoring the increasing risks of long-term detention for foreign nationals as Tehran seeks sanctions relief. On 14 October, Iranian state media reported that a court in Tehran found two French nationals guilty of spying for Israel and France, sentencing them to 31- and 32-year prison sentences, respectively. The announcement almost certainly relates to Cecile Kohler and Jacques Paris, the only two remaining French nationals in Iranian custody (the Iranian authorities detained Kohler and Paris in 2022). Iran will highly likely attempt to leverage the continued detention of Kohler and Paris to gain diplomatic concessions from France, such as limited sanctions relief or the release of detained Iranian nationals. Following the re-imposition of UN sanctions against Iran on 27 September (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 29 September 2025), Tehran will almost certainly continue leveraging the detention of foreign nationals to secure periodic sanctions relief from nations enforcing the UN sanctions regime. As socio-economic pressure on Iran continues to increase in the coming months, foreign and dual nationals will almost certainly face elevated risks of surveillance, harassment and detention, compounding threats to locally engaged staff and travellers, including Iranian individuals who are married to – or have children with – foreign nationals.
• The US has sanctioned over 90 individuals and entities linked to Iranian oil exports, underscoring the increasing sanctions-exposure risks for firms engaged in regional financial, shipping and energy markets. On 9 October, the US sanctioned ten individuals and 40 entities associated with Iran’s oil and gas exports, as well as 44 vessels operating in Iran’s ‘shadow fleet’. The sanctioned entities include numerous firms based in China, Turkey, Singapore and the UAE, underscoring increasing sanctions-exposure risks for regionally engaged firms in the financial, shipping and energy sectors. Of note is the sanctioning of the Rizhao Shihua Crude Oil Terminal Company – which operates a crude oil terminal within the Lanshan port facility in Shandong (Shandong province, China) – and the Shandong Jincheng Petrochemical Group, an associated independent oil refinery in Shandong. Continued sanctions targeting Chinese oil terminals and refineries will likely disrupt ports’ operations, as well as their capacity to receive shipments of Iranian crude, as seen at the Dongjiakou port facility in early September. The sanctions have also targeted seven Indian nationals associated with firms managing vessels operating in Iran’s shadow fleet, underscoring the US government’s increasing scrutiny of Indian entities and their involvement in the import and transit of Iranian oil to Bangladesh, China and Pakistan. The continued expansion and enforcement of US sanctions will likely further disrupt Iranian efforts to maximise fuel exports and to access foreign currency, compounding the socio-economic pressure facing Iran and undermining its economic stability in the medium term.
ISRAEL
• Hamas’ repatriation of the remains of only four (of 28) deceased hostages has elevated the risk of domestic unrest in Israel and a resumption of military operations in Gaza. In line with the terms of the ceasefire agreement, Hamas released the remaining 20 living hostages on 13 October, after which Israel released 1,968 Palestinian detainees and prisoners. However, in contrast to the ceasefire’s term, Hamas released the remains of only four of 28 deceased hostages. While difficulties in locating the remains of all the deceased rendered this term challenging to fulfil, the number is considerably lower than was discussed in negotiations. Reports initially suggested that Hamas held at least 18 bodies. This has since raised concerns in Israel that Hamas hopes to use the remains of the deceased as bargaining chips in future negotiations. In response, the Hostages and Missing Families Forum has threatened to conduct large demonstrations, demanding that the government stop its co-operation with the agreement. After Israel threatened to limit its compliance with the ceasefire agreement (and due to pressure from the US and various other countries), Hamas released four more sets of remains late on 14 October (though one body was identified as not being that of an Israeli hostage). Even so, earlier on 15 October, Israel announced (in contrast to the agreed terms of the ceasefire) that the Rafah border crossing in southern Gaza would remain closed and that aid would only enter Gaza through the Kerem Shalom crossing (southern Gaza). As Hamas’ ostensibly limited compliance with the ceasefire agreement is likely to continue in the coming days, we assess that the risk of domestic unrest will increase across Israel. Protesters will likely demand that the Israeli government stop co-operating with the ceasefire agreement until Hamas complies fully with its terms. This will likely encourage the Israeli authorities to intensify pressure on Hamas, albeit gradually, reducing their own co-operation with the agreed terms of the ceasefire by further limiting the passage of aid. Such conditions will elevate the risk of the ceasefire breaking down in the coming weeks, though pressure from international mediators will likely ensure it holds for at least the coming 72 hours.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• GAZA STRIP: Amid ongoing disputes relating to Hamas’ release of deceased hostages, Israel will possibly restrict the entry of critical aid supplies into Gaza in the coming weeks, sustaining humanitarian concerns. On 14 October, Israel announced that it would restrict the entry of aid into Gaza following delays to the release of deceased hostages (see above). These restrictions include the continued closure of the Rafah border crossing (southern Gaza), a ban on fuel or gas deliveries (except for specified deliveries to select NGOs) and a limit of 300 trucks entering Gaza per day from 15 October (the ceasefire agreement stipulates the entry of 600 trucks per day). However, following the release of four additional deceased hostages on 14 October (see above), Israel relaxed the restrictions on aid deliveries (dozens of aid trucks entered Gaza on 15 October). The IDF has also announced that it will continue with preparations to open the Rafah crossing in the coming days. The ceasefire and increase in aid deliveries will likely moderate critical food insecurity conditions within Gaza in the coming weeks, though broader humanitarian and public health concerns will likely remain elevated. Additionally, on 15 October, the IDF announced that Hamas had released the remains of an unidentified individual as part of the hostage-release process on 14 October. The genetic profile of the remains does not match any of the Israeli hostages; there is a realistic possibility that Israel will characterise the incident as a violation of the ceasefire in the coming hours. In response to alleged violations of the ceasefire and hostage-release agreement, Israel will likely announce further temporary restrictions to the cross-border movement of aid in the coming weeks, sustaining critical disruption risks for aid supply chains. Persistent food security concerns in Gaza will also sustain the risk of opportunistic (and planned) robbery targeting aid convoys, storage facilities and distribution points in the coming weeks.
• GAZA STRIP: Strike risks remain heightened around the IDF’s abandoned positions. Following Israel’s official agreement to the ceasefire on 10 October, IDF troops withdrew from Gaza City and other positions within Gaza to a pre-agreed line within the strip (the yellow highlighted area marked in Figure 2). However, the IDF continues to monitor its abandoned positions. On 13 October, an IDF Hermes 450 drone fired warning shots at a group of Palestinians approaching an abandoned outpost in Khan Yunis (southern Gaza). Furthermore, the IDF continues to engage (with lethal force) unidentified individuals and groups that approach its current positions. In one incident in Shuja’iyya (central Gaza) on 14 October, the IDF killed five Palestinians. These incidents highlight the persistent and heightened threats to life, including for media, NGO and other foreign personnel operating in Gaza, particularly in the vicinity of past and present IDF outposts. We assess these risks will remain elevated in the coming weeks despite the ceasefire (or any progress vis-à-vis the agreement).
• GAZA STRIP: Clashes between Hamas and opposing militias will sustain elevated crossfire-exposure risks for staff in Gaza; any such incidents are also likely to signal Hamas’ intention to remain active in the governance of Gaza. Following the official start of the ceasefire, Hamas deployed over 7,500 of its operatives to re-establish the organisation’s authority across the strip. Hamas operatives subsequently conducted numerous public executions and engaged in armed clashes with anti-Hamas militias and clans. At the time of writing, reports indicate that Hamas has killed over 30 Gazans (including seven whom the group allegedly executed publicly). Hamas will likely conduct further such activities in the coming weeks, sustaining bystanders’ exposure to crossfire between the group’s members and adversarial militants. Furthermore, we assess these operations reflect Hamas’ determination to retain its control over the Gaza Strip (in clear contravention of the stated goals of the 20-point peace plan that underlines the ceasefire agreement). On 15 October, President Trump suggested that the group can be dealt with ‘violently’ if it refuses to disarm, highlighting the elevated risk of conflict resumption in Gaza in the coming months.
• WEST BANK: The release of Palestinian detainees into the West Bank will elevate radicalisation and security risks in the coming months. On 11 October, the IDF conducted operations in Nablus, Qalqilya and Ramallah and al-Bireh governorates in preparation for the release of 88 Palestinian detainees into the West Bank on 13 October. The Israeli security forces dispersed gatherings affiliated with Hamas, confiscated material deemed inciteful (including Hamas flags), arrested a number of individuals for allegedly inciting terrorism and searched the homes of those due to be released. Additionally, Israel banned demonstrations and celebrations related to the release in the West Bank. However, in the coming days, gatherings in support of Hamas and to celebrate the releases are likely to take place across the West Bank. Such events will raise the risk of clashes with the Israeli security forces, which are liable to employ aggressive dispersal methods, including stun grenades, tear gas and rubber bullets. Such methods will elevate physical security risks for bystanders – including NGO and media personnel – in the vicinity of all large gatherings. Furthermore, the Israeli security forces will likely augment their presence in the West Bank in the coming weeks, exacerbating travel disruption risks due to active operations and the establishment of additional checkpoints. This increased Israeli presence will likely compound tensions with local Palestinian residents and militants, elevating the risk of sporadic attacks and armed clashes with the Israeli security forces. Crossfire and misidentification risks will be particularly elevated near IDF positions and in Palestinian population centres. In addition, there is a realistic possibility that the IDF will conduct operations to recapture recently released detainees in the coming weeks, particularly if they reconnect with militant elements. Such operations will elevate the risk of domestic unrest in the West Bank and prompt accusations that Israel has breached the ceasefire, increasing pressure on the agreement and raising the risk of it breaking down in the subsequent weeks and months.
RED SEA
• Nothing significant to report
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS
• Israel-global: Pro-Palestine protesters will likely target football matches involving Maccabi Tel Aviv F.C. and/or the Israeli national team in Europe over the coming weeks and months. On 14 October, thousands of pro-Palestine protesters marched in Udine (Italy) before and during a match between Israel and Italy. The demonstrations culminated in clashes with the police and the arrests of several protesters. Protest-related unrest and harassment targeting Israeli fans is likely during the national team’s matches in Kaunas (Lithuania) and Chisinau (Moldova) on 13 and 16 November, respectively. The risk of physical attacks and harassment by radical pro-Palestine elements against Israeli tourists and athletes during Maccabi Tel Aviv F.C. matches in Europe in late 2025 will also be elevated. Maccabi Tel Aviv F.C. is due to play in Backa Topola (Serbia) on 23 October and 27 November, as well as in Birmingham (UK) on 6 November and in Stuttgart (Germany) on 11 December. Persistent pro-Palestine protest activity will also compound existing reputational and exposure risks for firms associated with major sports events through the remainder of 2025, particularly headline sponsors, security contractors and event-management firms.
Oct 13.
Palestinian Territories: Ban on prisoner-release celebrations will drive security risks in West Bank. On 13 October, Israel released over 1,900 Palestinian detainees as part of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire deal. Of this figure, 88 detainees were released within the West Bank (Palestinian Territories). Israel has banned celebrations in the West Bank. On the day of the release, the Israeli security forces dispersed crowds near Ofer Prison (Jerusalem governorate, West Bank) with tear gas. Regardless of the Israeli orders, we assess that celebrations across the West Bank are likely. Any such celebrations are likely to prompt the Israeli authorities to intensify their security operations in the coming days. This is likely to lead to sporadic clashes between Palestinians and the Israeli security forces. Such a scenario would in turn elevate NGO and business workers’ exposure to tear gas, stun grenades and – in some cases – live ammunition due to crossfire risks, especially if these workers are located in proximity to large gatherings in the West Bank. There is a realistic possibility that Israel will re-arrest released prisoners, which would drive accusations that Israel has breached the agreement. This would also elevate domestic unrest risks in the West Bank and inflame tensions during the ongoing ceasefire negotiations; this would in turn possibly delay the talks.
Israel-global: Peace agreement will partially mitigate against threats to bilateral agreements
On 13 October, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey and the US signed the Trump Peace Agreement at an international summit in Sharm El Sheikh (South Sinai governorate, Egypt). The agreement provides international guarantees for the implementation of the ceasefire and post-war reconstruction efforts in Gaza (Palestinian Territories). While the timeline for the deal’s subsequent phases remains uncertain, the agreement and a likely significant increase in humanitarian aid entering the strip in the coming weeks will reduce criticism of Israel and therefore temper associated threats to bilateral agreements involving Israel and (especially) its European partners. However, neither Hamas nor Israel officially participated in the summit. Given the outstanding disagreements over Hamas’ disarmament and the long-term governance of Gaza, we assess the ceasefire is at risk of temporary lapses (and possibly even a complete breakdown) in the coming months. Such conditions, including challenges to the effective implementation of the agreement driven by existing tensions between Israel and several of the agreement’s sponsors (such as Turkey), will threaten to undercut improving regional tensions. (Source: Sibylline)
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