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Military And Security Developments
Feb 01. (Africa)
01 feb 25. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth statement on U.S. Africa Command strikes in Somalia. At President Trump’s direction and in coordination with the Federal Government of Somalia, I authorized U.S. Africa Command to conduct coordinated airstrikes today targeting ISIS-Somalia operatives in the Golis mountains. Our initial assessment is that multiple operatives were killed in the airstrikes and no civilians were harmed. This action further degrades ISIS’s ability to plot and conduct terrorist attacks threatening U.S. citizens, our partners, and innocent civilians and sends a clear signal that the United States always stands ready to find and eliminate terrorists who threaten the United States and our allies, even as we conduct robust border-protection and many other operations under President Trump’s leadership. (Source: DoD)
Jan 31.
- Israel-Palestinian Territories: Gaza border opening will elevate transport disruption, security risks. Earlier on 31 January, Israeli state-owned media reported that the Rafah Border Crossing (Rafah governorate) will open later today rather than on 2 February as previously anticipated. Under the agreement for the restoration of movement through the Rafah crossing, up to 200 people per day will be permitted to transit the crossing, though there is a realistic possibility numbers will be limited below this figure until at least 2 February. Demand for the crossing’s use will likely result in large gatherings in proximity to the crossing. This, combined with efforts to effectively police the area, will likely drive the risk of clashes between civilians and the authorities, elevating bystander security risks for NGO personnel and localised travel disruption. Any ceasefire violations by Hamas, including incidents of weapons smuggling, will likely prompt Israel to restrict access to the crossing. We assess that this will disrupt the movement of humanitarian aid into Gaza and likely drive tensions with the EU (which will likely act as an observer) raising the threat of sanctions from EU member states.
- Syria: US strike targeting Al Qaeda affiliate underscores sustained threats from local jihadist groups. On 30 January, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced it had killed a senior operative of the al-Qaeda-affiliated Hurras al-Din (HaD) group in an airstrike in north-western Syria. While CENTCOM didn’t confirm the exact location of the strike, it likely took place near the village of Batabo (Idlib governorate). The strike comes a day after HaD announced it would dismantle itself following the appointment of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader Ahmed Al-Sharaa as Syria’s interim president. However, several former HaD members are likely to join other jihadist organisations operating in the country. As such, further US strikes targeting former HaD commanders are likely in the coming months, sustaining the heightened security and bystander risks in rural areas in north-western Syria. We assess it is also likely that the HTS-led government will launch a new crackdown targeting jihadist organisations affiliated with al Qaeda and Islamic State in the area, augmenting security and cross-fire risks during these large-scale campaigns.
Jan 30.
EXPANDED MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS
• On 27 January, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) expanded its ‘Iron Wall Operation’ to the Tulkarm governorate. The IDF claims that, since the expansion of the operation to Tulkarm (Tulkarm governorate), it has killed over 18 militants and arrested over 60 wanted terrorism suspects. During the week, IDF troops in Jenin (Jenin governorate) uncovered and destroyed over 100 IEDs while engineering forces destroyed over 30 roadside IEDs in the Tulkarm area (Tulkarm). IDF operations in the northern West Bank will likely continue throughout the ceasefire period, elevating bystander risks and travel disruption risks in the northern West Bank. Additionally, due to the intensity of operations, there is a realistic possibility of militant activity spilling over and increasing in the southern West Bank, elevating attack risks near roads and Israeli settlements in the coming weeks.
• On 29 January, the IDF conducted pre-emptive arrests in the West Bank ahead of the release of Palestinian prisoners. The IDF stated it targeted those identified as instigators during previous demonstrations and domestic unrest in preparation for the ceasefire-mandated release of Palestinian prisoners. Additionally, the Shin Bet augmented its forces in the West Bank. While these measures will likely slightly reduce domestic unrest risks in the coming days. Over the longer term, such arrests will compound the risk of radicalisation in the West Bank, raising unrest risks over the coming weeks. Rising radicalisation will compound attack risks near Israeli settlements and along key roads.
• On 29 January, an IDF aircraft fired warning shots at a vehicle which had not been cleared for transit through an unauthorised area towards northern Gaza. According to the IDF, the vehicle completed its transit towards northern Gaza despite the warning shots. Additionally, throughout the week, the IDF fired warning shots at individuals approaching troops stationed across Gaza. The incidents reflect likely efforts by militants to test and provoke the IDF while attempting to restore their presence in areas previously held by the IDF. The vehicle incident, in particular, highlights the limited ability of the IDF to stop vehicles suspected of smuggling weapons and the likely ongoing restoration of militant forces in northern Gaza. However, increasing incidents of vehicles travelling in unauthorised areas will elevate the risk of the IDF conducting strikes against these vehicles, elevating risks of misidentification and misfire.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OVERALL FORECAST
Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) released eight hostages from Gaza, though obstruction to the hostage transfers delayed prisoner releases in the West Bank. Earlier on 30 January, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) released three Israeli hostages and five Thai nationals from Gaza. In exchange for the hostage releases, Israel agreed to release approximately 110 Palestinian prisoners, including 33 serving life sentences. However, during the hostage releases, hundreds of militants and civilians obstructed the convoy’s movement, resulting in a highly chaotic transfer. The Israeli authorities subsequently temporarily delayed the release of Palestinian prisoners to later in the evening on 30 January. The releases will likely trigger demonstrations in the West Bank, moderately elevating unrest risk. Prior, on 28 January, the Israeli police arrested at least 12 individuals in East Jerusalem for allegedly participating in a pro-Hamas prisoner release rally. Despite efforts to prevent such demonstrations, further pro-prisoner release rallies are highly likely to emerge in the coming weeks, driving risks of clashes with the security forces and unrest risks in the West Bank, including in East Jerusalem and the Ramallah (Ramallah and al Bireh governorate) area.
• On 30 January, legislation severely restricting the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)’s operations in Israel came into force, significantly increasing socio-economic health concerns in the Palestinian Territories. The legislation prevents UNRWA from operating in Israeli territory and areas in the West Bank under its administration. The legislation also bans Israeli officials from communicating with UNRWA staff; this will prevent Israeli authorities from co-ordinating the movement of UNRWA personnel and aid supplies from Israel into Gaza and the West Bank. Given UNRWA’s central role in distributing aid and providing humanitarian services in Gaza, the legislation is highly likely to exacerbate food insecurity and broader socio-economic concerns, despite the ongoing ceasefire. In the coming weeks, the likely resumption of the Israel-Hamas war will almost certainly compound food insecurity, driving broader humanitarian and public safety concerns in the enclave. UNRWA’s decreased organisational capacity will also sustain long-term criminal and governance risks, sustaining threats to NGO staff operating in Gaza. While the impact on socio-economic conditions will likely be less intense in the West Bank (due to aid transit routes through Jordan), restricted UNRWA capacity in East Jerusalem will elevate risks of unrest, increasing bystander risks therein.
• In Israel, increasing tensions between government coalition parties will drive government instability risks and increase the likelihood of a general election in Q2. On 28 January, Shas party leader Aryeh Deri stated that, unless the coalition government regularises conscription exemptions for ultra-Orthodox men, his party will trigger a general election, likely by voting against the proposed state budget. If the government is unable to adopt a budget by 31 March, the government will automatically dissolve, triggering an early election. Although a Shas party spokesperson subsequently stated that Deri had not threatened to ‘topple’ the government, ultra-Orthodox parties will likely leverage their position in government to gain concessions on conscription legislation in the coming weeks amid concerns that the government will be unable to secure majority support for budget legislation. Continued brinkmanship and leveraging from coalition parties will likely delay the passage of the state budget in the coming weeks, increasing government instability risks and the possibility of a general election in Q2.
• Anti-conscription protests continue to drive unrest risks in Israel and will possibly escalate in the coming months. On 27 January, hundreds of ultra-Orthodox protesters gathered near the Tel Hashomer recruitment centre (Tel Aviv district) as part of a four-day anti-conscription protest campaign. Demonstrators repeatedly blocked nearby roads and clashed with police, resulting in several arrests. Additionally on 28 January, dozens of anti-conscription protesters gathered outside the International Convention Centre in central Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) to disrupt a ceremony honouring several ultra-Orthodox IDF personnel. Despite ongoing efforts from ultra-Orthodox coalition parties to gain concessions on conscription exemption (see above), on 29 January, the IDF announced it would issue 14,000 draft notices to ultra-Orthodox men by 31 March. Notice issuances and enforcement efforts will highly likely trigger further anti-conscription protests and unrest in the coming weeks. Demonstrations will be particularly likely in ultra-Orthodox population centres, such as Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv), Beit Shemesh and Jerusalem (both Jerusalem district), increasing localised travel and operational disruption risks. Protesters will also likely target IDF recruitment centres and conference centres hosting IDF events, moderately increasing risks of localised unrest and event disruption.
• Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will travel to the US in the coming week, increasing risks of pro-Palestine protests. On 2 February, Netanyahu will travel to the US for approximately five days, meeting with US President Donald Trump in the capital Washington DC on 4 February. The meeting is highly likely to trigger pro-Palestine demonstrations in the US, particularly in New York (New York), San Francisco (California) and Washington DC, driving localised disruption risks. In the Middle East, North Africa and Turkey regions, there is also a realistic possibility of small-scale pro-Palestine demonstrations targeting entities linked to the US government in the coming days, increasing bystander and incidental risks. This includes embassies and consulates. Even so, demonstrations are unlikely to attract significant attendance or trigger unrest, moderating risks for proximate entities or persons.
Palestinian prisoner and Israeli hostage releases on 30 January and 1 February will likely elevate attack risks across Israel throughout the coming days. Israel-Hamas tensions in days before and during hostage releases are often high, characterised by accusations of ceasefire violations and threats, increasing threats to the continuity of the ceasefire. The proximity of the two release dates will likely further elevate these tensions. Challenges around the releases on 30 January raise the likelihood of knock-on disruption during 1 February, including further ceasefire violations. This will elevate radicalisation risks and ethno-religious tensions between Palestinian and Israeli populations, driving attack risks across Israel. Attack risks will likely be elevated in big Israeli cities, particularly Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) as well as in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district), near Israeli settlements and key roads in the West Bank. Attacks will most likely be characterised by stabbings; however, car-ramming and shooting attacks also remain a realistic possibility particularly around Jerusalem and the West Bank. The opening of the Rafah border crossing in February will elevate risks of weapon smuggling and greater Israel-EU tension. The crossing will likely open under the observation of European border officers and border officers from the Palestinian Authority (PA) with the IDF remaining within the perimeter of the border crossing in Rafah. The subsequent movement of up to 200 individuals through the crossing per day will likely act as a key flashpoint point for elevated tensions and risks of clashes between the IDF, militants and other security elements in the area. Furthermore, perceived ceasefire violations will likely prompt the Israeli authorities to threaten to restrict access to the crossing, elevating threats to the ceasefire and the likelihood of spikes in diplomatic tensions with the EU in the coming weeks.
• Syria: Political uncertainty will likely persist despite appointment of interim president. During a conference on 29 January, the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led government announced the appointment of HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa as Syria’s interim president for the transitional period. The government also announced the dissolution of the 2012 constitution and the Ba’ath Party, as well as the former government’s parliament, the army and the security agencies. Furthermore, the new government declared that all other military factions, including HTS, would be dissolved into state institutions. Al-Sharaa now has the power to form an interim legislative council until a new constitution is approved. While these decisions are likely to mitigate against government instability in Syria, we assess that the unilateral nature of the announcement has prompted concerns of authoritarianism among several political factions. This will likely increase the risk of domestic unrest and political uncertainty in the coming weeks, augmented by the lack of a clear timeline for the national dialogue or constitution committee. In addition, the absence of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) from the conference signals a persistent political rift between the Kurds and government in Damascus, undercutting efforts to bolster national security.
• Iraq: Protesters’ threats to close oil facilities via sit-ins will raise energy security, supply chain risks. On 29 January, thousands of demonstrators led by the al-Qurnah District Movement joined tribes from northern Basra in al-Qurnah (Basra governorate) over the government’s failures to meet demands for improvements to essential services, including water and electricity infrastructure and job creation. The leader of the movement has signalled further escalation if the government does not act on its demands by 3 February, threatening the closure of oil facilities through sit-ins. This will exacerbate nationwide energy security and supply chain risks, which are currently heightened due to a large fire at the Rumaila oil field last week. A heightened security posture is likely in al-Qurna. Protests are likely to escalate in the coming days, driving the risk of sporadic clashes between the authorities and demonstrators, and therefore elevating the risk of arbitrary detention. We assess there is a realistic possibility that protests will turn disruptive, with demonstrators burning tyres and throwing rocks, in turn driving travel delays and bystander security risks.
Jan 28.
• Iraq: Iranian proxy refusal to disarm will undermine security capabilities, drive conflict escalation. On 27 January, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) faction Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya (HAAA) reaffirmed its rejection of disarmament and incorporation into official security institutions as long as US forces remain in Iraq. The group announced it will keep monitoring agreements between Iraq and the US on troop withdrawals, which were indefinitely delayed in August 2024. HAAA’s refusal to incorporate its assets into a state-wide institution will likely continue to undermine the security forces’ capabilities, sustaining security risks emanating from attacks and organised crime. Additionally, we assess that continued delays will elevate the likelihood of the resumption of IRI attacks targeting US forces in the region, particularly in Iraq and Syria, as well as retaliatory airstrikes by the US. These will also likely increase tensions between the US and the Iraqi government, increasing anti-West sentiment and elevating collateral risks for Western businesses and NGOs, including due to possible attacks on staff and damage to infrastructure.
• Syria: Easing EU sanctions will likely reduce compliance risks for key economic sectors. On 27 January, France’s foreign minister, Jean-Noel Barrot, stated that several EU sanctions against Syria will be gradually lifted as part of a broader move to stabilise the country. The sanctions most likely to be eased are those related to the banking, energy and transport sectors. We assess that the lifting of sanctions is highly likely to reduce compliance risks for the financial sector in particular, providing a route for Damascus to apply for loans from international financial institutions (which will help to ease Syria’s socio-economic challenges). Furthermore, the easing of energy sanctions is likely to allow Syria to export at least some of its oil products, providing opportunities for international investors in this key sector, including drilling companies. However, the rate of easing such sanctions will likely be contingent upon the progress made by the new government in protecting ethnic and religious minorities (as well as women and broader human rights) in 2025.
Jan 29.
• Egypt: Nationwide protests are likely in coming days; rising hostility to foreign investment is unlikely. Earlier on 29 January, several pro-government parties, civil society organisations and unions signalled preparations for large-scale anti-Trump and anti-Israel protests in the coming days to denounce any possible plans to relocate Palestinians to Egypt. The protests are indirectly sponsored and organised by the Egyptian security authorities and are designed to send a public message to the Trump administration. As such, the demonstrations will be strictly controlled by the state; the risk of clashes between the security forces and protesters will therefore remain low. Protests are most likely to take place after noon prayers on 31 January and 7 February in the capital Cairo. Other likely protest locations include al-Arish (North Sinai governorate), Alexandria (Alexandria governorate) and Giza (Giza governorate). Moderate mobility disruption risks in these cities will increase during the protests. Despite the uptick in anti-US sentiment in Egypt, we assess that the risk of attacks against US businesses will remain very low, though boycott campaigns, particularly on food chains, are likely to continue.
• Libya: Port shutdown will drive supply chain disruption, underscores socio-economic health risks. On 28 January, Libya’s state-run National Oil Corporation (NOC) announced that activities had resumed at Ras Lanuf and Sidra ports (both Sirte district) after protesters blocked an oil tanker from loading an oil shipment. Protesters are demanding the relocation of the headquarters of five major oil companies from the capital Tripoli to the Oil Crescent Region (eastern Libya, mostly al-Wahat district) to boost the socio-economic development of the area and improve living conditions therein. Protest activity will likely continue in the coming weeks as negotiations protract, elevating energy security and socio-economic health risks throughout Libya. The blockage of supply routes underscores the expansion of protesters’ disruptive activities, as previous demonstrations have mainly targeted oil fields. This trend underscores the rising risk of disruption facing businesses operating in non-oil sectors that are reliant on eastern ports, driving supply chain disruption and knock-on financial risks. We assess this latest demonstration underscores the protesters’ ability to access critical infrastructure sites, driving collateral security risks for oil industry personnel.
Jan 27.
• On 26 January, Israel, Lebanon and the US extended the Israel-Lebanese Hizballah (LH) ceasefire’s transition period, likely prompting greater efforts by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to secure southern Lebanon in time for the IDF withdrawal by 18 February.
• On 26 January, IDF troops shot and killed at least 22 Lebanese nationals and injured over 120 others who approached their positions in southern Lebanon.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OVERALL FORECAST
• Despite increased tensions between Israel and Hamas, the ceasefire agreement continues to hold, with hostage releases triggering celebratory demonstrations in major Israeli cities.
• Prisoner releases in the West Bank have also triggered demonstrations, increasing the risk of clashes with Israeli security personnel.
• US President Donald Trump has called for the relocation of ms of Palestinians to Egypt and Jordan, increasing the risk of protests and vandalism targeting US-linked businesses.
• The US will resume exports of heavy payload weapons to Israel, increasing reputational risks for firms linked to major US defence contractors.
• Iran continues to escalate its hybrid warfare tactics against Israel, increasing cyber and industrial espionage risks.
• The IDF’s opening of the al-Rashid and Salah al-Din roads in the west of the Netzarim Corridor to allow the return of displaced Palestinians to northern Gaza will elevate the risk of sporadic clashes.
Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon
• On 26 January, Israel, Lebanon and the US extended the Israel-Lebanese Hizballah (LH) ceasefire’s transition period, likely prompting greater efforts by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to secure southern Lebanon in time for the IDF withdrawal by 18 February. The extension comes against the backdrop of repeated claims of LH violations and concerns over the capacity of the LAF to maintain full control of southern Lebanon. These concerns have been compounded by claims that Suhil Bahij Gharb (the head of military intelligence in southern Lebanon) and various other LAF officers have passed sensitive information to LH, including advance warning of raids and patrols. This has reportedly enabled LH to avoid detection and to prevent its weapons being captured during LAF and UN Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFL) operations. It is likely that the leak will prompt the US and UN to increase their intelligence safeguarding, possibly reducing the flow of intelligence to the LAF. Furthermore, it is possible that the Lebanese government will increase efforts to sever ties between the LAF leadership and LH in the coming days, elevating the risk of arrests among LAF troops. Any such arrests and reduced intelligence flow would elevate the risk of clashes between LAF forces and LH operatives in southern Lebanon in the coming days, raising bystander security risks.
• On 26 January, IDF troops shot and killed at least 22 Lebanese nationals and injured over 120 others who approached their positions in southern Lebanon. Following the end of the initially agreed transition period, LH encouraged residents of southern Lebanon to return to their homes. Several of those returning carried images of LH’s late leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and approached IDF troops. It is likely that LH will encourage further provocations and clashes between civilians and the security forces for as long as the IDF sustains its presence in southern Lebanon. This will continue to drive elevated bystander risks around IDF positions in southern Lebanon. While the ceasefire is currently likely to hold, LH propaganda will likely exploit further incidents involving civilian casualties, as LH will seek to position itself as a strong defender of Lebanese civilians in contrast to the new Lebanese government. Efforts to reinforce this messaging will increase the likelihood of LH resuming low-level armed clashes with the IDF in southern Lebanon. Any mass casualty events or an escalation in the frequency of IDF clashes with LH operatives will elevate the risk of the ceasefire failing (and a return to open hostilities) in the coming weeks.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OVERALL FORECAST;
• Despite increased tensions between Israel and Hamas, the ceasefire agreement continues to hold, with hostage releases triggering celebratory demonstrations in major Israeli cities. On 25 January, Hamas released four Israeli hostages; all four were female IDF personnel taken hostage from the Nahal Oz army base (Southern district) on 7 October 2023. Israeli officials subsequently stated that Hamas had violated the terms of the ceasefire agreement by releasing female soldiers before all living female civilians. In response, the IDF delayed the return of Palestinian civilians to northern Gaza by approximately 48 hours, only allowing civilian passage via the Netzarim Corridor (central Gaza) from 27 January (see FORECAST). The hostage releases triggered large-scale, pro-agreement gatherings in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district, both Israel) on 24 and 25 January, moderately disrupting movement through both cities. Despite moderately elevated tensions, the ceasefire remains in place. Earlier on 27 January, Hamas confirmed that it will release a total of six hostages in the coming week; three hostages will be released on 30 January and three others on 1 February. Hostage releases will almost certainly trigger large-scale gatherings in major Israeli cities, increasing localised travel disruption risks.
• Prisoner releases in the West Bank have also triggered demonstrations, increasing the risk of clashes with Israeli security personnel. On 25 January, Israel released approximately 200 Palestinian prisoners as part of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire. The releases triggered substantial celebratory demonstrations in East Jerusalem (Jerusalem governorate) and Ramallah (Ramallah and al Bireh governorate), highlighting the increasing risks of travel and operational disruption in the West Bank. IDF personnel dispersed a parade in the Kafr Aqab area, with a spokesperson later stating that the IDF will work to prevent such celebrations and demonstrations in the coming weeks due to broader security concerns. Efforts to enforce a ban on demonstrations coinciding with prisoner releases will elevate the likelihood of clashes between participants and Israeli security personnel, driving broader unrest and bystander risks in the West Bank and Jerusalem areas (though widespread violence remains unlikely in the short term).
• US President Donald Trump has called for the relocation of ms of Palestinians to Egypt and Jordan, increasing the risk of protests and vandalism targeting US-linked businesses. On 26 January, Trump stated that he would ‘like’ Egypt and Jordan to host approximately one and a half m Palestinian civilians from Gaza in order to facilitate reconstruction projects in the enclave. Officials from Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority (PA) rejected the proposal and are highly unlikely to accommodate Trump’s request; Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) officials also rejected the proposal. Despite widespread regional condemnation, Trump’s statement is highly likely to embolden hard-right parties in Israel’s coalition government, particularly those supporting the re-establishment of Israeli settlements in Gaza. On 26 January, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich praised Trump’s statement and called for ‘emigration’ from Gaza. Although substantial displacement from Gaza into Egypt and Jordan remains highly unlikely, concerns regarding possible US-backed efforts to displace Palestinians from the Palestinian Territories will elevate the risk of protests targeting US-linked installations throughout the region, including embassies and consulates, driving security and bystander risks. Hostility to foreign investment will also possibly increase, driving risks of targeted protests and vandalism for firms strongly associated with the US, particularly in Algeria and Iraq.
• The US will resume exports of heavy payload weapons to Israel, increasing reputational risks for firms linked to major US defence contractors. On 25 January, President Trump announced that he had rescinded restrictions that prevented the export of certain heavy payload bombs to Israel. The former US president, Joe Biden, instituted the ban in 2024 amid concerns that Israel would employ the munitions during IDF operations in densely-populated parts of southern Gaza. The announcement highlights decreasing US scrutiny of Israeli military operations, though reputational concerns for firms exporting weapons to Israel will almost certainly remain elevated, sustaining risks of protests and vandalism targeting associated facilities. Firms linked to major US-based defence contractors exporting weapons to Israel (including those providing professional services such as accountancy, insurance and property management) will also face elevated risks of targeted activism from pro-Palestine groups, moderately increasing operational disruption risks and threats to staff.
• Iran continues to escalate its hybrid warfare tactics against Israel, increasing cyber and industrial espionage risks. On 26 January, the Iranian-linked Handala hacking group announced that it had broken into a network of loudspeakers and emergency response notification systems servicing over 20 childcare and school facilities in Israel. The hackers then broadcast songs and rocket sirens; Handala-linked hackers also sent hundreds of text messages to Israeli-registered phones. The successful attacks highlight the substantial exposure to Iranian-linked cyber attacks for private sector firms operating in Israel, particularly telecommunications firms. Additionally, on 27 January, the Shin Bet announced the arrests of two IDF reservists on charges of spying for Iran, highlighting continued Iranian efforts to infiltrate the Israeli security services. In the coming months, Iran will almost certainly continue pursuing hybrid warfare and espionage campaigns targeting Israel, increasing the risk of cyber attacks targeting Israeli-linked entities worldwide. This includes firms employing Israeli-made hardware, software and products, increasing operational and supply chain disruption risks. The IDF’s opening of the al-Rashid and Salah al-Din roads in the west of the Netzarim Corridor to allow the return of displaced Palestinians to northern Gaza will elevate the risk of sporadic clashes. While the IDF is attempting to control the flow of people and possible militants by limiting vehicular movement along Salah al-Din Road and warning against the smuggling of weapons into northern Gaza, it will likely be unable to enforce these measures effectively. Attempts to do so will increase bystander risks. Hamas and other militant groups will likely attempt to provoke and test the response of those IDF troops who are monitoring movement along these routes and manning checkpoints, likely by encouraging individuals to converge on IDF troops. Amid currently elevated tensions and attack risks, there is an elevated likelihood that IDF troops will open fire on perceived threats, driving the risk of misidentification and misfire. This will compound heightened bystander security risks, including for NGO staff. Incidents of weapons smuggling will likely increase the risk of the IDF once again closing off movement through the Netzarim Corridor, preventing the return of displaced people in contravention of the terms of the ceasefire and threatening the deal’s stability. (Source: Sibylline)
28 Jan 25. Israel says its troops in Syria will remain atop Mt Hermon indefinitely. Israeli troops who seized strategic ground in southern Syria after the fall of Bashar al-Assad will remain on the summit of Mount Hermon indefinitely, Defence Minister Israel Katz said on Tuesday after visiting troops there. Katz said Israel would not allow what he described as hostile forces to establish themselves in southern Syria. Mount Hermon, a huge cluster of snowcapped mountain peaks towering above the Syria-Lebanon border, overlooks the Damascus countryside as well as the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, which Israel captured from Syria in the 1967 Middle East war. Israel says its troops have taken up positions inside a U.N.-monitored demilitarised zone within Syria, and some have ventured beyond it. Israeli officials have previously said that the moves were limited and temporary, to ensure the security of Israeli borders. Israel’s move into Syrian territory has been criticised as a violation of international agreements by a number of countries and the United Nations, which has called for the troops to be withdrawn. (Source: Reuters)
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