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Military And Security Developments
Oct 09.
At 1200hrs (local time) on 9 October, Israel and Hamas signed a ceasefire and hostage-release agreement aimed at ending the Israel-Hamas war.
SIGNIFICANCE
• Israel’s cabinet will vote on the agreement this evening (9 October).
• Once approved, the ceasefire will come into immediate effect; the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will halt operations and withdraw to an agreed-upon line of control within Gaza (Palestinian Territories).
• Hamas has agreed to release all living and deceased hostages; following their release, Israel will free over 1,900 Palestinian prisoners.
FORECAST
The IDF’s withdrawal will reduce security risks across Gaza, though crossfire risks will remain elevated near IDF positions. In the coming days, the IDF will gradually withdraw its forces from most of the Gaza Strip, starting with Gaza City. From the beginning of next week, IDF troops will likely begin withdrawing from most of their axes of control in southern Gaza, particularly in Khan Yunis. According to the agreement, the IDF will retain forces within 53% of Gaza, likely near the strip’s borders. The ceasefire will reduce security risks across the Gaza Strip and allow greater aid provision, though food and water security risks will remain elevated. Exposure to crossfire will remain heightened near IDF positions in the coming days due to the latent risk of opportunistic militant attacks and misidentification by IDF units. Prior to the ceasefire coming into effect, Gazan militants will possibly launch rocket strikes, though these will only slightly raise security risks for Israeli population centres near the strip’s borders due to elevated interception rates. The ceasefire will reduce the likelihood of Houthi attacks against Israeli and Israeli-affiliated shipping in the coming weeks.
Possible delays to hostage releases and negotiations over the agreement’s longer-term clauses will sustain the risk of conflict re-escalation. Despite the likely implementation of the ceasefire in the coming hours, there is a realistic possibility of delays to the release of living and deceased hostages in the coming days. Such delays would increase diplomatic deadlock between Israel and Hamas; the risk of a resumption of IDF operations in Gaza would also increase if this deadlock were to persist over a period of several days. Even if the initial phase of the ceasefire agreement is successfully implemented, negotiations over the agreement’s post-conflict governance clauses would likely be extremely tense. Hamas would almost certainly oppose proposals to disarm its militant factions entirely and to exclude its political leadership from participating in post-war governance structures. Israel and the US would likely characterise this position as a rejection of the ceasefire’s key characteristics, increasing the risk of long-term conflict re-escalation.
Global pro-Palestine activism, particularly in Europe, will likely persist through 2025 despite the ceasefire, sustaining reputational risks for entities affiliated with Israel. While the ceasefire’s implementation will likely reduce the scale and frequency of protests, demonstrations will almost certainly continue, during which physical attacks against Israeli-affiliated businesses and Jewish sites by radical elements are possible. Global boycott campaigns against Israeli-affiliated businesses are also likely to persist into 2026, impacting the tech, defence and fresh produce sectors in particular. Several businesses, especially in Europe, will continue to distance themselves from Israeli companies in these sectors, impacting their global sales and operations. Physical security risks for Israeli tourists visiting Europe in 2026 will remain elevated, undermining operational continuity for several tourism companies, booking platforms, hotels and airlines (particularly those operating in the Mediterranean region) throughout the next year.
• Israel-Palestinian Territories: Ceasefire will moderate security risks, humanitarian conditions in Gaza. Earlier on 9 October, at 1200hrs (local time), Israeli and Hamas delegations signed a ceasefire and hostage release agreement in Sharm El Sheikh (South Sinai governorate, Egypt). The ceasefire will likely take effect later in the day after the Israeli cabinet formally approves the agreement; Hamas will likely release the 20 living hostages by 13 October. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will also withdraw to an agreed-upon line outside locations such as Gaza City, though Beit Hanoun (North Gaza Governorate), the Philadelphi Corridor and Rafah (Rafah governorate) are likely to remain under IDF control. The agreement will almost certainly moderate security risks and humanitarian conditions in Gaza by facilitating increased inflows of food and medical aid. There is a realistic possibility of delays to hostage releases, which will sustain tensions in the coming days; however, the first stage of the agreement will likely be completed by 19 October due to assertive diplomacy from Arab states and the US. Negotiations on the peace plan’s further stages will likely take several weeks, given that sticking points remain including Hamas’ disarmament. During the negotiations, we assess that there is a realistic possibility that the IDF will maintain an on-the-ground presence in Gaza, sustaining the risks of conflict resumption in the coming weeks.
• Syria: Resumed clashes underscore ceasefire fragility, elevated risks of armed conflict in Suwayda. On 8 October, heavy clashes erupted between the National Guard (i.e. a Druze militia affiliated with the cleric Hikmat al-Hijri) and the Syrian government’s forces in the town of Walgha (Suwayda governorate). Local media reported that the clashes killed and injured at least eight people. We assess that the National Guard likely attempted to take over several villages along the existing lines of control, which are loosely defined by a ceasefire agreement with the government forces. These clashes underscore the fragility of the agreement, which will likely sustain security instability in Suwayda throughout 2025. We assess that in the coming days, there is a realistic possibility that the National Guard will conduct further attacks against Arab tribal and government forces across Suwayda. These will likely result in the complete closure of provincial highways, disrupting humanitarian aid routes and supply chains to the provincial capital Suwayda. This will increase food and energy security risks in the city as well as the risks of ethno-religious armed conflict resuming in southern Syria in the next three months.
Syria: Lifting of restrictions signals conflict de-escalation, ceasefire will likely hold into 2026. On 9 October, the Syrian government forces lifted restrictions and opened roads to the Kurdish-controlled districts of Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud in Aleppo (Aleppo governorate). This comes after the agreement of a ceasefire between the leader of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa on 7 October, following clashes that had erupted the previous day. The meeting and the subsequent lifting of restrictions signal a de-escalation; we assess that the current ceasefire will likely hold until at least January 2026. Nevertheless, sporadic clashes between the SDF and Turkish-backed factions in the Syrian army remain a realistic possibility, sustaining security instability in Aleppo and along Syria’s northern border in the coming months. These sporadic clashes will likely be small in scale and remain concentrated along the lines of control, primarily around the Tishreen dam in Aleppo, without evolving into a widespread armed conflict.
* Morocco: Anti-corruption protests will likely continue, elevating domestic unrest risks. On 9 October, the Moroccan youth movement GenZ 212 staged further anti-corruption protests in the capital Rabat, as well as in Casablanca (Casablanca-Settat region) and Tangier (Tangier-Tetouan-Al Hoceima region), ahead of King Mohammed VI’s address to Parliament later on 10 October. The group also issued a set of demands calling for the government’s resignation and for comprehensive reforms to Morocco’s economy, education, governance and health care systems. At least three people have died in the ongoing protests, which began on 27 September. Further demonstrations are likely nationwide in the coming days, increasing the risk of sporadic clashes between protesters and the security forces. The authorities are likely to employ heavy-handed tactics, including tear gas, water cannons and possibly live ammunition, elevating exposure to crossfire or misidentification for proximate staff, especially near government buildings and banks. If the Moroccan government does not meet GenZ 212’s demands, protests are likely to increase in scale and frequency in the coming weeks, significantly elevating domestic unrest and security risks.
Oct. 08.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
IRAN
• Iran continues efforts to moderate the socio-economic impact of UN sanctions through diversified trading partnerships; this strategy will likely increase supply chain exposure risks and struggle to mitigate a broader economic fallout.
• Turkey announced sanctions on Iran in line with UN directives, moderately delaying efforts to increase defence co-operation.
• Increasing separatist activity in western Iran will likely trigger a crackdown on ethno-religious minorities, elevating threats to locally engaged staff.
ISRAEL
• A second Gaza-bound flotilla has underscored the reputational risks for companies in the defence and maritime sectors that are affiliated with Israel.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• GAZA STRIP: Negotiations between Israel and Hamas have resumed in Egypt, underscoring the improving prospects for a ceasefire and hostage release agreement.
• GAZA STRIP: Security risks in Gaza City and northern Gaza remain elevated despite the halt of the Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF’s) military operations.
• WEST BANK: The Israeli security forces’ interception of an Iranian weapon shipment to the West Bank highlights continued efforts to arm militants, driving security risks in the West Bank.
IRAN
• Iran continues efforts to moderate the socio-economic impact of UN sanctions through diversified trading partnerships; this strategy will likely increase supply chain exposure risks and struggle to mitigate a broader economic fallout. On 7 October, Iranian government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani stated that Iran will attempt to mitigate the economic impact of UN sanctions by deepening its engagement with non-Western trade partners, through forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Mohajerani also stated that Iran would possibly engage in bartering systems to bypass sanctions exposure. The announcement comes after the Wall Street Journal reported on 5 October that China and Iran have engaged in barter systems and alternative trade mechanisms since 2018 to bypass US sanctions, facilitating the trade of Iranian oil and raw metals for Chinese investment in infrastructure projects. In the coming months, Iran will highly likely attempt to engage in further bartering with trade partners to moderate broader socio-economic pressure by retaining access to key commodities (particularly industrial components, pharmaceuticals and chemical compounds), while preserving its already depleted foreign currency reserves. We assess that such arrangements are unlikely to entirely insulate the Iranian economy from the fallout of broad international sanctions. This will increase risks of anti-government protests in the coming weeks, given sustained inflation, currency depreciation and commodity shortages for consumers. The bartering agreements will also possibly increase supply chain exposure risks for firms that are engaged in the purchase and sale of minerals and metals, particularly given Iran’s substantial exports of aluminium, copper, iron and zinc to China, India, Pakistan and Turkey. This will increase supply chain verification requirements for regionally engaged firms, amid rising scrutiny of Iranian exports and broader economic opacity.
• Turkey announced sanctions on Iran in line with UN directives, moderately delaying efforts to increase defence co-operation. On 1 October, Turkey announced that it would sanction 20 individuals and 18 entities associated with Iran’s nuclear programme, including financial institutions such as Bank Sepah. The announcement comes after the UN Security Council voted to re-impose nuclear sanctions on Iran on 27 September (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 29 September 2025), underscoring increasing international engagement with sanction requirements. Given Turkey’s significant Iranian diaspora, the sanctioning will likely restrict remittance flows via high-profile Iranian financial entities, increasing risks of money laundering activity and irregular banking transfers within Iran. Consequently, sanctions exposure risks and due diligence requirements will increase for entities in Turkey’s financial sector; these risks will also impact firms purchasing processed metals and polymers from Iranian exporters, given that many Iranian producers have links to government bodies and sanctioned individuals. The announcement came as Iran’s defence minister met with his Turkish counterpart in Turkey’s capital Ankara, also on 1 October, to discuss bilateral security co-operation. Turkey’s efforts to expand and enforce UN sanctions will likely moderately delay the progress towards bilateral co-operation, sustaining long-standing tensions between Iran and Turkey in the medium-to-long term.
• Increasing separatist activity in western Iran will likely trigger a crackdown on ethno-religious minorities, elevating threats to locally engaged staff. On 6 October, unidentified militants conducted a grenade and shooting attack on an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operational base in Sarvabad (Kurdistan province), killing two IRGC personnel and injuring three others. The Iranian authorities have claimed that the attack was perpetrated by ‘counter-revolutionaries’; this statement is likely a reference to Kurdish separatist militants. The attack underscores the moderately elevated risks of separatist violence targeting the Iranian security and police forces in western Iran; there has been an uptick in IRGC shooting incidents targeting kulbars (i.e. ethnic-Kurdish porters) during cross-border movements from Iraq following the Israel-Iran war. The shooting incidents highlight Iran’s border security crackdown amid broader efforts to prevent infiltration from Israeli-linked individuals and entities. The Iranian government’s measures will almost certainly continue to disproportionately target ethnic minorities, particularly ethnic-Arabs, ethnic-Balochs and ethnic-Kurds in the short-to-medium term. Continued arrests, shooting incidents and executions will highly likely compound ethno-religious tensions in western and eastern Iran, sustaining risks of further separatist attacks targeting IRGC and government facilities. Subsequent crackdowns will increase the risks of surveillance, harassment and detention for locally engaged staff, particularly for ethnic minorities and foreign nationals.
ISRAEL
• A second Gaza-bound flotilla has underscored the reputational risks for companies in the defence and maritime sectors that are affiliated with Israel. Earlier on 8 October, the Israeli Navy intercepted a flotilla sailing to Gaza, detaining 150 activists. The flotilla comes shortly after the interception of the Global Sumud Flotilla on 1 and 2 October, indicating the possibly increasing utilisation of flotillas by pro-Palestine activists. These campaigns will elevate risks of sporadic spikes in diplomatic tensions between Israel and the countries of origin of the detained foreign activists, particularly in the event of alleged poor treatment of detainees. Such a situation will increase the risk of lawsuits being filed against Israel and the individual Israeli security personnel participating in interception and detention operations. Furthermore, Israel’s interception of flotillas will likely exacerbate pro-Palestine activism globally, particularly in the resident countries of flotilla members. These will also elevate reputational and boycott risks for companies affiliated with Israel over the coming weeks, particularly in the maritime and defence sectors.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• GAZA STRIP: Negotiations between Israel and Hamas have resumed in Egypt, underscoring the improving prospects for a ceasefire and hostage release agreement. On 3 October, Hamas tentatively agreed to a US-backed 20-point ceasefire proposal to end the Israel-Hamas war. Hamas stated that it would be willing to release all remaining Israeli hostages in line with the proposal, but that further negotiations are necessary to finalise post-war governance structures within Gaza. Indirect negotiations between Israel and Hamas subsequently began in Egypt on 6 October; Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi has characterised reports from mediators as ‘very positive’. Earlier on 8 October, regional media outlets reported that delegations from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) would imminently join negotiations in Egypt, underscoring the potential progress towards an agreement involving the numerous militant factions operating in Gaza. The ongoing negotiations and mediators’ substantial engagement underscore the improving prospects for the implementation of a ceasefire and hostage release agreement in the coming days. However, negotiators have yet to finalise a list of the Palestinian prisoners that Israel will release as part of a ceasefire agreement; the US-backed proposal states that Israel will release 250 Palestinian prisoners serving life sentences and 1,700 others detained during the Israel-Hamas war. Hamas highly likely hopes to secure the release of the high-profile Hamas militant Marwan Barghout and of several perpetrators of the 7 October 2023 attack. Israel will likely reject such proposals, increasing the risks of a temporary deadlock. Negotiations will remain extremely sensitive to brinkmanship regarding prisoner releases and the timeline of hostage releases from Gaza; the risks of stalling remain elevated in the coming days, possibly delaying the implementation of a ceasefire proposal. Nevertheless, we assess that there is a realistic possibility that Israel and Hamas will agree to the proposal in the coming days, decreasing risks of armed conflict within Gaza in the short term.
• GAZA STRIP: Security risks in Gaza City and northern Gaza remain elevated despite the halt of IDF military operations. On 4 October, the IDF halted its offensive operations in Gaza, including its ongoing efforts to capture Gaza City. This followed a request from President Trump and a directive by Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu amid efforts to negotiate a ceasefire. The IDF has now shifted to defensive operations to enhance security near its positions, including via the continued surveillance of the area to prevent militant attacks. In the past week, Gaza-based militants continued their offensive operations and attacks against the IDF’s positions, prompting return fire and airstrikes. These incidents will sustain security risks across Gaza, particularly within Gaza City and near IDF positions. The IDF will likely retain its current active defensive posture throughout the Sukkot holiday period (6-13 October). However, any delays in the current ceasefire negotiations will elevate risks of a resumption in military offensive operations, in an IDF-led effort to pressure Hamas negotiators. As such, security conditions across Gaza and particularly Gaza City will remain fragile and subject to rapid changes in the coming days.
• WEST BANK: The Israeli security forces’ interception of an Iranian weapon shipment to the West Bank highlights continued efforts to arm militants, driving security risks in the West Bank. Earlier on 8 October, the Israeli security agencies said that they intercepted a large weapon shipment from Iran’s IRGC to the West Bank. According to their statement, the shipment included 29 Claymore mines, 15 anti-tank rockets and four drones, at least two of which had the capacity to drop explosive payloads. The Israeli security agencies referred to some of the weapons in the shipment as ‘balance-breaking’ weapons, severely threatening the security environment in the West Bank. This is the third large Iranian weapon shipment to the West Bank that has been intercepted in the past 12 months (previous instances occurred in March 2025 and November 2024). Iran likely views the provision of more sophisticated ‘balance-breaking weapons’ to the West Bank as key to its national defence strategy, after the degradation of proxies in Lebanon and Syria emboldened Israel to conduct substantial strikes on Iran earlier in 2025. We assess that Iranian shipments will continue, further destabilising the West Bank’s fragile security environment over the coming months. This is highly likely to drive the IDF and other Israeli security agencies to increase their operational presence in the West Bank in the coming weeks, particularly along border areas and Ramallah (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate). A heightened presence will elevate physical security risks emanating from sporadic clashes and crossfire between the Israeli security forces and militants during IDF raids on suspected militant positions; it will also cause mobility disruption, impacting supply chains across the West Bank.
RED SEA
• RED SEA: Houthi attacks against Israel are highly likely to decrease in the possible event of an Israel-Hamas ceasefire in the coming days. On 7 October, the IDF intercepted four explosive-laden drones over the city of Eilat (South district, Israel) within one hour of their deployment by Houthis. No injuries or damages were reported by the Israeli authorities. However, local Jordanian media reported that shrapnel hit a vehicle in the nearby city of Aqaba (Aqaba governorate, Jordan), causing minimal damage. The drone attack comes a day after local Eilat officials announced that they had installed bomb shelters in several beaches and other public places. While these bomb shelters will help mitigate risks of injuries in Eilat, the risk of collateral damage resulting from drone interception is likely to persist in Aqaba, sustaining ongoing security threats to residents and tourists in the city. However, Houthi attacks against Israel are highly likely to decrease if a ceasefire is reached during the ongoing talks between Hamas and Israel in Egypt.
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS
• ISRAEL-GLOBAL: Pro-Palestine protests in Europe are likely to persist into the rest of 2025 even if a ceasefire deal is reached. On 7 October, medium-scale pro-Palestinian protests erupted in several countries, including Germany, the Netherlands, Turkey, the UK and the US. Similarly, several pro-Israel events and rallies were organised across Europe, commemorating the second anniversary of the 7 October 2023 attack. The authorities have not reported any altercations between the two opposing groups on that day. As the Israel-Hamas war enters its third year, the frequency of pro-Palestine protests (particularly in Europe) will likely increase through the coming weeks, especially if the ongoing ceasefire talks in Egypt stall. However, we assess that even if a ceasefire is reached in the coming days, pro-Palestine protests in Europe are likely to persist into the final months of 2025, albeit at a reduced frequency and scale. Similarly, boycott campaigns and rallies against Israeli-affiliated businesses are likely to persist, sustaining significant compliance and reputational risks for these entities in Europe through 2026, particularly in the tech and defence sectors.
• GLOBAL: Israeli-linked entities participating in sporting and cultural events will almost certainly continue facing scrutiny from pro-Palestine activists, underscoring elevated event management risks. On 6 October, the Israel-Premier Tech cycling team announced that it would re-name and re-brand itself for the 2026 sporting season, following intense scrutiny of the team’s connections to Israel in recent months. The announcement comes after the organisers of the 4 October Giro dell’Emilia cycling race in Italy withdrew their invitation for Israel-Premier Tech to participate, amid concerns that pro-Palestine protesters would target the event. Previously, Pro-Palestine demonstrators disrupted Spain’s high-profile Vuelta a España cycling race to protest Israel-Premier Tech’s participation, triggering an early finish to the race’s final stage (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 4 September 2025). The re-branding initiative underscores the significant reputational concerns for Israeli-linked entities, particularly sports teams participating in high-profile events in public spaces. In the coming months, cultural and sporting events involving Israeli participants, delegations and teams will likely continue facing elevated risks of targeted protests and demonstrations, increasing risks of disruption and last-minute cancellations. This will likely trigger increased insurance and security costs for affected events, while efforts to hold events behind closed doors will likely undermine sales revenue and broader engagement from target audiences.
• Belgium: Defence director’s warning highlights demand for clearer counter-drone guidelines. On 8 October, Thales Belgium Director Alain Quevrin warned that drone overflights are being detected at an increasing rate near the defence firm’s sensitive manufacturing sites, including the Évegnée Fort munitions factory (Walloon region). Quevrin has called for clearer legal guidelines for how companies can address the elevated threat of unidentified drone activity near sensitive sites, including the conditions during which they can detect, jam and/or shoot down drones. Under current EU regulations, critical national infrastructure (CNI) providers and defence firms are unable to neutralise drones without co-ordinating with the police or national security agencies. European states are exploring strategies to bolster lagging counter-drone measures, including the construction of a ‘drone wall’, though such efforts are unlikely to mitigate against the threat to sensitive sites in the short-to-medium term. Denmark plans to grant CNI operators autonomy to employ counter-drone systems; this will possibly prompt similar legislation in other EU states. However, we assess that legal and practical challenges – particularly the risk of collateral damage – will limit the legislation’s implementation
Oct 07.
Executive summary
• In response to the recognition of an independent Palestinian state by several Western countries, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has threatened to respond with unspecified measures, raising concerns that he may act to undermine the viability of a potential Palestinian state. This report outlines the most viable and possible scenarios for Israel’s response.
• If Israel decides to fully occupy and annex the West Bank, this would require a substantial military operation, triggering widespread conflict across the West Bank and a third Intifada. By critically undermining the prospects of a two-state solution, Israel would also trigger substantial international and regional isolation.
• If Israel partially annexes the West Bank, it would almost certainly face international backlash, but short of a total breakdown of regional treaties and relations with major allies. Rates of settler violence and clashes with Palestinians would increase in the West Bank, while regional pro-Palestine protests would grow in frequency and scale, increasing hostility to Israeli- and US-linked foreign investment.
• In our most likely scenario, the Israeli government would accelerate and expand its plans to develop new and current settlements, as well as move to legalise outposts. This would drive a gradual escalation of international criticism against Israel and would intensify ethno-religious tensions in the West Bank.
• Alternatively, Israel could possibly limit its response to economic and political measures such as withholding funds from the Palestinian Authority (PA) and pausing relief for external bodies that provide funding, degrading the PA’s capacity to pay civil service employees. In this scenario, Israel would also suspend elements of security co-operation, decreasing the PA’s capacity to respond to militant violence and organised criminal activity.
• There is a very low possibility of Israel deciding not to respond to Western recognitions of Palestinian statehood, reducing diplomatic tensions. However, pro-Palestine activism would likely persist, sustaining security, operational and reputational risks for companies affiliated with Israel (particularly in the defence, construction and food sectors) due to protests, vandalism and boycott campaigns.
Context
In September 2025, numerous Western states, including Australia, Canada and the UK, recognised an independent Palestinian state citing concerns regarding humanitarian conditions in Gaza, rising settler violence in the West Bank and the failure to advance the two-state solution. On 21 September, Prime Minister Netanyahu stated that his government would ‘respond’ with unspecified measures at a later date. This statement, paired with Prime Minister Netanyahu’s long-standing opposition to the formation of a Palestinian state in line with the two-state solution, has triggered concerns from numerous regional and international parties that Israel will retaliate by annexing the West Bank in whole or in part, thereby isolating the PA.
Territorial designations in the West Bank are complex and primarily stem from the 1993 and 1995 Oslo Accords. These treaties designate three areas within the West Bank, as outlined in Figure 1; they do not categorise East Jerusalem, which remains under Israeli civil and security control. Within Area C and the East Jerusalem area, there are 160 Israeli settlements, as well as numerous ‘outposts’ (i.e. settlements recognised as illegal by Israel) with a population of over 700,000. The West Bank is classified as occupied territory under Israeli and international law and consequently does not form part of Israel’s sovereign territory.
Prospects of shifting territorial control in the West Bank are a key driver of inter-communal and militant violence throughout Israel and the Palestinian Territories; they also threaten backlash from foreign governments across the Middle East and beyond. Below, we have outlined the most viable possible scenarios of Israel’s response to the growing international support for Palestinian statehood in the coming three months, analysing the impact of Israel’s potential decision-making. Our most dangerous scenarios consider the West Bank’s full and partial annexation, which would result in substantial backlash, threatening global and regional cooperation with Israel. There is a realistic possibility that these scenarios will be rendered almost entirely unworkable for Israel, especially if there is progress in the ongoing peace negotiations under US President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan. Regardless of diplomatic efforts in the coming weeks, the peace process will remain vulnerable, sustaining the possibility that our dangerous scenarios or our most likely long-term scenario will materialise.
• Region: Anniversary of 7 October 2023 attack in Israel will drive domestic unrest, attack risks. The second anniversary (7 October) of Hamas’ 2023 attack against Israel will likely act as a flashpoint for protests and antisemitic violence across Western Europe. In Italy, the radical pro-Palestine activist group Giovani Palestinesi (Palestinian Youth) has planned demonstrations (allegedly to commemorate the attack) at 1930hrs (local time) in Bologna (Emilia-Romagna region) and Turin (Piedmont region). Activists will likely ignore any protest bans issued by the local authorities, driving the risk of violent unrest. Clashes with the police during nationwide pro-Palestine demonstrations since 1 October have underscored the elevated anti-Israel sentiment across Italy. Elsewhere, thousands of students will likely attend pro-Palestine demonstrations at universities across the UK, despite Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer’s call for cancellations following the 2 October terrorist attack against a synagogue in Manchester (Greater Manchester; see Sibylline Alert – 2 October 2025). We assess that heightened ethno-religious tensions will elevate the risk of sporadic physical attacks targeting Israeli and Jewish personnel and institutions in Western Europe in the coming hours.
• Yemen: Houthi detentions of UN staff underscore risk of harm for NGO personnel, operational risks. On 6 October, a UN spokesperson confirmed that the Iranian-backed Houthis detained nine of its personnel in Yemen. The statement did not specify the timing or circumstances of the latest detentions but comes amid ongoing Houthi seizures of UN assets in the country. The recent move likely reflects Houthi attempts to uncover foreign intelligence assets; these efforts will likely continue in the coming months, increasing risks of arbitrary stop-and-search and detention practices. These will elevate physical and psychological risks for NGO and foreign personnel due to poor detention conditions and limited access to healthcare. Persistent Houthi detentions are likely to hinder NGO operations on the ground due to the absence of key personnel and assets, also impacting disruption to the provision of aid, elevating food security risks. Additionally, there is a realistic possibility that some charities and NGO personnel will leave Yemen in the coming months, due to the increased scrutiny and risks of detention from the Houthis. This will increase risks of workforce retention, further exacerbating socio-economic risks and the country’s humanitarian crisis.
Oct 06.
• Israel-Palestinian Territories: Ceasefire is realistic, though implementation will likely be delayed. Later on 6 October, an Israeli delegation will arrive in Egypt’s Sharm El Sheikh (South Sinai governorate) for indirect peace talks with a Hamas delegation led by deputy chairman Khalil al-Hayya, based on US President Donald Trump’s 20-point ceasefire plan. On 3 October, Hamas tentatively agreed to the peace plan, stating that further negotiations are necessary before a full commitment. We assess that President Trump’s push for a ceasefire is key and will increase the possibility of both sides reaching an agreement in the coming weeks. The current negotiations are likely to revolve around the first phase of the ceasefire; key sticking points include the lines of withdrawal and the identity of the Palestinian prisoners to be released. These issues are likely to delay the implementation of the agreement, possibly to next week. Furthermore, while the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have reduced the intensity of their military operations and airstrikes across Gaza, these activities have not completely halted, sustaining elevated security risks for personnel across the strip, particularly near IDF positions. In the longer term, other disputes (such as over Hamas’ disarmament) will present persistent threats to the peace process’ viability over the coming weeks, delaying the implementation of the agreement and sustaining risks of a complete collapse of the peace negotiations.
• Syria: New clashes in northern Syria will elevate armed conflict risks in coming weeks. On 5 October, new clashes erupted between the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian government’s forces near Dayr Hafir (Aleppo governorate). The clashes follow a period of mobilisation by both sides along the front lines in Aleppo’s countryside, as well as within the city of Aleppo where the SDF retains control of the Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafieh neighbourhoods. The clashes come amid a prolonged impasse in talks over the integration of the Kurdish forces within the Syrian Armed Forces. In the coming weeks, tensions along the lines of control in northern Syria will remain heightened, particularly in the areas near Dayr Hafir and Manbij (Aleppo governorate), as well as surrounding the Tishrin dam; this will sustain elevated risks of further clashes. Additionally, a possible increase in both sides’ deployment of forces in the coming days, including tanks and missiles, will elevate the risks of full armed conflict between the parties. Such a conflict will likely prompt direct Turkish intervention against Kurdish units along the northern border, significantly elevating security instability across Syria. (Source: Sibylline)
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