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Military And Security Developments
Oct 02.
IRAN
- The UK and the US have sanctioned numerous Iranian entities in line with UN sanctions, compounding fiscal pressure on Iran and increasing the risk of hybrid retaliation in the medium term. On 1 October, the UK announced that it had sanctioned over 70 Iranian entities and individuals in line with the re-imposition of UN sanctions (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 29 September 2025). Sanctioned entities include numerous Iranian-owned banks, the Iran Insurance Company and the government-owned National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). The UK also imposed asset freezes on Iran’s Ministry of Energy and Ministry of Petroleum, and sanctioned numerous individuals associated with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The sanctions will also restrict Iran’s access to critical foreign currency reserves and assets held overseas; four sanctioned banks (Bank Melli, Bank Saderat, Bank Sepah and Persia International Bank Plc) held assets valued at over USD 1.2 billion in the UK in 2024. Financial entities processing payments to Iran, Iranian nationals and Iranian-linked entities will also face significantly elevated regulatory scrutiny, increasing compliance requirements in the medium-to-long term. Also on 1 October, the US announced that it had sanctioned over 40 entities and individuals associated with Iran’s nuclear and missile production programmes, primarily those linked to the procurement of chemical compounds, aircraft parts and sensors. In the coming months, Western states will almost certainly continue to expand and enforce sanctions targeting Iran, deterring engagement with Iranian entities and individuals in key sectors, particularly insurance, finance, logistics and energy. These measures are highly likely to increase fiscal pressure on Iran, triggering a broader hybrid response as part of Tehran’s efforts to ease socio-economic strains. Such measures are likely to include the detention of foreign nationals in Iran, the hijacking of affiliated vessels in the Persian Gulf and escalating cyber activity targeting public and private sector entities associated with nations enforcing sanctions.
- Iran’s accession to an anti-terrorist financing convention will not moderate money laundering exposure risks; it is also unlikely to stabilise macro-economic conditions. On 1 October, the Expediency and Discernment Council approved Iran’s accession to the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (CFT). The approval likely reflects Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s support for measures designed to remove Iran from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)’s blacklist. Iran has been blacklisted by the FATF since 2020 due to its extensive financial support for designated terror organisations such as Hamas, the Houthis and Lebanese Hizballah (LH). The accession is highly unlikely to result in demonstrable changes to Iran’s anti-money laundering or anti-terrorist-financing practices. As such, the FATF is unlikely to remove Iran from the backlist in the short term, sustaining significant barriers to Iran’s access to Western financial markets and systems. In the medium term, Iran will likely seek to deepen its economic integration with countries such as China, Russia and various diplomatically aligned states as part of its ‘Turning East’ policy. Although such integration will moderate long-term commodity-shortage risks, Iran’s current levels of economic instability, currency devaluation and inflation will sustain deteriorating socio-economic conditions over the coming weeks, increasing the risk of anti-government protests in major cities in the short term.
ISRAEL
- The Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF’s) interception of the ‘Global Sumud Flotilla’ will elevate international pro-Palestine activism, increasing operational and reputational risks for Israeli-affiliated businesses. Between 1 and 2 October, the IDF intercepted 47 vessels comprising the Global Sumud Flotilla. The operation largely took place outside Israeli-controlled waters off the coast of Gaza (Palestinian Territories). During the operation, forces of the Shayetet 13 naval commando unit boarded vessels, detained activists and redirected the vessels to the Port of Ashdod (Southern district, Israel). Foreign national crew members will likely face brief detentions in Israel before being deported to their countries of citizenship. Such detentions and repatriations are likely to elevate diplomatic tensions moderately between Israel and states whose nationals are detained in Israel. Regardless of the flotilla’s success (or lack thereof), its coverage across international media will likely continue to encourage activism, including pro-Palestine protests and actions that target Israeli and Israeli-linked firms, increasing operational disruption and reputational risks for such businesses.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- GAZA STRIP: Hamas is unlikely to accept the US-backed ceasefire proposal unconditionally, sustaining regional tensions and the risk of armed conflict. On 29 September, US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly released a 20-point ceasefire plan for the ongoing Israel-Hamas war and post-war governance in Gaza. The agreement would institute an immediate and permanent ceasefire in Gaza, as well as the release of all remaining hostages within 72 hours. The proposal also details the immediate disarmament and demobilisation of Hamas, the subsequent deployment of an ‘International Stabilization Force’ and the formation of a technocratic government (‘Board of Peace’), with the partial involvement of the Palestinian Authority (PA, subject to major reforms). Netanyahu stated that Israel would accept the plan but would immediately resume combat operations should Hamas violate the terms of the agreement. At the time of writing, Hamas has not formally responded as discussions with Qatari and Turkish mediators are ongoing. In the coming days, Hamas will likely respond to the proposal with several conditions that focus in particular on establishing finite timelines for the IDF’s withdrawal and concessions on disarmament. Israel and the US will likely characterise such a response as a rejection of the proposal’s core tenets, meaning that the implementation of a ceasefire and hostage-release agreement remains unlikely in the short term. There is also a realistic possibility that Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) will reject the agreement, moderating the prospects for the immediate release of all Israeli hostages (even if Hamas agrees to the proposal). As such, we assess that IDF combat operations will likely continue in the short term, sustaining the risk of armed conflict, particularly in northern Gaza.
- GAZA STRIP: Further NGO operational suspensions in Gaza City will exacerbate humanitarian concerns in northern Gaza. On 1 October, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) announced the temporary suspension of operations in Gaza City due to the intensifying military offensive within the city. The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Operations (OCHA) reported that only one UN-run health facility remains operational in northern Gaza, underscoring the escalating public health concerns for populations remaining within Gaza City as the offensive progresses. Further NGO operational suspensions are highly likely in the coming days. Civilians in Gaza City therefore face critical food, water and energy security risks. These conditions will almost certainly compound humanitarian concerns and pro-Palestine activists’ scrutiny of IDF operations, increasing reputational exposure risks for Israeli-linked firms, particularly those operating in the security, defence, automotive, shipping and financial service sectors.
- GAZA STRIP: The closure of the Netzarim Corridor and completion of a full military cordon around Gaza City highlight the possible intensification of IDF operations in the coming 72 hours. On 1 October, the IDF confirmed the closure of all south-to-north movement along the Netzarim Corridor (northern Gaza). On the same day, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz announced that the IDF had completed the military cordon surrounding Gaza City, issuing a final warning for Gazan citizens to leave the city (stating that all who remain will be regarded as ‘terrorists and terror supporters’). These events signal the IDF’s preparations to move into key Hamas strongholds within Gaza City, as well as a likely intensification of military operations in the coming 72 hours. Such an intensification is likely to include a substantial airstrike campaign, followed shortly after by a large-scale ground manoeuvre into the city, significantly elevating security risks therein, including within humanitarian facilities.
- WEST BANK: Military operations in Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate are likely to intensify following the discovery of rocket shells. On 1 October, the IDF found 15 rocket shells in various production stages (as well as explosive devices and other weapon parts) during operations in Beitunia (Ramallah and al-Bireh). This marks the latest discovery of an apparent rocket-production facility in the West Bank. Increased efforts by West Bank militants to produce rockets are likely to persist over the coming months, elevating security risks across the West Bank due to likely test launches and possible launch failures. Security risks across Israeli population centres in the West Bank and those bordering the West Bank will also gradually increase. The development of militant rocket stockpiles in the West Bank likely reflects a red line for Israel. As such, the IDF will almost certainly escalate its military operations in Ramallah and al-Bireh in the coming weeks. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that the IDF will launch intense operations covering all of the West Bank; it will likely focus on Ramallah and al-Bireh and the Jordan Valley area to locate and destroy rocket-production facilities. Such operations will significantly increase the risk of damage to civilian infrastructure in Palestinian population centres across the West Bank, elevating energy and water security risks and worsening socio-economic conditions. Security risks for personnel and bystanders due to crossfire between the IDF and militants will also increase.
- WEST BANK: A car-ramming attack near the al-Khader intersection (Bethlehem governorate) highlights elevated radicalisation and attack risks. On 30 September, a Palestinian resident of Beit Fajjar (Bethlehem) injured two Israeli teens in a car-ramming attack near the al-Khader intersection; a passing IDF reservist subsequently killed the perpetrator. The incident highlights the rising rate of radicalisation among Palestinian residents of the West Bank and the growing risk of opportunistic and low-sophistication sole-perpetrator attacks targeting individuals identified as Israeli civilians. Such attacks are increasingly likely around roads, public transport hubs and gas stations; assailants are likely to employ ‘cold weapons’ such as knives and vehicles. Attack risks will remain particularly elevated in the coming weeks, especially throughout October due to the Jewish High Holidays (1-2 October and 6-14 October).
RED SEA
- RED SEA: The Houthis’ imposition of ‘sanctions’ on US firms will elevate regional tensions and armed conflict risks. On 30 September, the Iranian-backed Houthis announced that they had imposed sanctions on 13 US energy companies, nine executives and two vessels in retaliation for US sanctions imposed in July and September. The announcement underscores the elevated risk of attacks and harassment facing vessels navigating the Arabian and Red seas, especially those that are affiliated with ‘sanctioned’ companies and individuals. There is a realistic possibility that the Houthis will try to board vessels or coerce them to re-route to Houthi ports. Due to the heightened potential for misidentification, these risks will extend to all vessels navigating the area. These elevated security risks will increase insurance costs for shipping operations in the area and possibly prompt the re-routing of vessels, which would increase supply chain delay risks for oil and energy commodities. Any Houthi attacks that strike US-affiliated ships would threaten the viability of the Houthi-US ceasefire, elevating the risk of armed conflict and a resumption of US strikes on Houthi territory in Yemen. This would increase bystanders’ exposure to blasts, particularly around ports and in the capital Sanaa.
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS
- UK: A terrorist attack against a synagogue has underscored the elevated risk of targeted violence, particularly during religious holiday periods. On 2 October, a sole perpetrator killed two people and injured at least five others in a car-ramming and stabbing attack targeting the Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation Synagogue in the Crumpsall area of Manchester (Greater Manchester county). The attacker targeted the synagogue at approximately 0930 hrs (local time) during the morning Yom Kippur prayer service. Greater Manchester Police personnel shot the perpetrator at the scene and have characterised the event as a terrorist incident. The attack underscores the elevated risks of violence and sole-perpetrator attacks targeting locations associated with the Jewish community during periods of religious significance, such as Yom Kippur and the upcoming Sukkot period (6-13 October). The risk of targeted violence will be particularly acute for Jewish places of worship, community centres, schools and dedicated retail outlets, as well as locations associated with Israel, such as Israeli diplomatic centres, consulates and trade missions. In the coming days, the UK police will likely adopt an elevated posture around such locations, moderating the prospects for successful high-capacity attacks in the short term. However, ethno-religious tensions linked to the Israel-Hamas war will sustain the risk of further low-capacity attacks in the medium-to-long term, particularly for religious institutions with close ties to Israeli communities in the UK.
- GERMANY: An alleged Hamas plot underscores the persistent security threats to Israeli and Jewish institutions, as well as businesses affiliated with Israel. On 1 October, the German authorities announced the arrest of three alleged Hamas members in the capital Berlin. They are suspected of plotting attacks against Israeli and/or Jewish institutions in the country. The security forces carried out property searches in Leipzig (Saxony state) and Oberhausen (North Rhine-Westphalia state). During the arrests, an AK-47 assault rifle, several pistols and significant quantities of ammunition were seized. According to German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt, the suspects had been under surveillance for several months. Dobrindt also revealed that it was unclear precisely which institutions the suspects intended to target. This is not the first time that alleged Hamas members have plotted to carry out attacks in Germany; three operatives were arrested in Berlin in 2023. The German authorities have also identified other plots linked to Iran targeting Jewish and/or Israeli institutions over the past year. The latest arrests underscore the persistent threat posed by radical Islamist elements/organisations – including Hamas – to Jewish and/or Israeli institutions in Germany. The risk will remain particularly heightened over the coming 24 hours during the remainder of Yom Kippur (1-2 October). Furthermore, radical elements will possibly exploit pro-Palestine protests in German cities to vandalise businesses/entities affiliated with Israel.
- QATAR-US: A new security arrangement will mitigate against the risk of retaliatory strikes during possible future regional conflicts. On 1 October, US President Donald Trump pledged in an executive order to guarantee Qatar’s security and to regard any attack against the Gulf state as a threat to US security. Notably, the executive order outlined that the US would respond to any attack against Qatar by taking all lawful and appropriate measures (including military action) to defend the interests of both countries. This comes nearly three weeks after Israel struck Doha (Qatar) in an operation targeting Hamas’ political leaders. Doha was also struck by an Iranian missile attack in June that targeted the US’ al-Udeid air base in retaliation for US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. We assess that the new security arrangement will mitigate against the risk of similar retaliatory attacks against Qatar by both sides during any future regional conflict (or a resumption of Iran-Israel hostilities in 2026). Nevertheless, in the event of any such regional conflict, the risk of retaliatory Iranian attacks against other US bases and interests in the Gulf region would remain elevated, particularly those in Bahrain, Kuwait and Iraq.
- Israel-global: IDF interception of pro-Palestine flotilla will raise diplomatic tensions, reputational risks. Late on 1 October, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted at least 40 vessels from the ‘Global Sumud Flotilla’ in the Mediterranean Sea outside Israeli waters. It transferred the crew members, including the activist Greta Thunberg, to the Port of Ashdod (Southern district, Israel). Foreign crew members will likely face brief detentions in Israel before being deported to their countries of citizenship. Such detentions and repatriations are likely to elevate diplomatic tensions moderately between Israel and states with nationals detained in Israel. Regardless of the flotilla’s lack of success, coverage of the event across international media will likely continue to encourage activism, including pro-Palestine protests and the targeting of Israeli and Israeli-linked firms, increasing operational disruption and reputational risks for these businesses. We assess this trend will be exacerbated due to the realistic possibility of the Israeli navy using excessive force to halt the progress of other vessels from the flotilla if they enter Gaza’s (Palestinian Territories) waters, further inflaming anti-Israel sentiment globally.
- Morocco: Growing protests will elevate security risks; looting, vandalism are likely in major cities. On 1 October, the police fatally shot two protesters while defending a police station in Lqliâa (Souss-Massa region) from a group of young men carrying blades. Nationwide anti-government protests and clashes with the security forces have continued to intensify, with 263 police officers and 23 civilians injured since demonstrations started on 27 September. State media has also reported looting and vandalism at administrative buildings and banks in Agadir, Ait Amira, Inezgane and Tiznit (all Souss-Massa). We assess that protest organisers (mainly the GenZ 212 Discord group) will call for further gatherings in the coming days, particularly over the coming weekend (4-5 October). This would highly likely trigger wider clashes with the security forces in several cities, including the capital Rabat, elevating bystanders’ exposure to tear gas (and possibly even live ammunition) in major Moroccan cities. Physical security risks will be most elevated in the vicinity of banks, government buildings and ATMs during these events; widespread vandalism and looting incidents remain likely.
Oct 01.
- Yemen: Houthi threat on US shipping elevates regional tensions, armed conflict risks. On 30 September, the Iran-backed Houthis announced that they had imposed sanctions on 13 US energy companies, nine executives and two vessels. The Houthis characterised this move as a retaliation for the US’ imposition of sanctions in July and September. This announcement signals an elevated risk of attacks and harassment of vessels sailing in the Arabian and Red seas that are affiliated with the sanctioned companies and individuals. There is a realistic possibility that the Houthis will try to board vessels or coerce them to re-direct their routes to Houthi ports. Due to the high potential of misidentification, these risks will extend to all vessels sailing across the area. These elevated security risks will increase insurance costs for shipping operations in the area and possibly prompt the re-routing of vessels, which would increase supply chain delay risks for oil and energy commodities. Houthi attacks on US-affiliated ships will threaten the viability of the Houthi-US ceasefire, elevating risks of armed conflict and of the resumption of US strikes in Houthi territory; this would drive exposure to blasts, particularly around ports and the capital Sanaa.
- Iraq: Withdrawal of US forces will elevate security risks across Iraq in coming months. On 30 September, the US Department of Defense officially announced that the US military is scaling back its presence in Iraq following what it described as ‘success’ in the fight against the Islamic State (IS). This comes after local media reported earlier in August that US forces had begun to withdraw from the Ain Al Assad airbase (Anbar governorate), while keeping a small number of officers in the capital Baghdad. We assess that it is likely that part of these withdrawn forces will be relocated to Iraq’s Kurdistan autonomous region and to the US’ bases in eastern Syria in 2026. Nevertheless, this withdrawal will almost certainly increase security risks across Iraq; IS and other jihadist groups are highly likely to capitalise on the resultant security vacuum to re-group and expand their influence nationwide. An uptick in attacks against military and government facilities, as well as religious sites, is likely throughout 2026.
Sep 30.
- Israel-Palestinian Territories: US-backed plan will temper security, humanitarian concerns in Gaza. On 29 September, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that Israel had accepted a US-backed peace proposal to end the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza. Under the 20-point plan, the US would co-ordinate with Palestinian and international partners to establish an internal security force (‘International Stabilisation Force’) and a temporary technocratic government (‘Board of Peace’) following the release of all Israeli hostages within 72 hours of Israel’s official acceptance of the plan. Upon Hamas’ acceptance of the deal, Israel will enter a phased withdrawal from Gaza, mitigating against security risks for civilians and personnel on the ground. Furthermore, the plan outlines the establishment of increased aid for certain areas in Gaza, regardless of Hamas’ acceptance. We assess this will moderate the ongoing humanitarian crisis and reduce energy, food and water security risks. However, if Hamas rejects the plan, the US will likely back Israeli military operations in Gaza, significantly elevating security risks and humanitarian concerns within Gaza City.
Sep 29.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
IRAN
- The UN has re-imposed pre-2015 sanctions on Iran, significantly increasing pressure on the country’s economy, undermining its socio-economic health and raising regulatory framework risks for export firms.
- The re-implementation of UN sanctions on Iran has significantly increased regional tensions and will almost certainly exacerbate compliance challenges for regionally engaged firms.
ISRAEL
- The Houthis’ use of cluster munitions to target Israel highlights sustained elevated security risks across the country.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- GAZA STRIP: A US-backed ceasefire and hostage-release and post-war governance plan underscore the increasing international momentum towards de-escalating the Israel-Hamas war (though their complete implementation remains unlikely).
- GAZA STRIP: The construction of three new logistical centres in Gaza City highlights preparations for a gradual military advance into the city, sustaining long-term security risks.
- GAZA STRIP: The suspension of NGO operations in Gaza City underscores the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in central and northern Gaza.
- WEST BANK: A car-ramming attack has underscored the elevated attack and international terrorism risks proximate to the Israeli security forces.
IRAN
- The UN has re-imposed pre-2015 sanctions on Iran, significantly increasing pressure on the country’s economy, undermining its socio-economic health and raising regulatory framework risks for export firms. On 26 September, the UN Security Council (UNSC) rejected a China-Russia-proposed resolution to extend sanctions relief for Iran for six months; consequently, UN sanctions came back into force on 27 September. The move re-imposes all UN sanctions adopted between 2006 and 2010, to include an arms embargo, travel bans, asset freezes and a ban on sales of all components that could facilitate the development of nuclear weapons (including munitions capable of delivering a nuclear warhead). The Iranian rial (IRR) subsequently fell to a record low, trading at approximately 1,123,000 per USD on 27 September. Since 1 January, the IRR traded at an average of 80,000 to the USD. As UN member states begin to re-impose sanctions, as well as to freeze the Iranian Central Bank’s assets and to restrict trade with Iranian entities, further currency devaluations are highly likely, increasing socio-economic health concerns, as well as the risk of commodity shortages and the likelihood of anti-government demonstrations in Iran’s major cities. Protests would likely trigger further police and security force crackdowns, sustaining significant human rights concerns and the risk of harassment and detention for locally engaged staff, particularly foreign nationals. In response to increasing socio-economic pressure, the Iranian government will likely move to sell off portions of its gold reserves, possibly increasing price volatility within gold markets in the short term. Iran will also possibly move to alter import and export regulations to moderate the risk of shortages and raise revenue by increasing duties on certain exports, elevating regulatory framework risks and supply chain disruption for Iran’s primary trade partners, including China, India, Pakistan and Turkey. Such disruption would likely primarily impact Iran’s exports of unrefined metals, polymers and agricultural goods, increasing financial-exposure risks of firms reliant on Iranian-derived inputs.
- The re-implementation of UN sanctions on Iran has significantly increased regional tensions and will almost certainly exacerbate compliance challenges for regionally engaged firms. Following the UNSC vote, Iran recalled its ambassadors to France, Germany and the UK; in the coming days, British, French and German nationals (as well as dual nationals) in Iran will face increased scrutiny and arbitrary detention risks, underscoring the sustained threats to locally engaged staff. Although Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated that Iran will not withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), there is a realistic possibility that Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) or legislature will call for Iran’s withdrawal in the coming days, compounding regional tensions in the medium term. Despite the increased economic pressure on Iran resulting from the sanctions re-implementation, the effectiveness of sanctions will depend on the extent to which UN member states adopt domestic legislation to match the international sanctions regime, as well as whether they then enforce such legislation. On 27 September, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov characterised the sanctions re-implementation as ‘illegal’. He also underscored the likely gaps in international enforcement. These ‘gaps’ will likely sustain covert Iranian access to military technology and knowledge sharing, moderating the sanctions’ direct impact on the Iranian security forces’ capacity. Despite inconsistent enforcement, the majority of Western states (particularly the US) will highly likely seek to impose UN sanctions rigorously, increasing compliance concerns for firms with operations in Iran. These risks will be particularly acute for firms engaged in the pharmaceutical, technology and chemical-processing industries. Regulatory scrutiny will likely be most intense for firms engaging in the sale or purchase of items included on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Trigger List and Dual-Use List, including machine tools, electronics, industrial materials and chemical compounds. Regionally engaged shipping firms will also likely face increased scrutiny of their rosters and vessels’ travel history (particularly those navigating to and from Iran), resulting in moderate operational disruption and broader exposure to sanctions in the medium-to-long term.
ISRAEL
- The Houthis’ use of cluster munitions to target Israel highlights sustained elevated security risks across the country. On 28 September, the Iranian-backed Houthis claimed to have targeted Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) with a ballistic missile armed with cluster munitions. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted the missile successfully; there were no reports of injuries or damage. Since 22 August, the Yemen-based group has increased its use of missiles equipped with cluster munitions to target Israel. While Israel’s air defences remain able to intercept the majority of Houthi ordnance, particularly missiles targeting central Israel, the use of cluster munitions highlights persistent security risks for personnel and assets not in the immediate vicinity of obvious targets. Due to the nature of cluster munitions, the trajectory of a given missile launch is less indicative of the area(s) that is (are) liable to be hit, while air defences will need additional resources to intercept all potential cluster bombs, elevating the likelihood of misses. Furthermore, due to the need to intercept all the cluster munitions, shelter-in-place waiting times will likely increase, delaying the return of staff from shelters and therefore elevating operational disruption risks (slightly).
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- GAZA STRIP: A US-backed ceasefire and hostage-release and post-war governance plan underscore the increasing international momentum towards de-escalating the Israel-Hamas war (though their complete implementation remains unlikely). On 28 September, numerous regional media sources published the text of US President Donald Trump’s 21-point ceasefire and post-war governance plan for Gaza. If adopted, the proposal would result in an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, as well as the release of all Israeli hostages within 48 hours, the progressive withdrawal of the IDF and the deployment of an international Arab- / Muslim-majority country-led stabilisation force to Gaza. The proposal also details plans for the formation of a non-Hamas, technocratic governance body to administer Gaza in the short term, and conditions the involvement of the Palestinian Authority (PA) on its engagement with a reform package. The text also states that Israel will not seek to annex or occupy Gaza, and that aid will be distributed by organisations not associated with either Israel or Hamas. The proposal underscores the sustained international pressure on Israel and Hamas to accept a ceasefire and hostage-release agreement and will almost certainly inform discussions between Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during the latter’s official visit to Washington DC (US) on 29 September. However, military operations are ongoing. On 28 September, Hamas’ military wing stated that it had lost contact with two Israeli hostages and called for the IDF to halt its operations in Gaza City’s Sabra and Tel al-Hawa areas to facilitate their relocation. Although there is a realistic possibility that Hamas’ claims are accurate, there is also a realistic possibility that the statement aims to maximise psychological pressure on Israel’s domestic population and further undercut support for the Israel-Hamas war. Even so, the statement will also likely undermine Hamas’ ability to commit credibly to the safe release of Israeli hostages under a ceasefire agreement, moderating the prospects for the immediate implementation of such a deal. Even if Israel and Hamas agree to the implementation of the US-backed plan, the agreement’s complexity will sustain risks of non-fulfilment and violations, undermining its longevity.
- GAZA STRIP: The construction of three new logistical centres in Gaza City highlights preparations for a gradual military advance into the city, sustaining long-term security risks. The centres, which will likely be completed in the next two weeks, will service the IDF’s Divisions 36, 98 and 162 (which are currently operating within the city) and provide daily maintenance for tanks, armoured personnel carriers (APC) and other equipment. The centres highlight likely preparations for a prolonged operation in Gaza City (that will likely last several months). This is consistent with the tactics currently employed by the IDF, which are characterised by a slower, more methodical approach than previous operations. Ground operations to dismantle military infrastructure are typically now preceded by intense airstrikes to clear hostile forces. This will prolong the elevated security risks in Gaza City over the coming months, increasing the likelihood of a further deterioration of humanitarian conditions in the city (see below).
- GAZA STRIP: The suspension of NGO operations in Gaza City underscores the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in central and northern Gaza. On 26 September, Doctors without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF) announced it had suspended operations in Gaza City due to the IDF’s ground offensive. The IDF estimates that approximately 700,000 of Gaza City’s 1 m residents have evacuated the city, primarily towards the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone in southern Gaza. The operational suspension underscores critical threats to life for locally engaged NGO personnel as operations in Gaza City continue to intensify. Most recently, on 29 September, the IDF ordered the evacuation of the Shifa Hospital complex ahead of operations in the immediate vicinity of the facility in the coming days. IDF operations within Gaza City will highly likely trigger further NGO service suspensions, restricting civilian access to emergency medical care in northern and central Gaza. This will likely trigger increased demand for NGO services and medical care in southern Gaza, exacerbating pressure on already-strained healthcare resources. Shortages of equipment and medication will increase the risk of altercations and violence targeting medical staff, while also elevating the risk of communicable disease outbreaks in densely populated informal displacement camps in the short-to-medium term. As humanitarian conditions within Gaza remain critical, Israeli-linked firms and individuals will almost certainly continue facing significant scrutiny from pro-Palestine activists, sustaining broader reputational and governance concerns in the short-to-medium term.
- WEST BANK: A car-ramming attack has underscored the elevated attack and international terrorism risks proximate to the Israeli security forces. On 28 September, a Palestinian resident of Nablus (Nablus governorate) crashed his truck into an IDF patrol car at Jit Junction (Qalqilya governorate), killing one soldier. The attacker was shot and killed at the scene. Jit Junction is located at the point connecting Highways 60 and 55 and the access road to Nablus (Nablus). Following the attack, the IDF blocked entrances and exits to Nablus and nearby villages, including Nabi Ilyas (Qalqilya). The attack highlights the increasing radicalisation risks in the West Bank, which will exacerbate the risk of future attacks. These risks are likely to remain elevated throughout October, particularly around the Jewish High Holidays (1-2 and 6-14 October) and the second anniversary of the 7 October 2023 attack. In the coming weeks, the IDF is likely to establish new checkpoints across the West Bank, increasing travel disruption. Such checkpoints are likely to be targeted and to act as bottlenecks for bystanders, increasing exposure to crossfire during possible attacks against Israeli security personnel manning the checkpoints.
RED SEA
- RED SEA: Israel will likely strike Houthi assets in the coming days, further undercutting humanitarian conditions. Israel is likely to intensify its strikes against Houthi targets in the coming days in retaliation for the Houthis’ earlier launch of a missile equipped with a cluster munitions-carrying warhead (see above). As such, there is a realistic possibility that Israel will retaliate forcefully against Houthi government and civilian officials, as it did on 24 August (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 28 August 2025). Exposure to strikes over the coming days will be highest near government buildings within Houthi-held territory, particularly in the capital Sanaa. Further damage to civilian infrastructure, including energy and water facilities, is also likely; this would undermine living conditions across Houthi-held territory in the coming weeks.
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS
- LEBANON: Lebanese Hizballah (LH)’s persistent refusal to disarm will continue to raise the risk of unrest over the next six months. On 28 September, tens of thousands of LH supporters gathered in the capital Beirut’s southern suburbs to commemorate the first anniversary of the assassinations of its former leaders Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safieddine. The event formed part of an 18-day commemoration period that will continue until 12 October. No major mobility disruption or clashes with the security forces were reported by local media. However, during the event, the current leader of LH, Naim Qassem, reaffirmed his rejection of the government’s nationwide disarmament plan, the first phase of which (targeting Palestinian camps) is already being implemented by the army (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 23 September 2025). In addition, Qassem claimed the group is restoring its military capabilities. The belligerent rhetoric likely reflects the widening rift between LH and the Lebanese government over this issue, as well as the growing risk of Shia unrest across the country in the coming six months. However, these risks will be tempered by the likely intensification of mediation efforts by the Amal movement and its leader, Nabih Berry, over the coming weeks. Furthermore, the Lebanese army is likely to extend the planned disarmament timeline to at least mid-2026 in order to reduce the likelihood of a major confrontation with LH and allow space for further negotiations. In addition, LH’s persistent refusal to disarm will also partially increase the risk of armed conflict resuming with Israel in the coming three months (following likely allegations that the group has violated the ceasefire agreement).
- Israel-Yemen: Continued Houthi targeting of Israeli cities will sustain business disruption, injury risks. On 28 September, the Iran-backed Houthis claimed to have targeted Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) with a ballistic missile armed with cluster munitions. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have intercepted the missile successfully, with no reports of injuries or damage. Houthi weapons have breached Israeli airspace on at least three instances since 7 September, when a Houthi drone reached Ramon Airport (ETM, Southern district). This underscores the Houthis’ growing capacity to evade air defences in southern Israel, sustaining elevated security risks for personnel and assets across the region. We assess that as the Houthis continue to target densely populated cities with large-scale ordnance, including in Tel Aviv, the frequency of air raid sirens triggering evacuations from offices, homes and hospitality venues will likely increase. This will elevate business disruption and the risk of harm to personnel and travellers during evacuations, including with injuries from crowd crushes.
- Iran: Sanctions will elevate compliance, operational risks; worsening national socio-economic health. Earlier on 29 September, the EU confirmed the reinstatement of sanctions on Iran. The announcement came after the UN Security Council (UNSC) re-imposed international sanctions on Iran on 27 September, as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s (JCPOA) snapback mechanism. The UN sanctions include an arms embargo on conventional weapons, as well as prohibitions on exports and transfers of parts and technologies related to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic program. Furthermore, the EU sanctions include asset freezes on multiple Iranian banks including the Central Bank of Iran; they also impose bans on Iranian purchases and transportation of crude oil, the sale and supply of gold and certain naval equipment. We assess that the sanctions will significantly undercut the value of the Iranian rial (IRR), increasing inflation rates and exacerbating the prevalence of money laundering and organised crime nationwide. Companies operating in Iran will face increasing operating costs for raw materials and wages. International companies operating or dealing with Iran will also face elevated compliance risks, exacerbating financial risks over the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)
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