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NEWS IN BRIEF – MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Jan 17.

  • Lebanon-France: Presidential visit will facilitate government stability, drive financial investment. Earlier on 17 January, French President Emmanuel Macron arrived in Lebanon, in the capital Beirut, to meet with President Joseph Aoun. Parliament elected Aoun on 9 January following over two years of political deadlock. Macron will also meet with UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres ahead of the deadline for the transition period of the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire agreement, which will be fully implemented by 26 January. Macron’s visit highlights France’s efforts to reinstate its influence in the Middle East and is likely a precursor to increased French investment in Lebanon, including financial support to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). These will possibly reduce government stability and socio-economic health risks and drive investor confidence and security capacity over the coming months. Furthermore, investments will likely come in the telecommunications and transport sectors, boosting public and essential services. However, international support is likely to be conditioned by Lebanon’s ability to enact reforms; we assess that Lebanon will likely continue to suffer from policy challenges throughout the year.

Jan 16.

  • On 15 January an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) drone strike on Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) forces killed two soldiers and one civilian, though unlikely to elevate risks of wider armed conflict.
  • Overnight on 13 January, an Iran-backed Houthi missile was partially intercepted by the IDF, with debris causing damage in Jerusalem district.
  • Overnight on 15 January, Israel conducted airstrike in Gaza, underscoring continued severe security risks despite the announcement on ceasefire agreement.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OVERALL FORECAST

  • In Israel and the Palestinian Territories, developments in ceasefire negotiations triggered numerous demonstrations in major cities, highlighting increasing disruption risks.
  • Israel’s Defence Minister announced plans to conscript thousands of ultra-Orthodox men into the IDF, triggering anti-conscription protests and increasing unrest risks.
  • The incoming US administration under President-elect Donald Trump will likely remove sanctions on Israeli settlers in the West Bank, moderating compliance concerns but increasing regional tensions.
  • The Israeli government will likely agree to the ceasefire, though delays to the cabinet approval process will likely continue over the coming hours.
  • Agreement to the ceasefire will almost certainly exacerbate tensions within Israel’s coalition government, increasing medium-term government stability risks.
  • If implemented, the ceasefire will likely face significant pressure and is unlikely to be extended into a second phase, sustaining armed conflict risks in the coming months.
  • Tensions between Israel and Hamas remain significantly elevated; there is a realistic possibility that the provisionally approved agreement will falter, significantly increasing protest and unrest risks throughout the region.
  • Failure to implement the ceasefire will likely trigger an uptick in rocket attacks targeting Israel, sustaining security concerns.
  • Sporadic hostilities between Israel and HTS forces are unlikely to elevate risks of wider armed conflict. On 15 January, the IDF killed two Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) soldiers and one civilian in a drone strike on an HTS-led government vehicle convoy around the village of Ghadir al-Bustan (Quneitra governorate). The IDF claimed it conducted strikes near several armed vehicles travelling outside the buffer zone in southern Syria in an attempt to disperse them. The incident highlights elevated security risks in Daraa and Quneitra governorates tied to HTS efforts to increase its security presence in the area amid IDF incursions and enduring sensitivity to any armed presence close to the buffer zone. Despite these risks, sporadic kinetic incidents between HTS and the IDF are unlikely to lead to a wider armed conflict. However, sustained border tensions and IDF activity in and outside the buffer zone will elevate the risk of reprisal attacks by rogue jihadist elements affiliated with HTS, sustaining elevated security risks close to the buffer zone.
  • Overnight on 13 January, an Iran-backed Houthi missile was partially intercepted by the IDF; debris inflicted damage in the Jerusalem district. The IDF confirmed that it successfully intercepted the missile after several attempts. However, large debris from the missile hit a civilian house in Mevo Beitar (Jerusalem district) causing material damage but no injuries. The incident comes amid an uptick in Houthi attacks targeting Israel over the past week. Such strikes will drive elevated collateral security risks across Israel (including Central and Jerusalem districts) posed by airspace breaches and debris. In the event of a ceasefire with Hamas, there is a realistic possibility that Houthi attacks against Israel will continue but at a reduced frequency.
  • Overnight on 15 January, Israel conducted airstrikes across Gaza, underscoring persistently severe security risks despite the announcement of a ceasefire agreement. According to Gazan sources, the strikes killed at least 78 individuals, hitting Deir al-Balah, Gaza City and Khan Younis. The IDF will likely continue to intensify its military operations (including strikes) until any ceasefire agreement fully enters into force; this underscores severe security risks across Gaza in the coming days.

Developments

  • In Israel and the Palestinian Territories, developments in ceasefire negotiations triggered numerous demonstrations in major cities, highlighting increasing disruption risks. On 14, 15 and 16 January, thousands of pro-agreement demonstrators gathered in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district, Israel), moderately disrupting movement through the city. Conversely, hundreds of protesters opposing the agreement gathered in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) on 13, 14, 15 and 16 January, blocking several major road intersections and disrupting movement through the Rehavia area. In the Palestinian Territories, numerous pro-ceasefire demonstrations and public gatherings emerged in the West Bank and Gaza following Qatar’s announcement on 15 January that both parties had signed a ceasefire agreement, including in Ramallah (Ramallah and al Bireh governorate, West Bank). In the coming days, ceasefire-related developments will almost certainly continue triggering large-scale demonstrations and gatherings in major cities, driving risks of operational, supply chain and travel disruption (see FORECAST).
  • Israel’s Defence Minister announced plans to conscript thousands of ultra-Orthodox men into the IDF, triggering anti-conscription protests and increasing unrest risks. On 14 January, Defence Minister Israel Katz announced that the IDF will seek to enlist 4,800 ultra-Orthodox men in 2025 and progressively increase recruitment targets in the coming years while also sanctioning non-compliance through unspecified means. Although the Knesset has yet to adopt the proposal, on 15 January, dozens of anti-conscription, ultra-Orthodox protesters gathered outside the Tel Hashomer base in Tel Aviv, blocking proximate roads and triggering low-intensity clashes with the police. In the coming weeks, further anti-conscription demonstrations are highly likely, increasing unrest risks in ultra-Orthodox population centres including Beit Shemesh (Jerusalem), Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv) and Jerusalem’s Geula, Kikar HaShabbat and Mea Shearim areas. Protesters will also highly likely block nearby thoroughfares, particularly on Highways 1 and 4, elevating risks of temporary travel and supply chain disruption. Demonstrators will also likely continue targeting IDF recruitment centres with protest-related violence and unrest, driving localised security and bystander risks.
  • The incoming US administration under President-elect Trump will likely remove sanctions on Israeli settlers in the West Bank, moderating compliance concerns but increasing regional tensions. On 15 January, Trump’s nominee for secretary of state, Marco Rubio, stated that the Trump administration would move to repeal sanctions on Israeli settlers in the West Bank. The outgoing Biden administration previously expanded sanctions on settlers associated with violence targeting Palestinian civilians, increasing sanctions exposure risks for firms operating in Israel. Although the Trump administration’s likely repeal of sanctions will moderate compliance concerns, particularly for financial entities servicing Israeli settlements, it will also highly likely embolden settlers to further expand settlements in the West Bank. Such efforts are highly likely to exacerbate ethno-religious tensions in the West Bank, trigger clashes with Palestinian civilians and increase regional tensions.

The Israeli government will likely agree to the ceasefire, though delays to the cabinet approval process will likely continue over the coming hours. In Israel, confirmation that the agreement will proceed will likely trigger large-scale public gatherings and celebrations in major cities, driving operational and supply chain disruption risks, particularly through Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Smaller-scale demonstrations opposing the ceasefire are also likely, particularly in Jerusalem, increasing risks of clashes between protesters and counter-protesters; that said, widespread unrest remains unlikely. In the coming days, demonstrations to mark prisoner releases in the West Bank are also highly likely, disrupting movement through major cities and possibly triggering localised clashes with the security forces.

Agreement to the ceasefire will almost certainly exacerbate tensions within Israel’s coalition government, increasing medium-term government stability risks. National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir has threatened to withdraw from the coalition government while Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has reportedly refused to commit to remaining within the coalition unless Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu commits to a full-scale resumption of IDF operations in Gaza following the initial 42-day ceasefire. Although opposition leaders including Benny Gantz and Yair Lapid have publicly committed to supporting the government in the short term to ensure the adoption of the ceasefire, escalating disputes between coalition parties will highly likely undermine government stability in the coming months. Increasing coalition disputes will likely disrupt efforts to adopt budget legislation before 31 March; failure to do so will automatically trigger a general election, likely resulting in protracted coalition formation negotiations.

If implemented, the ceasefire will likely face significant pressure and is unlikely to be extended into a second phase, sustaining armed conflict risks in the coming months. As the ceasefire comes into force, tensions between Israel and Hamas will remain significantly elevated, sustaining risks of conflict re-escalation. As the likely rate of hostage releases will be lower than during the 2023 ceasefire, delays or disruption to hostage location and release will drive risks of agreement failure. Additionally, delays to the IDF’s withdrawals from population centres will also possibly trigger localised clashes, driving risks of re-escalation. More broadly, disputes linked to aid provision, prisoner releases or the return of displaced Palestinians to northern Gaza will maintain significant pressure on the agreement, undermining the ceasefire’s longevity. We assess that an extension into the second phase remains unlikely due to opposition from parties within Israel’s coalition government, sustaining risks of IDF re-deployment and conflict re-escalation in the coming months.

Tensions between Israel and Hamas remain significantly elevated; there is a realistic possibility that the provisionally approved agreement will falter, significantly increasing protest and unrest risks throughout the region. If the ceasefire fails to come into effect, large-scale, anti-government demonstrations will almost certainly emerge throughout Israel, driving critical operational disruption risks. Demonstrations in major cities will likely attract tens of thousands of participants, particularly in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Risks of unrest, including blockades of major highways, bonfires at major intersections and clashes with the police will also substantially increase, driving security and bystander risks. Risks of domestic unrest in the West Bank will also significantly increase, including in the Jerusalem and Ramallah areas. In the broader region, large-scale pro-Palestine protests will also almost certainly emerge in major cities, particularly in Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Turkey. Locations and installations associated with Israel and the US will also face elevated risks of targeted protests and vandalism, driving threats to staff and assets.

Failure to implement the ceasefire will also likely trigger an uptick in rocket attacks targeting Israel, sustaining security concerns. Continued IDF operations will likely trigger an uptick in rocket fire from Gaza-based militants and the Iran-backed, Yemen-based Houthis in the coming days. Although the IDF will likely intercept the majority of munitions (particularly those targeting major population centres), risks of air defence penetration will sustain security risks as well as incidental risks linked to interception-related shrapnel. The Houthis will also possibly temporarily intensify rocket fire targeting commercial vessels moving through the Red Sea. This will increase security risks for cargo, crews and vessels while continuing to disrupt international supply chains.

  • Israel-Palestinian Territories: Ceasefire remains likely despite delays. On 15 January, US President Joe Biden announced a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, which is set to come into effect on 19 January. Israel’s cabinet was due to convene at 1100hrs (local time) to approve the agreement. However, the meeting was postponed after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office claimed Hamas was seeking last-minute concessions. This came as members of the Religious Zionist Party, including its leader, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, convened to decide on the party’s future in the governing coalition. Although pressure from within the coalition will likely threaten government stability, approval of the ceasefire remains likely. However, if the deal fails, significant demonstrations across Israel would be highly likely, especially in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) and Jerusalem (Jerusalem district, both Israel). There is a realistic possibility of any such protests turning violent, particularly in Tel Aviv, elevating bystander safety risks due to sporadic clashes between protesters and the security forces.
  • Syria-Israel: IDF strike on HTS positions is unlikely to lead to wider armed conflict in southern Syria. On 15 January, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed two Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) fighters and one civilian in a drone strike on a convoy in the village of Ghadir al-Bustan (Quneitra governorate, Syria). The fighters were part of an HTS-led government force deployment which arrived earlier in Quneitra to clear weapons caches from locals and to impose security after the IDF partially withdrew from the area. The strike underscores the significant security risks in Quneitra and Daraa governorates tied to the risk of localised clashes as a result of HTS’ efforts to increase its security presence in the area amid persistent limited IDF incursions. However, we assess these sporadic kinetic incidents are unlikely to lead to a wider armed conflict between the new Syrian government and Israel. Nevertheless, border tensions and continuous IDF incursions will elevate the risk of reprisal attacks by rogue jihadist elements affiliated with HTS, further augmenting instability in H1 2025.

Jan 15.

  • Iraq-Syria: Border security operation will likely elevate security risks in Nineveh governorate. On 14 January, Iraqi media reported that the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) launched a joint operation to enhance security on the border between Iraq and Syria. Iraq’s renewed efforts to address significant military drawbacks on its border, which is frequently used by terror cells to facilitate attacks in the country, will likely elevate security risks in the area for the duration of the operation due to an increasing risk of armed clashes. The operation will likely slightly moderate risks of attacks and organised crime in the month after the operation concludes, undercutting key routes for drugs, human and weapons trafficking. However, the length of the Iraq-Syria border in Nineveh governorate makes it hard to effectively police, with organised criminals and terror groups likely finding alternative routes to operate. We assess that this underscores significant flaws in security force capabilities and sustains criminal and security risks in the longer term.
  • Libya: New UN plan is unlikely to lead to elections in H1 2025. On 13 January, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) announced a political initiative to pave the way for national elections. The initiative revolves around launching a national dialogue and forming an advisory committee, which will establish plans for economic reforms, national reconciliation and government unification. However, there is a realistic possibility that both the Benghazi-based House of Representatives (HoR) and the Tripoli-based State Council (SC), will challenge the committee’s jurisdiction, postponing the UNSMIL plan, which already lacks a clear timeline. Even after selecting the committee members, multiple flashpoints will highly likely pose challenges to the prospective talks, including issues such as the unification of the armed forces, militia influence and the role of the Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar in any future government. We assess that this will likely further delay the presidential and parliamentary elections beyond H1 2025, sustaining policy stagnation and governance challenges in addition to domestic unrest and energy security risks.

Jan 14.

  • Lebanon: Election of prime minister signals reduced policy risks; sectarian politics are sustained. On 13 January, Nawaf Salam, the head of the International Court of Justice, was elected as the new prime minister of Lebanon. Salam received 84 votes out of 128, while Lebanese Hizballah (LH) and their Shia ally, the Amal Movement, abstained after realising they wouldn’t be securing a majority for their favourite, caretake Prime Minister Najib Mikati. Salam is a seasoned politician and diplomat, highly regarded and known for his technocratic expertise and reformist stance. Salam’s election became possible after several parties came together to form a bloc against LH. The decision highlights LH’s increasing weakness, however, the organisation remains influential within Lebanon, particularly within the country’s framework of multi-confessional diversity. Risks of deadlock within Lebanon’s politics, while moderately reduced, remain, particularly as Salam is likely to face challenges when selecting his Cabinet in the coming days. We assess that a prolonged cabinet selection process will likely reduce the government’s momentum and will signal persistently elevated policy risks and threats to government stability.

Jan 13.

  • On 10 January, Israel conducted strikes in Yemen in parallel with the US and UK, elevating energy and bystander security risks
  • IDF airstrikes targeting Lebanese Hizballah (LH) military infrastructure in southern and eastern Lebanon reflect persistent concerns over possible breaches to the ceasefire agreement
  • On 12 January, the Israeli security forces arrested two militants in Nablus (Nablus governorate, West Bank) en route to conduct a small-arms terror attack

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OVERALL FORECAST

  • Ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas have reportedly progressed, increasing prospects for an agreement framework being reached in the coming days
  • There was a further uptick in anti-government protest activity, moderately increasing bystander and collateral risks
  • Amid increasing pressure on the Israeli government to conscript ultra-Orthodox men into the IDF, intensifying anti-conscription protests will drive operational disruption risks
  • Israel’s finance ministry will partially withhold tax transfers to the Palestinian Authority (PA), increasing socio-economic health concerns in the West Bank
  • Fatah publicly criticised Hamas’ militant activity in the West Bank, highlighting long-term governance concerns in the Palestinian Territories
  • Vandalism against two synagogues in Sydney (New South Wales state, Australia) and an attack in Newtown (Sydney) highlight increasing security and bystander risks in regions outside the Middle East
  • The IDF is likely to escalate operations in northern Gaza in the coming days in preparation for a ceasefire agreement
  • On 10 January, Israel conducted strikes in Yemen in parallel with the US and UK, elevating energy and bystander security risks. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) targeted dual-use infrastructure, including Hudaydah Port and oil storage facilities at Ras Isa Port (both al-Hudaydah governorate), as well as the Hezyaz central power station in the capital Sanaa and sites in Harf Sufyan district (Amran governorate), killing at least one port worker. This marked the fifth Israeli strike on Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen and the first conducted in parallel with the US and UK since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war. The strikes followed an increase in Iran-backed Houthi attacks on Israel over the past three weeks, including three Houthi drones that the IDF intercepted on the evening of 9 January. According to the IDF, since the start of the Israel-Hamas war, the Houthis have launched over 320 drones and 40 surface-to-surface missiles targeting Israel. The strikes caused power outages across Sanaa. Later on 11 January, the Houthis claimed they targeted the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier. However, a visit to the vessel on 12 January by Gen. Michael Erik Kurilla, Commander of United States Central Command (CENTCOM), suggests that there was little-to-no damage to the ship. IDF and US-led coalition strikes against Houthi targets across Yemen are likely to continue in response to Houthi attacks against Israel and shipping in the Red Sea. These will sustain elevated bystander security risks and drive energy security risks across Houthi-held territory, impacting business operations and elevating humanitarian concerns. Furthermore, continued US-led coalition strikes against Houthi targets will elevate arbitrary detention risks in Houthi-held territory, particularly for foreign nationals, especially NGO staff who are citizens of coalition member countries.
  • IDF airstrikes targeting Lebanese Hizballah (LH) military infrastructure in southern and eastern Lebanon reflect persistent concerns over possible breaches to the ceasefire agreement. In the early hours of 13 January, IDF airstrikes targeted LH military infrastructure, including long-range missile launchers, a military compound and smuggling routes along the Lebanon-Syria border. The IDF claims it first reported these sites, identified as key military threats, to the body monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, but that they were not addressed, prompting the airstrikes. While the ceasefire is likely to continue holding, the strikes highlight Israel’s willingness to pursue a military resolution to concerns over the ceasefire’s implementation, particularly after the end of the transition period on 25 January. As such, a continued state of elevated bystander security risks across southern and eastern Lebanon, including in Baalbek-Hermel governorate, will likely persist after 25 January.
  • On 12 January, the Israeli security forces arrested two militants in Nablus (Nablus governorate, West Bank) en route to conduct a small-arms terror attack. The two militants are residents of Jenin (Jenin governorate). They are also members of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). The Israeli Shin Bet claim they were carrying two M-16 assault rifles and ammunition in their car when they were arrested. The incident reflects the elevated levels of security preparedness in response to a highly pronounced threat of terror attacks emanating from the West Bank, particularly the northern West Bank. Attackers are likely to target military checkpoints, civilian roads and travel hubs. There is a realistic possibility that the Israeli security forces will conduct operations in the northern West Bank in the coming days, particularly around Jenin, elevating bystander security risks. Additionally, the IDF is likely to erect more checkpoints across the West Bank in the coming days, elevating travel disruption and impacting business operations as a result.
  • Ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas have reportedly progressed, increasing prospects for an agreement framework being reached in the coming days. On 12 January, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office confirmed that a high-level delegation would attend renewed ceasefire and hostage-release negotiations in Qatar. On 13 January, numerous media sources citing Egyptian, Israeli, US and Hamas officials reported a substantial breakthrough in negotiations overnight, bolstering prospects for negotiating parties reaching an agreement framework in the coming days. The agreement will likely include three phases of staggered hostage releases, as well as IDF drawdowns from Gaza and releases of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prisons. Yet despite such reports, negotiations remain highly fragile and neither party has confirmed the reception of a final proposal at the time of writing, moderating prospects for an imminent agreement.
  • There was a further uptick in anti-government protest activity in Israel, moderately increasing bystander and collateral risks. On 11 January, thousands of anti-government demonstrators gathered in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) for hostage-release rallies; the police arrested several participants following low-intensity altercations, though protests remained broadly peaceful. Smaller-scale demonstrations also emerged in Caesarea, Haifa, Hadera (all Haifa district), Ness Ziona, Raanana, Rehovot, Rishon LeZion (all Central district), Beersheva, Carmei Gat, Ofakim (all Southern district) and Herzliya (Tel Aviv). Protesters also temporarily blocked junctions along several major thoroughfares, including highways 4 (Northern), 34 (Southern), 65 (Haifa) and 90 (Northern), marking a substantial proliferation of protest activity following weeks of declining attendance. Amid reports of progressing ceasefire negotiations, there is a realistic possibility of further small-scale protests in major cities in the coming days, moderately increasing operational disruption risks. Failure to make demonstrable progress towards an agreement by 18 January will likely bolster attendance at the weekly nationwide hostage-release rallies, driving risks of significant travel disruption and low-intensity unrest.
  • Amid increasing pressure on the Israeli government to conscript ultra-Orthodox men into the IDF, intensifying anti-conscription protests will drive operational disruption risks. On 9 January, dozens of anti-conscription protesters gathered in Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv) and temporarily blocked traffic along Highway 4. Demonstrators clashed with the police, while several participants attacked an IDF officer in the protest’s vicinity, highlighting the elevated risks of violent unrest amid increasingly frequent anti-conscription protests. On 10 January, Israel’s High Court of Justice ordered the government to detail how it plans to conscript ultra-Orthodox men and enforce draft orders, following a ruling in June 2024 that struck down broad exemptions to mandatory military service. The order comes before Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz is scheduled to present a formal proposal for conscription reform to the Knesset on 14 January. The government’s response to the court order, paired with Katz’s proposal, will substantially increase the risk of pro- and anti-conscription protests in the coming days. There is a realistic possibility of protest-related unrest and clashes with the police, increasing security and bystander risks, particularly in ultra-Orthodox population centres such as Bnei Brak, Beit Shemesh (both Jerusalem) and Jerusalem itself. Amid ongoing demonstrations, supply chains that rely on overland movement via highways 1 and 4 will face substantial disruption, driving broader operational disruption risks.
  • Israel’s finance ministry will partially withhold tax transfers to the Palestinian Authority (PA), increasing socio-economic health concerns in the West Bank. On 12 January, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich announced that Israel would use approximately USD 544 m of tax revenue collected on the PA’s behalf to pay the authority’s outstanding debts to the Israel Electric Company. The announcement highlights continued efforts by Smotrich to disrupt financial transfers to the PA. In the coming weeks, continued delays to financial transfers will increase pressure on the PA’s financial solvency, elevating risks of delayed salary payments to civil servants in the West Bank and undermining the provision of PA services. As such, socio-economic health concerns and the risk of unrest, including in Ramallah (Ramallah and al Bireh governorate), will likely increase as disruption to financial transfers persists.
  • Fatah publicly criticised Hamas’ militant activity in the West Bank, highlighting long-term governance concerns in the Palestinian Territories. On 11 January, Fatah released an official statement criticising Hamas’ alleged efforts to ‘stir security chaos’ in the West Bank. The statement reflects sustained tensions between the groups, particularly amid ongoing PA counter-terrorism operations targeting Hamas and allied militant groups in Jenin. Such tensions will likely undermine long-term efforts to foster reconciliation between the groups or to achieve consensus regarding the administration of Gaza, sustaining governance concerns in the Palestinian Territories.
  • Vandalism against two synagogues in Sydney (New South Wales state, Australia) and an attack in Newtown (Sydney) highlight the security and bystander risks in regions outside the Middle East. On 10 January, unidentified individuals defaced a synagogue in the Allawah suburb of Sydney. Subsequently, unidentified individuals defaced a synagogue in the Newtown area before attempting to conduct an arson attack against the facility. The attacks come amid a sustained uptick in violence targeting the Jewish community in Australia, reflecting elevated ethno-religious tensions overseas linked to the Israel-Hamas war. Although the Australian Federal Police announced the formation of an antisemitism taskforce in December 2024, facilities associated with the Jewish and Israeli communities, including religious institutions, schools and community centres, will face elevated risks of targeted vandalism and violence in the coming months, increasing security, bystander and collateral risks.

The IDF is likely to escalate operations in northern Gaza in the coming days in preparation for a ceasefire agreement. The IDF will likely try to complete military objectives in Gaza before a ceasefire comes into effect, primarily focusing on Beit Hanoun and Jabalia. Additionally, even in the event that ceasefire negotiations break down, there is a realistic possibility that the IDF will launch high-intensity, large-scale operations across Gaza. The IDF is likely to increase the intensity of its operations in Beit Hanoun and there is a realistic possibility that such operations will expand into areas within which Israel has not operated for several months, including in southern Gaza. This will elevate the risk of population displacement and bystander security risks, raising humanitarian concerns. While likely to be sporadic, strikes in humanitarian areas remain a realistic possibility.

* Syria: Thwarted attack on shrine underscores significant threat of IS resurgence in 2025. On 11 January, the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led government announced that it thwarted an attempted suicide bombing attack by the Islamic State (IS) group inside the Sayyida Zaynab shrine, a prominent Shia site in the capital Damascus’ southern outskirts. The interior ministry arrested four men suspected to be IS members and confiscated several weapons. Notably, IS detonated a bomb near the shrine in 2023, injuring and killing multiple worshippers. The announcement underscores the significant threat of an IS resurgence in Syria in 2025, as the group is highly likely to continue capitalising on the security gap in the Syrian Desert. The release of hundreds of Jihadists from prisons operated by the former government will exacerbate this threat. In the coming months, security and bystander risks will continue to be significantly heightened around Shia religious sites across Syria, as well as around churches and government facilities.

* Lebanon-UAE: Aid shipment will moderate food security risks, though distribution delays are likely. On 12 January, the UAE sent approximately 3,000 tonnes of aid to Lebanon, including food, winter supplies, shelter materials and goods for women and children. This follows a similar shipment by the UAE in October 2024 as part of a USD 100 m aid initiative aimed at moderating the effects of the latest Israel-Hizballah war. The delivery will likely temper food security and socio-economic health risks, as well as mitigate against healthcare risks (such as the spread of infectious diseases). Although shelter materials will provide temporary relief, the increased use of informal shelters in urban areas, such as the capital Beirut, will likely trigger evacuations and sporadic clashes with the authorities. The latest shipment comes during the winter months, and will likely moderate the risk of widespread domestic unrest emanating from poor humanitarian conditions. However, we asses that political corruption and weak NGO capacity in Lebanon will likely delay distribution, leading to uneven aid delivery and sustaining the risk of unrest and/or looting. (Source: Sibylline)

 

16 Jan 25. Biden Announces Ceasefire Deal Between Hamas, Israel in Farewell Address. In his final address from the Oval Office yesterday, President Joe Biden announced a ceasefire and hostage-exchange deal between Israel and Hamas — a truce that Defense Department officials believe signals a possible end to 15 months of conflict in the region. Since Hamas kicked off hostilities with a surprise attack on Israeli military personnel and civilians Oct. 7, 2023, DOD has maintained its steadfast commitment to Israel while simultaneously encouraging a diplomatic solution to secure long-term stability in the region. Last September, in a press conference that addressed Israel’s prolonged military campaign in Gaza, Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder summarized the department’s position.

“Hamas must be held accountable for the murder of innocent civilians,” Ryder said. “But Defense leaders are committed to swiftly reaching a ceasefire deal that secures the release of all remaining hostages.”

For decades, the U.S. military has participated in joint exercises and provided defense resources to bolster Israel’s ability to deter and counter regional threats. The 2022 National Defense Strategy notes that the U.S. has “a long history of working with Israel and other partners in the Middle East to counter air and missile threats.”

To secure permanent peace, the Biden administration worked alongside regional partners — including Qatari and Egyptian mediators — to press all parties toward a ceasefire. Throughout the negotiations, DOD, in coordination with the State Department and intelligence agencies, stood by to de-escalate tensions and safeguard civilians in the affected areas. Biden’s speech highlighted the collaboration between his national security team and President-elect Donald Trump’s incoming administration, which Biden called essential to finalizing the deal in the days following the November election. In recent weeks, envoys from both the outgoing and incoming White House teams met with Israeli and regional leaders, coordinating efforts to ensure the deal would be in place before the inauguration — a symbolic deadline that hastened the agreement after eight months of negotiations. Although portions of the arrangement remain sensitive, defense leaders said the ceasefire stipulates that Hamas must stop rocket attacks immediately and release all identified hostages within six weeks. In return, Israel has agreed to halt ongoing military operations within Gaza’s borders. Both sides have also committed to maintaining open channels of communication for further confidence-building measures. In a statement released yesterday, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III applauded the armistice, offered the department’s condolences to the families of Americans killed during the war, and expressed hope for a lasting peace.

“Israelis and Palestinians need not be doomed to eternal conflict, and with leadership and wisdom, we can make progress toward the day when Israelis and Palestinians live side by side in peace and security in two sovereign states, with mutual security and dignity,” Austin said.

Beyond the Israel-Hamas talks, DOD remains focused on a range of Middle Eastern security issues, from ISIS and Iranian-backed militias — which continue to threaten regional stability — to maritime security in the Red Sea, where Houthi rebels threaten commercial shipping with Iranian-supplied drones and ballistic missiles. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

16 Jan 25. Israel strikes Gaza within hours of ceasefire accord with Hamas, residents say. Israel intensified strikes on Gaza hours after a ceasefire and hostage release deal was announced, residents and authorities in the Palestinian enclave said, as mediators sought to quell fighting ahead of the truce’s start on Sunday. The complex ceasefire accord between Israel and militant group Hamas, which controls Gaza, emerged on Wednesday after months of mediation by Qatar, Egypt and the U.S. and 15 months of bloodshed that devastated the coastal territory and inflamed the Middle East. (Source: Reuters)

 

15 Jan 25. Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on the Ceasefire and Hostage-Release Deal Between Israel and Hamas. I am pleased that Israel and Hamas have today secured a ceasefire and hostage-release deal, after months of determined diplomacy by the United States, along with Egypt and Qatar. From President Biden on down, we have worked tirelessly as one administration to reach this deal and this day. This deal must be implemented rigorously, but it can open a new window of hope for Israelis and Palestinians after the months of bloodshed and anguish that followed Hamas’s despicable terrorist assault on Israel on October 7, 2023. We bow our heads today in memory of all those slain by Hamas on October 7, for every murdered hostage, and for all the innocent civilians killed in this tragic war initiated by Hamas—including far too many children. For them, their families, and their loved ones, this ceasefire and hostage-release deal has come too late. The Department again offers our deepest condolences to the families of all of our American citizens killed in this harrowing war, and it renews today our unstinting commitment to bring home the Americans still being held in Gaza and to finally return the remains of our slain fellow citizens to their mourning families. After these months of terror and trauma, we recommit ourselves today to move toward a more hopeful, secure, and just future for Israelis and Palestinians alike. Israelis and Palestinians need not be doomed to eternal conflict, and with leadership and wisdom, we can make progress toward the day when Israelis and Palestinians live side by side in peace and security in two sovereign states, with mutual security and dignity. And we remember that the children of Abraham are taught that whoever saves a single life saves an entire world. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

15 Jan 25. Israel and Hamas have agreed a ceasefire to halt the 15-month war in Gaza and free the remaining hostages, mediators said, raising hopes of an end to a devastating conflict that has shaken the Middle East and the world beyond. But, despite celebrations erupting across the region, the office of Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned that some details still had to be finalised as of Wednesday night. The multiphase agreement, due to take effect on Sunday, a day before Donald Trump returns to office as US president, was announced by Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin al-Thani. However, he noted that the parties still had to give final approval. The agreement offers hope of a halt — and potentially an end — to a brutal war that has become the deadliest chapter in the decades-long history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, leaving Gaza in ruins, consuming Israeli society and pushing the Middle East to the brink of a full-blown war. The conflict was triggered by Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, during which fighters from the Palestinian militant group killed 1,200 people and took 250 hostages in the deadliest day for Jews since the Holocaust. Israel responded with an offensive in Gaza that has killed more than 46,000 people and fuelled a humanitarian catastrophe in the enclave. Supporters of Israeli hostages kidnapped during the October 7 2023 attack by Hamas © Ronen Zvulun/Reuters Previous attempts by the US, Qatar and Egypt to broker a deal to end the conflict and secure the release of the 98, mainly Israeli, hostages still in Gaza — not all of whom are alive — had repeatedly foundered when Israel and Hamas refused to make the necessary concessions. But the re-election of Trump — who threatened that there would be “all hell to pay” if the hostages were not released before his inauguration — injected renewed momentum into the long-stalled talks. Trump was among the first leaders to hail the deal on Wednesday, writing on his Truth Social platform ahead of the formal announcement: “WE HAVE A DEAL FOR THE HOSTAGES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY WILL BE RELEASED SHORTLY.” He added that his national security team would “continue to work closely with Israel and our Allies to make sure Gaza NEVER again becomes a terrorist safe haven”. In comments praising the deal, US President Joe Biden described the Doha-based talks as “one of the toughest negotiations I have ever experienced”. He added that the agreement would “halt the fighting in Gaza, surge much needed-humanitarian assistance to Palestinian civilians, and reunite the hostages with their families after more than 15 months in captivity”. (Source: FT.com)

 

11 Jan 25. Iran’s IRGC unveils new underground missile base: Report. Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) has unveiled a new underground missile base, local media reported.

Footage broadcast by state-run IRIB TV on Friday night showed the facility, described as a “missile city,” being unveiled in the presence of IRGC Commander Hossein Salami and Amir-Ali Hajizadeh, head of the IRGC’s Aerospace Force.

The base houses advanced Iranian missiles, including the “Emad, Qadr and Qiam,” all liquid-fueled, the state TV narrator said. The subterranean facility is one of hundreds of such bases belonging to the IRGC’s Aerospace Force, reports Xinhua news agency, quoting IRIB.

The footage indicated missiles from the base were used in Iran’s second retaliatory military operation against Israel in October last year.

Salami, during a visit to the base, praised its forces for their involvement in the April 14, 2024, and subsequent October operations against Israel. He said Iran’s defence systems and missiles were “increasing on a daily basis in different parts of the country.”

He dismissed “enemy” claims that Iran’s missile production capacity had been disrupted, asserting that the country’s missiles were “increasing and improving every day in terms of quantity as well as quality, efficiency and design.”

On October 1, 2024, Iran launched dozens of ballistic missiles at Israel, calling the attack retaliation for the assassinations of key resistance figures, including Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, and senior Iranian commander Abbas Nilforoushan.

Meanwhile, recently, the Iranian forces also staged an exercise after American news website Axios reported that US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan presented US President Joe Biden with options for a potential US attack on Iranian nuclear facilities “should the Iranians move towards a nuclear weapon before January 20, 2025.”

Iran’s armed forces began a large-scale joint air defence exercise near the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in central Isfahan province last week.

The “Eqtedar” (Power) 1403 exercise was launched on the orders of Khatam al-Anbia Air Defense Base Commander Qader Rahimzadeh, IRIB TV said.

The first phase involves Aerospace Force units of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) conducting “all-out point defence of the nuclear site against numerous aerial threats under tough electronic warfare conditions,” according to IRIB.

IRGC spokesman Ali-Mohammad Naeini said on Monday that the annual drills aim to maintain and improve military preparedness, counter potential military threats and acts of sabotage, and boost national morale.

(Source: Google/IANS)

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