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Military And Security Developments
Jul 03.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
IRAN
- Iran is likely attempting to leverage restrictions on international nuclear monitors to gain broader concessions during negotiations with the US, compounding regional tensions.
- Commercially available satellite imagery indicates that Iran has initiated assessment and repair operations at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP, Qom province), sustaining regional tensions.
- Iran has continued to engage in a widespread counter-espionage campaign; arrests targeting foreign nationals are likely to increase regional tensions.
- Iran will likely adopt legislation intensifying penalties for espionage and collaboration with Israel and the US, compounding human rights concerns.
ISRAEL
- A ceasefire in the coming three weeks is a realistic possibility, though challenges from far-right politicians are likely to prevent a permanent deal.
- The prospects of a ceasefire and hostage-release deal will likely increase protests throughout Israel in the coming days.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- Substantial Hamas infrastructure in Hebron (Hebron governorate, West Bank) indicates a growing militant presence in the southern West Bank; this will drive the risk of attacks.
- Allegations that Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) staff have routinely shot at Palestinian civilians attempting to access aid in Gaza will increase human rights concerns amid sustained reputational risks.
RED SEA
- Nothing significant to report
IRAN
- Iran is likely attempting to leverage restrictions on international nuclear monitors to gain broader concessions during negotiations with the US, compounding regional tensions. On 2 July, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian approved a law limiting Iran’s co-operation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Under the law, IAEA inspectors will be unable to enter Iran unless granted explicit permission by the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC); the law also conditions broader co-operation with the IAEA on the agency’s recognition of Iran’s ‘right to enrich uranium’. However, and also on 2 July, the IAEA stated that it had not received formal notification of the suspension and that its inspectors within Iran had not been asked to leave the country. This likely indicates that Iran does not seek to restrict all IAEA activity within its territory immediately. Rather, Iran likely seeks to leverage variable restrictions on IAEA monitoring operations during potential negotiations with the US to maximise concessions vis-à-vis its nuclear programme. Even so, restrictions on IAEA monitoring capabilities will highly likely compound international concerns regarding the continuity of assessments, as well as possible Iranian efforts to re-develop its nuclear programme rapidly at undisclosed sites. Should Iran broadly restrict IAEA monitoring operations in the coming weeks, negotiations with the US are unlikely to progress meaningfully, moderating prospects for a comprehensive agreement in the short-to-medium term. France and/or the UK will also possibly initiate efforts to trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)’s snapback clause – which would re-impose UN sanctions on Iran for violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – in the event of continued restrictions. These measures will highly likely sustain significant economic pressure on Iran, driving the risk of unrest in major cities, as well as sanction-exposure risks for regionally engaged firms.
- Commercially available satellite imagery indicates that Iran has initiated assessment and repair operations at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP, Qom province), sustaining regional tensions. On 1 July, satellite imagery showed that the Iranian authorities have initiated efforts to fill in penetration points at the FFEP facility, with bulldozers possibly indicating nascent efforts to re-establish access to the facility. While it is highly unlikely that the FFEP remains operational at present, continued Iranian assessments and potential repair efforts will highly likely exacerbate tensions with the US due to concerns that Iran intends to reconstitute its nuclear capabilities (rapidly) without international monitoring (see above). If Iran makes demonstrable steps towards repairing and reconstituting its uranium-enrichment capabilities in the coming months, bilateral negotiations with the US are unlikely to progress meaningfully, increasing the risk of limited Israeli airstrikes targeting nuclear facilities that are subject to repair or expansion efforts. While any such airstrikes are unlikely to escalate rapidly into a resumption of the Iran-Israel war, continued diplomatic stasis will almost certainly sustain elevated regional tensions linked to Tehran’s nuclear programme in the coming weeks.
- Iran has continued to engage in a widespread counter-espionage campaign; arrests targeting foreign nationals are likely to increase regional tensions. Throughout the reporting period, Iran has arrested dozens of individuals on suspicion of ties to foreign intelligence services and ‘hostile states’. On 30 June, a judiciary spokesperson announced that the authorities had arrested an unspecified number of individuals accused of spying for Israel, including ‘European nationals’. Although no further details have emerged regarding the alleged arrests, the statement highlights substantially elevated risks of surveillance, harassment and detention for foreign and dual nationals, particularly those linked to entities with a presence in Israel. Separately, on 3 July, international media reported that the Iranian authorities plan to charge two French nationals arrested in 2022 with crimes that include spying for Israel and plotting to overthrow the government; these charges can carry the death penalty. Iran is highly likely to leverage the detention of European nationals to gain diplomatic and financial concessions from France, particularly amid elevated tensions linked to Iranian espionage operations and proxy activity in Europe (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 27 June 2025).
- Iran has also likely intensified its repression campaign against ethno-religious minorities amid broader concerns of an imminent uptick in secessionist militant activity. On 1 July, the Tasnim media outlet announced that the authorities had killed two individuals and detained 50 others in Sistan and Baluchistan province due to their connections to a ‘mercenary terrorist element’. This likely refers to these individuals’ possible connection to Baloch separatist groups, including the Jaish al-Adl militant group. In the coming months, concerns over a resurgence in secessionist activity by Iran’s numerous ethno-religious minorities, particularly ethnic-Arabs, -Azeris and -Balochs, will likely trigger further mass arrests. Intensifying repressive tactics will likely increase threats to local staff, while also compounding longer-term ethno-religious tensions, as well as the risk of domestic unrest and secessionist militant activity, particularly in Sistan and Baluchistan.
ISRAEL
- A ceasefire in the coming three weeks is a realistic possibility, though challenges from far-right politicians are likely to prevent a permanent deal. In recent days, Israel approved a framework for a US-proposed 60-day ceasefire in which a total of ten living and 18 deceased hostages will be exchanged over five separate release dates. Currently, Israeli intelligence agencies assess that there are approximately 20 living Israeli hostages in Gaza (as well as 30 deceased). In exchange, Israel will release an undisclosed number of Palestinian prisoners, withdraw IDF troops from pre-agreed areas in northern and southern Gaza and increase aid deliveries in collaboration with the UN and Red Crescent. Additionally, the US has assured that talks will be held to end the war, but that Israel will not need to commit to ceasing military operations permanently in advance. Hamas will likely reply to the framework over the weekend; the temporary nature of the ceasefire is likely to be a key sticking point. Even if both sides agree to the framework, further negotiations to set guarantees and mechanisms are likely to take place in the coming week, prolonging the talks. Furthermore, Israel’s far-right minister of national security, Itamar Ben-Gvir, already announced his opposition to the deal; he is seeking to form a bloc with Israel’s finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich. As such, and while Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will likely be able to secure assent to the agreement on the grounds that it is not a permanent ceasefire, talks designed to secure a full end to the conflict are likely to face substantial resistance. With Netanyahu scheduled to visit the White House in Washington DC (US) on 7 July, there is a realistic possibility that a ceasefire deal will be reached in the coming three weeks.
- The prospects of a ceasefire and hostage-release deal will likely increase protests throughout Israel in the coming days. Large crowds are likely to attend protests in favour of a hostage-release deal in the coming days, particularly in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) on the eve of 5 July. Counter-protests against a deal are possible, elevating the risk of clashes. These risks will be elevated in urban centres in Central district, as well as outside Tel Aviv city and in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district). Despite the likely growth in protest attendance in the coming days, demonstrations are likely to remain largely peaceful; we assess the risks will be largely confined to localised travel disruption.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- Substantial Hamas infrastructure in Hebron (Hebron governorate, West Bank) indicates a growing militant presence in the southern West Bank; this will drive the risk of attacks. On 29 June, Israel’s internal security agency (the Shin Bet) revealed that, over the past three months, it has identified and dismantled a substantial Hamas terror cell in the West Bank; it has also arrested over 60 members in Hebron. The Shin Bet claims this was the largest such cell uncovered in a decade and that most of its members were previously prisoners in Israeli jails. The cell worked to recruit, arm and train residents in the area to carry out small arms and IED attacks against Israeli targets. The infrastructure highlights growing efforts by militants to expand their presence and influence throughout the West Bank outside their traditional northern strongholds (mainly around Jenin, Qalqilya, Tubas and Tulkarm governorates). Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations across the West Bank are likely to remain elevated in the coming days, particularly in the event of the prospective release of Palestinian prisoners amid a ceasefire agreement (see above). These operations will elevate the risk of armed clashes between troops and militants across the West Bank, increasing bystanders’ exposure to crossfire and/or the risk of misidentification by IDF personnel. The risk of militant and radicalised sole-perpetrator attacks against Israeli targets, particularly along roads, near settlements and in the vicinity of IDF positions, will also remain elevated in the coming days.
- Allegations that Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) staff have routinely shot at Palestinian civilians attempting to access aid in Gaza will increase human rights concerns amid sustained reputational risks. On 3 July, the Associated Press reported that several GHF subcontractors have claimed that GHF personnel managing aid distribution sites routinely employ live ammunition and stun grenades to disperse unarmed Palestinians trying to access aid supplies. The report comes after the Ha’aretz media outlet published accounts from unnamed IDF personnel indicating that similar incidents had occurred during IDF operations in closed military zones surrounding GHF facilities (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 30 June 2025). The reports underscore the critical threats to life for individuals attempting to access aid in Gaza, particularly at GHF distribution sites; this risk also extends to NGO personnel, particularly those operating in close proximity to GHF sites and supply chains. In the coming weeks, continued shooting incidents are highly likely to compound reputational concerns for entities associated with the GHF, particularly donors, subcontractors and service providers. Although pro-Palestine activism groups (including Palestine Action and the Palestine Youth Movement) will likely continue to prioritise targeting weapons manufacturers linked to the Israeli government, activist groups will also possibly intensify their efforts to identify and target entities associated with the GHF in the coming weeks. High-profile individuals associated with the GHF and the Israeli security forces more broadly will also face increased risks of targeted harassment and violence in the coming weeks (particularly in the US), increasing personal safety concerns.
RED SEA
- Nothing significant to report
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
- UK: A vote in favour of designating the radical pro-Palestine group Palestine Action as a terrorist entity will raise the risk of covert sabotage and reactionary protests. On 2 July, UK MPs voted in support of a government proposal to proscribe the radical pro-Palestine group Palestine Action under the Terrorism Act 2000. The changes will become law at 0000hrs (local time) on 9 July in the likely event that the House of Lords also approves the legislation. We assess that prior to the ban, the group’s ‘disruptive tactics’ will likely continue on trend, with protests and acts of sabotage widely circulated on social media. These tactics will possibly include demonstrations in the coming week in front of UK and international corporations in London that deal with the Israeli government and/or related entities, increasing the likelihood of low-level scuffles in central areas. Once the legislation comes into force, Palestine Action will likely adapt its tactics and carry out more covert, non-attributable acts of sabotage. Furthermore, we assess that the group will continue to prioritise targeting the Israeli defence company Elbit Systems, as well as its UK-based supply chain and production facilities. Lower-level risks of attempted vandalism will also persist vis-à-vis the local offices of firms that are allegedly connected to the Israeli defence industry, such as Allianz Insurance and the French multinational Thales. Palestine Action activists will likely increasingly attempt to operate via proxy groups, as well as to infiltrate legitimate protest movements to radicalise participants therein, increasing security risks during pro-Palestine marches in the UK.
- Norway-Israel: A Norwegian pension fund’s divestment from companies dealing with the IDF underlines rising compliance and reputational risks facing foreign investors in the Israeli market. On 30 June, Norway’s largest pension fund, KLP, announced that it would divest from two companies that sell equipment to the IDF that is allegedly used in Gaza. The two companies (the US’ Oshkosh Corporation and Germany’s ThyssenKrupp) produce military vehicles, among other products. This comes a month after Norway’s sovereign wealth fund stated it would divest from Israel’s Paz Retail and Energy Ltd due to the company’s involvement in supplying infrastructure and fuel to illegal Israeli settlements. As such, we assess that further Norwegian pension funds and companies will likely also divest from global entities (possibly including banks) that deal with the IDF and Israeli settlers through H2 2025. More broadly, there is also a realistic possibility that other European pension funds will implement similar measures, further exacerbating compliance risks for entities and individual investors engaged in Israel. These risks will continue to be elevated as long as the Israel-Hamas war protracts and humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip continue to deteriorate over the coming months.
- Egypt-Israel: Cross-border weapon smuggling will sustain the risk of misfire. On 1 July, the IDF intercepted and confiscated a drone carrying ten small arms that had crossed into Israeli territory from Egypt’s Sinai peninsula. On the same day, the IDF also apprehended the driver of a suspicious vehicle in the same border area, seizing an additional 14 small arms. While no further details were disclosed, the incidents highlight the persistent threat of weapon and drug smuggling along Israel’s border with Egypt; it is highly likely that Bedouin clans operating across the border are conducting this activity. While daily security co-ordination between the Egyptian military and the IDF remains stable, such incidents will sustain the risk of miscommunication and misfire by both militaries, which in turn will increase the risk of clashes and collateral damage along the entirety of the border.
- Israel-Syria: IDF operations against Iranian-backed militants in southern Syria are unlikely to undermine security talks with Damascus critically. On 2 July, the IDF arrested several members of an Iranian-backed terror cell in the villages of Ain al-Basali and Umm al-Luqs (both Quneitra governorate, Syria); they also seized small arms and grenades. This comes a month after two militias operating in the region separately claimed responsibility for launching two Grad rockets at Israel’s Golan Heights. One of these groups, Kataib Awli al-Bass, is part of the Iranian-linked Islamic Resistance Front, while the other, the Martyr Mohammed al-Deif Brigades, is relatively new. The recent IDF operation underscores sustained security and armed conflict risks in the Quneitra border area, where Damascus still does not enjoy full control and the IDF maintains a military presence, including through daily incursions. The operation also comes amid ongoing security agreement negotiations between Israel and Syria. There is a realistic possibility that Iranian-affiliated militants planned to attack IDF troops to sabotage the security talks. While such attacks are unlikely to impact the talks significantly, they will likely delay their implementation. Further IDF operations in the vicinity of the two aforementioned villages are likely in the coming days, as are Israeli airstrikes targeting weapon depots and military locations across Syria in the coming weeks. Retaliation against Israel’s operations by rogue Islamist factions and Iranian-backed militants remains possible, driving the risk of sporadic clashes with IDF troops in southern Syria. The fragile security situation in southern Syria (including Daraa governorate) means that the risk of misfire between the IDF and Syrian government forces will increase in the event of much deeper Israeli incursions.
Jul 02.
- Israel-Palestinian Territories: New ceasefire is realistic possibility, though challenges will remain. On 1 July, US President Donald Trump announced that Israel agreed to the ‘necessary conditions’ to finalise a 60-day ceasefire in Gaza. However, neither Israel nor Hamas have yet officially confirmed agreement to the deal’s conditions. The announcement likely refers to an agreed framework in an advanced stage, meaning that certain mechanisms in the deal are likely still not fully discussed or agreed upon by either or both parties. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is scheduled to meet Trump at the White House later next week on 7 July. As such, it is unlikely that a ceasefire will happen before then, though a ceasefire in the coming three weeks remains a realistic possibility. Even so, remaining sticking points, such as guarantees to both sides, as well as the question of Hamas’s survival in Gaza, will likely continue presenting challenges for a full, durable ceasefire in Gaza. We assess that failure to reach an agreement will likely prompt intensification and expansion of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations in Gaza, elevating security risks throughout the Strip.
Jun 31.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
IRAN
- Efforts to resume US-Iran negotiations have stalled, undermining prospects for an agreement in the short term.
- Amid increasing international tensions, there is a realistic possibility that Iran will resume uranium-enrichment activity in the coming months, increasing the likelihood of Israeli strikes.
- Increasing Iranian hostility towards the IAEA will undermine prospects for bi- and multi-lateral negotiations on Tehran’s nuclear programme.
- Iran will likely adopt legislation intensifying penalties for espionage and collaboration with Israel and the US, compounding human rights concerns.
ISRAEL
- Pro-hostage-release protests are likely to increase in the coming week; growing far-right sentiment will elevate the risk of violent altercations.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- The uptick in clashes between Israeli settlers and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) over the past week has increased security and attack risks in the West Bank.
- IDF operations in Gaza continue at pace, with allegations of further shooting incidents targeting civilians near aid sites underscoring critical threats to locally engaged staff.
- Clashes between Hamas and armed clans will likely continue escalating in the coming weeks, compounding the risk of armed conflict in Gaza.
RED SEA
- Houthi missile strikes against Israel continue, though a resumption of attacks on naval vessels remains unlikely in the coming weeks.
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Nothing significant to report
IRAN
- Efforts to resume US-Iran negotiations have stalled, undermining prospects for an agreement in the short term. On 27 June, US President Donald Trump stated that he would consider conducting further airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities if ‘necessary’. In response, Iran’s deputy foreign minister stated on 29 June that Iran would not engage in further negotiations with the US, unless Washington DC committed to not conducting any further strikes within Iranian territory during any such talks. The US is highly unlikely to agree to this condition publicly; on 30 June, Trump stated that the US was not engaging in negotiations with Iran or ‘offering them anything’. These statements underscore diminishing prospects for sustained bilateral negotiations and the establishment of a nuclear agreement in the short term. Amid rising concerns regarding the status of Iran’s nuclear programme (see below), failure to reach an agreement would increase the likelihood of Israel resuming strike action targeting Iranian nuclear facilities, exacerbating regional tensions and increasing the risk of conflict re-escalation. Should the diplomatic deadlock persist, France and/or the UK would also possibly initiate efforts to trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)’s snapback clause, which would re-impose UN sanctions on Iran for violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
- Amid increasing international tensions, there is a realistic possibility that Iran will resume uranium-enrichment activity in the coming months, increasing the likelihood of Israeli strikes. On 26 June, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Rafael Grossi stated that centrifuges at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) are no longer operational following US and Israeli airstrikes; as the FFEP produced the majority of Iran’s medium-enriched uranium, critical damage at the facility would highly likely delay Iran’s breakout time towards developing a nuclear weapon. However, on 29 June, Grossi noted that Iranian nuclear facilities had not experienced ‘total damage’ and that enrichment activity could theoretically resume within months. Grossi also stated that the Iranian authorities possibly moved stocks of low- and medium-enriched uranium from declared locations during the Iran-Israel war, and that its stockpiles are currently unaccounted for. Grossi’s statement comes amid increasing international speculation that US and Israeli airstrikes targeting Iranian nuclear facilities failed to disable Iran’s nuclear capabilities critically. Although Iran’s ability to develop (rapidly) stocks of highly enriched uranium and to produce a nuclear weapon has likely been substantially degraded, there is a realistic possibility that Iran will attempt to leverage its remaining stockpiles and resume enrichment activity in the coming months. While enrichment would likely rely on slower and less efficient centrifuges in smaller-scale facilities, a resumption of this activity would almost certainly compound regional tensions and increase the likelihood of resumed Israeli strike action. On 27 June, commercially available satellite imagery showed that reconstruction efforts at the Natanz facility (which includes two uranium-enrichment sites) had possibly begun; further activity around this site and the FFEP would increase the likelihood of limited Israeli strikes targeting these locations in the short term.
- Increasing Iranian hostility towards the IAEA will undermine prospects for bi- and multi-lateral negotiations on Tehran’s nuclear programme. On 26 June, Iran’s Guardian Council approved a parliamentary proposal to suspend co-operation with the IAEA, stating that further co-operation should only occur if the agency recognises Iran’s ‘right’ to enrich uranium domestically. The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) must approve the bill for it to come into force. In the coming weeks, there is a realistic possibility that the SNSC will vote to restrict (partially) co-operation with the agency. If the SNSC votes to approve the proposal, this will highly likely compound international concerns regarding the status and operationality of Iran’s nuclear programme, increasing regional tensions. Such restrictions would also increase the likelihood of France and/or the UK triggering the snapback clause under the JCPOA (see above). Regardless of whether the SNSC approves the proposal in the short term, we assess that Iran is highly likely to continue restricting IAEA monitors’ access to nuclear facilities, sustaining oversight concerns. On 27 June, the government-linked, ultra-conservative Kayhan news outlet published claims that Grossi is an Israeli agent and should be executed, while Iran’s foreign ministry stated on 30 June it would be unable to guarantee the ‘security of agency [IAEA] inspectors’. Increasing hostility towards IAEA personnel will likely further limit the agency’s operations within Iran, compounding oversight concerns and undermining prospects for further negotiations between Iran, the US and JCPOA signatories.
- Iran will likely adopt legislation intensifying penalties for espionage and collaboration with Israel and the US, compounding human rights concerns. On 29 June, Iranian state media released details of a legislative proposal that would significantly increase penalties for espionage and collaboration with ‘hostile countries’, including Israel and the US. The bill stipulates that cases of espionage or collaboration will be heard by a special branch of the Revolutionary Courts and will possibly carry the death penalty as punishment. Iran’s Revolutionary Courts prosecute individuals accused of opposing the government on ideological grounds and operate without juries or a defence council; the courts frequently issue harsh sentences (including the death penalty) based on confessions, which anti-government activists allege are routinely obtained through torture and duress. The media release comes amid a broader uptick in Iranian efforts to identify and prosecute individuals accused of collaborating with Israel, particularly during the Iran-Israel war. Since 13 June, Iran has reportedly arrested over 700 individuals suspected of collaborating with Israel; the state has executed at least six individuals convicted of espionage since then, including three on 25 June. The Iranian legislature is highly likely to adopt the legislation in the coming days, compounding human rights concerns and raising the likelihood of a further uptick in executions in the coming months. Individuals suspected of maintaining links to Israel, the US and/or allied states face significantly elevated risks of prosecution under the law; the risk of surveillance, harassment and detention extends to family members and associates of targeted individuals.
ISRAEL
- Pro-hostage-release protests are likely to increase in the coming week; increasing far-right sentiment will elevate the risk of violent altercations. Following the end of the Iran-Israel war, Israeli opposition politicians and pro-ceasefire activists have escalated calls for an end to the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza (Palestinian Territories) and the finalisation of a complete hostage-release deal. Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations are currently at an official deadlock. However, activists and politicians are hoping that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will use some of the political capital he has gained from Israel’s military success against Iran to accept an agreement that is possibly less popular among his right-wing base. Activists’ willingness to mobilise is likely to have been compounded by their assessment that Israel will possibly look to seize the opportunity stemming from Tehran’s weakened capacity to support Hamas following its war with Israel, which will consequently pressurise the group to secure a ceasefire. In addition to these factors, there is also increasing pressure from international partners, including US President Donald Trump. However, Israel has yet to decide whether to send a delegation to another round of ceasefire talks that will likely be held in Egypt or Qatar; there are still significant sticking points amid negotiations, including those related to preventing Hamas’ rearmament. As such, further delays are likely, which will drive hostage-release demonstrations across Israel in the coming week, particularly in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). However, Israel’s military operations in Iran have possibly further emboldened right-wing activists; they possibly also contributed to increasing far-right violent activities in the West Bank (Palestinian Territories) in the past week (see below). Such sentiment will also elevate the risk of clashes with pro-ceasefire protesters during demonstrations. The risk of violent altercations is higher in cities in Central district, as well as outside Tel Aviv and in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district).
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- The uptick in clashes between Israeli settlers and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) over the past week has increased security and attack risks in the West Bank. Overnight on 30 June, Israeli far-right activists and Israeli settlers held violent protests in front of the Binyamin Regional Brigade military base near Beit El (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate). Demonstrators threw rocks, sprayed troops with mace, slashed the tires of military vehicles and tried to break into the base, prompting the police to deploy stun grenades. On the same night, Israeli settlers also set fire to an Israeli security installation in the same area, causing over ILS 3 m (approximately USD 890,000) in damages. The incidents come amid a broader spike in settler violence against IDF troops. On 28 June, approximately 40 far-right Israelis clashed with IDF troops near a recently evacuated illegal settlement close to Ramallah (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate), resulting in the arrest of six individuals. These incidents have been largely concentrated near the Palestinian village of Kafr Malik (Ramallah and al-Bireh), which settlers attacked earlier last week and have continued to target (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 26 June 2025). An Israeli military official has claimed that a large proportion of those involved in the riots are not West Bank residents, signalling increased involvement from, and radicalisation among, Israeli far-right groups. Further clashes are likely in the coming days, particularly close to IDF positions in Ramallah and al-Bireh. If such clashes increase in frequency, there is a realistic possibility the IDF will adopt a more robust posture, elevating the risk of bystanders’ exposure to firearms. There is also a realistic possibility that elevated tensions will prompt the IDF to reduce their presence around Israeli settlements in the West Bank in the coming days, elevating these settlements’ exposure to Palestinian militant attacks.
- IDF operations in Gaza continue at pace, with allegations of further shooting incidents targeting civilians near aid sites underscoring critical threats to locally engaged staff. On 28 June, the IDF issued evacuation orders for the Gaza City and Jabalia areas in central Gaza amid intensifying ground operations and airstrikes in the area. The IDF later announced that an airstrike in Gaza City had killed Hakem al-Issa, a high-ranking Hamas commander who participated in the planning of the 7 October 2023 attacks. The IDF will highly likely continue intensifying their operations in the Gaza City and Jabalia areas in the coming days, likely disrupting efforts to distribute aid in the northern central Gaza area. More broadly, the Hamas-controlled Gazan health ministry has continued to publish numerous reports of IDF personnel killing civilians in the immediate vicinity of aid distribution points; the ministry alleges that IDF personnel have shot and killed over 500 civilians since the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) began operating in late May. The IDF disputes this claim, though it has confirmed that at least 19 shooting incidents have taken place during this time period (it generally characterises such incidents as warning shots). However, on 27 June, the Ha’aretz newspaper published accounts from unnamed IDF personnel alleging that they were given orders to shoot at unarmed civilians near aid distribution points, even when no threat was present. The IDF denies this allegation but has confirmed that it launched a probe into potential war crimes in relation to shooting incidents near GHF sites. Allegations of war crimes will highly likely compound reputational concerns for Israeli-linked companies, particularly weapons manufacturers, as well as engineering, shipping and logistics firms providing goods and services to the Israeli government. The risk of targeted and pro-Palestine activism will also increase, elevating the likelihood of site infiltration, vandalism and operational disruption.
- Clashes between Hamas and armed clans will likely continue escalating in the coming weeks, compounding the risk of armed conflict in Gaza. On 26 June, members of the Barbakh clan clashed with Hamas’ Sahm Unit in the vicinity of the Nasser Hospital in Khan Yunis, triggering fires within the hospital facility. The Sahm Unit operates as Hamas’ de facto police force and civil enforcement branch. Local media reports indicate that the clashes escalated after Sahm Unit personnel killed a Barbakh clan member and took shelter inside the hospital. Following the incident, militants affiliated with the anti-Hamas Abu Shabab militia stated that Hamas’ use of medical facilities renders these locations legitimate targets, increasing the risk of inter-militia clashes in and around medical facilities the coming weeks. The aforementioned shooting incident underscores armed clans’ increasing willingness to challenge Hamas’ authority, as well as their efforts to engage in civil enforcement. In the coming weeks, hostilities between Hamas, anti-Hamas armed groups and Gaza’s numerous armed clans will likely continue escalating, increasing the risk of decentralised clashes outside the IDF’s area of operations and compounding bystander risks, particularly for NGO personnel working in medical facilities. Casualties from these clashes will also increase the risk of cyclical retaliatory attacks, increasing threats to local staff, particularly those with familial links to clans engaging in hostilities with Hamas and allied militants.
RED SEA
- Houthi missile strikes against Israel continue, though a resumption of attacks on naval vessels remains unlikely in the coming weeks. The Houthis launched a ballistic missile towards Beersheba (Southern district) on 28 June. It was intercepted by the IDF outside Israeli airspace. Houthi attacks against Israel decreased during the Iran-Israel war. However, the Houthis are likely to continue targeting Israel in the coming weeks; they will likely gradually increase the frequency of strikes. Even so, Israeli air defences remain capable and are currently not stretched across multiple fronts, mitigating against significant security risks across Israel. The Houthis are currently unlikely to resume attacks in the Red Sea. In the event that the Iran-Israel war resumes, the risk of a resumption in such strikes will increase, though this remains unlikely due to the threat of a resumption in US strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen.
- Syria-US: Sanctions relief will moderate socio-economic health, energy security risks. On 30 June, US President Donald Trump signed an executive order ending the majority of economic sanctions on Syria. The order also directs the US Secretary of State to review Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)’s designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO). Sanctions targeting terrorist groups such as Islamic State (IS), associates of the former president – Bashar al-Assad – and manufacturers of captagon will remain in place. The sanctions relief will likely ease restrictions on the financial services sector, decreasing compliance and regulatory framework risks for international businesses, while also creating incentives for investment and increasing capital inflow. This will highly likely support the reconstruction of key energy and critical infrastructure projects, reducing energy security risks and moderating business operational and supply chain disruption in the long term. The removal of sanctions will also likely support the delivery of aid and local redevelopment efforts, moderating long-term socio-economic health risks in Syria. In turn, we assess this is likely to support government continuity, moderating the risk of domestic unrest in the coming months.
- Lebanon: Further crackdowns on terrorist cells are likely, increasing country-wide security risks. On 30 June, the security forces announced that they arrested a terrorist cell planning to conduct attacks on the local Shia community during the upcoming Ashura religious festival (5-6 July). The authorities added that the plot was tied to a wider plan by local jihadist organisations to launch synchronised attacks all over the country. Notably, this comes days after the authorities arrested a suspected Islamic State (IS) cell leader in Lebanon and confiscated weapons and drone-making equipment. We assess that further crackdowns by the Lebanese security forces are likely in the coming weeks, particularly in Tripoli (North governorate), driving sporadic armed clashes and increasing bystanders’ exposure to crossfire. This will, in turn, increase the likelihood of retaliatory attacks by local jihadist cells against security personnel. As such, we assess that security and bystander risks across the country will remain elevated throughout July, particularly around military facilities and checkpoints, as well as in the vicinity of churches and Shia shrines.
Jun 30.
- Iran-US: Persisting negotiations deadlock will increase risk of conflict resumption. On 29 June, Iran’s deputy foreign minister stated that Tehran would not engage in further negotiations with the US unless Washington pledged to refrain from carrying out additional strikes within Iranian territory. Subsequently, on 30 June, US President Donald Trump stated that the US was not engaging in negotiations with Iran or offering any deals. These statements reduce the likelihood of an imminent resumption of the nuclear talks and an interim deal in the coming month, amid persistent deadlock. We assess that any failure to reach such a deal in the coming months or evidence of progress in the coming weeks will subsequently increase the risks of a resumption of Israeli attacks against the Iranian nuclear and military facilities; this will, in turn, elevate risks of Iranian retaliatory strikes. Furthermore, the current deadlock also increases risks that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s (JCPOA) snapback clause will be triggered by Europe; this would re-impose UN sanctions on Iran for violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). (Source: Sibylline)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
A CNIM Group Company
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