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NEWS IN BRIEF – MIDDLE EAST – CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Jun 27.

Israel-Syria: Ongoing talks will likely result in interim security deal. On 25 June, Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa confirmed that his government is engaging in indirect talks with Israel to halt the latter’s incursions in southern Syria. Al-Sharaa’s statement came during a meeting with clan leaders from Quneitra governorate, where the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) had been conducting weekly incursions since January. The statement comes days after Israel’s National Security Council chief, Tzachi Hanegbi, confirmed the ongoing security talks. As such, we assess that these negotiations will likely result in an interim security deal with Israel. This deal will possibly involve high-level co-ordination concerning rogue Islamist groups in southern Syria as well as Iran-tied smuggling networks along the borders. There is also a realistic possibility that any such deal will involve guarantees by regional mediators such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Nevertheless, we assess that this deal is unlikely to evolve into full normalisation this year, given substantial opposition to such a move within Al-Sharaa’s Islamist base in the country.

Jun 26.

IRAN

  • The US announced that the ceasefire between Iran and Israel has reduced the risk of conflict in the coming weeks, though regional tensions remain significantly elevated.
  • Despite international speculation, US airstrikes likely substantially damaged the targeted Iranian nuclear facilities, moderating prospects for their rapid reparation.
  • The US and Iran will likely resume nuclear negotiations in the coming weeks, though sustained regional tensions will moderate the prospects for a comprehensive agreement in the short term.
  • Iran’s legislature passed a non-binding bill to suspend co-operation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reflecting efforts to maximise leverage during negotiations.
  • Iran has begun restoring internet connectivity, though the risk of digital surveillance and detention will remain substantially elevated in the coming weeks.

ISRAEL, GAZA AND THE WEST BANK

  • Israeli officials’ framing of the Iran-Israel war’s success will reduce the prospects for a unilateral and unprovoked resumption of the conflict in the coming weeks.
  • Clashes between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) / Israeli settlers and Palestinians in the West Bank (Palestinian Territories) will sustain elevated attack risks.
  • The suspension of aid into northern Gaza will exacerbate food security and public health risks; the seizure of aid by militants will elevate bystander risks around aid distribution centres.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • The resumption of Israeli gas field operations will ease energy security risks for Egypt and Jordan.
  • Further anti-Israel boycott measures through H2 2025 are likely amid sustained Israeli operations in Gaza and the West Bank.

IRAN

  • The US announced that the ceasefire between Iran and Israel has reduced the risk of conflict in the coming weeks, though regional tensions remain significantly elevated. On 23 June, US President Donald Trump announced that Israel and Iran had agreed to a bilateral ceasefire, which came into effect on 24 June. This followed shortly after an Iranian missile strike on a US airbase in Qatar, which US President Donald Trump characterised as a ‘very weak’ face-saving measure that was necessary for de-escalation (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 23 June 2025). Despite the authorities in Iran and Israel indicating they would observe the ceasefire, Iran launched a ballistic missile towards Israel after the ceasefire came into force, triggering an Israeli airstrike targeting a radar facility in northern Tehran province (Iran). Following this exchange, however, neither Iran nor Israel has engaged in further hostilities. The agreement remains in place, though it remains highly sensitive to allegations of non-compliance and violations in the coming days and weeks. Nonetheless, the US will likely continue to apply significant diplomatic pressure on both parties to comply with the agreement to moderate regional tensions and disruption to global energy markets. As such, re-escalation into armed conflict remains unlikely in the short term. Even so, Israel will almost certainly continue to scrutinise Iran’s military and nuclear operations intensely in the coming weeks. Iranian attempts to re-develop, re-constitute or re-locate nuclear assets rapidly will increase the risk of limited Israeli airstrikes targeting nuclear facilities, particularly in the event of a broader breakdown in nuclear negotiations with the US (see below). In response to limited airstrikes, there is a realistic possibility that Iran would conduct a limited drone or missile attack targeting Israel, though a sustained offensive remains unlikely. In the short term, neither Iran nor Israel is likely to seek rapid re-escalation, moderating the risk of armed conflict despite sustained regional tensions.
  • Despite international speculation, US airstrikes likely substantially damaged the targeted Iranian nuclear facilities, moderating prospects for their rapid reparation. On 25 June, several US media outlets reported that a preliminary assessment by the US’ Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) indicated that the US strikes on the Fordow enrichment facility (Qom province, Iran) had not destroyed core components of Iran’s nuclear programme and had only delayed its progress by ‘a few months’. This reported assessment contrasts statements made by President Trump, who has repeatedly indicated that the strikes ‘obliterated’ the facility and set back Tehran’s capabilities by ‘decades’. However, on 26 June, CIA director John Ratcliffe stated that the programme has been ‘severely damaged’, reflecting similar statements made by the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Commercially available satellite imagery of the Fordow facility indicates that at least six Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOPs, or ‘bunker busters’) penetrated the facility; they likely targeted structurally weak points such as entrance/exit points or air vents. This likely indicates that the munitions detonated within the facility. While MOP detonation is unlikely to have destroyed the facility’s centrifuge hall entirely, shockwaves radiating from the point of impact likely damaged the centrifuges’ fragile structure, as well as adjacent infrastructure (e.g. electricity supply systems, control equipment and cooling mechanisms), limiting their operationality. There is also a realistic possibility that the explosions triggered limited internal collapses or secondary explosions within the facility, limiting access to centrifuge halls and increasing the costs associated with potential repairs. Iran likely retains the technical capabilities to repair the facility. However, its willingness to engage in rapid reconstruction will likely remain contingent on the associated costs of such operations, the status of negotiations with the US and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran’s capacity to fill numerous vacancies, following Israel’s assassination campaign.
  • The US and Iran will likely resume nuclear negotiations in the coming weeks, though sustained regional tensions will moderate the prospects for a comprehensive agreement in the short term.  On 25 June, President Trump announced that the US and Iran would re-engage in nuclear negotiations in the coming days. While Trump did not specify a date for the meeting, it will likely take place in the coming two weeks and involve Omani mediation. While diplomatic re-engagement will likely moderate regional tensions in the short term, the dispute over Iran’s desire to maintain domestic uranium enrichment capabilities will likely act as a sticking point in future talks. The US is highly likely to call for Iran to dismantle its enrichment facilities and abandon its domestic capabilities; however, Iran is unlikely to make unilateral concessions on this matter unless it perceives any critical threats to regime stability. As such, negotiations will likely face substantial risks of stalling or even breaking down in the coming weeks, unless Tehran moderates its position. Negotiations will also remain extremely sensitive to developments regarding Iran’s possible efforts to repair, reconstruct or further develop its nuclear facilities in the coming months, as well as the stability of the Iran-Israel ceasefire. Should negotiations fail to progress productively in the coming weeks, the likelihood of Israel conducting limited strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure will increase, elevating the risk of conflict re-escalation. Sustained regional tensions will likely moderate the prospects of the US and Iran reaching a comprehensive nuclear and sanctions-relief agreement in the short term, including an interim agreement before the expiration of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in October.
  • Iran’s legislature passed a non-binding bill to suspend co-operation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reflecting efforts to maximise leverage during negotiations. The Majles unanimously approved the bill on 25 June. The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) would need to approve the bill for it to enter into force; the SNSC will likely consider the proposal in the coming days, though it is unlikely to vote to suspend co-operation with the IAEA permanently in the short term. Even so, Iran is highly likely to continue restricting the IAEA’s access to nuclear facilities in the coming weeks, undermining the agency’s oversight, assessment and monitoring capabilities. These measures likely reflect Iranian efforts to increase leverage amid negotiations with the US. While the move will possibly strengthen Tehran’s position, concerns that Iran is concealing information regarding the status of its nuclear programme (especially in the absence of consistent monitoring) will likely undermine US confidence in negotiations, elevating the risk of deadlock. If negotiations fail to progress in the coming weeks, regional tensions will likely increase, elevating the likelihood of conflict re-escalation between Iran and Israel.
  • Iran has begun restoring internet connectivity, though the risk of digital surveillance and detention will remain substantially elevated in the coming weeks. On 25 June, Iran’s communications minister announced that internet connectivity would resume in the coming days, following a 13-day blackout during the Iran-Israel war. The resumption of internet services will likely moderate disruption to communications with on-the-ground staff in Iran. However, amid concerns that anti-government activists will leverage resumed access to internet platforms to mobilise protests and unrest, the authorities are highly likely to augment censorship, monitoring and surveillance efforts in the coming weeks. Individuals associated with anti-government activity and/or those with links to international entities (particularly those with operations in Europe, Israel and North America) will face significantly elevated risks of online surveillance, physical harassment and detention from the security forces. These efforts will also increase compliance concerns for firms operating within Iran, particularly those advertising via online platforms. More broadly, Iran is also highly likely to continue conducting mass arrests of individuals associated with anti-government activity (including family members and associates of targeted individuals). Such risks will be particularly acute for individuals who allegedly maintain links to Israel, particularly foreign nationals; since 13 June, the Iranian authorities have arrested at least 500 individuals associated with such activity, underscoring sustained human rights concerns and threats to locally engaged staff.

ISRAEL, GAZA AND THE WEST BANK 

  • Israeli officials’ framing of the Iran-Israel war’s success will reduce the prospects for a unilateral and unprovoked resumption of the conflict in the coming weeks. Since the announcement of the ceasefire between Iran and Israel on 23 June, Israeli officials have made numerous statements claiming that military operations succeeded in surpassing already-heightened conflict objectives. As a full assessment of the extent of the damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities is likely to take at least a month – and possibly longer (due to Iranian constraints on international oversight) – a counter to this narrative is unlikely to emerge in the short term. This will moderate the risk of a substantial escalation in internal pressure on Israel’s leadership to relaunch military operations unilaterally in the coming weeks. However, if official reports emerge indicating that Iran has retained relatively substantial nuclear capabilities (which we assess is currently unlikely, see above), this will significantly elevate the risk of conflict re-escalation, particularly in the event of a hardline Iranian negotiating stance at the nuclear talks.
  • Clashes between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) / Israeli settlers and Palestinians in the West Bank (Palestinian Territories) will sustain elevated attack risks. On 25 June, dozens of Israeli settlers, some wearing masks, set fire to property in Kafr Malik (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate), prompting clashes with local Palestinians. IDF troops deployed to the scene claimed that Palestinian militants opened fire on them, prompting a small-arms exchange. According to the Palestinian health ministry, the clashes killed three Palestinians and injured seven others; one is in critical condition. The IDF reported that one officer sustained a head injury and that five Israeli suspects were arrested. The clashes highlight the persistently elevated ethno-religious tensions and risk of attacks in the West Bank, particularly in Silwad (Ramallah and al-Bireh). The latest clashes will likely compound radicalisation risks among the local Palestinian population and increase the risk of sole-perpetrator attacks targeting Israeli settlers and the security forces in the West Bank in the coming weeks, particularly along key roads.
  • The suspension of aid into northern Gaza will exacerbate food security and public health risks; the seizure of aid by militants will elevate bystander risks around aid distribution centres. On 25 June, Israel indefinitely halted aid deliveries through the newly established Zikim crossing (also known as the Western Erez crossing) in northern Gaza. The decision follows reports that Hamas-affiliated clans seized aid deliveries in Gaza City before assuming control of their distribution. The reports will likely increase the risk of right-wing Israeli demonstrations in the vicinity of crossings into Gaza during which participants attempt to disrupt aid deliveries, elevating the risk of altercations and harm impacting NGO and logistics personnel. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that Israel will also restrict the movement of aid through other crossings, compounding substantial food security risks. Such action would exacerbate rising reputational risks for international businesses affiliated with or operating within Israel (see below). Further reports of militant aid seizures would likely prompt the IDF to augment its posture and alertness around aid deliveries, increasing the risk of misfire and cases of misidentification, in turn elevating the likelihood of shooting incidents around distribution centres.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 

  • The resumption of Israeli gas field operations will ease energy security risks for Egypt and Jordan. On 25 June, Israel’s two natural gas fields, Leviathan and Karish, resumed operations after being shut since 13 June following the onset of the Iran-Israel war. The Chevron-operated Leviathan and Energean’s Karish fields provide nearly 20% of Egypt’s gas and a significant portion of Jordan’s energy. The fields’ closure prompted both states to launch emergency plans for the summer, including energy rationing and the suspension of operations at several factories. As such, the resumption of Israeli gas exports will significantly undermine energy security, particularly in Egypt, one of the region’s largest gas consumers. This will moderate prospective disruption to energy-intensive industries in Egypt (mainly fertilisers, steel and cement) in the coming months, mitigating against a deeper economic crisis. Furthermore, the reduced likelihood of electricity rationing and spiking energy prices in Egypt through the summer months will offset domestic unrest risks. However, we also assess that the government will likely seek to cut costs in a precautionary effort to boost liquidity, likely driving a partial reduction in energy subsidies for manufacturers across most sectors. Increasing operating costs will likely discourage investment through the coming months and possibly drive inflationary pressure. However, we assess that the risk of protests will not increase substantially.
  • Further anti-Israel boycott measures through H2 2025 are likely amid sustained Israeli operations in Gaza and the West Bank. On 24 June, the Co-op Group (a UK food retailer) stated it would cease sourcing products and ingredients from 17 countries, including Iran, Israel and Syria, where there are ‘internationally recognised’ human rights abuses and violations of international law. The measure will impact approximately 100 products. Notably, and on the same day, the Italian supermarket chain Coop Alleanza 3.0 also decided to cease selling several Israeli food products. Both decisions were widely welcomed by anti-Israel activists and organisations in the UK and Europe. We assess there is a realistic possibility that other European retailers will follow suit, especially those that have a substantial presence in the Middle East, North Africa and Turkey region. As Israel and Hamas have not made progress towards securing a ceasefire in recent weeks and IDF military operations in Gaza are highly likely to continue in the coming weeks, humanitarian conditions will almost certainly continue to deteriorate. These worsening conditions are highly likely to trigger wider boycott decisions in Europe and the US in the second half of 2025. This will in turn increase compliance risks for international retailers dealing with Israeli agriculture through 2025, particularly products sourced from expanding Israeli settlements, impacting Israeli exports globally.

US: Direct Involvement in Iran- Israel war risks domestic unrest

Key points 

  • On 22 June, US President Donald Trump announced that the US had conducted airstrikes targeting three Iranian nuclear facilities using B-2 bombers and naval assets.
  • We assess that the US’ direct involvement in the conflict has increased the risk of attacks and international terrorism in the country in the short-to-medium term.
  • Anti-war and anti-Israel protests will likely emerge in the coming days, increasing domestic unrest risks in major urban centres.
  • Volatile oil prices in tandem with ongoing trade wars will increase socio-economic health risks in the medium-to-long term.

Context

The US deployed B-2 Spirit stealth bombers from Whiteman Air Force base (Missouri) to target a uranium enrichment facility in Fordow (Qom province, Iran). The US also launched approximately 30 Tomahawk missiles from naval assets against a uranium enrichment plant in Natanz (Isfahan province, Iran) and a uranium conversion facility, also in Isfahan. Trump later called the operation a ‘spectacular success’. However, pollsters suggest that only around 36% of US citizens support the strikes, with 45% opposing the action. Similarly, the strikes have drawn criticism from across the political spectrum, including from traditionally ardent Trump supporters. On 24 June, Trump announced a ‘complete and total ceasefire’ between Israel and Iran (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 24 June 2025). Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Iranian officials acknowledged the ceasefire. However, within hours of the announcement, both Israel and Iran accused each other of violating the agreement. Despite the ceasefire framework, we assess that Washington DC’s initial military action (and further involvement in the negotiating process) has increased the short-to-medium-term risk of terrorism and domestic unrest in the US and undermined the country’s socio-economic health outlook.

Forecast

The US’ direct involvement in the conflict has increased the short-to-medium-term risk of attacks and international terrorism. On 22 June, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released a National Terrorism Advisory System bulletin warning of a heightened threat environment in the US following the strikes. DHS Secretary Kristi Noem warned of possible ‘acts of violence and antisemitic hate crimes’ by pro-Iran actors. Although the Iranian government vowed to respond to the 22 June strikes, it did not explicitly call for violence in the US. However, the conflict’s escalation has increased the risk of pro-Iran extremists and/or smaller cells attempting to conduct terror attacks in the US. It is highly likely that the US’ security apparatus is capable of mitigating against large-scale attacks. Any would-be attackers are therefore most likely to use firearms, rudimentary explosives or vehicles to prosecute ‘soft targets’ such as demonstrations or other mass gatherings. We assess that the risk of attacks and international terrorism will be elevated in the short-to-medium term. Given the uptick in anti-Israel sentiment in recent years, we also assess that the risk of attacks will be particularly heightened around Jewish and Israel-affiliated venues and events.

  • Iran-US: Negotiations remain fragile, though they are unlikely to break down in coming month. On 25 June, US President Donald Trump announced that nuclear negotiations with Iran are scheduled to take place next week, though he did not specify a date. Iranian officials have rejected these plans. Nevertheless, we assess that Iran-US negotiations will likely take place in the coming two weeks. Iran has publicly maintained its opposition to limitations on its enrichment activities, elevating the possibility that Tehran will adopt an uncompromising negotiating posture. Such a stance is likely to increase regional tensions and the risk of the negotiations breaking down. However, following the war, Iran is likely to prioritise regime survival and stability, an approach that is likely to moderate its negotiating position. As such, while a comprehensive nuclear agreement is highly unlikely to be struck in the coming days, we assess that negotiations are likely to continue over the coming month. This will moderate regional tensions and the risk of armed conflict in the coming weeks, while also reducing travel and business disruption risks.

Jun 25.

Iran Border Crossings under pressure.

Key points

  • Despite the ceasefire agreed on 24 June between Iran and Israel, the realistic possibility of a resumption of hostilities will drive refugee flows and sustain pressure on Iran’s various border crossings.
  • Major crossing points remain open along Iran’s borders with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Turkey and Turkmenistan. However, crossing the border at these points will possibly remain subject to pre-approval. Meanwhile, crossings remain closed along the Afghan and Pakistani borders, though the porous nature of those particular frontiers will drive knock-on security risks.

Context

The onset of the Iran-Israel war on 13 June prompted Iranians to flee to several neighbouring countries, namely Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and Turkmenistan. Although the ceasefire is holding, the prospects for continued fighting will sustain pressure along all of Iran’s borders. Varying border restrictions and geopolitical tensions will complicate multiple extraction routes and drive uncertainty.

Forecast

Afghanistan

On 14 June, local sources in Herat province (Afghanistan) reported that the Islam Qala-Dogharoon border crossing had closed, stopping the transit of goods and people. It reportedly remains closed for cargo trucks, though local reports indicate that thousands of Afghans have since returned to Afghanistan via this crossing in recent days. Given the increasing tensions and arrests of Afghan nationals for allegedly spying in Iran, the crossing will possibly also be used for deportations. While Afghanistan is unlikely to be a major destination for Iranian refugees, it will possibly act as a transit country for refugees fleeing overland to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, especially if the situation in Iran deteriorates significantly. This is likely to drive people-smuggling activities and the erection of temporary encampments for displaced people in Afghanistan.

Armenia

Among the various Eurasian countries bordering Iran, we assess that Armenia is likely to be the preferred route of evacuation, as the Armenia-Iran crossing is fully open and passage does not require pre-approval from the government (at the time of writing). However, there is only one crossing along the Armenia-Iran frontier, Agarak-Nordooz, which is situated between Syunik province (Armenia) and East Azerbaijan province (Iran). As a result, delays and longer wait times to traverse the border are highly likely. At the time of writing, only a limited number of Armenian citizens have sought to cross the border; this will limit the risk of a major migration flow pressuring Armenia’s limited services, as was the case in 2023 after Azerbaijan took control of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenian authorities have organised a bus service at the border for incoming travellers; they are charging a standard fee of AMD 12,000 (around USD 31) per person for a journey to the capital Yerevan  While the risk of an imminent resumption of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan remains low in the short term, the latter has long sought to establish (and to control) a transport corridor through Syunik along the Iranian border, which continues to drive tensions across the region. Due to concerns about cross-border provocations and tensions along the Armenia-Azerbaijan frontier, the UK and the US are advising against all travel within approximately three miles (5km) of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, which does not apply to the Agarak-Nordooz crossing. In general, Western governments’ travel risk advisories for Armenia remain subject to change, specifically regarding if or when hostilities between Iran and Israel evolve. However, we assess that Armenia is likely to remain a favourable extraction route in the short term.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan’s land borders have been closed since 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic, though exceptions have been made to allow for foreign nationals fleeing Iran. It takes approximately eight hours to reach the Astara crossing point – situated between Astara district (Azerbaijan) and Gilan province (Iran) – from Tehran (Iran) by road. In addition, US citizens reportedly need special authorisation from the Azerbaijani government before approaching the border. Reports from 23 June indicate there has been a decrease in the number of foreign citizens wishing to evacuate using the Astara checkpoint, though recent US and Israeli strikes will possibly drive numbers up once again. French citizens (including dual nationals) will possibly face interrogation or – in more extreme circumstances – be refused entry due to heightened tensions between France and Azerbaijan. After crossing, the border, evacuees are reportedly transported by bus to the Baku (Azerbaijan) before being allowed to continue on to their home countries It is uncertain whether all Azerbaijani citizens are currently allowed to leave Iran via the Astara border crossing, despite reports of other nationalities evacuating via this route. The actual number of Azerbaijani citizens who have reportedly crossed the border from Iran is significantly lower than the number of citizens who have asked for help to evacuate. This possibly indicates that only a select few Azerbaijani citizens are allowed to pass, namely diplomatic staff and/or their relatives, or that extensive vetting is required, possibly due to security concerns over espionage and infiltration by Iranian agents. Sustained conflict or escalation would possibly encourage migratory flows of Iran’s sizeable ethnic-Azeri population into Azerbaijan. An estimated 20 m ethnic-Azeris live in Iran, predominantly in the country’s northern regions. A significant influx would possibly elevate tensions between Baku and Tehran (the latter is historically wary of Azerbaijani irredentism).

Turkmenistan 

The Turkmen authorities claim that they are providing a 24-hour humanitarian corridor for foreign nationals arriving from Iran into Turkmenistan. Reports indicate that foreign nationals are using the Gaudan-Bajgiran and Artyk-Lotfabad border crossings, both of which are situated between Ahal province (Turkmenistan) and Razavi Khorasan province (Iran). The Chinese and Omani embassies in Iran have both recommended using the former checkpoint. However, reports from 20 June indicate that the US State Department is now advising US citizens in Iran to find alternate routes out of the country, rather than leaving via Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan’s foreign ministry has stated that evacuation efforts are being conducted in co-operation with the diplomatic missions of foreign states in Ashgabat (Turkmenistan). We assess this implies that pre-approval is required to enter. Given the extremely insular and authoritarian nature of Turkmenistan, the authorities will possibly seal the frontier with Iran if Ashgabat perceives that conflict spillover is liable to undermine the stability of the regime. This will possibly happen at short notice with limited (or no) forewarning. The Turkmen authorities are likely to treat foreigners (particularly Westerners) with suspicion, which could include extensive questioning at the border, as well as limitations on travel within the country and heightened surveillance.

Turkey

Since the start of the Iran-Israel war, there has been an uptick in the movement of people through the Gürbulak border crossing (Ağrı province, Turkey). Those crossing the border likely include Iranian citizens seeking to flee the hostilities, and also business and NGO personnel evacuating via land routes while airspace closures remain in place. As of 20 June, the US has warned its citizens to avoid the Gürbulak crossing due to overcrowding, but noted that Turkey’s Kapikoy and Esendere border points remain open. For those wanting to cross the border without a Turkish passport, prior approval is required via the relevant embassy in Ankara (Turkey), which will distribute entry permits. In the case of further escalation, border crossings will likely become overwhelmed, leading to a heightened security posture at major checkpoints and elevating the risk of sporadic clashes between the Turkish security forces and Iranian citizens. The Iran-Turkey border remains highly porous; as such, there is a realistic possibility that migrants will begin crossing the border illegally. Any such developments are likely to lead to increased arbitrary detention practices and to drive diplomatic tensions between Ankara and Tehran. Turkey has experienced significant irregular migration since the outset of the Syrian civil war; additional migratory flows are likely to exacerbate existing internal ethno-religious tensions and violence. This is also liable to drive socio-economic health risks, possibly leading to increased protest activity and sporadic clashes between the security forces and demonstrators. That said, if the ceasefire holds or a resumption of hostilities remains limited, most migration is highly likely to be temporary rather than permanent, moderating these risks in the short term.

Iraq

In addition to Israeli strikes, increased Iranian policing of minority communities due to growing fears of autonomist movements will drive displacement and border traffic risks vis-à-vis Iraq. In particular, this will likely drive an uptick in Iranian Kurds and non-Kurds migrating to Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region (KRI). This is partly due to weak border control stemming from misalignment between the local Peshmerga and centralised security forces. This will likely put pressure on decentralised local services, straining already-underdeveloped education, energy and health infrastructure. This is liable to exacerbate socio-economic health risks and drive incidents of anti-government and anti-migrant protests. Furthermore, an influx of Iranians into north-eastern Iraq will possibly drive ethno-religious tensions between predominantly Shia Iranians and secular or Sunni Kurds / Iraqis. It is possible this will drive an uptick in attacks and incidents of sporadic ethno-religious violence.

Pakistan

The hostilities have likely prompted Pakistan to keep its border with Iran closed in the coming days and weeks. On 15 June, the Balochistan provincial government ordered the indefinite closure of borders and five crossing points with Iran due to the deteriorating security situation. If they persist, the closures will likely undermine food and energy security in border districts, given their reliance on fresh food supplies and smuggled oil from Iran (prices are already reportedly increasing). Pakistan is also co-ordinating the evacuation of its nationals residing in Iran (particularly Pakistani pilgrims and students) through the Taftan border crossing.  On 18 June, and contrary to news reports, Pakistan’s foreign ministry stated that all border crossings remain fully operational. However, we assess that the borders are closed to non-Pakistani returnees (particularly potential refugees from Iran) in a bid to prevent a deterioration in the already-frail security situation in Balochistan province (Pakistan). If tensions escalate, there is a realistic possibility that members of the separatist Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) who are currently in Iran would attempt to cross into Pakistan, likely prompting the authorities to strengthen/extend border closures. Nevertheless, the border as a whole is largely porous; securing it entirely is likely to be beyond the scope of the authorities.

  • North America region: US strikes on Iran have sustained threat of attacks, violent extremism. On 24 June, Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Anita Anand stated that she is ‘deeply concerned’ about foreign interference by Iran and the possibility of terrorist sleeper cells in Canada. This follows the US strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities on 22 June. Anand noted that Iran could use sleeper cells to commit acts of violence in Canada against critics of Tehran. On 22 June, the US Customs and Border Protection agency also stated that the threat of sleeper cells in the US has ‘never been higher’ (though there are currently no specific threats). In the short term, the likelihood of violent extremism will increase if the Iranian leadership issues a religious ruling calling for retaliatory violence against targets in Western nations. As such, the risk of attacks targeting institutions, lawmakers and public figures who overtly criticise Iran is elevated. Nonetheless, the Canadian and US authorities are largely capable of mitigating against sophisticated plots. We assess that sole perpetrators will likely remain reliant on low-capacity attacks involving firearms, vehicles and/or rudimentary incendiary devices; we also assess that, overall, such incidents remain unlikely across North America.
  • Iran: Temporary suspension of IAEA is possible; regional tensions, armed conflict risks will increase. Earlier on 25 June, local news agencies reported that Iran’s parliament approved a bill to suspend co-operation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In recent weeks, Iran has also threatened to exit the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits nuclear weaponisation and imposes international monitoring on nuclear facilities (it has since clarified that it will not exit the treaty). To enter into force, the latest bill needs final approval from the Supreme National Security Council. As such, while a temporary suspension of co-operation remains a realistic possibility (likely as a form of leverage in nuclear negotiations), a permanent suspension of co-operation with the IAEA remains unlikely. However, Iran has engaged in informal restrictions on IAEA monitoring in recent years, and it is likely to continue these actions in the coming month. We assess that such actions are likely to raise the risk of a breakdown in nuclear negotiations due to oversight concerns, elevating regional tensions and armed conflict risks in the coming months.
  •  Lebanon: International aid will ease economic recovery in south; domestic unrest risks will persist. Earlier on 25 June, the World Bank (WB) approved USD 250 m in financing for Lebanon to aid in the reconstruction of severely damaged public infrastructure and the management of rubble in regions affected by the Israel-Hizballah war. The initial funding is part of the Lebanon Emergency Assistance Project (LEAP) that includes other grants amounting to a total of USD 1 bn. The WB’s aid will be critical in restoring operations for essential services in Lebanon’s southern regions, including water, energy, transport, health, education and municipal services. As such, this will likely facilitate the resumption of local business operations in the south by early 2026, particularly in the logistics and agriculture sectors. However, due to severe damage to public infrastructure during the war, high rates of unemployment and a lack of fully functional health services will sustain domestic unrest risks and government instability through the second half of 2025.

Jun 24.

Ceasefire Implications

Key points

  • US President Donald Trump announced a bilateral ceasefire between Iran and Israel, scheduled to come into force by 25 June. However, the proposal’s complex timing structure will likely trigger allegations of violations from both parties, undermining the agreement’s potential stability.
  • Despite risks of the ceasefire breaking down in the coming days, the US will highly likely maintain pressure on Israel and Iran to de-escalate the Iran-Israel war. This pressure will likely moderate risks of sustained armed conflict, though periodic hostilities will remain a realistic possibility.
  • Iranian negotiators previously cited an immediate ceasefire with Israel as a precondition for resuming nuclear negotiations with the US. The ceasefire announcement possibly indicates that negotiations will resume in the coming days, moderating regional tensions. However, they will also present numerous trigger points for a full resumption of Israeli attacks on Iran.

Context 

On 23 June in the capital Washington DC at approximately 1800hrs (local time), US President Donald Trump announced that Israel and Iran had agreed to a bilateral ceasefire, which would be progressively implemented later on 24 June and come into full effect 24 hours later. Under the agreement, Iran was scheduled to first cease attacks, with Israel due to follow suit several hours later. The authorities in Iran and Israel subsequently announced they would observe the ceasefire, indicating it will likely be implemented in the coming hours. The ceasefire follows the launch of US airstrikes against Iranian nuclear facilities on 22 June. There is a realistic possibility that these strikes rendered Iran’s primary uranium enrichment and conversion facilities non-operational. In so doing, this would have gone some way towards addressing Israel’s primary objective in launching ‘Operation Rising Lion’ on 13 June, eliminating Iran’s nuclear programme as a serious threat, thereby increasing willingness to agree a ceasefire (see Sibylline Middle East Conflict Update – 23 June 2025). In response to the US strikes, Iran launched approximately ten ballistic missiles towards the US Al Udeid airbase in Qatar; the attack did not result in damage to the facility or any casualties. Trump subsequently indicated that it was ‘time for peace’, indicating that the US would not retaliate for the attack. Despite agreement from both Iran and Israel to adhere to the ceasefire, Iran launched at least one missile barrage towards Israel at approximately 1030hrs (local time, Israel), several hours after the ceasefire nominally took effect. Israel characterised the launch as a violation of the ceasefire and subsequently conducted a limited airstrike targeting an Iranian radar system in northern Tehran province. This interaction underscores the proposal’s fragility amid sustained regional tensions.

Forecast

Despite nominally committing to the ceasefire proposal, Israel and Iran will possibly continue exchanging hostilities in the coming hours, driving risks of the ceasefire failing to come into effect. Following Israel’s radar attack, there is a realistic possibility that Iran will launch a low-capacity drone attack targeting Israel. Allegations of reciprocal violations will sustain a low-level risk of the agreement breaking down prior to full implementation. Such a breakdown would elevate risks of conflict re-escalation between Israel and Iran, sustaining elevated security and bystander risks therein; risks of operational and supply chain disruption would likely persist. Conflict re-escalation would also likely trigger further regional airspace closures, disrupting commercial airline operations and increasing risks of travel delays. Even so, the US will sustain significant pressure on both parties to adhere to the agreement, bolstering prospects for de-escalation in the coming days   Effective ceasefire implementation would highly likely moderate regional tensions and substantially decrease risks of Iran moving to restrict the navigability of the Strait of Hormuz, moderating supply chain disruption risks and pressure on global energy markets. Exposure to Iranian-fired ordnance (including intercepted or malfunctioning ordnance) in Iraq, Israel, Jordan and Syria would also decrease, facilitating a resumption of regional airline operations over the coming week. Moreover, the risk of attacks by Iranian proxies against US and Israeli assets would also reduce, with the exception of the Houthis, who will likely sustain attacks against Israel regardless. This is due to Israel’s military operations in the Gaza Strip. That said, Israel will almost certainly continue to intensely scrutinise Iran’s military and nuclear operations in the coming weeks. Iranian efforts to re-develop missile and drone production and launch facilities will possibly trigger further airstrikes from Israel, which would also be likely in the event Iran attempts to relocate nuclear assets. However, operations would likely remain limited and periodic. In response, there is a realistic possibility that Iran would conduct retaliatory drone attacks targeting Israel. Such hostilities are unlikely to escalate into armed conflict resumption, but rather evolve into a dynamic mirroring the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire.

If the ceasefire remains in place, Iran will likely re-engage in nuclear negotiations with the US in the short term, though discussions will remain extremely sensitive to allegations of ceasefire violation and nuclear non-disclosure

The US will almost certainly seek to leverage the significant damage done to Iran’s military and nuclear infrastructure during the Iran-Israel war to secure major concessions regarding Tehran’s nuclear programme. This will highly likely include calls for Iran to commit to dismantling domestic uranium enrichment facilities, exporting medium-enriched uranium stockpiles to third parties and permitting rigorous international oversight of nuclear activity, as well as damage assessments to facilities targeted by Israel and the US. Iran’s willingness to make such concessions will highly likely depend on the extent of sanctions relief offered by the US during negotiations. Developments in Iran’s domestic security environment will also likely influence Tehran’s willingness to make concessions during negotiations. Any uptick in domestic unrest and/or secessionist militant activity will likely lead to greater Iranian flexibility. Even so, negotiations will remain extremely sensitive to deadlock, particularly if Israel or the US alleges that Iran is withholding information regarding its nuclear activities (particularly the location of enriched uranium stockpiles). Tehran will also highly likely call for significant and permanent sanctions relief, elevating the risks of negotiations failing to progress in the coming weeks. Should deadlock persist, Israel will likely launch a renewed airstrike campaign targeting nuclear facilities and military positions within Iran, likely with US approval. Such operations would increase risks of conflict re-escalation and an Israeli refocus on regime change, compounding regional tensions.

  • Iran-Israel: Risks of armed conflict remain elevated despite ceasefire announcement. Earlier on 24 June, Israel announced it had accepted a ceasefire with Iran, announced earlier by US President Donald Trump. According to Trump’s announcement, the ceasefire will be staged, with Iran first stopping hostilities and Israel following suit 12 hours later. The ceasefire initiative indicates a possible de-escalation in the coming days. However, following the ceasefire announcement, Iran launched several waves of missiles, which killed four civilians in Beersheba (Southern district). There is a realistic possibility of further Israeli retaliation and Iranian responses in the coming hours until the ceasefire should fully enter into force for both sides (at 1900hrs Israel time). Such exchanges, particularly if causing severe damage and loss of life, will sustain elevated risks of ceasefire breakdown. In the event the ceasefire holds over the coming 48 hours, it will likely remain fragile and susceptible to breakdown due to disagreements during negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme.
  • Region: Ceasefire will decrease risks of operational disruption in Gulf states. Earlier on 24 June, the US President Donald Trump announced that Israel and Iran had agreed to a phased bilateral ceasefire to be fully implemented after 24 hours. The ceasefire came shortly following a limited Iranian missile strike that targeted the Al Ubeid US base in Qatar; all ordnances were intercepted. The ceasefire will almost certainly decrease operational disruption risks in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries over the coming week. Air traffic over the region will gradually resume alongside shipping operations in the Gulf. Despite the first-ever Iranian attack on Qatar, we assess that the latter will almost certainly not retaliate as Tehran likely contacted Doha before the strike to mitigate damage risks. That said, we assess that the security environment in the Gulf region in the coming days will remain significantly volatile due to the fragile ceasefire and the realistic possibility of ceasefire violations.

Jun 23.

IRAN

  • The US conducted airstrikes targeting three key nuclear facilities in Iran, increasing regional tensions and the risk of Iranian retaliation.
  • Israel continues to conduct frequent airstrikes against central and western Iran, sustaining significant security and bystander risks near military, security force and police facilities.
  • Iran’s legislature passed a non-binding vote to shut the Strait of Hormuz; while a blockade remains unlikely in the coming days, market concerns over navigability will likely remain elevated over this period.
  • Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has reportedly re-iterated plans related to his succession, underscoring elevated threats to government stability.

ISRAEL

  • Following the US strikes on Iran, the Home Front Command (HFC) raised Israel’s nationwide threat level to ‘critical’, increasing labour flexibility concerns and operational disruption risks.
  • The US strikes against Iranian nuclear assets have brought Israel closer to its baseline objective of eliminating Iran’s nuclear programme, possibly increasing the prospects for de-escalation in the coming weeks; however, Israel currently shows no willingness to lessen its strikes.
  • A possible change in Iranian strike patterns would elevate business disruption risks.
  • The Tel Aviv stock market opened higher, underscoring sustained investor confidence despite persistent socio-economic health risks.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • Iran launched several ballistic missiles targeting the US Air Force base in al-Udeid (Qatar).
  • A reshuffling of Iranian-aligned proxies’ assets in Iraq signals possible conflict spillover into that country in the coming days.
  • Iranian proxies are likely to be ordered to launch retaliatory attacks against US assets in Iraq and Syria, as well as strikes against Israel in the coming days.
  • In response to the recent US strikes against Iran, the risk of anti-US protests is increasing across the region; demonstrations are most likely in Iraq but are also possible in Jordan.
  • The US conducted airstrikes targeting three key nuclear facilities in Iran, increasing regional tensions and the risk of Iranian retaliation. On 22 June, the US conducted strikes against three Iranian nuclear facilities in Fordow (Qom province), Isfahan and Natanz (both Isfahan province). While a battle damage assessment is ongoing, initial satellite imagery shows that the facilities sustained substantial damage. Following the strikes – dubbed ‘Midnight Hammer’ – the US clarified that the action was not conducted to facilitate regime change but rather as a limited and precise attack against Iran’s nuclear programme. On 23 June, Iran warned that the US strikes had expanded the scope of legitimate targets for the Iranian armed forces, elevating regional security risks near US assets (see below). The US is likely to retaliate against Iran and/or Iranian proxies in the event of Iranian attacks that target its assets, elevating the risk of snowballing armed escalation and exacerbating security risks and business operational disruption, including global supply chain disruption (see below).
  • Israel continues to conduct frequent airstrikes against central and western Iran, sustaining significant security and bystander risks near military, security force and police facilities. Since 21 June, Israel has continued to conduct airstrikes across Iran. It has employed hundreds of munitions against security force positions associated with Iran’s conventional armed forces (Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as well as numerous missile-production, -storage and -launch facilities nationwide. These strikes will likely continue to undermine Iran’s ability to deter further Israeli airstrikes through conventional means. More broadly, strikes have also continued at pace against the capital Tehran, sustaining substantial bystander exposure risks throughout the city. Since 21 June, Israel has conducted strikes targeting the Basij militia headquarters, the Elvin prison facility and the headquarters of the Iranian Cyber Police (FATA, all Tehran province). In the coming days, strike action targeting Iran’s domestic security and policing forces will likely continue, underscoring ongoing efforts by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to undermine government stability in Iran (see below).
  • Iran’s legislature passed a non-binding vote to shut the Strait of Hormuz; while a blockade remains unlikely in the coming days, market concerns over navigability will likely remain elevated over this period. On 22 June, the Majles voted to close the Strait of Hormuz; the vote is non-binding and does not indicate that Iran will imminently restrict passage through the waterway. Such a measure would need final approval from the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), an executive body that comprises cabinet ministers, senior military commanders and intelligence chiefs. The SNSC is unlikely to vote to close the Strait of Hormuz to vessels unilaterally in the coming days. Even so, amid elevated concerns that Iran will move to restrict vessel passage (partially) through the strait, oil exporters are highly likely to attempt to expedite shipments from the Gulf to receiving markets. Any such efforts would increase shipping traffic in the narrow waterway, elevating the risk of bottlenecks and vessel collisions in the coming days. Also in the coming days, there is a realistic possibility that Iran will try to restrict the navigability of the waterway partially by adopting an elevated naval posture in the area or increasing drone surveillance and harassment of transiting vessels. The risks of harassment, transit delays and/or attempts to disrupt vessel passage will be particularly acute for vessels with demonstrable links to Israel and/or the US. Such measures would almost certainly increase bilateral tensions with the US; they would also compound regional tensions, disrupt global supply chains and trigger price volatility in oil and gas markets, exacerbating the risk of further armed conflict and regional spillover.
  • Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has reportedly re-iterated plans related to his succession, underscoring elevated threats to government stability. On 23 June, international media reported that Khamenei has named three senior clerics as potential successors in the event of his incapacitation or death. The reports underscore increasing concerns that Israel will expand its ongoing assassination campaign targeting high-ranking military officials to include political figures, particularly Khamenei. Should Khamenei no longer be able to serve as Supreme Leader, the Council of Guardians would designate a successor. Such an event would substantially increase threats to government stability and trigger intense competition for military, religious and political authority within Iran. However, and despite the possible acceleration of contingency planning, Khamenei is highly unlikely to designate any single individual as his preferred successor in order to moderate potential challenges to his authority. This will likely sustain entrenched and high-level factionalism within Iran’s clergy; efforts to consolidate support for and/or co-opt IRGC factions will elevate the risk of lapses in the security forces’ capacity as Israeli operations targeting Iran continue at pace.

ISRAEL

  • Following the US strikes on Iran, the Home Front Command (HFC) raised Israel’s nationwide threat level to ‘critical’, increasing labour flexibility concerns and operational disruption risks. The HCF issued the measures at 0345hrs (local time) amid concerns of major Iranian retaliation targeting Israel. The ordinance bans all public gatherings and only allows essential businesses to operate. Although work-from-home directives will moderate the risk of major operational disruption for firms with flexible working arrangements, the ordinance will almost certainly disrupt operations for non-essential firms in sectors such as transport, manufacturing, retail and hospitality. Continued school and daycare closures will also likely contribute to increased labour flexibility concerns as the ordinance remains in place, driving broader operational and supply chain disruption. There are several indications the HFC will soon relax these measures. However, if the directive is extended beyond the coming week, prolonged business disruption will likely undermine profitability for locally engaged firms, particularly in the hospitality, retail and tourism sectors, compounding broader socio-economic concerns linked to the Iran-Israel and Israel-Hamas wars.
  • The US strikes against Iranian nuclear assets have brought Israel closer to its baseline objective of eliminating Iran’s nuclear programme, possibly increasing the prospects for de-escalation in the coming weeks; however, Israel currently shows no willingness to lessen its strikes. Israel likely considers the destruction of Iran’s nuclear programme a necessary prerequisite before any de-escalation can be considered (see Sibylline Special Report – 20 June 2025). The US strike against the Fordow enrichment facility (Qom province) possibly critically damaged a key asset that Israel would otherwise have been unable to destroy. Subsequently, unnamed Israeli officials suggested to international media that Israel is seeking to end the war early and to capitalise on the achievement of combined US-Israeli attacks against nuclear facilities. As such, announcements that nuclear facilities and production capabilities have been completely destroyed would likely indicate greater Israeli willingness to end the war. However, Israel is likely to remain dynamic in its decision-making regarding the war, and to assess whether to de-escalate against the prospects of possible regime collapse and the extent of damage to Iran’s nuclear and military capabilities, as well as the Iranian response. Given these considerations, Israel is likely to continue its attacks against Iran through at least the coming week (the IDF is currently sustaining its daily strike rate).
  • A possible change in Iranian strike patterns would elevate business disruption risks. During five waves of missile launches against targets across Israel on 23 June, Iran only launched nine missiles in total; this is much lower than normal (barrages usually comprise 20-60 missiles per wave). While one of the missiles did impact the area near a strategic energy facility in Ashdod (Southern district, Israel) this was likely because it struck what is considered to be an open area (which receive less coverage from Israeli air defences; see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 19 June 2025). Regardless, the ordnance landed close enough to the facility to cause temporary and localised power cuts, likely due to shrapnel, underlining the sustained threats from near misses. The reduction in ordnance likely reflects Iranian weapon management, as well as attempts by Tehran to sustain disruption while employing minimum ordnance. Furthermore, in the past week, Iran’s strike pattern has indicated a possible focus on Israeli infrastructure, particularly in port cities such as Ashdod (Southern) and Haifa (Haifa district, Israel), elevating risks near dual-use infrastructure. Iran is likely to experiment with different strike patterns in an effort to prolong its weapons stockpile while penetrating Israel’s air defences. The risk of further damage from Iranian missiles that sporadically penetrate Israel’s air defences will persist despite a high interception rate and relatively few Israeli casualties, underscoring the effectiveness and importance of Israeli shelters. Even so, we assess that changes in Iranian strike patterns and continued targeting of dual-use infrastructure will likely drive operational disruption (including to stable energy provision) and threats to staff over the coming days.
  • The Tel Aviv stock market opened higher, underscoring sustained investor confidence despite persistent socio-economic health risks. Upon opening on 22 June, the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) hit a record high, with the TA-125 rising by 1.6%. The increase comes amid a broader uptick in the TA-125’s value; the index rose for five consecutive days from 15 to 19 June and gained 6% through the trading week, reflecting sustained investor confidence in the long-term stability of Israel’s economy. In the coming weeks, major capital flight remains unlikely, though the TASE will likely remain sensitive to regional developments, particularly vis-à-vis the navigability of the Strait of Hormuz (see above). In addition, broader operational disruption stemming from sustained security risks associated with the Iran-Israel war, particularly if the conflict protracts in the coming months, will drive the risk of recession in late 2025 / early 2026.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 

  • Iran launched several ballistic missiles targeting the US Air Force base in al-Udeid (Qatar). Earlier on 23 June, local media reported several interceptions over Doha (Qatar); no direct hits have been reported at the time of reporting. This comes hours after the shutdown of the country’s airspace by the authorities and alerts by the US and UK embassies on the same day advising their in-country citizens to remain in shelter. It is likely that Iranian retaliatory attacks will also target other US bases in the Gulf in the coming hours, including those in Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE. Strikes targeting US military installations are also highly likely in Iraq, particularly the al-Asad Airbase (al-Anbar governorate). In the coming hours, widespread operational disruption across all business sectors in Qatar is almost certain as a precaution against another possible wave of Iranian strikes against al-Udeid. Such strikes are highly likely to trigger further shutdowns of airspaces across the Gulf in the coming 24 hours. In response, the US is likely to launch further attacks against nuclear and military assets in Iran over the coming days, driving the risk of a cycle of escalatory retaliatory attacks. Iranian strikes are ongoing; we will monitor the situation closely and publish an Alert in the event of any further urgent developments.
  • A reshuffling of Iranian-aligned proxies’ assets in Iraq signals possible conflict spillover into that country in the coming days. On 23 June, local media reported that Iranian-backed groups in Iraq are intensifying security re-adjustments nationwide (including by relocating strategic assets and senior commanders) in response to the recent US strike on Iran. Proxies such as Kata’ib Hizbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq have introduced sweeping changes to their operational protocols, including by shuttering known residences and headquarters, suspending routine gatherings and discarding smartphones. Notably, these developments follow an Israeli strike two days earlier along the Iran-Iraq border that killed a senior figure from Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, another Iranian-backed militia. These notable precautionary measures suggest there is a heightened likelihood of Israeli pre-emptive action against these groups; they also possibly reflect these groups’ efforts to mitigate against any retaliatory impacts following the launch of their own operations against Israeli and US targets (see below). US-Israeli strikes are likely to involve targeted assassinations within urban centres in Iraq, including the capital Baghdad, as well as wider attacks on bases, checkpoints and patrols near the Syrian and Iranian borders.
  • Iranian proxies are likely to be ordered to launch retaliatory attacks against US assets in Iraq and Syria, as well as strikes against Israel in the coming days. To date, no signs of full mobilisation have yet been reported. This restraint likely reflects pressure from the Iraqi government and Shia factions (particularly given the prominent Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s firm opposition to their involvement). These entities are urging neutrality to preserve political stability ahead of the critical parliamentary elections in November. Nevertheless, and despite the absence of mobilisation, it remains likely that these proxies will become directly involved in the conflict, further stretching Israel’s interception capacity and elevating the threat of strikes targeting Israeli cities, particularly dual-use infrastructure (see above). Strike threats to US military-bases in the region will also increase, elevating collateral risks for proximate staff and assets, particularly organisations working closely with US-government assets in the region.
  • In response to the recent US strikes against Iran, the risk of anti-US protests is increasing across the region; demonstrations are most likely in Iraq but are also possible in Jordan. In Iraq, all Shia parties, including the Sadrists, will almost certainly organise large anti-US protests in the capital Baghdad in the coming days (likely after Friday prayers), significantly heightening security and bystander risks in the International Zone, where the US embassy is located. Mounting anti-US sentiment (especially in Iraq) will also render sporadic attacks against US businesses by rogue Shia groups and sole perpetrators a realistic possibility in the coming weeks, particularly if the war extends. Protests are also possible in Jordan, particularly those converging on the US embassy in the capital Amman. The security forces will likely attempt to disperse any such protests forcibly, elevating exposure to tear gas and low-level clashes. However, wider violence is unlikely. While broader unrest remains possible, elevated levels of policing and strict controls on public gatherings will mitigate against protest risks in many regional jurisdictions.
  • Iran-Israel: Increased adoption of AI underscores elevated mis-, disinformation risks amid war. On 21 June, international news outlets reported that the escalating war between Iran and Israel has provoked an uptick in the distribution of artificial intelligence (AI)-generated mis- and disinformation on social media platforms. Namely, pro-Iran accounts are continuing to share fake media that exaggerates the aftermath of Iranian strikes against Israel. Similarly, pro-Israel accounts have increased the dissemination of old videos depicting civil unrest in Iran to feign local Iranian support for Israel’s military campaign. These posts amassed over 100 m views between 13 and 19 June, highlighting their rapid propagation. It is unknown whether the accounts in question are linked to the Iranian and/or Israeli states; however, we assess these developments underscore the elevated risks linked to mis- and disinformation in the short-to-medium term amid the escalating Iran-Israel war.
  • Middle East, North Africa and Turkey: US strike action will elevate regional tensions, attack risks. On 22 June, the US conducted strikes against three Iranian nuclear facilities in Fordow (Qom province), Isfahan (Isfahan province) and Natanz (Isfahan province, see Sibylline Alert – 22 June 2025). While battle damage assessment is still ongoing, initial satellite imagery shows that the facilities sustained substantial damage. Following the strikes, Iran warned earlier on 23 June that this US attack had expanded the range of legitimate targets for its own armed forces. Direct Iranian retaliation against US assets in the region remains a realistic possibility; Iran is also likely to mobilise its proxies, particularly in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. This will elevate risks of conflict escalation; the US will likely retaliate against proxies in the region, as well as Iran itself. While the Strait of Hormuz remains open, there is a realistic possibility of Iran moving to restrict vessel passage through it in the coming days, elevating supply chain disruption and oil price volatility. Additionally, we assess that the strike will likely elevate anti-US and possibly anti-western sentiment in the region, elevating risks of domestic unrest near US and western embassies and assets in the coming weeks, particularly in Iraq.
  • Cyprus-UK: Arrest of British national underscores elevated Iranian-linked security threats. On 21 June, the Cypriot authorities arrested a British national on suspicion of espionage and terrorism-related offences. The individual is suspected of conducting surveillance on the UK military base RAF Akrotiri (British Overseas Territory of Akrotiri and Dhekelia) and the Cypriot Andreas Papandreou Air Base (Paphos district) since mid-April. Local media reports indicate he was of Azerbaijani descent with alleged ties to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The suspect was remanded in custody for eight days following a district court appearance. Further information has not been disclosed for national security considerations. RAF Akrotiri is frequently used for airstrikes, logistics and surveillance, including missions targeting Islamic State (IS) and assisting Israel against Iranian airborne attacks. We assess that this incident likely underscores an elevated threat posed by Iranian actors or proxies targeting strategic European military assets following the outbreak of the Iran-Israel war. The Cypriot authorities have already issued a heightened security alert in response to the escalated risk of Iranian-directed terrorist attacks targeting Israeli nationals awaiting repatriation in Cyprus.
  • Syria: Church bombing underscores persistent Jihadism re-emergence threats. On 22 June, a suicide bomber killed at least 22 people and injured 52 others in a small-arms and explosives attack on the Greek Orthodox Church of Mar Elias in the capital Damascus. While no group has yet claimed responsibility, the government accused the Islamic State (IS) of the attack. The developments underscore the persistent threat of IS resurgence in Syria as the group continues to capitalise on the security vacuum in large parts of the country to rebuild its local cells and capabilities. As such, IS will almost certainly continue its attempts to attack religious and ethnic minorities, sustaining bystander and security risks around religious sites, including Shia shrines and churches. Furthermore, we assess that the presence of rogue and pro-IS jihadist groups in Syria outside of the government’s control will increase the risk of further waves of terrorist attacks through 2025. In the coming days, new crackdowns against these groups are highly likely, exacerbating security risks in Damascus until the end of June.
  • US: Strikes on Iran will increase risk of attacks, domestic unrest, violent extremism in short term. On 22 June, the Department of Homeland Security issued a National Terrorism Advisory System bulletin, alerting to the potential of cyberattacks carried out by actors affiliated with Iran. The bulletin stated that the ongoing conflict in Iran is causing a ‘heightened threat environment in the US. The conflict could also contribute to ‘US-based individuals plotting additional attacks’ on US soil that are ‘motivated by anti-Semitic or anti-Israel sentiment’. Though there are no current specific threats, Customs and Border Protection stated the threat of sleeper cells in the US has ‘never been higher’. In the short term, the likelihood of violent extremism will increase if the Iranian leadership issues a religious ruling calling for retaliatory violence against targets inside the US. That said, the US authorities are largely capable of mitigating sophisticated plots. Sole perpetrators will likely remain reliant on low-capacity attacks employing firearms, rudimentary incendiary devices or vehicle ramming. However, we assess that such attacks remain unlikely. (Source: Sibylline)

 

25 Jun 25. US strikes failed to destroy Iran’s nuclear sites, intelligence report says. US strikes may only delay Iran nuclear program by months, sources say.

  • Summary
  • Israeli prime minister, Iran president both claim victory
  • US airstrikes only set back Iran’s nuclear program by months, initial US intelligence assessment finds
  • US tells UN Security Council that strikes ‘degraded’ nuclear program

U.S. airstrikes did not destroy Iran’s nuclear capability and only set it back by a few months, according to a preliminary U.S. intelligence assessment, as a shaky ceasefire brokered by U.S. President Donald Trump took hold between Iran and Israel. Earlier on Tuesday, both Iran and Israel signaled that the air war between the two nations had ended, at least for now, after Trump publicly scolded them for violating a ceasefire he announced at 0500 GMT. As the two countries lifted civilian restrictions after 12 days of war – which the U.S. joined with an attack on Iran’s uranium-enrichment facilities – each sought to claim victory. Trump said over the weekend that the U.S. deployment of 30,000-pound bombs had “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program. But that claim appeared to be contradicted by an initial assessment by one of his administration’s intelligence agencies, according to three people familiar with the matter. One of the sources said Iran’s enriched uranium stocks had not been eliminated, and the country’s nuclear program, much of which is buried deep underground, may have been set back only a month or two. Iran says its nuclear research is for civilian energy production. (Source: Reuters)

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