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NEWS IN BRIEF – MIDDLE EAST – CONFLICT

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22 Jun.

22 Jun 25. Hegseth, Caine Laud Success of U.S. Strike on Iran Nuke Sites. During a press conference at the Pentagon today, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Air Force Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, lauded the success of the U.S. Central Command’s overnight strike on three Iranian nuclear facilities. Dubbed “Operation Midnight Hammer,” Centcom deployed multiple combined assets to inflict significant damage at the sites of Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan.

“The order we received from our commander in chief was focused, it was powerful and it was clear. We devastated the Iranian nuclear program,” Hegseth said at the outset of his remarks, also noting that the operation did not target Iranian troops or citizens.

“Initial battle damage assessments indicate that all three sites sustained extremely severe damage and destruction,” Caine told the media.

After proceeding quietly and with minimal communication for 18 hours from the U.S. to the target area, the first of seven B-2 Spirit stealth bombers dropped two 30,000 GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator “bunker buster” bombs at the Fordo site yesterday at approximately 6:40 p.m. EDT, Caine said.

The initial mission package also included several decoy aircraft that flew west over the Pacific Ocean as “a deception effort known only to an extremely small number of planners and key leaders here in Washington and ,” Caine said.

Such tactics were also used in support of the main strike package of aircraft.

“The U.S. employed several deception tactics — including decoys — as the fourth and fifth generation aircraft pushed out in front of the strike package at high altitude and high speed, sweeping in front of the package for enemy fighters and surface-to-air missile threats,” Caine said.

Following the initial strike on Fordo, the remaining B-2s went on to deploy their ordnance, eventually totaling 14 MOPs hitting the targeted areas. This was the first operational use of the GBU-57 MOP, Caine noted.   In addition to the MOPs, Caine said a U.S. submarine operating in Centcom’s area of responsibility launched more than two dozen Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles at key infrastructure targets at the Isfahan site, bringing the overall total of precision-guided weapons employed during the operation to approximately 75. Caine stated there was no detectable retaliation to the strikes.

“We are unaware of any shots fired at the package on the way out. Iran’s fighters did not fly, and it appears that Iran’s surface-to-air missile systems did not see us,” he said, adding, “Throughout the mission, we maintained the element of surprise.”

Both Hegseth and Caine shared praise for the military personnel who worked to execute the mission.

“I want to recognize the pilots who flew those bombers, who flew those fighters, who flew those refuelers; warriors. I want to recognize the sailors on those destroyers, in those subs, on those carriers; warriors, all of them,” Hegseth said, also recognizing soldiers who conducted air and base defense.

“Every American involved in this operation performed flawlessly,” he added, also giving recognition to the Israeli government for its contribution to the positioning and preparation of the effort. This was a complex and high-risk mission, carried out with exceptional skill and discipline by our joint force,” Caine said, also noting that the mission demonstrated the “unmatched reach, coordination and capability of the United States military.”

“In just a matter of weeks, this went from strategic planning to global execution,” he said, adding that he concurs with President Donald J. Trump’s assessment that “no other military in the world could have done this.”

When asked about the overall intent of the strikes, Hegseth said the mission was specifically focused on preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.

“This mission was not, and has not been, about regime change. The president authorized a precision operation to neutralize the threats to our national interests posed by the Iranian nuclear program and the collective self-defense of our troops and our ally, Israel,” Hegseth said.

As to the potential for Iran attempting retaliation for the U.S. strikes, Caine said Centcom is operating under elevated force protection measures throughout the Middle East region and that any retaliation by Iran or its proxies would be “an incredibly poor choice.”

“We will defend ourselves. The safety of our service members and civilians remains our highest priority,” he said. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

Military And Security Developments

Jun 22.

US and Israel Strike Iran Nuclear Facilities 

Analysis current as of 0730hrs (BST), 22 June 2025

EVENT

Earlier on 22 June, US President Donald Trump announced that the US had conducted airstrikes targeting three key nuclear facilities in Iran, destroying uranium enrichment facilities in Fordow (Qom province) and Natanz (Isfahan province), and another unspecified facility in Isfahan province. Iranian authorities have confirmed that US airstrikes targeted the facilities, though state media denied that the facilities have been ‘irreversibly damaged’.

SIGNIFICANCE

  • The strikes mark a major escalation between the US and Iran and comes amid the ongoing Israel-Iran war (see Sibylline Special Report – 20 June 2025). Trump stated that US military ‘worked as a team’ with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and that the strikes underscore the US’s support for Israel’s efforts to neutralise Iran’s nuclear programme.
  • Trump stated that the US would conduct further strikes unless Iran ‘make[s] peace’. This almost certainly refers to Iran making significant concessions regarding its nuclear programme during negotiations with the US.
  • At 0345hrs (local time), Israel’s Home Front Command raised the nationwide threat to ‘critical’ amid concerns of a major Iranian retaliation. This guidance bans all public gatherings and only allows essential businesses to operate.
  • Iranian authorities have stated that all nuclear material had been removed from the targeted sites prior to US airstrikes, underscoring broader efforts to moderate risks of nuclear incidents or safety breaches amid continued strikes on enrichment and uranium stockpile facilities.

FORECAST

Iran will likely directly respond to US strikes by targeting US military installations in the region, increasing conflict escalation risks. In the coming hours, Iranian authorities will likely continue working to determine the impact of strike action on the facilities’ operationality and Iran’s nuclear programme; the extent of damage to the facilities will likely influence the intensity of Iran’s response to strike action. In the coming days, Iran will likely mobilise efforts to conduct strikes targeting US assets and installations in the region, substantially increasing regional tensions. Strike action will likely primarily target US installations in Iraq, particularly the Al-Asad Airbase (Al Anbar governorate) and Harir Air Base (Erbil governorate), while strikes targeting US positions in Syria such as the Abu Hajar airfield (al-Hasakah governorate) and the Al-Tanf garrison (Rif Dimashq governorate) are also possible. Though less likely, there is also a realistic possibility that Iran will retaliate against US strike action by targeting US assets and installations in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE, increasing conflict spillover risks. If Iran attempts to target US assets and installations in the region, the US would highly likely conduct further strikes within Iran, possibly targeting military and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) installations and assets, increasing risks of conflict escalation.

Iran is highly likely to mobilise its proxies to target US bases in the region, compounding security and bystander risks for proximate installations, as well as commercial vessels moving through the Red Sea. Iran is highly likely to call for proxy mobilisation in Iraq, with elements of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) likely resuming attacks targeting US bases and possibly resuming drone attacks targeting Israel in the coming days. Such attacks will increase risks of retaliatory US and Israeli strikes targeting locations associated with proxy activity, driving conflict escalation and ethno-religious tensions therein. The Yemen-based Houthis will also likely resume attacks on US and Israeli-linked vessels in the Red Sea in the coming days, significantly increasing security risks for vessels traversing the Bab el-Mandeb and sustaining significant pressure on global supply chains. However, Lebanese Hizballah (LH) is unlikely to resume attacks on Israel in the coming weeks due to broader capacity limitations, moderating prospects for an escalation on the Israel-Lebanon border. Even so, Iran-backed militant groups and factions in Lebanon and Syria will possibly attempt to conduct low-capacity rocket attacks targeting northern Israel in the coming days, likely triggering Israeli airstrikes targeting infrastructure and locations associated with militant activity. A general escalation in proxy attacks targeting Israel and the US will increase risks of regional conflict escalation, while compounding security and bystander risks for locally engaged staff.

Amid escalating regional tensions, concerns that Iran will restrict movement through the Strait of Hormuz will likely trigger substantial volatility on global energy markets. Although Iran is unlikely to unilaterally close the Strait of Hormuz in the coming days, there is a realistic possibility that Iran will attempt to restrict the passage of vessels through waterway to maximise economic pressure on the US and Israel and deter further airstrikes. The Strait is a critical maritime route through which approximately 25% of the world’s crude oil supply and 20% of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade flow. Such a closure would severely disrupt crude oil exports from Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, triggering global crude price surges, significant shocks across international energy markets and substantially undermining global supply chain continuity. Amid increasing concerns that Iran will restrict passage through the Strait, oil exporters will likely attempt to expedite shipments from the Gulf to receiving markets, increasing risks of bottlenecks and vessel collisions in the coming days.

In the coming days, Iranian hostilities towards Israel will likely intensify, with missile and drone attacks sustaining security risks in Israel and disrupting travel through regional airspace. By 0900hrs (local time) on 22 June, Iran had launched at least three missile barrages towards Israel; this marks a moderate increase in the frequency of missile attacks compared to recent days and almost certainly reflects Iranian efforts to retaliate against US strikes on nuclear facilities. In the coming days, Iran will likely attempt to intensify missile attacks targeting Israel, likely employing heavier munitions (including one-tonne missiles; see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 19 June 2025) and cluster munitions to increase pressure on Israeli air defences. In response, Israel is highly likely to continue intensifying airstrikes within Iran, possibly increasing targeting of Iranian energy infrastructure and/or expanding the ongoing assassination campaign targeting nuclear scientists and military personnel to include high-ranking political figures. Such intensification will likely undermine prospects for diplomatic de-escalation, sustaining significant operational disruption in both Iran and Israel. Regional airspace closures and flight suspensions are also highly likely to remain in place in the coming days, restricting access to commercially available evacuation routes. Broader disruption to airline operations (including route diversions away from impacted airspace) will also sustain risks of delays to intercontinental flights, increasing travel costs and risks of supply chain disruption.

In the coming days, risks of anti-US demonstrations in the broader region will increase, driving risks of unrest and hostility to US-linked investment. In the coming days, risks of anti-US protests and unrest will increase throughout the region, particularly in Iraq and Yemen, as well as in Shia-majority areas in Lebanon and Syria. Demonstrations will likely target around US embassies and will possibly spread to also target entities associated with the US, including retail outlets, hospitality venues and NGOs, increasing risks of targeted unrest, violence and vandalism for locally engaged firms, particularly in Iraq. More broadly, risks of anti-US protests will also remain elevated in Algeria, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Turkey and Venezuela, increasing risks of temporary travel and operational disruption in the immediate vicinity of protest sites. Anti-war protests are also highly likely to escalate in the coming days, particularly in the US, with large-scale demonstrations increasing localised transit and supply chain disruption risks in major urban centres including Chicago (Illinois), New York (New York), Los Angeles and San Francisco (California), Seattle (Washington) and the capital Washington DC.

Jun 20.

  • US: Conflict in Middle East  will sustain heightened nationwide threat of political violence, hate crimes. On 19 June, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) stated that its hate crime unit was probing anti-Muslim threats against mayoral candidate Zohran Mamdani. On the same day, Ohio Representative Max Miller was reportedly ‘run off the road’ by a driver with a Palestinian flag. Additionally, the Memphis (Tennessee) Police Department released reports stating that a man was arrested on 15 June for attempted kidnapping and stalking of the Memphis Mayor Paul Young. These incidents underscore the increasing normalisation of political violence in the US, as well as heightened levels of hate-fuelled crimes amid the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. As partisanship and anti-government sentiment remain heightened, the risk of violence against government-related targets will be sustained in the short term. Contentious policy decisions regarding the Israel-Iran war will raise the risk of attacks. Targeted attacks are possible in instances where personal information is leaked online. While security measures for individuals and government-related events will almost certainly be augmented in the coming weeks, we assess that bystander risks will remain elevated.
  • UK: Beach at military base highlights escalating pro-Palestine activism, security vulnerabilities. Earlier on 20 June, the pro-Palestine group Palestine Action (PA) published footage of at least two activists gaining unauthorised access to Royal Air Force (RAF) Brize Norton (Oxfordshire county), where they vandalised at least two Airbus Voyager air-to-air refuelling tankers. The activists sprayed the aircraft’s engines with red paint (a common tactic of the group) and seemingly managed to escape undetected. RAF Brize Norton is the largest RAF air base and is used to resupply British bases in Cyprus. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has confirmed the incident, and an investigation is ongoing. PA is the most capable activist group in the UK and has regularly targeted defence and other companies with perceived Israeli ties, using infrastructure disruptions, site occupations and vandalism. However, targeting British military assets reflects a major escalation in the activists’ tactics. Further activist breaches of military sites are a realistic possibility. While security will likely be augmented as a result of the latest breach, the fact that it occurred at all underscores severe security failures at sensitive UK installations.
  • Iraq: Protests highlight elevated anti-Western sentiment, elevating attack risks. On 18 June, the influential Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr called for ‘co-ordinated and peaceful’ protests after Friday Prayers on 20 June. Sadr’s call comes amid other Shia and pro-Iran factions across Iraq calling for protests against the breach of Iraqi air sovereignty by Israel and the US presence. As Sadr is ordinarily largely opposed to Iran, his calls highlight the increasing tensions within Iraq’s Shia community and broader citizenry over issues of Iraqi sovereignty and foreign intervention. The Iran-Israel war will likely continue exacerbating anti-Western sentiment over the coming weeks, increasing risks of attacks targeting Western government assets and personnel, domestic unrest and hostility to foreign investment. We assess that protests are likely nationwide, particularly in the capital Baghdad, Basra (Basra governorate) and Najaf (Najaf governorate). There is a realistic possibility that protests become violent and the security forces deploy forceful dispersal measures, elevating risks of travel disruption and bystander exposure to tear gas and rubber bullets (and possibly live ammunition) near protests.

Jun 19.

IRAN

  • Israel is likely to expand the scope of its targeting in response to any Iranian strikes that cause mass casualties and/or significant damage to critical infrastructure.
  • Israeli-linked cyber attacks against Iranian entities will exacerbate a retaliatory cycle of cyber activity, driving the risk of operational disruption and financial losses.
  • Israeli airstrikes against major Iranian cities have triggered substantial internal displacement; continued evacuations are increasing the risk of travel delays.
  • The mobilisation of US B-2 bombers to the region has increased the risk of armed escalation; direct US participation in Israeli strikes is a realistic possibility.
  • However, reported negotiations between the US and Iran will possibly delay the US’ decision vis-à-vis strike action against Iran; however, these discussions are unlikely to diffuse regional tensions substantially.
  • Israel continues to target Iranian nuclear facilities; limited international monitoring will increase hazard risks in both Iran and Iraq.

ISRAEL

  • Israel’s shift to managing its use of interceptors will elevate the security risks impacting rural and less populated areas.
  • A new alerting policy will reduce the risk of confusion and conflicting updates; however, it will also reduce warning times.
  • The easing of the ‘shielding guidance’ will allow the Israeli economy to open partially, though it is also likely to be reverted in the event of intensified Iranian strikes.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • Rising rates of domestic unrest amid elevated levels of anti-West sentiment will increase the risk of attacks against Western targets.

IRAN

  • Israel is likely to expand the scope of its targeting in response to any Iranian strikes that cause mass casualties and/or significant damage to critical infrastructure. In the coming days, Israel is likely to increase (gradually) the rate of its strikes targeting energy facilities and symbolic government infrastructure. However, such strikes are currently most likely to be carried out in response to (and in the immediate aftermath of) Iranian strikes against Israel. We assess that Israel will continue to prioritise nuclear and military infrastructure. However, if the conflict continues over the coming four-to-eight weeks (which would indicate a clear shift in Israel’s ambitions, namely the collapse of the Iranian regime), the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would likely continue to increase the frequency of its strikes against government and energy sites; we assess there is a realistic possibility that it would also target government officials and politicians. In this scenario, we assess that security risks would be elevated in the vicinity of state-aligned facilities, as well as for personnel (including news crews and NGOs) working with (or in close proximity to) state officials.
  • Israeli-linked cyber attacks against Iranian entities will exacerbate a retaliatory cycle of cyber activity, driving the risk of operational disruption and financial losses. On 17 June, international news outlets reported that the Israeli-linked hacktivist group ‘Predatory Sparrow’ conducted a disruptive cyber attack targeting Bank Sepah (an Iranian bank), disabling several payment systems nationwide and restricting access to mobile banking facilities. On 18 June, Predatory Sparrow also claimed to have conducted an attack against Nobitex, Iran’s largest cryptocurrency exchange. Hackers targeted the firm’s hot wallets and internal reporting infrastructure, stealing at least USD 90 m in cryptocurrency. Nobitex confirmed the breach earlier on 19 June; it remains offline at the time of writing. These cyber attacks likely reflect increasing Israeli-linked efforts to disrupt the operational continuity of major digital platforms and financial institutions within Iran, and to increase pressure on Iran’s economic and technological resilience as the Iran-Israel war continues at pace. The attacks also likely reflect efforts to foment anti-government sentiment within Iran and to increase pressure on government stability. In the coming days, attempts to perpetrate cyber attacks targeting Iranian entities will almost certainly continue, while Iranian-linked cyber threat actors will almost certainly continue to try to conduct retaliatory attacks targeting Israeli and Israeli-linked entities. The risk of cyber attacks, including distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) operations and data leaks, will be particularly acute for entities linked to the Israeli government; there is also an elevated risk of disruptive attacks targeting multinational firms employing software and hardware components produced by Israeli firms.
  • Israeli airstrikes against major Iranian cities have triggered substantial internal displacement; continued evacuations are increasing the risk of travel delays. On 16 June, the IDF issued evacuation orders for Tehran’s (Iran) 3rd and 18th districts before conducting strikes in the area. Subsequently, US President Donald Trump stated that Iranian civilians ‘should’ evacuate Tehran immediately due to safety concerns. The announcement triggered a significant uptick in civilian efforts to leave the capital via key thoroughfares, resulting in major traffic jams that reportedly lasted over 12 hours. As Israeli airstrikes targeting Iranian military and security facilities (many of which are located in densely populated urban centres) and assassination efforts targeting high-ranking military officials continue, escalating security concerns will likely trigger further evacuations, particularly from Tehran. Above-average road usage will almost certainly increase the risk of travel delays and critical supply chain disruption, as well as exposure to road-based hazards and accidents. An influx of displaced civilians moving to smaller population centres will possibly result in short-term retail and commodity shortages, with resultant price hikes exacerbating socio-economic health concerns and the risk of petty theft at outlets. Increased demand for public services will also elevate operational disruption risks for firms reliant on public sector operations. More broadly, while Iran’s airspace remains closed, its land borders with Afghanistan, Armenia, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and Turkmenistan are currently open; this will facilitate moderate levels of overland evacuation. Iranian nationals are currently unable to cross the Azerbaijan-Iran border. However, foreign nationals are currently able to cross this border; the Azeri authorities have reportedly authorised at least 600 evacuations via the Astara border crossing (Gilan province, Iran).
  • The mobilisation of US B-2 bombers to the region has increased the risk of armed escalation; direct US participation in Israeli strikes is a realistic possibility. In the past week, satellite images revealed that the US moved four B-2 bombers to Diego Garcia; it also deployed fighter jets to the Middle East region. Notably, B-2 bombers are the only conventional aerial assets capable of carrying the specific ordnance needed to penetrate deep-underground heavily fortified bunkers, such as the Fordow enrichment facility (Qom province). This comes amid increasingly aggressive rhetoric from President Trump on the topic of Iranian nuclear enrichment and US National Security Meetings during which the prospects of direct US strikes were allegedly discussed, underlining the growing risk of armed conflict. However, reported negotiations between the US and Iran will possibly delay the US’ decision vis-à-vis strike action against Iran; however, these discussions are unlikely to diffuse regional tensions substantially. On 18 June, local media reports indicated that Iran had dispatched a negotiating delegation to Oman to engage in nuclear negotiations with the US. During the talks, Iran reportedly indicated it would be willing to make concessions on its nuclear programme if Israel ceases airstrikes against Iranian territory. There is a realistic possibility that the negotiations will delay a decision by the US on whether to participate in strike action against Iranian nuclear facilities, particularly the Fordow enrichment facility (see above). However, Israel is unlikely to agree to halt its ongoing offensive in the immediate term, moderating the prospects for an imminent breakthrough in negotiations or substantial delays to the US’ decision-making.
  • Israel continues to target Iranian nuclear facilities; limited international monitoring will increase hazard risks in both Iran and Iraq. Earlier on 19 June, Israel conducted strikes targeting the Arak heavy water reactor (Markazi province, Iran). The Iranian authorities stated the facility was non-operational at the time of the strike, which will limit the risk of a major nuclear incident stemming from the strike. On 18 June, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Rafael Grossi reported that Israeli strikes against the Natanz nuclear facility (Isfahan province, Iran) significantly damaged above ground facilities, while strikes against adjacent electricity substations damaged the facility’s underground enrichment facilities and operability. Airstrikes also damaged the Isfahan nuclear facility (which previously held stockpiles of medium-enriched uranium), though the agency has not observed airstrikes directly impacting the Fordow enrichment facility. More broadly, Grossi reported that Iran has closed all nuclear sites to IAEA inspectors, limiting the agency’s monitoring capabilities and capacity to verify the location of uranium stockpiles, as well as the extent of damage to targeted facilities and/or possible enrichment activity therein. In the coming days, Israel is highly likely to continue striking Iranian nuclear facilities and adjacent buildings (including electricity substations and water management sites). Strikes targeting enrichment facilities, stockpiles and auxiliary support are unlikely to trigger major nuclear incidents, moderating domestic and regional hazard risks. However, strikes targeting nuclear reactors, heavy water facilities and power stations will elevate the likelihood of nuclear incidents (including major radiation leaks, reactor meltdowns and/or ground water contamination), increasing exposure risks within Iran and across the broader region, particularly eastern Iraq.

ISRAEL

  • Israel’s shift to managing its use of interceptors will elevate the security risks impacting rural and less populated areas. In recent days, Israeli military officials indicated that the IDF will begin to manage its supply and use of interceptors in preparation for Iran using its heavier one-tonne missiles. Overall, Israel’s Iron Dome rocket defence system’s interceptors are cheap and produced at a high volume. However, longer-range interceptors, such as the Arrow 3, are more expensive (each Arrow 3 interceptor costs an estimated USD 2.5 m) and are produced at a lower volume. The manner in which Israel prioritises its use of interceptors will likely depend on factors such as the population density of whatever area(s) and/or strategic facilities critical to the war effort and Israeli economy the IDF assesses Iran will target. As such, Iranian missiles are more likely to hit low density population centres and rural areas in the coming weeks. Furthermore, Israeli efforts to maximise interceptor supplies will likely drive Iran to increase its targeting of interceptor factories, exacerbating collateral risks for proximate assets and the risk of secondary explosions. Increasing domestic demand will also threaten to delay the delivery of such systems to other countries; this includes Germany, which is scheduled to receive Arrow 3 interceptors in late 2025. Any resultant disruption to the fulfilment of defence contracts with Israeli firms would, in turn, possibly lead to cancellations.
  • A new alerting policy will reduce the risk of confusion and conflicting updates; however, it will also reduce warning times. On 17 June, the Home Front Command (HFC) changed its alert policy; alerts now pass through three stages rather than four, essentially dropping the initial message that is typically sent 15-30 minutes before the other alerts. The new alerting process includes a message that is sent whenever missiles are airborne instructing people to get close to a sheltered place. Five-to-ten minutes after this message is sent, a siren will indicate if there is a need to find shelter. Lastly, a message will indicate whether it is safe to leave the shelter. The reduced warning time will increase the risk of individuals rushing to shelters, in turn elevating the likelihood of accidents and exacerbating risks for staff safety.
  • The easing of the ‘shielding guidance’ will allow the Israeli economy to open partially, though it is also likely to be reverted in the event of intensified Iranian strikes. On 18 June, the HFC published an amendment to the shielding guidance, effective until 2000hrs (local time) on 20 June (though it is likely to be extended under current conditions). The new guidance allows the re-opening of businesses that have access to a shelter located within a minute by foot of their premises. Additionally, public gatherings and events hosting a maximum of 30 people are allowed to go ahead across most of Israel (in some parts of northern Israel the limit is 100 people). Beaches and educational facilities are currently closed. This change was possibly implemented due to the current casualty number being significantly lower than military officials’ assessment before the war (the IDF’s leadership initially projected between 800 and 4,000 casualties due to Iranian retaliation). However, there is a realistic possibility that Iran will intensify its strikes in the coming days, increasing the likelihood of its missiles penetrating Israel’s air defences. We assess this trend will escalate if Iran is able to sustain frequent barrages for a prolonged period, elevating security risks across Israel. As such, the new HFC guidance will likely change in response to intensified Iranian strikes, whereupon it will possibly revert to heavy restrictions.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 

  • Rising rates of domestic unrest amid elevated levels of anti-Western sentiment will increase the risk of attacks against Western targets. On 18 June, the influential Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr called for ‘co-ordinated and peaceful’ protests after Friday Prayers on 20 June. In the past week, there have been increasing calls for protests across Iraq, some of which followed the G7 summit in Canada. On 18 June, the Iraqi security forces augmented their positions around the German embassy in the capital Baghdad following indications that it would be specifically targeted by protesters. The continuation of the Iran-Israel war will likely drive further such protests across the region (particularly after Friday prayers) and compound anti-West sentiment. This will in turn elevate the risk of attacks targeting Western-affiliated businesses, government assets and personnel as the war progresses, particularly in Iraq and in the event that the US supports Israel in conducting direct strikes against Iran.
  • Israel-Syria: Israeli incursions are unlikely to undermine security talks. On 18 June, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted incursions into several towns and villages in Syria’s Quneitra and Daraa governorates; they bulldozed numerous structures, including farms and residences, allegedly due to their proximity to Israeli military posts. The IDF’s recent activity in southern Syria likely signals Israeli efforts to expand the IDF’s current area of military control beyond the buffer zone between Syria and Israel. This trend will likely continue through the summer, triggering further tensions within communities in Quneitra and Daraa and increasing the risk of attacks against the IDF by rogue local militias. Nevertheless, we assess these Israeli incursions are unlikely to undermine the ongoing indirect talks between the Syrian and Israeli governments concerning de-escalation and possible security co-ordination in the coming months.
  • Iran-Israel: Strike on Israeli hospital will possibly drive escalation, widen scope of targets in Iran. Earlier on 19 June, an Iranian missile directly struck the Soroka Medical Center in Beersheba (Southern district, Israel), causing extensive structural damage and injuring at least 40 people. Iran stated that it targeted the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) C4I Corps headquarters, which is located approximately one mile (1.6km) from the hospital. The strike comes after the IDF targeted a partially built heavy-water research reactor at the Arak Nuclear Complex near Arak (Markazi province, Iran). These latest attacks underscore the elevated risk of conflict escalation between Iran and Israel. In the coming days, Israel will likely expand its scope of targets in Iran and increase the frequency of strikes against energy infrastructure and symbolic government infrastructure. Such strikes will exacerbate energy security risks and increase the likelihood of sporadic power outages and fuel shortages, in turn elevating operational disruption across Iran and raising the broader risks of volatility facing the oil market. We also assess that Israel will possibly target Iranian politicians, driving security risks for bystanders near government locations, as well as wider risks for government stability.

Jun 18.

  • Iran-Israel: Increased cyber activity highlights elevated security, disruption risks amid escalating war. Earlier on 18 June, international news outlets reported that the pro-Israel hacktivist group ‘Predatory Sparrow’ claimed a cyber attack against Iran’s largest cryptocurrency exchange, Nobitex. The attack was first detected on 18 June, though it is unclear when the infection began. The group targeted the firm’s hot wallets and internal reporting infrastructure and allegedly stole approximately USD 73 m in cryptocurrency. The group conducted a previous disruptive cyber attack against Bank Sepah (an Iranian bank) on 17 June; that attack is currently affecting payment services and customers’ ability to access mobile banking accounts. Simultaneously, Israeli organisations have allegedly experienced a 700% surge in cyber attacks since 12 June, showcasing the uptick in cyber activity amid the escalating Iran-Israel war. We assess that additional cyber operations by Israeli- and Iranian-aligned threat actors remain highly likely, underscoring the heightened security, disruption and financial risks facing operators in both countries in the short term.

Jun 17.

IRAN

  • A further expansion in Israeli strikes against key Iranian infrastructure and political figures remains a realistic possibility in the coming days, significantly elevating energy security risks. Over the past 72 hours, Israeli strikes against Iranian energy infrastructure have been limited. However, continued Iranian targeting of Israeli population centres and dual-use infrastructure (including power plants, ports and chemical plants) is likely to prompt Israel to increase the frequency of its strikes against Iranian energy infrastructure. It is also possibly prepared to expand its target set to include political officials. Any such strikes would severely increase the risk of power cuts and fuel shortages across Iran, driving collateral risks for personnel emanating from strikes against residential areas and government facilities. Furthermore, strikes against government officials would almost certainly further increase government stability risks in Iran, though enhanced sheltering of key officials will minimise critical stability risks in the coming weeks. More broadly, key threats to Iranian energy security and exports will increase the likelihood of Iran moving to limit navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. While Iran is currently reluctant to employ this measure, as it would increase the likelihood of international intervention and conflict escalation, it remains a realistic possibility as a matter of last resort. Such a move would significantly elevate price volatility across the international oil market, compounding inflationary pressures on global operating costs.
  • Israeli strikes have destroyed above-ground facilities at the Natanz fuel-enrichment plant (Isfahan province), though damage to other nuclear sites remains limited, which has moderated hazard risks. On 13 June, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that airstrikes by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had destroyed above-ground structures at Natanz. However, the strikes did not damage the below-ground structures containing the facility’s centrifuges. As of 16 June, IAEA reports revealed that airstrikes had also damaged auxiliary buildings at the Isfahan nuclear facility (Isfahan). However, the agency has not observed damage at the Fordow fuel-enrichment plant or at nuclear facilities in Bushehr (Bushehr province), Khondab (Markazi province) or the capital Tehran. Although strikes against enrichment facilities are unlikely to trigger major nuclear incidents, strikes against uranium stockpile storage facilities would increase the risk of non-critical chemical contamination incidents facing proximate population centres. However, strikes targeting nuclear power plants and heavy water reactors would substantially increase the risk of higher-impact nuclear incidents, including radiation leaks. As Israeli strikes on nuclear facilities and adjacent infrastructure continue to escalate, chemical hazard and nuclear incident risks will increase, elevating public health and environmental exposure risks nationwide.
  • Iran’s legislature will consider a bill to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT), compounding regional tensions and sanctions-exposure risks. Earlier on 16 June, the spokesperson for Iran’s foreign ministry announced that the Majles will consider the legislation in the coming days. The treaty codifies international commitments not to develop nuclear weapons; it also mandates that international inspectors are allowed to access nuclear facilities. Despite claims by President Masoud Pezeshkian that Iran will not seek to develop a nuclear arsenal, the announcement likely forms part of Iran’s efforts to signal that it would be willing to develop some form of nuclear weapon if Israel continues to intensify its airstrikes and operations targeting military, nuclear, energy and internal security infrastructure. If Iran moves to withdraw from the NPT in the coming days, Israel is likely to request US assistance to strike the Fordow fuel-enrichment plant (Qom province), a hardened enrichment facility which Israel currently lacks the munitions to destroy. US engagement in such strike action would almost certainly depend on the credibility of assessments that Iran is seeking to develop an operational nuclear weapon imminently, as well as the status of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and whether Iran’s ongoing strike campaign expands to include US assets in the region. Additionally, the UK and France are highly likely to propose a resolution triggering the ‘snapback’ mechanism under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); this would facilitate the reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran for violating commitments to contain its nuclear programme. We assess that such action would significantly increase regional tensions and sanctions-exposure risks for regionally engaged firms.
  • Iran is highly likely to scrutinise foreign nationals and ethno-religious minorities more intently in the coming days, increasing surveillance, harassment and detention risks for locally engaged staff. Earlier on 16 June, numerous state-linked social media accounts published claims that the police and security forces have arrested several Israeli Mossad agents in Iran in recent days. The Iranian authorities have not commented on these claims at the time of writing, though they will likely increase scrutiny of individuals associated with foreign states, particularly dual nationals and those working for foreign companies. Surveillance, harassment and detention risks will also extend to ethno-religious minorities associated with anti-government and secessionist activity, particularly ethnic-Azeris, Balochs and Kurds. Such trends will in turn compound the risk of anti-government protest activity, particularly in Sistan and Baluchistan province.

ISRAEL

  • Iranian strikes are likely to continue in the coming days, sustaining severe security risks across Israel. Waves of Iranian missile strikes targeting Israel are likely to continue, primarily at night. So far, each Iranian barrage has consisted of an average of 30 to 60 projectiles (with around 350 missiles fired in total at the time of writing). The majority of strikes have targeted Central, Haifa, Northern and Tel Aviv districts (specifically the Haifa and Tel Aviv metropolitan areas). The current interception rate of Israeli (and allied) air defences is around 92%; roughly 5% of Iranian missiles have struck open areas. However, direct hits have been recorded in Bnei Brak, Tel Aviv (both Tel Aviv), Petah Tikva, Rehovot, Rishon LeZion (all Central), Tamara (Northern) and Haifa. Iranian missiles carry a half-tonne warhead; they also impact their target at high speed, creating a shockwave several hundred meters from the point of impact. Israeli shelters are built to protect against this shockwave but not against a direct hit. At the time of writing, Iranian strikes have killed at least 24 civilians (most were not sheltering in protected spaces) and injured over 200 others, underlining the severe security risks facing staff across Israel.
  • There is a growing risk that Iranian strikes will increasingly target Israeli energy and dual-use infrastructure (including chemical plants) in the coming days. Missile attacks targeting energy infrastructure will increase the risk of temporary blackouts, though they are unlikely to disrupt energy security conditions critically nationwide. However, in the event of successful strikes against the Orot Rabin (Haifa) and Rotenberg (Southern district) power plants, prolonged blackouts are more likely. Successful strikes against chemical plants in Haifa would substantially increase environmental hazards and population health risks. This would likely prompt mass evacuations from the Haifa metropolitan area and severe disruption for business operations, including at Haifa’s port, elevating supply chain risks.
  • The growing frequency and intensity of Iranian strikes will increase the risks of population displacement and travel disruption across Israeli metropolitan areas. Despite several strikes against metropolitan areas (particularly Tel Aviv and Haifa), this growing rate has not yet prompted the migration of large numbers of Israeli civilians from urban centres to lower-risk rural areas. However, if the frequency and intensity of Iranian strikes were to increase in the coming days (causing the death toll to rise), the likelihood of mass migration from these areas would be elevated. Any such migration (which would likely involve the movement of people to less targeted areas in southern Israel) would elevate the risk of travel disruption and traffic congestion along key highways, complicating staff evacuation and elevating their vulnerability to being caught in a missile barrage while they are not located near an appropriate shelter. We currently assess that the conflict is likely to be prolonged and to extend beyond the coming weeks; socio-economic health risks in Israel would be elevated in this scenario. The Home Front Command has indicated its support for a differential approach to tackle the risk of a prolonged closure of Israel’s economy. As such, and as the war progresses over the coming month, there is a realistic possibility that Israel will remove or reduce operating restrictions (such as limiting operations to essential workers) in areas identified as low risk. However, even with a partial restoration of business operations, the effects on Israel’s economy would likely be severe, compounding the costs associated with the ongoing Israel-Hamas war and increasing the risk of recession. Furthermore, businesses (even those in areas likely to be declared as low risk) will remain closed or experience significant operational disruption due to shortages among the willing labour force.
  • Israel’s closure of gas fields will elevate energy security and domestic unrest risks within neighbouring countries. On 14 June, the Israeli energy ministry ordered the closure of the Leviathan and Karish offshore gas fields. The two fields supply gas to Egypt and Jordan; some of the supply is also sold to Europe, meaning that regional and international energy security risks are currently elevated. In response to the halt in production, both Egypt and Jordan have initiated emergency protocols to limit their current energy use, elevating operational risks for heavy energy-consuming businesses, particularly in the manufacturing sector. Furthermore, the halt will increase the likelihood of temporary power cuts and load-shedding in both countries, elevating the risk of domestic unrest in the event of prolonged disruption.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 

  • Lebanese Hizballah (LH) indicated that it will not join the war, moderating security risks in northern Israel and across Lebanon. On 13 June, LH officials indicated to foreign news agencies that the organisation is not intending to join Iran in strikes on Israel; they instead issued an official statement condemning Israel. An LH attack on Israel remains unlikely in the coming weeks due to the degradation of the group’s military capabilities and the risks to its domestic legitimacy, which would be further exacerbated if LH pursued operations that prompted further Israeli strikes against Lebanon. Even so, the risk of rogue militant groups in Lebanon launching strikes against Israel will be elevated over the coming weeks, driving security risks in northern Israel, particularly near the Israel-Lebanon border.
  • The IDF has instituted lockdown measures in the West Bank (Palestinian Territories), increasing operational and supply chain disruption risks. On 13 June, the IDF announced additional troop deployments to the West Bank and placed all Palestinian towns under lockdown measures. The ordinances restrict movement between population centres, significantly disrupting overland movement and supply chain continuity for locally engaged firms. Intensified checkpoint measures within major population centres, including Nablus (Nablus governorate) and Qalqilya (Qalqilya governorate) have also restricted intra-city travel, compounding operational disruption risks therein. The lockdown measures underscore significant concerns that Iranian-backed militants within the West Bank will substantially increase their activity as the Iran-Israel war continues to escalate, underlining increasing security and bystander risks, particularly in northern governorates. However, the lockdown measures do not apply to Israeli settlements in the West Bank, will which likely exacerbate ethno-religious tensions. Efforts to enforce the lockdown on Palestinian villages will increase the risk of localised clashes and bystanders’ exposure to crossfire, while also compounding longer-term radicalisation and militant recruitment risks throughout the West Bank.
  • Regional airspace closures will likely remain in place in the coming days, restricting access to commercially available evacuation routes and disrupting international travel. Since Israel initiated Operation Rising Lion on 13 June, Israel, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria have announced closures to their respective airspaces, significantly disrupting regional travel. On 16 June, Israel’s national airline, El Al, announced it would operate repatriation flights for Israeli nationals abroad, though these efforts are unlikely to signal a broader resumption of aviation activity. Regional airspace closures will likely remain in place in the coming days, critically disrupting airline operations and restricting access to commercially available evacuation routes. In the coming days, international flights transiting over the region will also almost certainly continue to be re-routed, increasing travel times, costs and fuel consumption for transcontinental flights.
  • Iran: Evacuation orders will drive mass departures from Tehran, exacerbate travel disruption. On 16 June, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) ordered the evacuation of District 3 in Tehran (Iran) ahead of an airstrike against the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) headquarters. Hours later, US President Donald Trump issued a statement on social media calling for ‘everyone’ to evacuate Tehran immediately. We assess that the mass departure of residents, businesspeople and diplomatic personnel is highly likely to intensify in the coming hours and days, exacerbating transport disruption along intercity roads and major highways exiting Tehran. Risks associated with poor driving practices, including collisions and crashes, will likely be exacerbated by above-average road usage and outdated road infrastructure. Long lines at fuel stations will heighten the risk of localised fuel shortages and additional travel disruption. Regional airspace closures will likely remain in place in the coming days, restricting access to commercially available evacuation routes and driving additional strain to overland transport.
  • Israel: Operational disruption will continue to impact local economy amid war with Iran. On 16 June, Fitch Ratings stated that Israel’s current credit rating is within range to absorb the impact of its ongoing war with Iran. Currently, Israel’s rating at Fitch stands at ‘A’ (with a negative outlook). However, Fitch warned that its assessment is contingent upon the war remaining short-lived and contained. Currently, operational disruption will continue to affect almost all businesses and industries due to ongoing governmental restrictions (including limiting work to only essential employees) and labour shortages. We assess that a prolonged war would exacerbate these trends, elevating the risk of a recession by the end of 2025 (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 16 June 2025). Furthermore, while the agriculture, tech and financial sectors will (largely) remain resilient, long-term hostilities are likely to affect these sectors, along with heavy manufacturing and logistics due to Iranian attacks against infrastructure (as well as the protracted risk of strikes against Israel’s offshore gas facilities).

Jun 16.

  •  Iran-Israel war will sustain long waits at land crossings, flight disruption. Earlier on 16 June, Turkmenistan’s Foreign Ministry reported that approximately 120 foreign nationals have crossed the Iranian-Turkmen border so far amid the ongoing Iran-Israel war.  Turkmenistan is offering assistance to foreign diplomats and their families, as well as other citizens; nationals from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Romania, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are among those to have used this route so far. That said, approximately 200 Russian citizens were estimated to have entered Azerbaijan from Iran on 15 June, which possibly suggests limited exceptions with pre-approval from the Azerbaijani government. As of 14 June, the Agarak-Nordooz checkpoint between Armenia’s Syunik province and Iran’s East Azerbaijan province was open. Border checkpoints between Eurasian countries and Iran will likely be liable to higher volumes of people seeking to cross, likely meaning longer wait times and enhanced document checks. We assess that moderate flight disruption and cancellations at airports across the region (namely in Armenia, Azerbaijan and possibly Georgia) will likely persist over the coming days.
  • Egypt: Iran-Israel war will significantly increase energy security risks through summer. On 14 June, the Egyptian government announced that it had temporarily halted production at several fertiliser plants due to the expected drop in imported natural gas supplies from Israel. This follows the temporary closure of Israel’s Leviathan and Karish gas fields on the same day after the onset of Iranian rocket attacks. We assess that temporary operational disruption is likely to affect other energy-intensive sectors in Egypt, such as steel and cement manufacturing. Furthermore, load shedding in the coming weeks remains a realistic possibility to reduce pressure on the electricity grid, which typically reaches its maximum capacity during the summer (between May and September). As such, domestic unrest risks will partially increase in the coming weeks, as ms of households will possibly be affected. However, we assess that the Egyptian government will likely attempt to mitigate these risks through July and August by importing more Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) from regional suppliers (such as Qatar), increasing the pressure on the national budget, likely elevating socio-economic risks in H2 2025.
  • Jordan: Iran-Israel war spillover will elevate domestic unrest, energy security risks. Earlier on 16 June, Jordan’s National Electric Power Company announced it had activated its emergency protocol, suspending gas supply to factories connected to the main gas network. The move comes amid a halt in gas production and delivery in Israel’s Leviathan Gas field due to the ongoing Iran-Israel war. A company official commented earlier that Jordan’s fuel reserves for electricity generation are sufficient for ‘at least’ 20 days, indicating significantly elevated energy security risks. While Jordan is unlikely to be directly targeted despite assisting Israel in intercepting certain Iranian ordnance, incidental security risks remain (emanating from missile faults and shrapnel), driving threats to life and assets within the kingdom. In the coming weeks, Jordanian support for Israel and growing energy risks will elevate the risks of Iranian cyber-social engineering operations to increase domestic unrest and anti-government sentiment in the country. Even so, we assess that the Jordanian security forces will likely remain capable of moderating these risks; the government and the monarchy’s rule will likely remain stable due to overall broad public support.

FORECAST

MIDDLE EAST: The ongoing Iran-Israel war will highly likely impact Russia’s ongoing full-scale invasion of Ukraine in various ways. This includes the provision of military aid from allies to each warring party, as well as how diverted global attention will impact the ailing path towards a ceasefire and resolving the war in Ukraine. The Israeli-Iranian war will highly likely reinforce the Trump administration’s planned reduction of US military assistance to Ukraine. On 10 June, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced that the US will reduce funding allocated for military support for Kyiv. Hegseth implied that this decision was connected to ‘competing interests around the globe’. This highly likely refers to the Middle East and the possibility of hostilities in other areas of US interest (namely, Taiwan and the South China Sea). As such, even if the US does not become directly involved in the Iran-Israel war, the situation is highly likely to reinforce the already very low prospect of new US aid for Kyiv in the near term, with the US likely to focus on increasing support to Israel. On 14 June, Hegseth confirmed that the US has diverted an unspecified number and type of its counter-drone systems from Ukraine to the Middle East. Additionally, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on 13 June that a Patriot air defence system, which Israel was due to transfer to Ukraine before being sent to the US for repairs, has not yet arrived. Continued retaliatory Iranian strikes against targets in Israel will likely require the US to focus on strengthening air defence capabilities across the wider region, to the exclusion of Ukraine. Any redirection or reprioritisation of air defence systems and/or components will likely moderately degrade Ukraine’s ability to respond to high-intensity Russian long-range attacks over the medium-to-long term. Meanwhile, Iranian preoccupation with responding to Israeli long-range strikes will likely have a moderate impact on Russia’s acquisition of supplies for its war in Ukraine. While Iranian munition exports to Russia will likely decrease over the short-to-medium term, Russia has localised the production of Shahed drones. Those drones were originally Iranian-made and designed, but Russia has since not only massively expanded local production, but has also upgraded these beyond their original design. As of May 2025, Russia was estimated to be creating, in all, around 170 Shahed drones per day, with plans to increase this figure to 190 by the end of 2025. Ukraine may possibly seek to exploit the current Israeli-Iranian war to target Russian facilities producing Shahed drones or other UAVs in long-range strikes over the short-to-medium term. Should the Iran-Israel war persist over the coming weeks and months, this could realistically further distract the US and see it disengage (directly or indirectly) from the peace process, or otherwise seek a quick resolution to the Russo-Ukrainian war so it can focus on the Middle East. The US has already scaled back its direct role in facilitating negotiations between the two sides. In the absence of meaningful progress, the White House could reorient its diplomatic efforts to the Middle East, leaving the war in Ukraine to continue, which, in our assessment, would suit Russia’s interests for as long as it continues to advance on the battlefield. However, Washington DC could also reprioritise and seek to push Ukraine to agree to a quick peace, including accepting unfavourable conditions which are more favourable to Russia. Russia will likely present itself as a potential mediator in the war between Israel and Iran, but its influence remains limited, given that Israel, not Iran, is largely determining the tempo and duration of operations at present. US President Donald Trump stated on 15 June that he does not oppose his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, in attempting to broker peace. Trump stated that the two leaders had discussed this during a call on 14 June; the Kremlin had also said that Putin was ready to mediate between Israel and Iran. We assess that, if Putin were to successfully negotiate a de-escalation, this would possibly increase the likelihood of the Trump administration giving credence to Russian peace demands in Ukraine. In turn, Moscow would highly likely seek to use this to present Kyiv as the impediment to its own peace negotiations. That said, it remains unclear if Moscow will play any role in mediation, either because of or despite its close relationship with Tehran. Lastly, sustained Israeli-Iranian hostilities will possibly bolster Russian revenues from oil sales, improving its socio-economic health outlook and ability to fund a protracted war and efforts to reconstitute its military. Global oil prices soared on 13 June after Israel launched its initial attack against Iran, with Brent and Nymex crude prices jumping by more than 10% and reaching their highest levels since January. Additionally, volatility with oil prices and supply could also realistically encourage the EU and G7 to consider postponing plans to lower the existing price cap of USD 60 per barrel on Russian oil in the near term. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 12 June 2025. We assess that, given around 30% of Russia’s state revenues came from oil and gas exports in 2024, a major protracted crisis in the Middle East (particularly if Tehran were to close the Hormuz Strait) would be a significant short-term boon to Russia’s economy, albeit at a potential strategic cost if Iran, Russia’s principal ally in the Middle East, destabilised. (Source: Sibylline)

 

18 Jun 25. Khamenei says Iran will not surrender in national address. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said the Iranian nation “is not one to surrender,” a day after US President Donald Trump called on the country to surrender unconditionally.

“Let the Americans know that the Iranian nation is not one to surrender, and any military intervention on their part will undoubtedly result in irreparable damage,” Khamenei said Wednesday in a national address – only his second public comments since Israel launched its attack against Iran last week. “Those who are wise and familiar with Iran, its people, and its history never speak to this nation in the language of threats,” he warned.

After Trump on Tuesday said Khamenei was “an easy target” for the US and Israel, he then ramped up his demands on Truth Social: “UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER!” In his address, Khamenei said “the Americans should know that any military intervention by the United States will undoubtedly result in irreparable damage.” (Source: CNN)

 

13 Jun 25. Cuashub.com said today that CENTCOM General shares C-UAS focus following Houthi campaign. Aircraft equipped with laser-guided rocket systems accounted for nearly 40 percent of the U.S. military’s drone kills during a months-long campaign against Iran-backed Houthi forces in and around the Red Sea, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander Gen. Erik Kurilla told lawmakers on Tuesday. Speaking before the House Armed Services Committee, Kurilla offered new insight into ‘Operation Rough Rider,’ a U.S.-led effort initiated under President Donald Trump and aimed at suppressing Houthi attacks on commercial and military vessels in a critical maritime corridor.

“About 40 percent of the drones shot down were shot down by something called Advanced Precision Weapon Kill System (APKWS), a laser-guided 2.75-inch rocket fired off our F-16s or F-15s,” Kurilla said. “That’s a $25,000 munition going against a roughly $50,000 or $100,000 drone – that is an Iranian-provided drone.”

=Launched early in President Donald Trump’s second term, Operation Rough Rider aimed to disrupt drone and missile attacks launched by Iran-backed Houthi fighters in Yemen. The Houthis had been targeting international shipping lanes near the Red Sea since 2023, citing U.S. support for Israel as the motive. The attacks disrupted one of the world’s most important maritime trade routes and escalated into a broader regional security challenge.

Kurilla described Operation Rough Rider as a focused campaign to deter those strikes:

“The president gave us a very specific mission, which was to get the Houthis to quit shooting at American ships,” he told lawmakers. “Six months ago on 12 November 2024, was the last time a destroyer went through the Bab-el-Mandeb. It was attacked 17 times with anti-ship ballistic missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles and UAVs. In the last week, we put four destroyers back through the Bab-el-Mandeb.”

While Operation Rough Rider officially ended in early May following a U.S.-Houthi agreement brokered in part by Oman, CENTCOM’s operations in the region continue. The U.S. is still using the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to defend Israel against ongoing attacks, including from Houthi-launched drones and missiles.

Lawmakers at the hearing highlighted the campaign’s cost – an estimated $1bn – and noted the loss of several high-value U.S. drones and aircraft.

Counter-UAS priorities

Despite the expense, Kurilla said the operation highlighted the need for more advanced and cost-effective counter-UAS tools.

“We absolutely need to be putting more work into directed energy [and] high-powered microwaves,” he said, pointing to technologies that could neutralize drones at a lower cost than traditional munitions.

Kurilla also emphasized the need for better detection tools, particularly to track drones with small radar signatures, recommending enhanced use of airborne Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR).

The CENTCOM chief framed software and electronic warfare capabilities as key enablers in modern air defense:

“Software is a weapon,” he said. “We are making changes to the Navy’s software on the SPY radars based on what we’re seeing.”

Kurilla noted that software-driven advances in Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) were already reshaping how CENTCOM conducts operations:

“We have engineers every day making improvements on our ability to do that,” he said. “It’s a warfighting headquarters.”

Kurilla’s repeated emphasis on counter-drone systems came in response to lawmakers pressing him on where Congress should prioritize funding.

“We’re only going to see the systems get smaller, more lethal,” he said. “That’s why Ukraine and Russia went to fiber optics, going out to 40 kilometers with fiber optic drones, you can’t jam that. So those are the things I would ask for right now.”

RELATED CONTENT: CENTCOM Colonel discusses the challenge of adapting to the drone threat

Colonel Nathaniel Huston of U.S. Central Command will speak at the upcoming Counter UAS Middle East and Africa conference alongside a representative from the Jordanian Armed Forces. Col. Huston will share CENTCOM’s perspective on protecting U.S. and allied forces from UAS threats in the region.

https://cuashub.com/en/content/centcom-general-shares-c-uas-focus-following-houthi-campaign/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)

 

13 Jun 25. Mossad Executed Massive Covert Operation to Paralyze Iran’s Air Defenses and Missile Capabilities. Note: This report was last updated as of 4 p.m. EDT, June 13, 2025. Things are still actively unfolding. For the latest, check live updates from the Associated Press, Times of Israel, or The Guardian. In a sweeping and highly coordinated military and intelligence operation, Israel launched what it called a preemptive strike early Friday morning against Iran’s nuclear and missile infrastructure, following years of covert groundwork. The effort, named Operation Rising Lion, combined deep-cover Mossad activity and wide-scale Israeli USAF (IAF) strikes, culminating in one of the most ambitious Israeli operations in history. According to Israeli security officials cited by The Times of Israel, N12, Euronews, and Fox News, Mossad had spent years infiltrating Iranian territory. Their agents reportedly smuggled in precision-guided weapons, camouflaged advanced strike systems in vehicles, and even established a secret drone base near Tehran.  The intention, officials said, was to create the conditions for a decapitating blow to Iran’s air defense and long-range missile capabilities, executed from within Iran’s own borders. Overnight Thursday into Friday, this covert architecture was activated. According to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), approximately 200 IAF aircraft launched simultaneous strikes across Iran, targeting nearly 100 installations.  These included uranium enrichment facilities, missile storage depots, and radar and surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites. The IDF said it dropped over 330 munitions, including Small Diameter Bombs and long-range Popeye missiles. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

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