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———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–Military And Security Developments
16 Jun.
16 Jun 25. Iran lauds ‘new method’ as missiles hit Israel’s Tel Aviv, Haifa
15 Jun.
ISRAELI, IRANIAN STRIKES ELEVATE REGIONAL SECURITY RISKS
Analysis current as of 1200hrs (BST)
EVENT
On 14 June, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck two fuel depots and reservoirs supplying Iran’s capital Tehran, as well as an onshore refinery servicing the South Pars gas field (Bushehr province), partially suspending production. In response, Iran launched two ballistic missile barrages towards Israel, triggering sirens in the Central, Haifa, Jerusalem, Northern and Tel Aviv districts. Missile fire resulted in localised damage to pipelines and transmission lines within the Bazan oil refinery complex in Haifa (Haifa district), though the facility remains operational.
SIGNIFICANCE
* The strikes mark the first direct targeting of energy infrastructure since the IDF initiated pre-emptive airstrikes on 13 June as part of ‘Operation Rising Lion’ (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 13 June 2025). The shift also marks an escalation from primarily targeting military and nuclear assets and suggests broader goals of undermining the stability of the Iranian government
* Regional tensions remain significantly elevated, with oil prices increasing by 8% per barrel since 13 June amid concerns that conflict will critically disrupt regional energy markets.
FORECAST
The IDF will almost certainly sustain airstrikes against Iranian nuclear, military and energy infrastructure in the coming days, elevating energy security and government stability risks. Further IDF strikes will significantly increase security and collateral risks for proximate installations and bystanders, particularly those located near weapons and fuel depots surrounding major cities. Strikes targeting energy infrastructure will increase the likelihood of electricity and communications blackouts, particularly in Tehran. Damage to critical and dual-use infrastructure will also highly likely compound operational and supply chain disruption risks nationwide, possibly triggering shortages of key goods. In the coming days, there is also a realistic possibility that the IDF will expand ongoing assassination efforts targeting key military and nuclear programme figures to include government personnel. Such efforts will sustain risks of strikes in densely populated residential areas and further exacerbate government stability risks if successful.
Iran will almost certainly continue conducting retaliatory missile attacks against Israel, likely including direct strikes targeting energy infrastructure and chemical plants. Although Israeli air defences remain highly effective in intercepting the majority of Iranian ordnance, exposure to shrapnel and risks of air defence penetration will sustain elevated threats to life and collateral risks throughout Israel in the coming days. Repeated missile barrages will also increase labour flexibility and operational disruption concerns throughout Israel, while risks of wildfires will remain particularly elevated in rural areas. Missile attacks targeting energy infrastructure will increase risks of temporary blackouts, though are unlikely to critically disrupt energy security conditions nationwide, unless strikes against the Orot Rabin (Haifa) and Rotenberg (Southern district) power plants are successful. Possible Iranian efforts to target chemical plants in Haifa (Haifa district) will also substantially increase environmental hazard risks in the coming days, driving risks of further escalation.
As tensions continue to escalate, risks of Iran moving to limit navigation through the Strait of Hormuz will increase. Efforts to restrict vessel movement through the Persian Gulf are highly likely to exacerbate price volatility in international oil markets, compounding global operating costs. Such efforts would also increase risks of broader international involvement to break partial or total blockades, compounding regional tensions and risks of conflict escalation. More broadly, regional airspace closures will likely remain in place in the coming days, critically disrupting commercial airline operations to and from Israel, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. International flights transiting through the region will likely continue to be re-routed, increasing travel delays and restricting access to commercially available evacuation routes.
Jun 14.
IRAN-ISRAEL: CONFLICT ESCALATION IS LIKELY IN COMING HOURS, DAYS
Key points
* Following Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure earlier on 13 June, Iran launched over 100 drones at Israel.
* Israel and Iran are highly likely to engage in further tit-for-tat strikes in the coming hours and days, significantly increasing the risk of substantial conflict escalation.
* The risk of escalation will almost certainly continue to disrupt regional air travel and pressurise oil markets in the coming days, though we assess that direct strikes on US assets are currently unlikely.
Context
At approximately 0330hrs (local time) on 13 June, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched ‘Operation Rising Lion’, a series of strikes targeting nuclear and military assets in Iran. The initial strikes targeted several locations, including numerous residential buildings and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) headquarters in the capital Tehran, as well as the Natanz nuclear facility (Isfahan province). The IDF also targeted dozens of radars and air defence missile launchers in the west of Iran. The Iranian authorities have stated via the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that nuclear sites at Fordo (Qom province) and Isfahan had not been hit and that there was no increase in radiation levels at the targeted Natanz site.
The IDF claims to have killed three of Iran’s military commanders: Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Hossein Salami, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran Mohammad Bagheri and Head of the Khatam-al Anbiya Central Headquarters Gholam Ali Rashid. The Iranian authorities have also confirmed that the strikes killed the former head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organisation (IAEO), Fereydoon Abbasi. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is confirmed to be alive.
In response, Iran launched more than 100 drones toward Israel, which Israel has started to intercept outside its airspace. The Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) is also intercepting drones in its airspace, which it closed earlier in the day. The US embassy in Israel has instructed employees and family members to shelter in place until further notice; all flights in and out of Israel’s Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV) have been cancelled. Comments from Iranian officials indicate that Iran will no longer attend US-Iran nuclear talks scheduled to take place in Muscat (Oman) on 15 June.
In the coming hours and days, Israel will likely launch further strikes against Iranian nuclear and military facilities
Strike action will significantly increase security and collateral risks for proximate installations stemming from exposure to primary explosions, secondary explosions and possible nuclear accidents. Further assassination attempts targeting military and nuclear programme personnel will also sustain the likelihood of strikes in residential areas, including densely populated urban centres, substantially increasing the threats to life and assets therein. There is also a realistic possibility that Israel will target dual-use infrastructure associated with nuclear and military facilities, increasing the likelihood of strikes hitting energy substations, port infrastructure and airport facilities. This would increase the likelihood of electricity and communications blackouts, as well as substantial supply chain disruption; this would, in turn, possibly result in shortages of key goods, as well as broader operational disruption for locally engaged firms in Iran. Flight disruption is almost certain to continue through the coming days (at least), resulting in overcrowding at ports of entry/exit.
In the coming hours, Iran will almost certainly continue to retaliate against Israel, increasing the likelihood of a large-scale missile strike in the coming days
Due to the scale and impact of the IDF strikes, Iran is highly likely to launch further direct strikes targeting Israel in the coming hours and days. Although Israeli air defences remain highly capable of intercepting Iranian ordnance, the risks of air defence penetration and shrapnel exposure would increase in the event of a higher-capacity Iranian strike, exacerbating security and bystander risks throughout Israel. Security risks are particularly acute close to key IDF bases, particularly air force bases such as Nevatim (Southern district, Israel) and the Shimon Peres Negev Nuclear Research Centre (Southern, also known as the Dimona Reactor). Key military infrastructure, including the IDF General Staff headquarters and the defence ministry in Tel Aviv’s central HaKirya area, will also possibly be targeted. As in Iran, flight disruption will likely continue over the coming days; while the national carrier El Al will likely resume flights as soon as possible, other international airlines will likely delay the resumption of flights
The risk of further retaliatory airstrikes will almost certainly continue to disrupt regional air travel; pressure on oil markets will increase the risk of price volatility
In the coming days, the risk of repeated strike action will likely result in continued airspace closures and flight diversions away from impacted airspace over the Middle East region, disrupting regional travel and increasing journey times for intercontinental flights. Commercial carriers are highly likely to suspend services to and from Israel, Iran and Iraq; they will also possibly reduce service offerings to Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. Given concerns that Iran will possibly attempt to limit navigation through the Strait of Hormuz if Israeli airstrikes persist, international oil markets will likely continue to face substantial price volatility (after already increasing by over 9% earlier in the day), raising short-term energy security concerns and costs worldwide.
Iran will possibly use its proxies in Iraq to launch attacks against Israel, increasing the risk of IDF retaliatory attacks inside Iraq, including against the capital Baghdad
In the coming days, there is a realistic possibility that Iran will use its numerous Shia proxies in Iraq – such as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) – to launch missile and drone attacks against Israel. Such co-ordination would increase the likelihood of Iran amassing a sufficient volume of ordnance to overwhelm Israel’s air defences, significantly increasing the risk of successful penetration, as well as the threat to ports and residential areas. Any significant involvement by these proxies in the current hostilities is likely to prompt Israel to conduct airstrikes against their bases inside Iraq, significantly elevating security risks in most major cities, including Baghdad. The Yemen-based Houthis are also likely to intensify the frequency of their ballistic and drone attacks against Israel. However, we assess that the Israeli strikes are unlikely to undermine the current truce between the Houthis and the US. Similarly, we also assess that the current developments are unlikely to compromise the ceasefire between Lebanese Hizballah (LH) and Israel.
The conflict is currently unlikely to spill over to US assets or prompt direct US strikes
As the US has denied any involvement in the strikes, Iran is highly unlikely to strike US assets in the region. Similarly, as the US is calling for restraint and indicating interest in continuing nuclear talks, Washington DC is unlikely to support Israel’s strikes against Iran directly (though we assess the US is still likely to provide Israel with support in intercepting incoming ordnance, particularly in the event of a large-scale strike).
However, in the unlikely event that any such support prompts Iran and/or its proxies to target US assets in the region, we assess this would trigger the US to back Israeli strikes, increasing the probability of the actualisation of our most likely scenario: A joint Israeli-US strike is conducted in multiple waves; the strike primarily targets Iran’s uranium-enrichment facilities, particularly those in Natanz (Isfahan province) and Fordow (Qom province), degrading its nuclear capabilities (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 12 June 2025).
Similarly, the likelihood of any such co-operation would increase if Iran completely withdraws from talks and instead attempts to accelerate its nuclear programme rapidly. However, its capacity to pursue this course of action has possibly been highly compromised.
Jun 13.
- Regardless of heightened tensions over the past 24 hours, we assess that nuclear talks between Iran and the US will likely resume on 15 June.
- Iran’s response to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s censure decision will raise the risk of US-Iran talks failing.
- Regardless, we assess that joint Israeli-US strikes are unlikely in the coming 24-to-72 hours; talks will likely progress towards an interim agreement.
- There is a realistic possibility that Israel would take unilateral action against Iran’s nuclear facilities if it loses confidence in the effectiveness of the negotiations and Iran follows through on its plans to upgrade its enrichment capabilities.
- However, if negotiations do fail in the coming days, the risk of Israeli and US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities would increase.
MOST LIKELY SCENARIO
- A joint Israeli-US strike is conducted in multiple waves; the strike primarily targets Iran’s uranium-enrichment facilities, particularly those in Natanz (Isfahan province) and Fordow (Qom province), degrading its nuclear capabilities.
MOST DANGEROUS SCENARIO
- Israel and the US conduct more extensive joint strikes against Iranian targets; this necessitates substantial Iranian retaliation.
CONTEXT AND LATEST DEVELOPMENTS;
- Regardless of heightened tensions over the past 24 hours, we assess that nuclear talks between Iran and the US will likely resume on 15 June. On 11 June, the US State Department ordered the departure of all non-essential personnel from its embassy in Baghdad (Iraq, see Sibylline Alert – 11 June 2025). The decision was likely aimed at exerting pressure on Iran amid the ongoing nuclear negotiation process, while also preparing for the possibility that the talks fail in the coming days. Earlier on 12 June, Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad al-Busaidi confirmed that the sixth round of US-Iran nuclear talks will be held in Muscat (Oman) on 15 June. During these talks, Iran will likely deliver its counter to the previous US proposal, which Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei rejected on 4 June due to Washington DC’s demands that Iran should halt its uranium enrichment. Any such counterproposal is likely to include provisions for lifting sanctions on Tehran, among other concessions from the US.
- Iran’s response to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s censure decision will raise the risk of US-Iran talks failing. Earlier on 12 June, the IAEA announced that Iran is in breach of its non-proliferation obligations. This prompted Iran to double-down; it announced plans to establish a third uranium-enrichment facility and upgrade several of its centrifuges to advanced IR-6 models. These announcements are in contravention to Iran’s obligations; they also risk the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) triggering the ‘snapback’ mechanism under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which would result in the reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran and raise the risk of US-Iran talks breaking down.
- Regardless, we assess that joint Israeli-US strikes are unlikely in the coming 24-to-72 hours; talks will likely progress towards an interim agreement. Although tensions are elevated, we assess that the most likely scenario in the coming days involves a decision being made to continue nuclear negotiations over the coming weeks; we also assess that the US and Iran are likely to reach an interim agreement in the coming months. Back-and-forth posturing is likely to continue as a negotiation tactic; however, low-level engagement will likely continue, sustaining contact between Iran and the US and moderating the risk of a total breakdown in talks (see Sibylline Special Report – 13 May 2025).
- There is a realistic possibility that Israel would take unilateral action against Iran’s nuclear facilities if it loses confidence in the effectiveness of the negotiations and Iran follows through on its plans to upgrade its enrichment capabilities. However, this remains less likely than joint Israeli-US action. Israel would likely be reluctant to launch strikes while US-Iran talks are ongoing or without US consent. Such strikes would likely derail US-Iran talks, disrupting President Trump’s foreign policy objectives and thereby substantially threatening a relationship crucial to Israeli national security. Additionally, strikes by Israel alone are unlikely to degrade Iran’s nuclear programme significantly, thereby limiting the value of such an operation.
- However, if negotiations do fail in the coming days, the risk of Israeli and US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities would increase. This report will address the most likely and most dangerous outcomes of such a decision.
MOST LIKELY SCENARIO
- A joint Israeli-US strike is conducted in multiple waves; the strike primarily targets Iran’s uranium-enrichment facilities, particularly those in Natanz (Isfahan province) and Fordow (Qom province), degrading its nuclear capabilities. We assess that targets would include laboratories, known logistics facilities tied to the nuclear programme and air defence systems tasked with securing these locations.
- In the hours and days after such a strike, we assess that Iran would conduct retaliatory strikes against Israel and several US assets in the region. Iranian attacks against Israel would almost certainly involve a wide range of medium-to-long-range ballistic missiles and drones (similar to past attacks in 2024) primarily targeting key Israeli military bases, ports, infrastructure and possibly adjacent civilian population centres. Iranian retaliation against the US would remain focused on US bases/assets in Iraq (including Kurdistan), Syria and possibly Jordan, but would not extend to US bases in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.
- We also assess that Iran would highly likely co-ordinate such retaliatory strikes with its numerous proxies. In Iraq, Iranian proxies like the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) would likely launch direct attacks against US troops operating on the ground, as well as projectiles against US bases. These proxies, along with the Yemen-based Houthis, would also significantly increase the frequency and intensity of their aerial attacks against Israel, threatening the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) capacity to intercept munitions targeting key military positions, airports, infrastructure and/or civilian population centres. This would likely drive further Israeli-US retaliation against Iranian proxies in Iraq over the following week, driving bystander collateral risks, including in Baghdad.
- Nevertheless, after the initial round of any mutual retaliation, Tehran would likely want to avoid broader escalation given its degraded air defence capabilities, as well as the latent risk of domestic unrest stemming from the economic shocks of military strikes. Instead, it is more likely to focus on drawing up international diplomatic support to cease hostilities. While the conflict would be unlikely to mutate into a full regional war with prolonged and sustained military activity, any strikes that are conducted would undermine the prospects for a new nuclear agreement with Tehran for the rest of 2025 (at least).
- Even such a limited conflict would heavily impact the GCC’s regional economies, driving a spike in capital outflows from regional markets and exchanges. We also assess that temporary disruption to the regional energy and logistics sectors would highly likely follow any initial strikes targeting Tehran, causing a shock across these local economies. However, we assess the impacts are likely to be temporary, and that they would begin to recede within a month of the cessation of hostilities.
MOST DANGEROUS SCENARIO
- Israel and the US conduct more extensive joint strikes against Iranian targets; this necessitates substantial Iranian retaliation. As outlined in our most likely scenario, strikes would primarily target nuclear and military facilities; they would succeed in severely degrading Iran’s nuclear programme and/or would cause high military casualties (while not completely negating Iranian capacity to respond). In addition, strikes would also impact key energy and logistics infrastructure, disrupting Iran’s oil sector and rendering any Iranian denial of strikes impossible. Large-scale strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities would increase the risk of a nuclear accident or malfunction leading to nuclear fallout.
- In the days following such action, we assess that Iran would launch large-scale retaliatory strikes against Israel and proximate US assets, with barrages increasing incidental security risks across the region. In addition to strikes targeting key Israeli military infrastructure, and impacting proximate urban centres, Iran would also attempt to degrade Israeli nuclear facilities, with successful breaches of Israeli air defences elevating the risk of nuclear accidents. Iran would also target US military assets in the region, particularly those in Iraq, Jordan and Syria. Successful strikes resulting in the deaths of US service personnel would increase the risk of further Israeli-US retaliation, in which a cycle of strikes is liable to escalate to open conflict between the Israel-US coalition and Iran. Conflict escalation would also elevate the risk of misfire, faulty ordnance and shrapnel hitting neighbouring regional countries, including Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, further exacerbating the threat to personnel and assets. These retaliatory barrages would substantially disrupt regional air travel, with international airlines likely to scale back operations across the region, including via last-minute cancellations. This would substantially disrupt evacuation contingency procedures; it would also lead to overcrowding at ports of entry/exit and increase the costs of other egress options.
- To increase the effectiveness of any such strikes, Iran would also seek to mobilise its proxies and co-ordinate attacks against Israeli and US assets. To increase the likelihood of ordnance breaching the US’ and Israel’s combined air defences, Iran would seek to co-ordinate strikes with its proxies in Lebanon, Iraq and in Yemen, nullifying the US-Houthi ceasefire. In response, the US and Israel would launch retaliatory strikes across the region, increasing strike risks across Lebanon (including the capital Beirut), areas across Iraq and Houthi-occupied territory in Yemen. This would prompt a resumption in Houthi attacks against US/Israel-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea. Such attacks would almost certainly elevate security risks for other proximate commercial and military vessels, again increasing insurance premiums and prompting global supply chains to shift from the Suez Canal to the Cape of Good Hope (South Africa), extending journey times and costs. A prolonged cycle of retaliatory strikes between the Houthis and the US would increase the likelihood of Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia and the UAE as the group seeks to compel regional parties to pressure the US to de-escalate.
- Escalating military pressure on Iran would push Tehran to attempt to bar Israeli- and US-affiliated shipping from transiting through the Straits of Hormuz. Attempts to interdict Israeli-US vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Gulf would drive the risk of misidentification, particularly for vessels associated with Western economies, substantially reducing the movement of goods and oil along this critical maritime route. Such strikes would disrupt global supply chains significantly and trigger a spike in oil prices. Additionally, substantial damage to Iran’s oil sector as a result of Israeli-US strikes would increase the likelihood of vessel hijackings targeting oil tankers and vessels transporting high-value goods through the region. This would substantially elevate security threats to crew and the likelihood of asset loss.
- Iran-Israel: Strikes against Tehran have elevated risk of protracted armed conflict. At approximately 0330hrs (local time) on 13 June, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) targeted nuclear and military assets in Iran, including sites in the capital Tehran and the Natanz nuclear facility (Isfahan province). Israel also killed three of Iran’s top military commanders. In response, Iran launched more than 100 drones, which the IDF and Israel’s regional allies intercepted. Israeli strikes against Iranian assets are likely to continue in the coming days, sustaining elevated security risks for proximate personnel. This will also increase the likelihood of communications and supply chain disruption for firms in Iran. Iran is also highly likely to launch further direct strikes targeting Israel in the coming days, increasing security and business operation risks throughout Israel, particularly in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) and near key military sites. We assess that regional flight disruption will almost certainly persist in the coming days, increasing supply chain risks and undercutting the tourism sector in neighbouring countries. Following the strikes, US-Iranian nuclear talks scheduled to take place on 15 June are unlikely to proceed.
- Region: Israeli strikes on Iran will drive risk of sole-perpetrator attacks in Western Europe. Earlier on 13 June, Israel’s National Security Council issued a heightened travel advisory, warning that ‘terrorist elements’ could target Israelis and Jews worldwide amid the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) operation against Iran. We assess that the risk of Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe will moderately increase in the coming days and weeks. The ongoing Israel-Hamas war has already exacerbated the Islamist terrorist threat in Europe. It is therefore possible that the Israeli strikes on Iranian targets will act as a trigger for radicalised individuals. We assess that the primary threat will likely stem from radicalised sole perpetrators using low-sophistication tactics such as knife, arson and car-ramming attacks. It is also possible that Iran will leverage its proxies to conduct attacks. The risk will be particularly elevated at Israeli and/or Jewish institutions in Western Europe, particularly Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK (though attacks are also liable to occur indiscriminately in public places).
- Region: Iran-Israel hostilities will trigger partial business disruption in Gulf markets. Earlier on 13 June, Israel struck several Iranian nuclear facilities; it also targeted Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders in the capital Tehran. While hostilities between Iran and Israel are likely to continue in the coming days, we assess that Iran is unlikely to target assets in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Even so, the risk of collateral damage in coastal cities across the Gulf is elevated. This risk stems primarily from misfires, malfunctions and interceptions during large-scale missile barrages. While we assess that Iran is currently unlikely to close the Strait of Hormuz, operational disruption risks for various industries operating in GCC countries will increase due to the shock to the energy market and the possible outflow of ‘hot money’ by foreign investors. However, we assess these impacts are likely to be limited to the period of active hostilities and reversed within a month of de-escalation.
Jun 12.
- Middle East, North Africa and Turkey: Evacuation of US embassy highlights increased conflict risks. On 11 June, the US State Department ordered the departure of all non-essential personnel from its embassy in Iraq, in the capital Baghdad (see Sibylline Alert – 11 June 2025). The decision was made amid rising tensions between the US and Iran over nuclear negotiations; the next round of talks is scheduled to take place in Oman on 15 June. The decision likely aims to exert pressure on Iran during the negotiations while also preparing for the possibility of their failure. Furthermore, earlier on 12 June, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that Iran is in breach of its non-proliferation obligations, prompting Iran to announce plans to establish a third uranium enrichment facility. These developments will elevate the risks of deadlock in negotiations. If negotiations fail in the coming days, the risks of Israeli and US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities will increase significantly. We assess that such strikes, depending on their intensity, will elevate the risks of an Iranian response targeting US and Israeli military assets in the region. This will significantly elevate the risks of armed conflict escalation, impacting supply chain and business operations throughout the region.
- Egypt: March to Gaza will increase border tensions, supply chain disruption. On 11 June, the Egyptian authorities arrested and deported several foreign activists who arrived in the capital Cairo to participate in the Global March to Gaza. The Egyptian authorities stopped tens of activists at the Cairo International Airport (CAI) following their arrival, while arresting others in several hotels in downtown Cairo. Meanwhile, a convoy of approximately 1,000 activists continued its march through eastern Libya in an attempt to cross into Egypt and reach the borders with Gaza in the coming days. However, we assess that the Egyptian authorities are unlikely to permit the convoy to cross through the Egyptian-Libyan border, elevating risks of clashes at the Sallum border crossing (Matruh governorate). We assess that any clashes at this key crossing will almost certainly disrupt the supply chains between Egypt and Libya in the coming days. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that Egyptian pro-Palestine activists will attempt to conduct sporadic protests in the next 48 hours in Cairo, elevating risks of further arbitrary arrests and clashes in the downtown area.
Jun 11.
- Israel: Sanctions against ministers underscore growing diplomatic isolation, reputational risks. On 10 June, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway and the UK enacted sanctions and imposed travel restrictions on Israeli Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich and Israeli Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir for inciting settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank. The move underscores Israel’s growing diplomatic isolation and increasing tensions with its Western allies, elevating the risks of further sanctions related to its activities in the West Bank in the coming months. In turn, this will elevate compliance, operational and reputational risks for international and Israeli-affiliated businesses operating in the West Bank. In addition, there is a realistic possibility that the sanctions will increase scrutiny of nationals from the sanctioning states travelling to Israel in the coming weeks, particularly NGO personnel and political figures. We assess that this will likely elevate travel disruption and operational risks to international organisations active in Israel and the Palestinian Territories.
Jun 10.
- Israel: New resolution will elevate domestic unrest risks, highlights democratic backsliding risks. On 8 June, the government approved a resolution that allows a new ministerial committee to ratify the dismissal of the Attorney General (AG). The new method bypasses the previous procedure that required the consultation of a statutory committee made up of legal professionals and public figures before the AG could be formally dismissed. This places the AG’s role more directly under the control of the government and underscores the severe threats to checks and balances within the Israeli governmental system. The decision will likely elevate domestic unrest and anti-government sentiment in the coming week, in turn raising the risk of large protests in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) in front of the Knesset, as well as in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), particularly on Saturday nights. While the High Court of Justice is unlikely to approve the decision, any move by the court to strike down the resolution would likely further increase far-right demonstrations against the judicial system. We assess that any such gatherings would further elevate the risk of clashes between protesters and counter-protesters in the coming months, exacerbating bystander security risks, particularly near protest locations in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.
- Israel-Yemen: Naval strikes on Hudaydah Port will sustain supply chain disruption, security risks. Earlier on 10 June, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted naval strikes on Iran-backed Houthi infrastructure in Yemen’s Hudaydah Port (Al Hudaydah governorate), the first use of Israel’s navy against the group. The IDF said the strikes were in response to recent Houthi missile and drone attacks on Israel; Defence Minister Israel Katz threatened the group with a naval and aerial blockade if attacks continued. Despite this, the Houthis will likely continue targeting major population centres in Israel in the coming weeks, including Haifa (Haifa district), Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). This will elevate bystander security risks for personnel, especially in proximity to dual-use infrastructure such as central district’s Ben Gurion Airport (TLV). We assess that there is also a realistic possibility that the Houthis will target Israeli naval infrastructure in the Red Sea, driving crossfire and misidentification risks to commercial vessels. This will likely sustain global supply chain delays and increased shipping costs for businesses.
Jun 09.
- Strikes against Beirut (Lebanon) highlight the sustained security risks therein, though major armed escalation remains unlikely.
- Iranian orders for Chinese ballistic missile components will sustain elevated regional tensions and the risk of port incidents over the coming months.
POLITICAL FORECAST
- The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) has temporarily suspended aid distribution operations, sustaining critical disruption to humanitarian efforts in Gaza.
- Iran’s counterproposal to the US will maintain the ongoing nuclear talks, though sanctions risks will continue.
- Israel’s seizure of an activist ship in international waters will drive diplomatic tensions.
- A resolution to establish a new committee to dismiss Israel’s Attorney General underscores increased democratic backsliding and elevated domestic unrest risks in the country.
- Strikes against Beirut (Lebanon) highlight the sustained security risks therein, though major armed escalation remains unlikely. On 5 June, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck eight buildings in the Dahiah suburb of Beirut; the IDF alleged that the buildings hosted underground drone production facilities for Lebanese Hizballah (LH)’s 127 air unit. The IDF issued an evacuation warning for the area approximately one and a half hours before the strikes, prompting mass evacuations and traffic jams in the capital on Eid al-Adha eve. The incident followed rocket strikes conducted by Syrian militants affiliated with LH last week (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 5 June 2025). The strikes underscore the sustained and elevated threats to life within Dahiah (which remains an LH stronghold) emanating from sporadic Israeli strikes. Israel will likely remain willing to conduct strikes in Beirut (particularly against facilities controlled by LH or LH-aligned groups in the city’s southern suburbs) in response to perceived threats and in retaliation for strikes on its territory. As such, the risk of further strikes will persist over the coming weeks, though a major escalation in the frequency of Israeli strikes, or of armed conflict between Israel and Lebanon, remains highly unlikely.
- Iranian orders for Chinese ballistic missile components will sustain elevated regional tensions and the risk of port incidents over the coming months. In the past week, unnamed sources revealed to international news outlets that Iran has ordered thousands of tonnes of ammonium perchlorate from China in recent months. The chemical is a primary component in the production of solid fuel for missiles. Iran will likely use the compound to replenish its stockpile of medium-range ballistic missiles, the production of which was undercut by the October 2024 Israeli strikes. According to the report, the amount of ammonium perchlorate will be sufficient to produce approximately 800 ballistic missiles. Iran will likely also send part of the chemical shipment or related derivatives to its proxies across the region (including possibly the Yemen-based Houthis). Such transfers will sustain elevated regional tensions and the risk of proxy attacks against Israel and (in the event that nuclear negotiations break down) US forces in the region. Furthermore, in the coming months, the risk of unplanned detonations due to poor storage conditions (such as those that allegedly led to the explosion at Iran’s Shahid Rajaee Port in April; see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 28 April 2025) or possibly sabotage will remain elevated. In turn, these will sustain the already-elevated risks facing assets, staff, business operations and supply chains either related to (or located in the vicinity of) chemical storage sites.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) has temporarily suspended aid distribution operations, sustaining critical disruption to humanitarian efforts in Gaza. On 7 June, the controversial US-backed GHF suspended food aid distribution in Gaza, citing threats from Hamas. After operations resumed on 8 June, local media claimed that Israeli forces killed at least four people and injured several others attempting to access a GHF centre in Rafah. This came as unionised truck drivers in Gaza stated on 7 June that the transport of aid had also been suspended for a third consecutive day. These events underscore critical disruption risks facing humanitarian operations in Gaza and highlight ongoing logistical difficulties in mitigating against ongoing famine and dehydration risks, exacerbating pressure on already-stretched critical medical infrastructure. Furthermore, reduced access to medical supplies will exacerbate broader health risks, including the prevalence and spread of infectious disease. The continued and prolonged suspension of aid distribution will increase pressure on existing aid caches. This will drive bystander security risks for NGO personnel due to increased instances of shootings and crushes near aid centres arising from large congregations of people seeking to access limited resources. As aid disruption continues, the frequency of pro-Palestine protests in the wider region will likely increase, exacerbating ethno-religious tensions.
- Iran’s counterproposal to the US will maintain the ongoing nuclear talks, though sanctions risks will continue. Earlier on 9 June, Iran’s foreign affairs ministry stated that it would deliver a counterproposal for a nuclear deal to the US via Oman. The proposal will likely include provisions for the lifting of sanctions on Tehran. The development comes after Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei rejected the previous US proposal on 4 June, stating that Iran would continue to enrich uranium. There is no indication as to when a sixth round of discussions is scheduled, though negotiations will likely continue in the coming weeks; we also assess that the US and Iran will likely reach an interim agreement in the coming months (see Sibylline Special Report – 13 May 2025). The promise of a counterproposal comes as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief, Rafael Grossi, condemned Iran’s acquisition of confidential IAEA documents ahead of its Board of Governors quarterly meeting this week. The US and the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) will likely meet to propose a resolution in which they will declare that Iran is in breach of its non-proliferation obligations. If the resolution passes, it is unlikely to be immediately referred to the UN Security Council (UNSC); we assess that it is more likely to be used to pressure Iran to secure a deal with the US. Given Iran’s stated submission of a counterproposal and willingness to engage in negotiations, it is unlikely that Tehran will react to any formal censure by engaging in activity that could contravene the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in the coming weeks. Such action would almost certainly increase the risk of the E3 pre-emptively triggering the JCPOA’s ‘snapback’ mechanism, which would reinstate UN sanctions. If negotiations fail to progress in the coming weeks, we assess that the likelihood of Israeli airstrikes targeting Iranian nuclear facilities would increase, driving armed conflict risks.
- Israel’s seizure of an activist ship in international waters will drive diplomatic tensions. Earlier on 9 June, the Israeli naval authorities seized a UK-flagged vessel, Madleen, approximately 100 miles (161km) off the coast of Gaza, before towing it to dock at the Port of Ashdod (Southern district, Israel). The Madleen was carrying several international activists, including Swedish citizen Greta Thunberg, who aimed to deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza later on 9 June. All crew members were detained in Israel and will likely be deported to their respective countries in the coming hours and days. The French and Swedish governments have offered consular support to their citizens, while the Spanish authorities have reprimanded Israel’s embassy chief in Madrid, underscoring ongoing diplomatic tensions over the seizure. The Madleen’s aim to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza comes days before pro-Palestine activists are due to gather in Cairo (Egypt) on 12 June before travelling by road and on foot to Rafah by 15 June as part of a ‘Global March on Gaza’. The demonstration will likely attract thousands of participants. It also comes as hundreds of Tunisian activists, including doctors, plan to undertake a bus journey to break the ‘siege’ of Gaza; they are expected to reach Rafah by 13 June. The Israeli authorities’ relatively soft handling of the Madleen seizure will possibly spur further instances wherein international activists attempt to breach the blockade and increase participation in other forms of direct action. The security forces are highly likely to employ heavy-handed techniques to disperse activists who approach border posts in large numbers, driving bystander security risks stemming from clashes and the use of tear gas.
- A resolution to establish a new committee to dismiss Israel’s Attorney General underscores increased democratic backsliding and elevated domestic unrest risks in the country. Earlier on 9 June, Israel’s Attorney General (AG), Gali Baharav-Miara, was summoned to a hearing pending her dismissal on 17 June by a new ministerial committee. On 8 June, the government approved a resolution that allows the new committee to ratify the dismissal of the AG, bypassing the previous procedure that required the consultation of a statutory committee of legal professionals and public figures. A citizen action group immediately filed a petition to the High Court of Justice asking the court to annul the resolution. However, Minister of Transport Miri Regev indicated that the government would not obey the court’s decision, should it choose to intervene. The resolution removes the independence of the AG and places the position directly under the control of the government. In tandem with ministers’ objections to the role of the judiciary, we assess this underscores ongoing democratic backsliding in Israel, as well as the significant threats to checks and balances within its system of governance. Any decision to approve the resolution and summon the AG would likely elevate domestic unrest and anti-government sentiment in the coming week, in turn raising the risk of large protests in front of the Knesset in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district), as well as in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), particularly on Saturday nights. In the event that the court rejects the resolution, there is likely to be an increase in far-right demonstrations against the judicial system. There has been an increase in violence and vandalism during recent protests, including the shattering of a window at the High Court of Justice by someone using either an airsoft gun or a slingshot during a right-wing protest on 5 June. This underscores the elevated likelihood of sporadic clashes, as well as increased asset and bystander safety risks near protest locations in both Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. (Source: Sibylline)
13 Jun 25. Israel attacks Iran’s nuclear sites and kills head of the army. Israel has assassinated the head of Iran’s armed forces as it carried out what it described as a “pre-emptive strike” on the regime’s nuclear programmes. General Mohammad Bagheri, Iran’s chief of the military staff, was killed along with top commanders and nuclear scientists as Israel launched waves of attacks including a strike on Natanz, Tehran’s enrichment facility. In response, Iran launched more than 100 drones, Israel’s military said. Israel is braced for a further retaliatory attack which Tehran said would be “harsh and decisive”.Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, said the military campaign will continue for “as many days as it takes”, raising fears of all-out war. The US confirmed on Thursday night it was not involved in the attack, which appears to have killed some of the officials in their homes. Bagheri was the Islamic republic’s highest-ranking military officer. The strikes also killed Hossein Salami, the leader of Iran’s powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Two hundred jets were deployed in the attack and 100 targets were struck, Israel said. Israel has declared a state of emergency across the entire country ahead of an expected response from Iran that it said could come within hours. Officials in Tel Aviv have warned that Iran could retaliate by launching hundreds of ballistic missiles. Israel has launched airstrikes against Iran, saying the regime has enough material to build 15 nuclear bombs “within days”. In what could be the opening salvo of a regional war, explosions lit up the skyline in Tehran, as jets attacked both nuclear and conventional regime targets – without the support of the US. Blasts were heard in Natanz, one of two known nuclear underground sites, according to state television. The headquarters of the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps were also ablaze, in a sign that Israel is targeting key elements of the regime, not just military infrastructure. (Source: Daily Telegraph)
09 Jun 25. Iran Claims Seizure of ‘Treasure Trove’ of Israeli Secrets. Iran will soon make public a large collection of secret Israeli documents, including information about Israel’s nuclear program and military ties with the U.S. and Europe, Iran’s intelligence minister Esmail Khatib told state TV on Sunday. Khatib described the files obtained by Tehran as a “treasure trove” that would enhance Iran’s offensive capabilities, though he provided no evidence at the time of the announcement. How Iran acquired the documents remains unclear and details about the operation have not been disclosed. Khatib however noted that the transfer of the documents was “time-consuming and required security measures.”
“Naturally, the transfer methods will remain confidential, but the documents should be unveiled soon,” Khatib added.
Khatib’s remarks come after Iranian state television reported on Saturday that Iranian intelligence officials had seized “sensitive documents” from inside Israeli territory. The report mentioned two Israeli citizens, Roy Mizrahi and Almog Atias, who were arrested last month on suspicion of spying for Iran. Iranian media linked their arrests to the alleged document leak. Israeli officials confirmed the arrests but did not specify whether they were connected to the reported breach. Iran’s claim comes amid mounting international pressure over its nuclear program. This week, the International Atomic Energy Agency, an independent body that promotes the peaceful use of nuclear energy, is expected to vote on whether to censure Iran for non-compliance with its nuclear obligations, a move that could pave the way for renewed U.N. sanctions. Iran repeatedly denied seeking nuclear weapons and maintains that its nuclear program is intended solely for peaceful, civilian purposes. This stance remains a key point of contention in Iran’s ongoing indirect talks with the United States, which aim to resolve the long-standing dispute over Tehran’s nuclear ambitions through a potential agreement. On Wednesday, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei rejected the current U.S. proposal, which reportedly calls for Iran to abandon its uranium enrichment program, saying it was “100 percent against our interests.”
“The rude and arrogant leaders of America repeatedly demand that we should not have a nuclear programme. Who are you to decide whether Iran should have enrichment?” he said.
Khamenei emphasized that uranium enrichment remains central to Iran’s goal of achieving energy independence and that Tehran would not seek approval from Washington for its decisions. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
06 Jun 25. Netanyahu Confirms Arming Gaza Clans Amid Criticism Over Jihadist Links and Aid Theft. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has acknowledged that his government is arming local clans in Gaza as part of a covert campaign to weaken Hamas, drawing harsh criticism from political opponents and security officials. In a video statement posted Thursday, Netanyahu said the effort involved activating “clans in Gaza which oppose Hamas,” a move he claimed would “save the lives of Israeli soldiers.” The admission came after Avigdor Lieberman, a former defense minister and leader of the opposition Yisrael Beiteinu party, revealed on Israeli Channel 12 News that the government was supplying rifles to extremist groups inside Gaza. Lieberman called the operation “complete madness,” alleging that Israel was “giving weapons to a group of criminals and felons, identified with Islamic State, at the direction of the prime minister.” A day later, speaking on Israel’s Army Radio, Liberman escalated his criticism, saying, “We’re talking about the equivalent of ISIS in Gaza.” Among the groups reportedly receiving Israeli arms is a militia led by Yasser Abu Shabab, a Rafah-based clan leader with a history of criminal activity. Israeli officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, told The Associated Press that Abu Shabab’s group, known as the “Popular Forces” or “Anti-Terror Service,” received Kalashnikov rifles and other weapons seized from Hamas. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
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