NEWS IN BRIEF – MIDDLE EAST

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Military And Security Developments

06 Jun.

Israel-Lebanon: Beirut’s strikes highlight sustained security risks; major escalation is unlikely. On 5 June, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck eight buildings in the Dahiah suburb of the capital Beirut, claiming they are drone production sites for Lebanese Hizballah (LH)’s 127 air unit. The IDF issued an evacuation warning for the area shortly before the strike (approximately one and a half hours), prompting mass evacuation and traffic jams in the capital on Eid al-Adha eve. The strikes underscore sustained and elevated threats to life within Beirut’s Dahiah area emanating from sporadic Israeli strikes. Israel will likely remain willing to conduct strikes within Beirut, particularly its southern suburbs, in response to perceived threats and in retaliation for strikes on its territory. The incident followed rocket strikes by Syrian militants affiliated with LH earlier this week (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 5 June 2025). As such, the risk of further strikes will persist over the coming weeks, though we assess that a major escalation in the frequency of Israeli strikes or of armed conflict between Israel and Lebanon remains highly unlikely.

05 Jun.

Syrian militant rocket strikes will drive Israeli retaliation and Syrian government crackdown in the coming weeks.
A settler attack on a Palestinian village will elevate ethno-religious tensions, radicalisation risks, likely driving attacks in the West Bank in the coming weeks.
Attack on aid truck drivers highlights severe security risks for logistics staff in Gaza.
Israel’s delivery of weapons to anti-Hamas Palestinian militias in Gaza will expand the risk of armed clashes into areas outside of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations.

POLITICAL FORECAST

The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) temporarily suspended aid distribution operations; unionised truck drivers in Gaza announced indefinite strike action, underscoring critical disruption to humanitarian efforts.
Pro-Palestine activists will mobilise a high-profile mass demonstration in Egypt on 15 June, increasing crowd management risks and pressure on the security forces.
Increasing tensions within Israel’s coalition government over conscription legislation reform will increase government stability and policy risks.
Spain cancelled the purchase of anti-tank missile systems from an Israeli-linked subsidiary, underscoring significant operational and reputational concerns for firms in the defence and technology sectors.
In Germany, an uptick in antisemitic incidents underscores elevated risks of targeted violence, particularly during protests linked to the Israel-Hamas war.
Syrian militant rocket strikes will drive Israeli retaliation and Syrian government crackdown in the coming weeks. On 3 June, Syrian militants targeted Israel with two rockets, triggering sirens in Haspin and Ramat Magshimim (both Northern district). Both fell in open areas without causing any damage. The IDF subsequently targeted the source of the strike, an area near Tasil (Daraa governorate), about 7.5 miles (12km) from the Israel-Syria border, with artillery fire. Additionally, following its initial response, the IDF conducted airstrikes in Daraa governorate, targeting weapons belonging to the Syrian government; on 4 June, it conducted additional strikes near Al-Rabiaa (Hama governorate), targeting weapon caches. In the coming weeks, further Israeli strikes across Syria and particularly in Daraa and Hama governorates are likely, elevating bystander security risks near army and militia positions and assets. However, the strikes are unlikely to elevate the risks of armed conflict (war) between Syria and Israel. Two separate militia groups claimed responsibility for the attack. The first, Kataib Awli al-Bass, is part of the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria (IRFS) and has connections to Iran and Hizballah. The second, a new group named Martyr Mohammed Al-Deif Brigades, is possibly connected to Palestinian militants and Hamas, though this is unconfirmed. It remains unclear which group was responsible, though there is a realistic possibility the attack was carried out jointly. As such, in the coming weeks, Syrian government forces will likely crack down on Palestinian and Iran/Hizballah-affiliated militias. These will elevate security and bystander risks in major cities, including the capital Damascus, with armed clashes remaining a realistic possibility. Additionally, the security forces will also likely escalate their operations against local smuggling networks with ties to Iran, particularly in Daraa governorate, sustaining elevated security risks in the area.

A settler attack on a Palestinian village will elevate ethno-religious tensions, radicalisation risks, likely driving attacks in the West Bank in the coming weeks. On 4 June, approximately 40 masked Israeli settlers vandalised and set fire to Palestinian cars and houses in Deir Dibwan (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate). The attack comes a day after Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz appointed a special project manager to address rising settler attacks in the West Bank, underlining limited prospects for a reduction in settler impunity. Israeli policing of settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank has remained severely limited, with the majority of investigations remaining unsolved and without any arrests. The recent attack is almost certain to elevate ethno-religious tensions and radicalisation risks among the Palestinian population in the West Bank. As such, attacks targeting Israeli civilians and the security forces, particularly on key roads, near public transport locations and security positions, including checkpoints, will likely increase in the West Bank over the coming weeks.
Attack on aid truck drivers highlights severe security risks for logistics staff in Gaza. On 4 June, an unidentified armed group ambushed a humanitarian aid convoy of 50 trucks near Deir al-Balah (Deir al-Balah governorate) in central Gaza, and killed several of the drivers, kidnapping and injuring others. Following the attack, the Association of Private Transport and Contractors in Gaza announced an indefinite strike, suspending all trucking operations involved in transporting humanitarian aid in the strip until further notice (see below). The attack highlights the limited security provision along key roads leading to distribution centres. In the coming days, there is a realistic possibility that the IDF will launch operations attempting to reduce militant activity along these roads, elevating bystander security risks and possibly disrupting aid deliveries. However, such operations will likely only have a temporary impact, with militants able to utilise their mobility to maintain a presence in the area. As such, without regular IDF military escorts (provision of which is currently unlikely), aid convoys will remain vulnerable to further attacks.
Israel’s delivery of weapons to anti-Hamas Palestinian militias in Gaza will expand the risk of armed clashes into areas outside of IDF operations. On 5 June, local news outlets revealed that Israel had delivered weapons, such as AK-47 rifles, to militias opposing Hamas. The provision of weaponry will further militarise political disputes, increasing the risk of armed clashes between Hamas and militia forces across the Gaza Strip. Such clashes will render Hamas’ loss of territorial control to other militant groups a realistic possibility over the next four to seven months. As such, Hamas will possibly lose control of hostages, undermining ceasefire and hostage release negotiations by splitting stakeholders, resulting in separate negotiations between Israel and different groups.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) temporarily suspended aid distribution operations; unionised truck drivers in Gaza announced indefinite strike action, underscoring critical disruption to humanitarian efforts. Following shooting incidents in the vicinity of aid distribution centres on 1, 2 and 3 June, the GHF announced it would suspend aid distribution operations on 4 June to carry out works to increase its facilities’ capacity to manage large crowds. The GHF resumed operations earlier on 5 June. Also, earlier on 5 June, a labour union representing truck drivers in Gaza announced the suspension of all trucking operations involved in transporting humanitarian aid until further notice. The action comes after unidentified armed groups attacked an aid convoy near Deir al-Balah on 4 June, killing several drivers and kidnapping others. The strike action is highly likely to compound disruption to aid delivery and distribution efforts in Gaza, resulting in further suspensions of aid operations. Humanitarian conditions in Gaza will likely remain critical in the coming days, with persistently elevated food, energy and water insecurity compounding risks of dehydration, famine and associated medical risks. Tensions at existing storage and distribution facilities will increase the risks of violence and shooting incidents, sustaining security risks for on-the-ground NGO personnel. Further shooting incidents and disruption to aid operations will also likely drive pro-Palestine protests in the broader region (see below) and compound ethno-religious tensions linked to the Israel-Hamas war worldwide.
Pro-Palestine activists will mobilise a high-profile mass demonstration in Egypt on 15 June, increasing crowd management risks and pressure on the security forces. On 3 June, Progressive International announced it would participate in the upcoming pro-Palestine ‘Global March to Gaza’. Attendees will gather in the capital Cairo on 12 June before transiting by bus to Arish (North Sinai governorate) and walking 28 miles (45km) to the Egypt-Gaza border by 15 June. March organisers plan to call for the reopening of the Rafah border facility to aid deliveries. The demonstration will likely attract thousands of participants, with NGOs from at least 32 countries, including Australia, Canada, Germany, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, the UK and the US. The Egyptian authorities are unlikely to authorise the demonstration’s passage through the Sinai Peninsula, given numerous closed security zones therein. This will substantially increase the risks of unauthorised pro-Palestine demonstrations in Cairo in the coming days, increasing risks of transport disruption throughout the city, though these are most likely to be concentrated within mosques and union offices. The security forces will highly likely employ heavy-handed techniques to disperse any demonstrations that do emerge, increasing bystander exposure to low-intensity clashes and tear gas use. Risks of arbitrary detention for protest participants will also likely remain elevated in the coming days. Depending on the scale of attendance, pressure on the security forces’ crowd management skills will increase risks of altercations, stampedes and crushes, increasing hazard risks for attendees and locally engaged personnel. The march also coincides with a high-profile effort from pro-Palestine activists (including climate activist Greta Thunberg) to charter an aid vessel from Italy to Gaza. The Israeli authorities are highly unlikely to permit the vessel to dock in Gaza, with developments in the vessel’s transit possibly triggering further pro-Palestine protest activity in the coming weeks.
Increasing tensions within Israel’s coalition government over conscription legislation reform will increase government stability and policy risks. On 3 June, the leader of the Degel Hatorah faction of the ultra-Orthodox United Torah Judaism Party (UTJ) stated that his faction would withdraw from the coalition government unless it advances legislation providing broad conscription exemptions to ultra-Orthodox men. The statement comes amid reports that the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee (KFADC) has finalised draft legislation that would impose numerous financial sanctions on ultra-Orthodox men who do not respond to draft notices. On 4 June, the Democrats, Yesh Atid and Yisrael Beiteinu opposition parties announced they would submit legislation calling for the Knesset’s dissolution in the coming week. A UTJ spokesperson stated it would vote in favour of dissolving the legislature unless the government passes conscription exemption legislation in the coming week. The Likud-led coalition holds a 67-seat majority in the 120-seat Knesset; UTJ holds 7 seats, meaning at least one additional MK would need to defect from the coalition government to pass the dissolution legislation. In the coming days, coalition negotiations over conscription reform will almost certainly intensify; Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will possibly attempt to dismiss the chair of the KFADC in the coming days to consolidate support from ultra-Orthodox parties and moderate threats to government stability. Even so, escalating disputes over the matter will increase the risks of the Knesset dissolving in the coming weeks, triggering a general election and increasing governance concerns for locally engaged firms in the short to medium term. Risks of anti-conscription protests will also significantly increase in the coming days, elevating risks of operational, supply chain and transport disruption through ultra-Orthodox population centres, particularly Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv district), Beit Shemesh and Jerusalem (both Jerusalem district).
Spain cancelled the purchase of anti-tank missile systems from an Israeli-linked subsidiary, underscoring significant operational and reputational concerns for firms in the defence and technology sectors. On 3 June, the Spanish Defence Ministry announced that it had cancelled a USD 325m contract to purchase 168 SPIKE LR2 anti-tank missile systems, produced by a subsidiary of Israel’s Rafael Advanced Defense Systems. Madrid has frequently criticised Israel’s conduct during the Israel-Hamas war, with Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez calling Israel a ‘genocidal state’ and government officials calling for the EU to suspend its co-operation agreement with Israel and institute an arms embargo. In the coming months, states purchasing weapons systems and ammunition from Israeli contractors will likely face increasing domestic pressure to cancel contracts and purchase alternative systems, particularly in Europe. Even so, on 4 June, Israel’s Defence Ministry published data indicating that arms sales increased from USD 13bn in 2023 to USD 14.8bn in 2024, marking the fourth consecutive year of growth; European states purchased 54% of Israeli exports (up from 35% in 2023). Strong arms sales will likely offset the broader economic impact of contract cancellation in the short- to medium-term, though risks of pro-Palestine activism and protest campaigns targeting local subsidiaries will sustain operational disruption and reputational risks for associated firms.
In Germany, an uptick in antisemitic incidents underscores elevated risks of targeted violence, particularly during protests linked to the Israel-Hamas war. On 4 June, Germany’s Research and Information Centre on Antisemitism (RIAS) reported that there had been a 77% increase in antisemitic incidents in 2024 compared to 2023. The RIAS report recorded over 8,600 incidents through the year, with an increase in violent antisemitism in 2024, including attacks (186), threats (300) and extreme violence (eight). The report outlined that antisemitism primarily manifested at gatherings and protests, particularly at universities, underscoring elevated security risks to personnel in these settings. While anti-Israel activism was the main ideological driver of incidents, there was also an increase in right-wing, extremist-driven cases. In the coming months, antisemitic incidents are highly likely to continue occurring, particularly as the Israel-Hamas war continues at pace. Risks of harassment, targeted violence and low-capacity attacks will be particularly acute in the vicinity of installations associated with Germany’s Jewish and Israeli communities, particularly during demonstrations related to pro-Palestine and anti-Israel demonstrations.
Iran-US: Nuclear talks will likely continue despite enrichment dispute. Earlier on 4 June, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei rejected the latest US proposal for a new nuclear deal, saying Iran will continue to enrich uranium. This comes after five rounds of renewed discussions and follows reports that Israel is preparing to strike Iran if talks break down. Iran has previously rejected similar US demands, claiming enrichment is critical to its civilian nuclear programme. Despite the rejection, negotiations will likely continue in the coming weeks; we assess that the US and Iran will likely reach an interim agreement in the coming months (see Sibylline Special Report – 13 May 2025). This will likely involve a temporary pause on enrichment and partial centrifuge dismantlement, with the long-term goal of limiting use to Iran’s first-generation centrifuges, as was the case under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). A temporary agreement will render Israeli strikes on Iranian assets unlikely in the following months, moderating conflict escalation and regional tensions. However, if talks break down, Israel will likely strike nuclear facilities, driving armed conflict risks.
Syria-Israel: Rocket attacks will likely trigger wider crackdown on Palestinian groups in Syria. On 3 June, militias in southern Syria launched two Grad rockets, which fell in an open area near Ramat Magshimim (Northern district). Shortly after, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck the source of the rockets and carried out airstrikes in southern Syria, targeting weapon depots. Notably, two militias claimed responsibility separately; the first is Kataib Awli al-Bass (part of the Iran-linked Islamic Resistance Front), while the second is a new group called Martyr Mohammed Al-Deif Brigades. There is a possibility that the attack was carried out jointly by the two groups. The Syrian government will likely resume its crackdown on Palestinian militias in the country in the coming days. This will elevate security and bystander risks in major cities, including the capital Damascus; we assess that armed clashes remain a realistic possibility. In the coming weeks, further security crackdowns are also likely in Daraa governorate, primarily targeting local smuggling networks with ties to Iran, sustaining elevated security risks in the area.

03 Jun.

Syria: Integration of foreign fighters into army will elevate risk of mutiny, ethno-religious tensions. On 2 June, the US representative to Syria, Tom Barack, stated that Washington DC has reached an understanding with the government in Damascus that allows the integration of Islamist foreign fighters into the new Syrian army. Barack added that the move will keep these fighters (around 3,500 individuals) under the control of the Syrian state. While most of these fighters (mainly Uyghurs and Central Asian nationals) have historic affiliations with al-Qaeda, they have remained subordinate to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in recent years. Given that Syrian President Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa established HTS in 2017, the integration of these fighters into Syria’s government forces will mitigate against the risk of them joining Islamic State (IS) or al-Qaeda. However, we assess that their full integration is unlikely, and that the risk of mutiny and inter-militia fighting within the army will persist. Furthermore, these fighters are likely to commit human rights violations against ethnic and religious minorities, particularly during outbreaks of domestic unrest, elevating the risk of violence in response to the development of secular political movements.

02 Jun.

The Houthis’ attack pattern signals elevated risks across Israel during national events and celebrations; the threat of attacks targeting Israeli airlines is also rising.
Israeli strikes against Syria highlight persistent security risks therein, though they are unlikely to impact ongoing de-escalation talks.
A shooting at an aid distribution centre in Rafah in southern Gaza highlights elevated bystander security risks.

POLITICAL FORECAST

Deadlock in Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations persists, sustaining the risk of armed conflict in Gaza as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continues to expand its ground operations.
A diplomatic incident between Israel and a Saudi-led delegation attempting to enter the West Bank (Palestinian Territories) underscores elevated regional and diplomatic tensions.
The Israeli authorities arrested two foreign nationals in the West Bank, underscoring the elevated risk of deportation and travel disruption for individuals associated with pro-Palestine activism.
A sole-perpetrator attack targeting a hostage-release rally in the US underscores sustained risks of targeted violence and attacks as ethno-religious tensions linked to the Israel-Hamas war remain elevated.
A UN report into Iranian nuclear activity will likely increase regional tensions and compound pressure on negotiations with the US in the short term.
The Houthis’ attack pattern signals elevated risks across Israel during national events and celebrations; the threat of attacks targeting Israeli airlines is also rising. In recent weeks, the Iran-backed Houthis have gradually increased the frequency of their attacks targeting Israel. Furthermore, their attack pattern points to an elevated likelihood of targeting during national celebrations and events; previous Houthi attacks have coincided with Lag BaOmer (15 May), the announcement of the Eurovision final results (17 May), the National football cup final (29 May) and Shavuot (1 June). In addition, on 30 May, the Houthis threatened to expand their targeting to include El Al and other Israeli commercial airlines. Houthi attacks targeting Israel are likely to continue at this heightened frequency in the coming weeks; the likelihood of a strike will spike during national events, particularly sports competitions and holidays. While Israeli airlines will almost certainly avoid flying over Houthi-held territory, we assess the threat likely indicates the Houthis’ intention to target Israeli airports. While most Houthi ordnance is likely to be intercepted, occasional breaches of Israeli air defences remain possible, particularly by drones; such breaches will drive sporadic flight disruption during travel to and from Israel and the wider region.
Israeli strikes against Syria highlight persistent security risks therein, though they are unlikely to impact ongoing de-escalation talks. On 30 May, the IDF conducted airstrikes in Latakia and Tartus governorates against weapons storage facilities containing surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles (likely Yakhont missiles). The Syrian government confirmed that the strikes killed one civilian. Further Israeli strikes targeting weapons depots and military locations across Syria in the coming weeks remain likely, particularly in coastal areas where such strikes are likely to target Yakhont missiles, sustaining bystander risks near these locations. However, this is unlikely to prompt Syrian retaliation against IDF troops in Daraa and Quneitra governorates or hinder the ongoing de-escalation talks between the two countries. Even so, retaliation by rogue Islamist factions remain possible in the coming weeks, driving the risk of sporadic clashes with IDF troops in southern Syria. Such clashes would increase the risk of disruption to the ongoing Israel-Syria talks, likely delaying the prospects for an interim agreement.
A shooting at an aid distribution centre in Rafah highlights elevated bystander security risks. On 1 June, Palestinian media reported that the IDF opened fire on civilians at an aid distribution centre in west Rafah. The IDF has claimed there were unspecified armed threat actors present at the scene. It published footage of unknown masked gunmen shooting and throwing stones at crowds, though this footage lacks any details that confirm the time or location. Gaza’s health ministry reported that 31 people were killed and 170 others were injured. Since the opening of aid distribution centres run by the US-Israel-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) over the past week, there have been increasing reports of violence and attacks near humanitarian aid facilities, including shootings. There is a realistic possibility that militants will attempt to capitalise on these conditions to weaken the GHF’s credibility by conducting attacks and sabotage operations near aid distribution points, either shooting directly at civilians or triggering IDF crackdowns. In the coming weeks, incidents of violence and armed attacks near distribution centres will likely continue, sustaining elevated bystander security risks near humanitarian hubs.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Deadlock in Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations persists, sustaining the risk of armed conflict in Gaza as the IDF continues to expand its ground operations. On 29 May, US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff delivered a ceasefire proposal to Israel and Hamas as part of efforts to break the long-standing deadlock in negotiations. The US subsequently stated that Israel had agreed to the proposal, which would result in a 60-day ceasefire in Gaza and a partial IDF withdrawal in exchange for the release of ten living and 18 deceased hostages. Hamas responded to the proposal by indicating that it would be willing to release the hostages if Israel agrees to a permanent ceasefire. Witkoff characterised the response as ‘unacceptable’, while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that the response constitutes a ‘refusal’. Although Witkoff later stated that the proposal was intended to re-engage parties and foster further discussion, Hamas and Israel will likely maintain their hardline positions vis-à-vis the ceasefire’s length, moderating prospects for an agreement in the short term. This will sustain the risk of armed conflict in Gaza and maintain pressure on humanitarian conditions, driving pro-Palestine protests worldwide. Tensions between Israel and numerous allies, including Canada, France, Germany and the UK, will also likely continue to rise, elevating the likelihood of arms sales reviews and license revocations in the medium-to-long term. This will drive supply chain disruption risks for defence, technology and engineering firms tendering Israeli government contracts.
A diplomatic incident between Israel and a Saudi-led delegation attempting to enter the West Bank (Palestinian Territories) underscores elevated regional and diplomatic tensions. On 31 May, Israel barred a delegation of foreign ministers from Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Turkey, the UAE and Saudi Arabia from entering the West Bank to attend a Palestinian Authority (PA)-hosted summit the following day. The summit proceeded virtually on 1 June; discussions focused on proposals to reform the PA and efforts to secure a ceasefire in Gaza. The incident is highly likely to sustain elevated regional tensions between Israel and Saudi Arabia, likely further delaying US-led efforts to normalise relations between both states as part of the Abraham Accords. The move will also likely compound bilateral tensions between Israel and states with which it has already normalised relations, namely Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan and the UAE. Even so, these states are unlikely to withdraw from normalisation treaties in the short-to-medium term, moderating broader threats to bilateral relations in the medium-to-long term. However, amid the ongoing intensification of IDF ground operations in Gaza, the risk of anti-government and pro-Palestine demonstrations calling for denormalisation will increase in Jordan, moderately elevating unrest risks in the vicinity of Israeli- and US-linked entities, including diplomatic missions and high-profile businesses.
The Israeli authorities arrested two foreign nationals in the West Bank, underscoring the elevated risk of deportation and travel disruption for individuals associated with pro-Palestine activism. On 31 May, the Israeli authorities arrested an Irish national and a Swedish national in the West Bank after they allegedly violated an order to leave the Masafer Yatta area (Hebron governorate). The individuals are reportedly pro-Palestine activists and were attempting to document Israeli settler activity in the area. Both face deportation orders, highlighting the substantially elevated risks of arrest and deportation for foreign nationals engaged in activism and pro-Palestine demonstrations in the West Bank and Jerusalem areas. In the coming months, individuals associated with pro-Palestine activism will face elevated risks of scrutiny from the authorities when attempting to travel to Israel and the West Bank, increasing the likelihood of travel denial, visa revocation and deportation. These risks will be particularly acute for academics, NGO personnel and politicians, increasing the risk of travel, staffing and operational disruption for international organisations operating in Israel and the Palestinian Territories, particularly advocacy NGOs employing foreign nationals.
A sole-perpetrator attack targeting a hostage-release rally in the US underscores sustained risks of targeted violence and attacks as ethno-religious tensions linked to the Israel-Hamas war remain elevated. At 1326hrs (local time) on 1 June, a sole perpetrator attacked a crowd of demonstrators in Boulder (Colorado) who were participating in a weekly rally calling for the release of Israeli hostages from Gaza (see Sibylline Alert – 2 June 2025). The perpetrator employed an improvised incendiary device and injured at least eight demonstrators; no casualties have been reported at the time of writing. The FBI arrested the suspect at the scene and are investigating the incident as an ‘act of terrorism’. The perpetrator allegedly shouted ‘Free Palestine’ while attacking the crowd. The incident underscores the sustained risk of violence and low-capacity attacks targeting events and installations associated with Israel, particularly amid the intensification of IDF ground operations in Gaza. As the authorities have identified the suspect as an Egyptian national, who is possibly an irregular migrant, the attack is highly likely to compound ethno-religious tensions in the US. The risk of clashes at demonstrations related to the Israel-Hamas war will remain elevated in the coming weeks. Additionally, the risk of targeted violence will also extend to Jewish communities in the coming weeks, particularly during religious demonstrations and gatherings marking the ongoing Shavuot period (1-3 June). However, as numerous state authorities have announced plans to bolster their security forces’ posture around religious sites, successful high-capacity terror attacks are unlikely.
A UN report into Iranian nuclear activity will likely increase regional tensions and compound pressure on negotiations with the US in the short term. On 31 May, Reuters alleged that the latest International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) quarterly report on Iran’s nuclear programme indicates that Tehran has increased its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% by at least 133.8kg since February. This would bring Iran’s total stockpile of medium-enriched uranium to 408.6kg, which would be sufficient to facilitate the production of numerous nuclear warheads if the uranium is enriched beyond 85%. The report also allegedly includes details of Iranian nuclear activity at undeclared sites. The IAEA will formally publish the report before its next meeting on 9 June; if Iran has engaged in such measures, the US is highly likely to submit a resolution to the IAEA that would declare Iran in breach of its non-proliferation commitments. If passed, this resolution would likely facilitate efforts by France and/or the UK to pre-emptively trigger the snapback clauses under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which expire on 17 October (see Sibylline Special Report – 13 May 2025). The report is highly likely to increase pressure on US-Iran nuclear negotiations in the short-to-medium term, with allegations of non-disclosure elevating the risk of deadlock. On 1 June, a spokesperson for US President Donald Trump indicated that Special Envoy Witkoff had issued Iran with a ‘detailed proposal’ for an interim deal. Although Iran has not formally responded to the proposal at the time of writing, on 2 June, a spokesperson from the foreign ministry indicated that Iran requires US guarantees regarding sanctions relief in order to facilitate progress towards an agreement. In the coming days, tensions will likely remain high, increasing the risk of deadlock. Should negotiations fail to progress substantially in the coming weeks, we assess that the likelihood of US/Israeli airstrikes targeting Iranian nuclear facilities will increase.
Iraq: Power cuts will drive domestic unrest, operational risks. On 31 May, protesters demonstrated against electricity shortages in Najaf governorate. This followed similar demonstrations in other governorates earlier in the week, including Basra and Dhi Qar, protesting daily blackouts of up to six hours, among other persistent government public service failures. Protests involved the erection of roadblocks and tire burning. Power cuts will likely continue in the coming months, as above-average temperatures during the summer period (May to October) drive electricity demand, overwhelming Iraq’s outdated national grid. As blackouts continue, further demonstrations are highly likely. Clashes between the security forces and protesters are a realistic possibility, elevating bystander security risks to personnel (including injury and arbitrary detention), particularly near protest locations such as town halls and public squares. Persistent energy failures in the coming months will elevate risks to assets, including damage to sensitive equipment and communications disruption, driving operational risks to businesses across Iraq. Additionally, we assess that blackouts will likely increase emergency response and health risks due to disruption to vital emergency care and damage to medical infrastructure.
Syria-Israel: New airstrikes are unlikely to impact ongoing de-escalation talks. On 30 May, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted airstrikes in Latakia and Tartus governorates, targeting weapon storage facilities containing surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles. The Syrian government confirmed that the attack killed one civilian. The airstrikes come after a period in which Israel paused attacks on Syrian military facilities amid ongoing indirect de-escalation talks between the two countries. Additional Israeli strikes targeting weapon depots and military locations across Syria in the coming weeks remain likely, sustaining bystander risks near these locations. However, we assess that such airstrikes are unlikely to prompt a Syrian retaliation in the south against the IDF troops in Daraa and Quneitra governorates or hinder the ongoing talks. Even so, retaliation by rogue Islamist factions will remain a realistic possibility in the coming weeks. We assess that such incidents will drive the risk of sporadic clashes with IDF troops in southern Syria. Such clashes will possibly present drivers of temporary disruptions to ongoing Israel-Syria talks, likely delaying an interim ceasefire agreement. (Source: Sibylline)

06 Jun 25. Israel Hits Hezbollah Underground Drone Manufacturing Sites in Beirut. Israel launched airstrikes Thursday on four locations in southern Beirut, targeting what it said were underground drone production facilities operated by Hezbollah. It was the first Israeli strike near the Lebanese capital in over a month and came just one day before the Muslim holiday Eid al-Adha. According to the Israeli military, at least eight buildings were targeted in the neighborhoods of Hadath, Haret Hreik, and Bourj el-Barajneh. Prior to the strikes, evacuation warnings were issued, urging residents to leave the area. Following the airstrikes in Beirut, Israel issued another evacuation warning for the village of Ain Qana in southern Lebanon. Two more Hezbollah-linked buildings were targeted, according to Israeli military spokesperson Avichay Adraee. Israel stated that the targeted buildings were being used for drone production and added that Hezbollah, with support from Iran, was planning to expand its drone program. In a post on X, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) released a video revealing the locations of underground UAV sites. Though the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah remains officially in place, Israel continues its operations against Hezbollah and its military continues to occupy five strategic positions within Lebanese territory along the border. In a post on X, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun called the strikes a “blatant violation” of the ceasefire and said the timing of the strike, which came a day before the Eid al-Adha, showed Israel’s unwillingness to support peace in the region. He also said Israel was using Lebanon to send a message to the United States, which is in talks with Iran over its nuclear program. Meanwhile, Hezbollah denied that any drone factories were located at the sites Israel attacked. “Netanyahu wants to keep the war going,” a Hezbollah official said. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

06 Jun 25. US to Close All But One Military Base in Syria, Says Special Envoy. The United States has begun scaling down its military presence in Syria, planning to reduce from eight bases to one, U.S. Special Envoy Thomas Barrack said in an interview with Turkish broadcaster NTV.

“We’ve gone from eight bases to five to three. We’ll eventually go to one,” Barrack said. “What I can assure you is that our current Syria policy will not be close to the Syria policy of the last 100 years, because none of these have worked.”

Additionally, Barrack called Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) a key U.S. ally, saying their integration into Syria’s national forces was vital. Roughly 2,000 U.S. troops were deployed to Syria, mostly in the northeast, working with SDF to prevent a resurgence of the Islamic State. In April, the Pentagon revealed plans to consolidate its forces in Syria, reducing U.S. troop levels from approximately 2,000 to fewer than 1,000. Two sources told Reuters that U.S. forces are withdrawing from Deir el-Zor and consolidating in Hasakah province. A U.S. State Department official said troop levels would adjust “if and when appropriate,” based on operational needs. No timeline was given for the final drawdown. Meanwhile, U.S. officials told Fox News that approximately 500 U.S. troops have withdrawn from Syria in recent weeks, with three bases either closed or handed over to the SDF. The policy shift follows President Donald Trump’s surprise decision to lift sanctions on Syria and re-establish diplomatic ties with Damascus, now led by a new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa. Al-Sharaa, a former leader of the Islamist rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, was appointed to the role in January, following the ousting of longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad. Last week, Barrack raised the American flag in the U.S. Embassy in Damascus for the first time since its closure in 2012 during Assad’s regime. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

03 Jun 25. US Backs Syria’s Move to Incorporate Foreign Rebels into Army. The United States (U.S.) has signaled support for a Syrian plan to incorporate thousands of former foreign jihadist fighters into the national army, according to President Donald Trump’s special envoy to Syria. Thomas Barrack, U.S. ambassador to Turkey and Trump’s recently appointed envoy, told Reuters that Washington supports the move. “I would say there is an understanding, with transparency.” He said it was better to include the fighters, many of whom are “very loyal” to Syria’s new administration within the state, than to exclude them. Roughly 3,500 foreign fighters, mostly Uyghurs from China and nearby countries, will join Syria’s newly formed 84th Army Division, alongside regular Syrian troops, according to three senior Syrian defense officials cited by Reuters. The Uyghur fighters from China and Central Asia belong to the Turkistan Islamic Party, which Beijing has designated as a terrorist organization. The fighters previously belonged to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a former al-Qaeda affiliate that helped topple the administration of President Bashar al-Assad last year. Their status has complicated Western efforts to normalize ties with Syria’s new government. Until May, the U.S. had pushed for their exclusion. But policy has shifted after Trump’s recent Middle East tour, where he met Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and agreed to lift Assad-era sanctions. Two sources close to Syria’s defense ministry said the government argues integration reduces the risk of fighters rejoining extremist groups including the Islamic State. The U.S. State Department and Syrian officials have not yet responded to the report. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

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