Sponsored by Bertin Exensor
www.exensor.com
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Military And Security Developments
May 23.
- Israel-Palestinian Territories: Risk of ethno-religious violence will increase over holiday period. On 22 May, Israeli settlers wounded at least eight Palestinians and torched several vehicles in an attack on the Palestinian village of Bruqin (Salfit governorate, West Bank). The attack followed the killing of an Israeli by a Palestinian gunman on 14 May. In the coming days, ethno-religious tensions will likely increase on Jerusalem Day (25-26 May). Thousands of Israelis will likely march through Jerusalem’s Old City, including the Muslim Quarter, during the ‘March of the Flags’, which is highly likely to be a focal point of tensions with the local Arab and Muslim population. This is liable to elevate domestic unrest risks in the city, driving the likelihood of sporadic clashes and exacerbating security risks for personnel. Arab-owned businesses will likely suspend operations before the march, driving operational disruption. Ethno-religious tensions and the risk of attacks and domestic unrest will persist throughout Shavuot (1-2 June), particularly near the Western Wall and al-Aqsa Mosque compound. We assess that a heightened security posture is likely in Jerusalem throughout the coming week, driving exposure to attacks targeting the security forces.
- Israel: Appointment of new Shin Bet chief has elevated domestic unrest, supervision quality risks. On 22 May, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that he would appoint Maj Gen David Zini as the next Shin Bet chief. The announcement comes a day after Israel’s High Court of Justice ruled that Netanyahu had a conflict of interest and that he unlawfully fired the outgoing Shin Bet chief, Ronan Bar. Furthermore, on 21 May, Israeli Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara blocked Netanyahu from appointing a replacement until further instruction. Under the law, both an appointing committee and the government need to approve the prime minister’s recommendation. However, as of now, the appointing committee is missing one member, while another has been identified as having a conflict of interest. As such, Netanyahu’s announcement will likely be challenged, which would further delay the appointment of the new chief and likely prompt an increase in domestic unrest over the coming days, particularly in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) on 24 May. Additionally, the decision and related developments highlight the elevated risks related to corruption, government oversight, security force capabilities and supervision quality across Israel.
May 22.
• The uptick in the frequency of Houthi missile strikes targeting Israel is likely to continue in the coming weeks, sustaining elevated security risks and increasing operational disruption.
• Warning shots by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) near a diplomatic delegation visiting Jenin (Jenin governorate, West Bank) underscore the substantial security risks emanating from possible miscommunication and poor co-ordination.
• The risk of attacks and outbreaks of ethno-religious unrest will be elevated during Jerusalem Day (25-26 May) and the Shavuot holiday (1-2 June), particularly in Jerusalem’s Old City.
• In the past week, the IDF conducted exercises in preparation for strikes against Iran; this likely reflects contingency planning in the event that US-Iran nuclear negotiations fail, and is therefore not evidence of an imminent strike against Iran.
POLITICAL FORECAST
• Although aid deliveries into Gaza have resumed, operational disruption will almost certainly continue, limiting distribution operations and compounding humanitarian risks.
• Israel withdrew high-ranking delegates from ceasefire negotiations in Qatar, underscoring diminishing prospects for a ceasefire agreement in the short term.
• Increasing tensions between Israel and allies such as Canada, France and the UK will elevate the risk of trade disruption and compound long-term socio-economic concerns.
• The EU announced that it will lift sanctions on Syria, bolstering socio-economic health prospects and moderating compliance concerns for regionally engaged firms.
• The fatal shooting of two Israeli embassy staff members in the US underscores the elevated risks of violence and attacks targeting Israeli and Jewish individuals globally.
• The uptick in the frequency of Houthi missile strikes targeting Israel is likely to continue in the coming weeks, sustaining elevated security risks and increasing operational disruption. The Iran-backed Houthis have likely increased the frequency of their attacks (four strikes have occurred in the past week and two in the last 24 hours) in response to Operation Gideon’s Chariots and recent IDF strikes against Houthi-controlled territory. This will likely drive the rate of Israeli attacks against Yemen, significantly undercutting energy security and supply chain continuity. This escalating tit-for-tat dynamic will likely drive disruption to regional air travel, prompting last-minute delays and cancellations, particularly for flights to and from Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV). Security risks in Israel emanating from exposure to direct missile strikes and shrapnel will also remain elevated, particularly in areas surrounding TLV, despite effective air defences. Frequent sirens across a large number of population centres will drive bouts of operational disruption and safety risks for staff, related both to mental health and accidental injuries when running for shelter. While there is currently no indication that the Houthis will resume attacks on maritime vessels in the Red Sea, the likelihood of such attacks will increase over the coming three months as Operation Gideon’s Chariots continues to intensify. While such strikes are most likely to target Israeli (and Israel-affiliated) ships, the risk of misidentification and misfire will drive threats to all vessels in the Red Sea.
• IDF warning shots near a diplomatic delegation visiting Jenin (Jenin governorate, West Bank) underscore the substantial security risks emanating from possible miscommunication and poor co-ordination. On 21 May, the IDF fired warning shots after a delegation of diplomats from 20 countries visiting Jenin allegedly deviated from the pre-agreed route. The IDF has opened an investigation into the decision by its service personnel to discharge their small arms. The incident took place amid an IDF operation in Jenin that resulted in active combat between the IDF and militant forces. The incident highlights the critical threats to life (including for diplomatic, humanitarian and media staff) in areas subject to IDF operations in the West Bank. These risks are particularly elevated in the northern West Bank, especially in Jenin, Qalqilya (Qalqilya governorate), Tubas (Tubas governorate) and Tulkarm (Tulkarm governorate), though operations can be organised at relatively short notice in response to security developments across the territory. IDF military operations in the West Bank, and particularly its northern governorates, will likely continue in the coming weeks, sustaining these risks and underscoring the importance of co-ordination with the IDF when accessing these areas.
• The risk of attacks and outbreaks of ethno-religious unrest will be elevated during Jerusalem Day (25-26 May) and the Shavuot holiday (1-2 June), particularly in Jerusalem’s Old City. Jerusalem Day is traditionally marked by the ‘March of the Flags’, which passes through Jerusalem’s Old City, including the Muslim Quarter. The march is highly likely to act as a focal point for tensions with the local Arab and Muslim population; there is a realistic possibility of altercations and clashes. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that Arab and Muslim-owned stores and street-level assets will be subject to vandalism, possibility prompting businesses to suspend operations in advance of the march. Additionally, during Shavuot, large crowds of Jewish people will participate in a pilgrimage to the Western Wall of the Jewish Temple in Jerusalem’s Old City (also the site of the al-Aqsa Mosque). On both Jerusalem Day and Shavuot, far-right activists are highly likely to try to access the al-Aqsa compound, elevating ethno-religious tensions and the risk of domestic unrest. As such, during both events, a heightened security presence will likely be deployed throughout Jerusalem, elevating the risk of travel disruption, as well as possible exposure to attacks targeting the security forces and associated crossfire. The risk of attacks in the West Bank, Jerusalem and across Israel will be elevated in the coming two weeks. Militants and radicalised individuals are likely to target areas with large crowds and security force positions, as well as places of worship, transport infrastructure and key routes.
• In the past week, the IDF conducted exercises in preparation for strikes against Iran; this likely reflects contingency planning in the event that US-Iran nuclear negotiations fail, and is therefore not evidence of an imminent strike against Iran. We continue to assess that Israel is unlikely to strike Iranian nuclear facilities without approval from or co-ordination with the US. However, Israel likely feels it is necessary to maintain a high state of readiness to guarantee rapid US support in the event that the talks fail. Israel likely views recent developments as reflective of a closing window of opportunity to pre-empt a mounting threat posed by Iran’s nuclear programme, and will likely push for strikes in the event that negotiations stall, sustaining the realistic possibility of strikes throughout the year. The exercise also likely serves the purpose of signalling ‘willingness’ to Iran, and is therefore likely a means with which to pressure Tehran into making concessions.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• Although aid deliveries into Gaza have resumed, operational disruption will almost certainly continue, limiting distribution operations and compounding humanitarian risks. On 20 May, 93 trucks of food aid entered Gaza via the Kerem Shalom border crossing (Southern district); however, the UN later stated that staff were to collect the shipments from within the border crossing facility until 22 May, due to issues with co-ordinating security and delivery routes with IDF personnel. In the coming days, similar volumes of aid will likely be delivered to the Kerem Shalom border crossing area, though security conditions and significant risks related to looting will sustain the likelihood of critical disruption to distribution operations. Although numerous NGOs have described current aid deliveries as broadly insufficient to meet widespread food insecurity, Israel is unlikely to authorise a significant increase in aid deliveries via existing delivery networks in the coming weeks. Rather, the authorities will likely increase aid deliveries through restructured mechanisms, which incorporate private contractors and the newly formed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF; see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 8 May 2025). As the UN and numerous associated NGOs have stated they will not participate in the restructured mechanisms due to neutrality concerns, these efforts are highly likely to disrupt (even further) the distribution of humanitarian aid in the coming weeks. As such, Israel will likely continue to face substantial international scrutiny, driving regional tensions and sustaining the risk of pro-Palestine protests, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa region, as well as in major cities across Australia, Europe and North America.
• Israel withdrew high-ranking delegates from ceasefire negotiations in Qatar, underscoring diminishing prospects for a ceasefire agreement in the short term. On 20 May, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that Israel had withdrawn high-level members of its delegation from mediated ceasefire negotiations with Hamas, citing a lack of progress towards an agreement. Although lower-level delegates remain in place, the withdrawal highlights diminishing prospects for an agreement. Subsequently, Netanyahu stated that Israel would only commit to ending the Israel-Hamas war in the event of Hamas freeing all remaining hostages, as well as disarming, demobilising and also exiling its leadership from Gaza, so as to facilitate the implementation of US President Donald Trump’s post-war development plan (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 6 February 2025). On 22 May, a Hamas spokesperson rejected these conditions; this indicates that deadlock will likely persist in the short term, undermining prospects for a ceasefire and hostage-release agreement.
• Increasing tensions between Israel and allies such as Canada, France and the UK will elevate the risk of trade disruption and compound long-term socio-economic concerns. On 19 May, Canada, France and the UK issued a joint statement calling on Israel to halt the expansion of IDF operations in Gaza and resume large-scale aid deliveries, stating they would take ‘concrete actions’ if Israel failed to do so. Subsequently, the UK announced the suspension of talks with Israel on establishing a free trade agreement and expanded sanctions targeting Israeli settlers and associated entities in the West Bank. On 20 May, France’s foreign ministry announced Paris’ support for efforts within the EU Foreign Affairs Council to initiate a review of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. The EU’s chief diplomat, Kaja Kallas, subsequently announced that the bloc would review Israel’s compliance with good governance requirements under the association agreement, which is the basis for bilateral relations and trade. These measures highlight increasing international scrutiny of Israel amid deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Gaza. However, the EU is highly unlikely to terminate the association agreement; rather, the bloc will likely call for Israel to engage in corrective measures or risk losing preferential market access in certain sectors. The end of free trade talks with the UK is also unlikely to undermine socio-economic health within Israel significantly, though it will possibly increase investor concerns and moderate bilateral capital flows in the short-to-medium term. Although broad Canadian, EU or UK sanctions targeting Israel remain highly unlikely, increasing regional tensions linked to the Israel-Hamas war will likely continue undermining bi- and multi-lateral trade relations, elevating socio-economic pressure on Israel in the medium-to-long term.
• The EU announced that it will lift sanctions on Syria, bolstering socio-economic health prospects and moderating compliance concerns for regionally engaged firms. On 20 May, the EU announced that it would lift all remaining economic sanctions on Syria, bar those directly targeting members of the former Assad regime. The announcement comes after the EU lifted sanctions targeting Syria’s energy and transport sectors in February. The move will significantly ease compliance concerns and sanction-exposure risks for firms seeking to enter Syria and/or integrate the Syrian market into regional operations, particularly those firms seeking to tender reconstruction and infrastructure development projects. Sanctions relief will also likely facilitate the re-integration of Syria’s banking, energy and finance sectors into global marketplaces, bolstering socio-economic health in the medium-to-long term. Even so, the EU also stated that it will continue to sanction individuals and entities associated with human rights violations in the country. Ongoing ethno-religious and sectarian violence in several regions throughout Syria will sustain risks of limited sanction re-application, thereby sustaining compliance concerns, particularly if sanctions target government-linked figures.
• The fatal shooting of two Israeli embassy staff members in the US underscores the elevated risks of violence and attacks targeting Israeli and Jewish individuals globally. On 21 May, a sole perpetrator shot and killed two Israeli embassy staff members in Washington DC (US), after they attended an event at the Capital Jewish Museum. The security forces immediately detained the perpetrator, who reportedly shouted ‘free Palestine’. International media reports indicate that the attack was almost certainly motivated by the ongoing Israel-Hamas war and antisemitic ideology. The attack underscores the sustained risks of sole-perpetrator attacks targeting members of the Israeli and Jewish communities worldwide, including in the US. The risk of similar attacks will remain elevated in the short term, particularly at locations associated with these communities, such as religious installations, community centres and specialised retail outfits. However, as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that security would be bolstered at Israeli missions worldwide (including embassies), an increased security force capacity is likely to mitigate against the risk of successful attacks targeting embassies and consulates in the short-to-medium term.
• Syria: Hostage situation involving governor highlights persistent instability in southern regions. On 21 May, a group of unidentified gunmen stormed Suwayda’s town hall (Suwayda governorate) and held
the governor and his staff hostage, demanding the release of an imprisoned associate. Shortly after, local government-aligned Druze factions drove the assailants from the building and freed the hostages. The incident underlines heightened security instability in southern Syria, particularly in Daraa and Suwayda governorates, where various criminal groups are able to exploit a limited government presence. The new government still lacks full security control over these governorates, particularly in rural desert areas along the border with Jordan, sustaining risks of armed theft, assassinations and kidnapping throughout 2025. However, this latest incident will likely prompt a new crackdown from Damascus and the aligned Druze factions on local criminal outfits and cross-border smugglers. This will increase the risks of clashes in Suwayda governorate in the coming weeks. We assess that any major clashes in the region will also affect mobility along highways connecting to the capital Damascus.
• Syria-EU: Sanctions relief will moderate compliance, regulatory risks, reduce energy security risks. On 20 May, the EU announced that it would lift all remaining economic sanctions on Syria, except for those directly related to the former Assad regime. The announcement builds on the EU’s previous sanctions relief, and will likely ease restrictions on the banking, energy and finance sectors. These measures, along with bilateral oil and gas agreements with other countries, will likely reduce energy security risks in Syria, moderating business operational and supply chain risks. Reinstated access to frozen assets will likely moderate business financial risks and increase investment opportunities. Furthermore, the announcement will likely decrease compliance and regulatory framework risks for international businesses investing in reconstruction projects. Although the EU has not set a timeline for sanctions removal, we assess it will likely be implemented in the coming weeks. However, since the EU stated it will also introduce targeted measures against entities committing human rights violations in the country, ongoing sectarian violence will possibly force the EU to adopt new sanctions, sustaining long-term socio-economic health risks.
May 21.
• Syria: Clashes near Russian air base underscore continued factionalism, sustained security risks. On 20 May, the Russian Armed Forces clashed with an unidentified armed group likely comprising foreign fighters formerly aligned with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) near the Russian-operated Khmeimim Air Base (Latakia governorate). According to Russian Telegram channels, the clashes resulted in the deaths of two Russian service members and at least three foreign fighters. This development comes after the government set a deadline for small groups (many of whom are formerly jihadist) to integrate into the security apparatus by 27 May. While many small groups are unlikely to resist integration into the Ministry of Defence, the clashes underscore the Syrian government’s lack of command and control over its former factions. As such, further instances of sectarian violence remain likely in the coming months, particularly against the Alawite community; risks of conflict escalation will likely rise as a result of unsanctioned operations. As Syria opens to foreign investment, we assess that factionalism will sustain attack and bystander security risks faced by international business personnel throughout Syria.
• Libya: Calls for a new cabinet will augment political instability, armed conflict risks. On 20 May, the Benghazi-based House of Representatives (HoR) launched the process of appointing a new prime minister to oversee presidential and parliamentary elections. The HoR gave prospective candidates two days to submit their candidacy. The House will then provide a new date to choose a new prime minister and task them with forming a cabinet to be presented for a vote of confidence. This announcement comes days after deadly clashes in the capital Tripoli, where the government of the Government of National Unity (GNU) is based; these clashes prompted anti-government protests against the de facto prime minister, Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh. However, we assess that the GNU is highly unlikely to recognise this latest move by the HoR, augmenting the major political rifts between the rival eastern and western governments. Such a move will also highly likely hinder any talks over a timeline for presidential and parliamentary elections this year, increasing political and economic instability as well as elevating risks of a resumption of armed conflict.
• Syria: Clashes near Russian air base underscore continued factionalism, sustained security risks. On 20 May, the Russian Armed Forces clashed with an unidentified armed group likely comprising foreign fighters formerly aligned with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) near the Russian-operated Khmeimim Air Base (Latakia governorate). According to Russian Telegram channels, the clashes resulted in the deaths of two Russian service members and at least three foreign fighters. This development comes after the government set a deadline for small groups (many of whom are formerly jihadist) to integrate into the security apparatus by 27 May. While many small groups are unlikely to resist integration into the Ministry of Defence, the clashes underscore the Syrian government’s lack of command and control over its former factions. As such, further instances of sectarian violence remain likely in the coming months, particularly against the Alawite community; risks of conflict escalation will likely rise as a result of unsanctioned operations. As Syria opens to foreign investment, we assess that factionalism will sustain attack and bystander security risks faced by international business personnel throughout Syria.
May 19.
• Ground operations in Gaza will likely focus on securing a prolonged Israel Defense Forces (IDF) presence in large parts of the strip.
• The ongoing manhunt in the West Bank will sustain the heightened risks of reprisal attacks by settlers and Palestinian militants in the coming days.
POLITICAL FORECAST
• On 18 May, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu authorised the resumption of aid deliveries into Gaza, though humanitarian conditions are unlikely to substantially improve in the short term.
• Despite continued negotiations, Israel and Hamas are unlikely to reach a ceasefire agreement in the coming days, sustaining risks of armed conflict and operational disruption in Israel.
• An uptick in arrests for espionage in Israel underscores elevated risks of hostile Iranian activity targeting Israeli-linked firms.
• The recovery of high-profile Israeli documents from Syria possibly indicates that efforts to normalise relations with Syria are progressing, though Damascus is unlikely to join the Abraham Accords in the short term.
• Ground operations in Gaza will likely focus on securing a prolonged Israel Defense Forces (IDF) presence in large parts of the strip. On 18 May, the IDF announced the launch of ground operations in several parts of the Gaza Strip, as part of the opening stage of a new major offensive named Gideon’s Chariots. This was followed by intensive waves of airstrikes, mostly in the northern parts of the strip, likely to prepare for such operations. The IDF chief announced that while the military is pressing forward with the offensive, it will also allow the government flexibility to pursue any prospective hostage deals. At present, five IDF divisions are operating inside the northern and southern parts of the strip, conducting limited incursions. The new offensive is highly likely to facilitate prolonged IDF control of large parts of the Gaza Strip, including Gaza City, over the coming months. This will include the establishment of further wide security corridors (similar to Netzarim and Morag corridors), dividing the strip into areas of control. However, Hamas and its affiliated militias still retain thousands of fighters and a complex underground network, likely delaying IDF efforts to seal off these areas. We also assess that in the coming weeks, the IDF will gradually force hundreds of thousands of Palestinian residents in the northern parts of the strip (including Gaza City) to relocate to Rafah and Al Mawasi areas, augmenting the deterioration of the humanitarian conditions.
• The ongoing manhunt in the West Bank will sustain the heightened risks of reprisal attacks by settlers and Palestinian militants in the coming days. The IDF has continued to impose a strict lockdown on the villages of Burqin and Kafr ad-Dik (both Salfit governorate) since a Palestinian gunman killed an Israeli motorist in a small arms attack on vehicles on Route 446 on 14 May (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 15 May 2025). Around 40 Palestinian suspects have been apprehended and questioned by the Shin Bet and the IDF so far. On 18 May, during operations in Burqin, the IDF disrupted an attempted attack on its personnel by a Palestinian individual carrying explosives. The incident is highly likely to further stoke ethno-religious tensions between Palestinians and Israeli settlers in the area. Copycat attacks by Palestinians on Israeli cars transiting main roads and throughfares are highly likely, elevating significant physical security risks in the area. There is also a high likelihood of reprisal attacks by settlers against Palestinian villages in the area over the coming days, augmenting the heightened security and bystander risks in Salfit governorate in general.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• On 18 May, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu authorised the resumption of aid deliveries into Gaza, though humanitarian conditions are unlikely to substantially improve in the short term. The IDF will now allow a ‘basic quantity’ of aid to enter the enclave, amid broader efforts to restructure aid delivery mechanisms and incorporate private contractors (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 8 May 2025). Local media reports indicate that approximately 50 trucks carrying food aid will enter Gaza on 19 May. Although the resumption of aid deliveries will possibly moderate critical food shortages in the coming days, broader food security conditions are unlikely to substantially improve due to the limited volume of aid deliveries. As such, NGO personnel will almost certainly continue facing elevated risks of exposure to violent crime, armed robbery and looting in the coming weeks, particularly during overland movement. Additionally, the intensification of IDF ground operations and the expansion of evacuation zones will drive risks of substantial operational disruption, particularly in the Khan Yunis area. In Israel, hard-right anti-aid groups such as Tsav 9 will also likely call for the resumption of demonstrations to disrupt aid deliveries into Gaza. Protests, unrest and sit-ins are likely to target key logistics hubs for aid deliveries, including the Kerem Shalom border crossing and the Port of Ashdod (both Southern district), impacting NGO supply chain continuity. Consequently, humanitarian conditions are unlikely to improve in Gaza in the short- to medium-term, compounding broader socio-economic and public health concerns.
• Despite continued negotiations, Israel and Hamas are unlikely to reach a ceasefire agreement in the coming days, sustaining risks of armed conflict and operational disruption in Israel. Negotiations in Doha are ongoing at the time of writing, with media outlets reporting that parties are considering various proposals from Israel, Hamas, the US and the Arab League. Despite continued engagement, a substantial breakthrough remains unlikely in the coming days, given long-standing incompatibilities between Israel and Hamas regarding the length of any potential ceasefire. The intensification of IDF operations in Gaza will also possibly limit Hamas’ capacity to credibly commit to the release of safe release of hostages. As deadlock persists, anti-government protests in Israel will likely continue at pace, elevating risks of operational disruption in major cities. On 17 May, thousands of protesters calling for the government to secure hostage releases gathered in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). Although large demonstrations remained broadly peaceful, smaller-scale rallies in Kiryat Ono (Tel Aviv), Kiryat Shmona (Northern district), Modi’in-Maccabim-Re’ut and Rehovot (both Central district) triggered low-intensity clashes with police and counterdemonstrators, underscoring moderately elevated unrest risks. Subsequently, police arrested nine protesters at an anti-war demonstration in Sderot (Southern), after participants attempted to block Highway 34. In the coming weeks, sustained protest activity is likely to continue to temporarily disrupt operational, travel and supply chain continuity in Israel’s major cities. While altercations between demonstrators, police and counter-demonstrators will moderately increase risks of limited and low-intensity unrest, escalation into widespread and violent unrest remains highly unlikely.
• An uptick in arrests for espionage in Israel underscores elevated risks of hostile Iranian activity targeting Israeli-linked firms. On 18 May, Israeli police arrested an 18-year-old Israeli national for conducting several ‘missions’ on behalf of Iranian-linked entities, including relaying information regarding former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett during his hospitalisation in April. On 19 May, police also announced the arrest and indictment of a 16-year-old Israeli national for spying for entities providing footage of public buildings and sensitive sites in the Rehovot area (Central) to Iran. The arrests come amid a broader uptick in Iranian efforts to recruit Israeli civilians to relay sensitive information and footage via social media platforms (primarily Telegram) in exchange for payment, often in cryptocurrency. In the coming months, Iran will almost certainly continue targeting Israel through non-conventional means, sustaining industrial espionage and infiltration risks for firms engaged in Israel and those linked to high-profile Israeli entities. This risk will be most acute for firms in the defence, technology and healthcare industries, particularly those tendering major contracts for the Israeli government.
• The recovery of high-profile Israeli documents from Syria possibly indicates that efforts to normalise relations with Syria are progressing, though Damascus is unlikely to join the Abraham Accords in the short term. On 18 May, Israel’s Prime Minister’s office announced that the Mossad had recovered an archive of 2,500 items belonging to Eli Cohen, a high-profile Mossad agent executed in Syria in 1965. Although the office stated that the Mossad recovered the archive through covert operations, there is a realistic possibility that the Syrian authorities facilitated the recovery amid broader efforts to moderate bilateral tensions. The announcement comes as regional media sources indicate that Israeli and Syrian representatives continue to participate in UAE-mediated discussions on normalising relations. On 14 May, US President Donald Trump also called on Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa to join the Abraham Accords. In the coming months, indirect diplomatic engagement between Israel and Syria will likely continue, possibly facilitating border demarcation efforts vis-à-vis the Golan Heights. There is also a realistic possibility that Israel will decrease the frequency and intensity of airstrikes targeting weapons depots and infrastructure associated with the Syrian security forces, moderating collateral and bystander risks in major cities. Syrian authorities will also possibly advance efforts to dismantle Palestinian militant factions active in Syria, though broader capacity constraints will moderate prospects for full de-militarisation in the short to medium-term. Such efforts will also possibly facilitate the long-term normalisation of relations, though such an agreement remains unlikely in the short term, sustaining regional tensions and compliance concerns.
• Libya: Significant risks of domestic unrest, militia violence will threaten business operations. On 17 May, large-scale anti-government protests erupted in the capital Tripoli. Protesters demanded the resignation of Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, head of the Government of National Unity (GNU), following a resumption of heavy clashes between militias in the city last week. Amid the protests, two ministers from the GNU resigned. While Dbeibeh vowed that he would end militia violence, we assess that further protests against him and the GNU will likely take place in Tripoli this week, sustaining security and bystander risks in the city. GNU-aligned militias based in Tripoli and Misrata (Misrata district) will highly likely use violence against protesters. As such, reprisal attacks against security personnel by anti-GNU militias will also remain likely in the coming days. There is a realistic possibility that such clashes will drive wider outbreaks of more substantial armed clashes across the western region, substantially elevating the risk of operational disruption and incidental damage to assets across most sectors (including energy).
• Syria: IS crackdown will drive bystander security threats, attack risks in coming weeks. On 17 May, Syria’s security forces raided several Islamic State (IS) positions in Aleppo (Aleppo governorate). The authorities killed three IS militants, detained a further four, and seized weapons and uniforms featuring government insignia. One member of the security forces was killed. Subsequently, on 18 May, the authorities commenced a wider crackdown on IS to remove the group from urban centres throughout the country. Increased security operations will drive bystander security risks to business and NGO personnel in major cities in the coming days and weeks, with threats arising from possible crossfire and misidentification during operations. In response to the crackdown, IS cells will possibly seek to undertake increased terror activity, driving attack risks, conflict escalation and ethno-religious tensions over the coming weeks. The crackdown is likely a result of the US removing sanctions on Syria. If the government stabilises Syria’s security environment, we assess that it will likely facilitate investment opportunities and moderate socio-economic health risks in the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)
20 May 25. Hamas Leader Mohammed Sinwar’s Body Found in Gaza Tunnel Hit by IDF Airstrike, Says Report. The body of Mohammed Sinwar, Hamas’s top commander in Gaza, was reportedly found in a tunnel under the European Hospital in Khan Younis, southern Gaza, following an Israeli airstrike last week. On Tuesday, the Israeli Air Force targeted a tunnel beneath the hospital where Sinwar was believed to be hiding. Gaza’s Hamas-run health ministry reported that 16 people were killed and more than 70 injured in the strike.
Al-Hadath, a Saudi news channel, reported that Sinwar’s body was recently discovered at the site along with ten of his aides and Mohammad Shabana, commander of the Rafah Brigade.
Israel’s Defense Minister did not release a statement confirming Sinwar’s death but says all signs point to his elimination.
“There’s no official confirmation, but according to all the indications Muhammad Sinwar was eliminated,” Defense Minister Israel Katz said.
Sinwar became Hamas’s top commander in Gaza after his brother, Yahya Sinwar, was killed by Israeli forces in October 2024. A third brother, Zakaria Sinwar, was reported killed in another strike on Saturday night. However, doctors later said he was alive but in critical condition.
Hamas has not yet confirmed the death of Sinwar. However, reports stated that the group is already considering potential successors. Among the figures being discussed are Ezzedine al-Haddad, head of the Gaza City Division; Nizar Awadallah, a senior political leader; and Khalil al-Haya, another prominent member of Hamas’s political wing. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
19 May 25. Joint statement from the leaders of the United Kingdom, France and Canada on the situation in Gaza and the West Bank. We strongly oppose the expansion of Israel’s military operations in Gaza. The level of human suffering in Gaza is intolerable. Yesterday’s announcement that Israel will allow a basic quantity of food into Gaza is wholly inadequate. We call on the Israeli Government to stop its military operations in Gaza and immediately allow humanitarian aid to enter Gaza. This must include engaging with the UN to ensure a return to delivery of aid in line with humanitarian principles. We call on Hamas to release immediately the remaining hostages they have so cruelly held since 7 October 2023.
The Israeli Government’s denial of essential humanitarian assistance to the civilian population is unacceptable and risks breaching International Humanitarian Law. We condemn the abhorrent language used recently by members of the Israeli Government, threatening that, in their despair at the destruction of Gaza, civilians will start to relocate. Permanent forced displacement is a breach of international humanitarian law.
Israel suffered a heinous attack on October 7. We have always supported Israel’s right to defend Israelis against terrorism. But this escalation is wholly disproportionate.
We will not stand by while the Netanyahu Government pursues these egregious actions. If Israel does not cease the renewed military offensive and lift its restrictions on humanitarian aid, we will take further concrete actions in response.
We oppose any attempt to expand settlements in the West Bank. Israel must halt settlements which are illegal and undermine the viability of a Palestinian state and the security of both Israelis and Palestinians. We will not hesitate to take further action, including targeted sanctions.
We strongly support the efforts led by the United States, Qatar and Egypt to secure an immediate ceasefire in Gaza. It is a ceasefire, the release of all remaining hostages and a long-term political solution that offer the best hope of ending the agony of the hostages and their families, alleviating the suffering of civilians in Gaza, ending Hamas’ control of Gaza and achieving a pathway to a two-state solution, consistent with the goals of the 18 June conference in New York co-chaired by Saudi Arabia and France. These negotiations need to succeed, and we must all work towards the implementation of a two-state solution, which is the only way to bring long-lasting peace and security that both Israelis and Palestinians deserve, and ensure long-term stability in the region.
We will continue to work with the Palestinian Authority, regional partners, Israel and the United States to finalise consensus on arrangements for Gaza’s future, building on the Arab plan. We affirm the important role of the High-level Two-State Solution Conference at the UN in June in building international consensus around this aim. And we are committed to recognising a Palestinian state as a contribution to achieving a two-state solution and are prepared to work with others to this end. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
A CNIM Group Company
——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————