Sponsored by Bertin Exensor
www.exensor.com
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
Military And Security Developments
Jan 10.
- Syria: Integration talks between Kurds, new government will possibly delay Turkish operation. Earlier on 10 January, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces’ (SDF) commander, Mazloum Abdi, announced that his forces would be integrated into the new Syrian army, which the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led government is currently reforming. Abdi also added that the Kurds have agreed on Syria’s territorial integrity, though many practical details are still being discussed with HTS. We assess there is a realistic possibility that Abdi’s statement and ongoing discussions with HTS will mitigate against the risk of an imminent Turkish operation against the Kurds in Syria. However, several key issues are highly likely to challenge the integration talks; the SDF will possibly seek to retain its structure under the new Syrian army as opposed to fully dismantling its existing command structures (a concept HTS is unlikely to accept). Furthermore, the full dismantling of Kurdish autonomous administrative bodies in the eastern Euphrates region is likely to be another major flashpoint hindering effective integration agreements, sustaining internal instability and political uncertainty.
- Lebanon: New president will possibly drive reconstruction efforts, moderate policy risks. On 9 January, members of the Lebanese parliament elected Joseph Aoun as president of Lebanon. In his inaugural address, President Aoun pledged to rebuild southern Lebanon and other parts of the country damaged during the recent Israel-Hizballah war. He affirmed that official state forces, i.e. the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), will be the only entities to exercise the right to carry weapons. Aoun’s election indicates progress towards a moderate increase in political stability. However, Lebanese Hizballah (LH) and other opposition factions retain considerable clout within the government, driving challenges to reconstruction and disarming efforts. US support for Aoun and the LAF will likely assist this process. However, we assess that such efforts will elevate the risk of armed clashes between LAF and LH. Increasing calls for disarmament are also likely to elevate tensions with other factions, sustaining instability risks (particularly in southern Lebanon) in the coming months.
Jan 09.
KEY POINTS
* Recent attacks against Israeli settlers have prompted a notable uptick in Israeli settler violence in the West Bank, elevating bystander risks around Palestinian population centres and driving the risk of radicalisation and further attacks.
* The election of Joseph Aoun, the commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), to the presidency will likely improve the stability of the Israel-Lebanese Hizballah (LH) ceasefire agreement and improve prospects for economic recovery; however, prospects for further tensions with LH will persist.
* Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) opened fire on an aid convoy (despite the convoy having obtained the necessary clearances), underscoring the sustained misidentification risks. On 5 January, the IDF opened fire on a UN World Food Programme (WFP) convoy in central Gaza near the Wadi Gaza checkpoint, causing no injuries. The convoy was travelling from southern to northern Gaza and received all necessary clearances from the Israeli authorities prior to its journey. In a statement, the IDF announced that it had investigated the incident, though it did not indicate whether it will take any further action beyond reclarifying to IDF soldiers the rules of engagement within the Gaza Strip. The incident highlights the severe security risks emanating from possible misidentification across Gaza, which will persist alongside active operations.
* West Bank: The IDF conducted a brigade-scale operation in northern and eastern areas of the West Bank on 7 January, confiscating weapons and arresting terrorist suspects. During the operation, the IDF killed one militant during clashes in Taluza (Nablus governorate). Additionally, on 7 January, the IDF conducted an airstrike against a militant squad near Tammun (Tubas governorate). IDF operations across the West Bank are likely to continue; they will increase in response to militant attacks in the area, elevating travel disruption around Palestinian population centres, as well as ethno-religious tensions.
* West Bank: The uptick in Israeli settler violence continues, sustaining bystander security risks near Palestinian population centres in the West Bank. Ever since Palestinian gunmen killed at least three Israelis on 6 January (see Middle East Crisis Update – 6 January 2025), extremist Israeli settlers have increased their attacks on Palestinian communities in the West Bank. Overnight on 6 January, dozens of Israeli settlers conducted sabotage attacks, including arson and vandalism, across the West Bank. The attacks targeted the Palestinian villages of al-Funduq, Hajjah, Immatain (all Qalqilya governorate) and Turmus Ayya (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate). Sporadic attacks by extremist Israeli settlers have continued in the past week; the latest incident on 8 January involved Israeli settlers setting fire to cars in Wadi Rahhal (Bethlehem governorate). While this uptick is likely to diminish in the coming week, the trend of Israeli settler violence continues to increase gradually and has been doing so for a prolonged period. Unless this trend is addressed by meaningful Israeli policing, it will continue to drive bystander security risks near Palestinian population centres and exacerbate ethno-religious tensions, elevating radicalisation and attack risks across the West Bank through the coming months.
* Iran: Recent military drills reflect Tehran’s concerns over attacks by Israel and the US against key facilities. On 7 January, Iran’s military began large-scale military exercises dubbed Eqtedar. The first part of the drills focused on air defences near the Natanz nuclear enrichment plant (Isfahan province). According to an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) spokesperson, the drills will continue covering other parts of Iran until mid-March. Eqtedar reflects Iranian concerns regarding attacks targeting the country’s nuclear facilities at a time when Iran’s air defences and early detection systems are at their lowest capacity in years. The drills will elevate the risk of periodic travel disruption across Iran’s airspace, land and sea. Misidentification and misfire risks during the drills will be elevated (though we assess that any such incident is ultimately unlikely). The drills are unlikely to deter Israel or the US from conducting attacks against Iran in the event of a substantial escalation and are unlikely to increase Iran’s capacity to negate any such strike significantly. The likelihood of Israeli strikes against Iran will increase after the inauguration of US President-elect Donald Trump on 20 January, as well as in response to any significant advances in Iran’s nuclear programme.
* Israel-Lebanon: Nothing significant to report (see Forecast for Lebanon’s presidential election)
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
* The IDF discovered the body of at least one hostage in Gaza, which will likely bolster anti-government protest attendance on 11 January. On 8 January, the IDF confirmed that it had recovered the body of a hostage from a tunnel in the Rafah area (southern Gaza) and that it had made ‘findings’ related to another hostage which led to ‘grave concerns for his life’. The hostages were a father and son from the Bedouin city of Rahat (Southern district, Israel). Both were believed to be alive until the recent discoveries; this will likely trigger increased attendance at the weekly hostage-release rallies on 11 January. Increased attendance will elevate risks of temporary travel and operational disruption in major cities, including Haifa (Haifa district), Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). Demonstrations will also possibly take place in Rahat in the coming days; gatherings are possible at proximate key intersections connecting highways 6 and 40, elevating the risk of supply chain disruption, particularly through the Beersheba area (Southern).
* Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz will present a formal proposal relating to the conscription of ultra-Orthodox men on 14 January, increasing protest and unrest risks. On 9 January, the chair of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee announced that Katz will present the committee with a formal proposal for conscripting ultra-Orthodox men into the IDF on 14 January. The announcement follows months of legislative deadlock regarding changes to conscription exemptions and legislation. Katz will likely propose legislation that nominally expands the eligibility of ultra-Orthodox men for conscription, while setting indefinite and imprecise recruitment targets. Such measures would maintain de facto exemptions for the majority of ultra-Orthodox men without violating the government’s legal obligations following a Supreme Court ruling on conscription eligibility in June 2024 (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 2 January 2025). Although this approach will likely reduce tensions within the coalition government and moderate government stability risks, continued efforts to exempt ultra-Orthodox men from military service will almost certainly sustain pressure on the IDF’s capacity in the short, medium and long terms. Reform proposals will also likely trigger pro- and anti-conscription protests in the coming weeks, elevating the risk of operational disruption and inter-protest clashes, particularly in and around the Beit Shemesh and Jerusalem areas (both Jerusalem).
* Israel announced that an agreement with Elbit Systems Ltd. was made for heavy air munitions amid increasing efforts to bolster self-sufficiency, possibly driving tensions with the US and triggering pro-Palestine protests. On 7 January, the defence ministry announced two deals with Elbit (collectively worth USD 275 million) to supply the IDF with high payload bombs and to develop a new production plant for the manufacturing of raw materials. The move reflects increasing Israeli efforts to strengthen domestic manufacturing capabilities and to moderate dependence on foreign suppliers. There is a realistic possibility that the move will increase diplomatic tensions with the US, Israel’s largest military aid provider, though broader disruption to bilateral relations remains unlikely. Publicity surrounding the deal and Elbit’s relationship with the IDF will possibly trigger an uptick in pro-Palestine protests targeting Elbit and its subsidiaries’ premises in the coming weeks, particularly in Europe and North America. Groups such as Palestine Action will also possibly mobilise supporters to vandalise such installations; they will also possibly target firms linked to Elbit, including those providing professional, financial and property management services. Targeted protests and vandalism will similarly increase bystander, collateral and operational disruption risks for proximate entities.
* Lebanon: Successful presidential election would moderate governance, socio-economic risks. Later on 9 January, members of Lebanon’s parliament will likely elect a new president for the first time since October 2022, when the former president Michel Aoun’s term ended. The parliament will likely elect Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Joseph Aoun following the Lebanese Hizballah (LH)-backed Suleiman Frangieh’s withdrawal from the race. Aoun is perceived to be a largely neutral figure within Lebanese politics; he also has a central role in the implementation of the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire agreement. His election would likely improve the prospects of sustaining the ceasefire agreement while moderating political deadlocks and policy risks. However, the government will need to implement constitutional amendments to allow a member of the armed forces to serve as president. In all, 86 votes are required to circumvent this rule. We assess that a delay in the election of a new president would exacerbate Lebanon’s economic and social crises, delaying critical economic reforms needed for international aid and damaging public trust.
* UAE: Detention of Egyptian activist will likely increase reputational, human rights risks. On 8 January, Lebanon highly likely extradited the Egyptian activist Abdul Rahman Yusuf to the UAE. The Lebanese security forces arrested Yusuf after he returned from a visit to Syria on 28 December 2024; this followed the issuance of an Egyptian arrest warrant. However, the UAE requested Lebanon to extradite Yusuf, apparently due to his public criticism of the Emirati government. The move will almost certainly increase reputational and human rights risks in the UAE; multiple international organisations, NGOs and activists have called for his release. We assess that anti-UAE online campaigns and reactionary small-scale protests in Germany, Lebanon, Turkey and the UK will increase in scope in the coming weeks. However, despite increasing reputational risks, it is unlikely that any such campaigns would significantly impact the rate of prospective foreign investment in the UAE.
Jan 08.
* Turkey-Syria: Belligerent rhetoric signals likely Turkish incursions in northern Syria in Q1 2025. On 7 January, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated that Turkey would carry out a cross-border offensive into north-eastern Syria against Kurdish forces if the latter failed to meet Ankara’s demands. Turkey continues to support the Syrian National Army (SNA) in its campaign against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northern Syria. This support is largely limited to daily drone strikes targeting the SDF’s supply line along the front, specifically around the crucial Tishrin Dam on the Euphrates River. Turkey is likely to escalate its drone and airstrikes in the coming weeks to support SNA advances and attempts to seize the strategic dam, escalating security risks in the area. We assess these actions will likely act as a precursor to a broader Turkish ground operation in north-eastern Syria in Q1 2025 to establish a wider buffer zone along the border, further destabilising the region.
Jan 07.
* Syria-US: Sanctions relief will reduce energy security risks; full sanctions removal is unlikely. On 6 January, the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued limited sanctions relief to Syria to support the provision of public services and humanitarian assistance following the fall of former president Bashar al-Assad’s rule. The exemptions will allow transactions with governing institutions in Syria, including energy, as well as personal remittances through 7 July; however, it will keep existing sanctions in place. The move will likely reduce energy security risks in the short term while ensuring the delivery of essential services to support government continuity, moderating the risk of domestic unrest and government instability caused by energy shortages. However, US sanctions continue to block Syria from importing wheat, sustaining serious food security risks in the coming months, particularly after Iran and Russia ceased supplies in December. We assess that the US will likely use sanctions as leverage to encourage the new Syrian authorities to adopt a moderate, Western-aligned government, reducing the likelihood of complete sanctions removal in the medium term and sustaining food security risks.
Jan 06.
KEY POINTS
* An uptick in cross-border rocket attacks by Gazan militants targeting Israeli population centres in the Gaza Envelope highlights sustained conflict risks across Israel; this trend elevates the likelihood of increased Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes in Gaza, including in humanitarian zones.
* A shooting attack in the West Bank will likely increase IDF operations in the area, elevating travel and business disruption; retaliatory Israeli settler violence targeting the Palestinian population is likely in the coming days.
* Gaza Strip: Multiple rocket incidents underline elevated militant and conflict risks in the Gaza Envelope. In the past week, Gazan militants increased the number of cross-border rocket strikes targeting Israeli population centres in the Gaza Envelope, particularly Sderot (Southern district). On 6 January, militants launched three rockets towards Sderot. The IDF intercepted only one of these rockets, with one falling within and causing material damage to a residential area; another fell in an open area. On 3 January, Hamas operative targeted an IDF helicopter in Gaza, triggering rocket sirens in Be’eri (Southern district) for the first time in 10 months. Later on 3 January, militants also launched rockets towards Sderot (Southern district). The uptick in militant activity and rocket attacks targeting Gaza Envelope population centres highlight sustained conflict risks across Israel, particularly in the Gaza Envelope This comes despite claims of mounting pressure for a ceasefire. An increase in cross-border launches will also increase the likelihood of IDF strikes targeting launch sites and an overall increase in air strikes across Gaza. This will drive further population displacement and bystander security risks, including in humanitarian areas.
* West Bank: Palestinian gunmen open fire on a highway, underscoring elevated attack risks and ethno-religious tensions. On 6 January, at least two Palestinians killed three Israeli civilians and injured 11 others in a small arms attack targeting Israeli vehicles on Highway 55 in the village of Al-Funduq (Qalqilya governorate, Palestinian Territories). The IDF has launched a manhunt for the perpetrators who remain at large, cordoning areas around the village as well as around Nablus city (Nablus governorate). The attack reflects elevated ethno-religious tensions and attack risks across the West Bank, particularly on key roads and transport hubs. Travel disruption and clashes between IDF personnel and Palestinians are likely in the coming days as is retaliatory Israeli settler violence (see FORECAST).
* Israel-Lebanon: IDF ground-clearing operations in southern Lebanon continue on trend. In the past week, the IDF sustained operations targeting military infrastructure in southern Lebanon, often involving infantry and mechanised units. IDF operations remain mainly focused on Nabatieh governorate, including Bani Haiyyan, Bint Jbeil, Marjayoun and Talloussah (all Nabatieh governorate). These operations are likely to continue throughout January, with a realistic possibility of further intensification in the coming two weeks, sustaining elevated bystander security risks in southern Lebanon.
* Israel-Yemen: The targeting of Israel by Iran-backed Houthis continues on trend, though no significant penetration of Israeli air defences took place. On 4 January, the Houthis claimed to have targeted the Orot Rabin power station in Hadera (Haifa district) with a ballistic missile. The IDF intercepted the missile before it reached Israeli air space. Additionally, on 3 January, the IDF intercepted a Houthi missile that triggered sirens in the Gush Dan area (Central, Southern and Tel Aviv districts) and Jerusalem district. The incidents reflect the sustained elevated risks of Houthi missiles across Israel, including on critical infrastructure such as the power grid. As such, further Israeli retaliatory strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen are likely (see
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
* Damage to a border crossing into Gaza (Palestinian Territories) and an airstrike on a major thoroughfare highlights sustained risks of disruption to aid delivery and distribution efforts. On 4 January, the IDF confirmed it had conducted an airstrike targeting militants moving along the Salah a-Din road, which also serves as a major thoroughfare for aid distribution. Although the strike did not damage any aid convoys in the area, concerns over militant use of designated humanitarian infrastructure will likely trigger similar strikes in the coming weeks, disrupting aid distribution efforts. Also on 4 January, rocket fire from northern Gaza damaged the Erez border crossing and an adjacent area; the crossing is a key entry point for aid deliveries and facilitated approximately 25% of convoy entries between 1 and 31 December. As clashes between the IDF and Gaza-based militants continue at pace, NGO staff will almost certainly continue facing significant security and bystander risks, elevating risks of operational disruption and undermining aid delivery and distribution efforts throughout Gaza. Additionally, in the coming weeks, Israeli legislation restricting the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)’s operations in Israel will also come into force. These restrictions will likely further compound disruption to aid delivery and distribution in Gaza, exacerbating humanitarian concerns throughout the enclave.
* Amid continued disputes over hostage releases, Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations will likely remain prone to stalling, despite reports of recent progress. On 5 January, numerous media sources reported that Hamas had approved a list of 34 hostages for release under a ceasefire agreement with Israel. However, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office subsequently stated that the list had been drafted during negotiations in July 2024 and that Hamas had not provided an update on the relevant hostages’ conditions. The dispute over the reported list highlights substantial tensions between negotiating parties, particularly regarding Hamas’ ability to credibly commit to releasing living hostages from Gaza. Consequently, negotiations will likely remain fragile and possibly reach additional impasses in the coming days, delaying agreement and implementation. Even so, amid continued international pressure to engage in negotiations, mediated talks will likely continue in the coming weeks, sustaining prospects for an agreement in the short- to medium-term.
* In Israel, there was a moderate uptick in anti-government protest activity, highlighting sustained risks of operational disruption in major cities. On 4 January, Hamas released a three-minute video of a female Israeli hostage. The video’s release coincided with weekly hostage release protests in major Israeli cities. Approximately 1,500 demonstrators gathered in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), while smaller rallies also emerged in Haifa (Haifa district) and Jerusalem (Jerusalem district). In Tel Aviv, the police arrested six protesters after a violent altercation with mounted units on Begin Street; police also arrested four demonstrators in Jerusalem. These marked the first arrests at hostage release rallies since early December 2024, when low-intensity clashes between protesters and police emerged in Tel Aviv after Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) released video footage of an Israeli hostage. As ceasefire and hostage release negotiations continue, Hamas and allied militant groups are highly likely to continue releasing video footage of hostages to maximise psychological pressure on the Israeli population and gain concessions from the Israeli government. Footage releases will likely trigger moderate upticks in protest attendance and possible disorderly protester conduct, increasing risks of altercations with police and driving localised bystander risks. These risks will be most acute in protest hotspots and centres, particularly Tel Aviv, though widespread unrest remains highly unlikely.
* Rising tensions between Israel and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) will likely increase pressure on the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire, highlighting risks of a limited resumption of armed conflict. On 4 January, Lebanese Hizballah’s (LH) leader Naim Qassem stated that the group’s ‘patience may run out’ amid continued IDF airstrikes and ground operations in Lebanon. Subsequently, on 5 January, Israel’s Defence Minister Israel Katz stated that LH has not withdrawn from numerous positions south of the Litani River and that, if the group does not abide by the terms of the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire, the agreement will become void and Israel will ‘act independently’. These statements highlight increasing pressure on the ceasefire agreement as the 60-day ceasefire transition period nears its end on 25 January. Amid elevated concerns over the ceasefire’s durability, US Special Envoy Amos Hochstein arrived in Lebanon on 6 January, highlighting ongoing diplomatic efforts to prevent conflict re-escalation. Even so, there is a realistic possibility that the IDF will maintain territorial positions in southern Lebanon after the transition period ends, increasing risks of a limited conflict resumption on the Israel-Lebanon border in the coming weeks.
* The Lebanese airport authorities continue efforts to enforce the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire agreement, driving risks of travel and operational disruption for locally engaged firms. On 2 January, authorities at the Beirut-Hariri International Airport (BEY) searched an Iranian Mahan Air flight after reportedly receiving intelligence that the plane was transporting significant capital to Lebanese Hizballah (LH). Mahan Air has allegedly served as a major transporter for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) when supplying LH with weapons, funds and advisory personnel. The search highlights continued efforts by Lebanese authorities to enforce the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire, which prohibits such transfers via Lebanese border crossings and airport facilities. In the coming weeks, however, Iran and LH will almost certainly continue pursuing efforts to re-arm the group, particularly via diplomatic staff and shipments. Such efforts will increase risks of operational disruption at major Lebanese border crossings, airports and port facilities, undermining supply chain continuity for locally engaged firms. Disruption to import and export activity, as well as travel via BEY, will sustain risks of broader operational disruption in the coming weeks while compounding socio-economic concerns amid Lebanon’s ongoing economic crisis.
* In Brazil, a federal court ordered police to launch a war crimes investigation into an IDF service member travelling in the country, highlighting elevated legal exposure risks for Israeli nationals. On 5 January, a Brazilian federal court ordered police to investigate an Israeli national for committing possible war crimes during military service in Gaza. The inquiry follows a complaint from the pro-Palestine Hind Rajab Foundation, based on the individual’s social media posts made during their deployment in Gaza. However, the individual in question left before their arrest. The incident highlights elevated legal exposure risks for IDF personnel travelling to and via states with highly active pro-Palestine movements, such as Brazil, France, Ireland, the Netherlands and South Africa. The risks of questioning and detention by the authorities will also extend to friends and families of individuals alleged to have committed war crimes, increasing legal exposure for Israeli nationals travelling overseas. Efforts to detain Israeli nationals following such complaints will almost certainly increase diplomatic tensions between Israel and arresting states, increasing risks of ambassadorial recalls and temporarily restricted access to embassy services for Israeli nationals.
FORECAST
Further Israeli military operations in Yemen remain likely in the coming weeks, elevating security risks near Houthi facilities and infrastructure used for smuggling. In recent weeks, Iran has increased its military support to the Houthis, including delivering advanced missile and drone parts. The increase in support comes amid the collapse of Iranian influence in Syria and mounting challenges to Iranian efforts to deliver weapons to militants in Syria and Hizballah in Lebanon. The Houthis remain a strong and functional force within Iran’s Axis of Resistance, still in possession of planetary fuel mixers able to make solid fuel for missiles. In the past months, the IDF methodically targeted solid fuel mixers in Iran, Lebanon and Syria. The recent uptick in Houthi attacks on Israel and their possession of such mixers will increase the likelihood of Israeli strikes targeting Houthi infrastructure in the coming months, including dual-use infrastructure such as ports and power plants. This will sustain elevated bystander security risks across Houthi-held territory in Yemen, also elevating energy and food security risks.
The latest shooting in the West Bank will drive further IDF operations and elevate risks of ‘Price Tag’ attacks by Israeli settlers targeting Palestinian population centres. In the coming days elevated IDF operations are likely in Qalqilya and Nablus governorates (including an increase in the proliferation of checkpoints) to arrest suspects of terrorism and confiscate weapons. These will likely drive bystander security risks and localised clashes between Palestinian militants and the Israeli security forces as well as elevated travel disruption, impacting business operations. Furthermore, increased IDF operations will likely elevate radicalisation risks among the Palestinian population, increasing risks of Palestinian sole-perpetrator and militant attacks targeting IDF checkpoints and transit hubs. This will elevate security risks during overland movement. Additionally, following the latest shooting, there is an increased risk of Israeli settler violent attacks targeting Palestinians in the West Bank in the coming days in ‘Price Tag’ attacks in retaliation for the shooting. Physical attacks, including arson and vandalism, are likely in small Palestinian towns and villages, elevating security risks for Palestinians and NGO staff as well as to primate assets.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
* A successful terror attack by LH and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
* High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
* Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
* Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting LH and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
* Israel re-launches widespread, high-intensity military operations in Gaza
* An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
* US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
* Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
* An IDF-targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)
* An LH strike causes a mass casualty event in Israel
* An IDF strike causes a mass casualty event in Lebanon
* An IDF strike kills civilians in Lebanon
* Israel-Palestinian Territories: Shooting points to sustained risk of violence in West Bank. Earlier on 6 January, two Palestinians killed three Israelis and wounded at least eight others in a small arms attack against vehicles along Highway 55 in the village of al-Funduq (Qalqilya governorate; West Bank, Palestinian Territories). Highway 55 crosses the West Bank and links areas to the north-west of Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district, Israel) to the outskirts of Nablus city (Nablus governorate, West Bank). The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) dispatched a large number of troops and a helicopter to search for the perpetrators, who remain at large. The ongoing manhunt includes cordons along Highway 55 and around Nablus city and nearby villages; this will almost certainly trigger localised mobility disruption in the coming 24 hours. The attack underscores the significant risk of ethno-religious violence in the West Bank; we assess this will almost certainly persist in the coming weeks. Retaliatory attacks by Israeli settlers in the West Bank against Palestinians are also likely, exacerbating the cycle of mutual violence.
Jan 03.
• Syria: New security campaign will increase risks of reprisal ethno-religious attacks. On 2 January, the Military Operations Administration led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched a large-scale security campaign in the Wadi Al-Zahab and Akramah neighbourhoods of Homs (Homs governorate). Officials stated that the campaign targets those individuals involved in war crimes and those refusing to surrender their weapons. The targeted neighbourhoods are inhabited mostly by members of the Alawite sect who are historically associated with the former government led by former president Bashar al-Assad. This comes days after the security forces launched a similar operation against pro-Assad cells in western Tartus (Tartus governorate), another Alawite stronghold. We assess that the risk of mutual reprisal attacks along ethno-religious lines is highly likely to increase significantly in Homs and Alawite areas in Latakia, Jableh (both Latakia governorate) and Tartus (Tartus) in the coming weeks. Wider curfews during the evening hours in these regions during January are also likely, driving business disruption risks. (Source: Sibylline)
07 Jan 25. China Supplying Weapons to Houthi Rebels in Exchange for Red Sea Passage.
A report citing American intelligence sources revealed that Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen are using Chinese-made weapons to target shipping in the Red Sea, while agreeing to spare Chinese vessels from their attacks.
According to Israel’s i24 News, the Houthis have developed a sophisticated supply chain in China, enabling them to acquire advanced components for their missile systems. These components include guidance systems essential for ballistic and cruise missiles.
Intelligence assessments reportedly indicate that the Houthis plan to produce hundreds of cruise missiles capable of striking Persian Gulf states.
Washington has previously identified and sanctioned companies supplying dual-use technologies that enhance the Houthis’ missile production capabilities. These companies include Shenzhen Rion Technology Co., Ltd. and Shenzhen Jinghon Electronics Limited.
The U.S. has reportedly informed China about these developments since September 2024, providing detailed intelligence on Chinese companies implicated in the arms supply network. Despite these communications, Beijing has not taken significant action to disrupt the network.
Diplomatic sources also indicated that Houthi officials visited China multiple times in 2023 and 2024, potentially meeting with senior Chinese officials to solidify these agreements.
While the Houthis had agreed to refrain from targeting Chinese-flagged vessels as part of the agreement, a targeting error in March 2024 reportedly resulted in the attack on a Chinese-linked oil tanker.
Maritime data suggests that Chinese-affiliated vessels continue to navigate the Red Sea with minimal interference, despite frequent Houthi assaults on other commercial shipping in the region. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
06 Jan 25. Israeli Defense Forces Reveal Details of Operation Targeting Iranian Missile Facility in Syria. The Israeli Defense Forces on Thursday revealed details and released footage of one of its most complex commando operations to date. Carried out by 120 members of the Israeli Air Force in September, the operation successfully targeted and destroyed a key underground Iranian missile manufacturing facility deep within Syria.
The raid struck the heavily fortified subterranean complex known as “Deep Layer” within the Scientific Studies and Research Center in the Masyaf region, west of Hama. The facility, vital to Iran’s production of precision-guided munitions for Hezbollah and the Assad regime, was a flagship project in Iran’s effort to expand its influence in the region.
The IDF had spent months gathering intelligence and meticulously planning the operation. A total of 21 fighter jets, five drones, and 14 reconnaissance aircraft were deployed to support the raid.
During the operation, which lasted for about two hours, the IDF simultaneously launched airstrikes and naval bombardments around the facility to create diversions and mask the arrival of the special forces.
Upon reaching the target, commandos infiltrated the underground complex, collecting intelligence and planting over 660 pounds of explosives to ensure the facility’s destruction. The detonation created a massive blast, reportedly felt like a “mini-earthquake” by soldiers on the ground.
At least 30 Syrian soldiers guarding the facility were killed while none of the 120 Israeli soldiers involved sustained any injuries.
The raid occurred while Syrian President Bashar al-Assad remained in power and Iran maintained a strong military presence in Syria.
The “Deep Layer” was built between 230 and 430 feet underground, making it impervious to conventional airstrikes. Its destruction marked a significant blow to Iran’s ambitions to arm Hezbollah with advanced weaponry. The mission was part of Israel’s broader strategy to disrupt Iranian military projects in the region. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
03 Jan 25. Israel lifts the lid on commando raid on Iranian-funded missile factory in Syria. More than 100 soldiers belonging to a special Israeli Air Force unit carried out a raid on an underground Iranian-financed missile factory in Syria, it has emerged.
Operation Many Ways took place on 8 September – although details have only just been declassified and released by the Israeli Defence Force.
The raid was carried out by the Shaldag, a unit that specialises in commando-style raids, with support from the Israeli Navy.
The IDF said no personnel were harmed during the operation.
While the mission had initially been shrouded in mystery, the IDF decided to confirm its existence by releasing videos that explain exactly how the raid was carried out.
These include footage of an aircraft targeting the elaborate tunnel system as well as body-cam footage of personnel taking part in the attack and storming the facility.
The factory was located between 230ft and 400ft below the ground, making it impossible to destroy from the air, according to the Times of Israel.
It was also built within a mountain in the Masyaf area of Syria – located in the northwest of the country and around 124 miles from the Israeli border.
Israeli forces said the facility was shaped like a horseshoe, with an entrance and exit on the side of the mountain for raw materials to enter and missiles to emerge.
One of the key aims of the mission was to destroy the factory, which the IDF said was manufacturing a number of weapon systems.
These included a surface-to-surface missiles, such as M220s, with a range of 70km, M302s converted into precision missiles with a range of 40km and M122s, which have a range of 40km.
M600F and M600GG missiles were also manufactured in the factory, according to the IDF, which said the missiles have a range of between 250km and 300km.
The factory, codenamed Deep Layer by Israel, was a “flagship project” for Iran, according to the IDF, which also said the factory was significantly increasing the supply of missiles to Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies in the Middle East.
In terms of the mission, the IDF said troops were flown in via helicopter, with both “fire and intelligence-gathering support from aircraft, fighter jets and naval vessels of the Israeli Navy”. (Source: forces.net)
03 Jan 25. Syria’s new government has triggered outrage after introducing an overhaul of the education curriculum that critics argue will impose an Islamist agenda on school students. Anger spread after the ministry of education this week published 12 documents listing adjustments and omissions to the schoolbooks of topics including Arabic, history, sciences, social studies and religion. Most changes involved removing references to the regime of ousted president Bashar al-Assad and his late father Hafez, who between them ruled with an iron fist for five decades, including photographs and mentions of the army and national anthem. But authorities also alarmed many by removing references to pre-Islamic deities — and even the word “deities” itself — and scaling back criticism of the Ottoman Empire. Also omitted were the text for Syria’s citizenship law, a section on the evolution of vertebrates’ brains, and mention of Zenobia, a famed pre-Islamic queen of the ancient city Palmyra. Critics feared the changes represent a slippery slope in which the Islamist rebel faction Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which dominates the new government, would seek to impose its religious worldview on what has long been one of the Middle East’s most secular countries. “The erasure of the defunct regime’s glorification is understandable, but deleting historical facts and events from our people’s struggle, and milestones of ancient civilisations?.?.?.?[is] not a coincidence,” Rima Flihan, a Syrian writer and human rights activist, wrote on Facebook. “Therein lies the danger.” Bassam al-Kuwatli, president of the anti-Assad opposition Syrian Liberal Party, or Ahrar, said the caretaker government should not be decreeing such big, non-urgent changes to implement “something that suits it ideologically”. While removing Assad’s legacy “is not controversial”, he said, the reforms should be undertaken by committees staffed with experts. Following rampant anger over the amendments, education minister Nazir al-Qadri said on Thursday that, while the old curriculum would remain in place until the formation of committees to audit schoolbooks, he had ordered some changes to delete “what glorifies the defunct Assad regime” and replace the old Syrian flag with the opposition flag. He added authorities would also modify “some of the incorrect information in the Islamic education curriculum”, including the interpretation of Quranic verses. Qadri was previously education minister in the HTS-backed de facto government of Idlib, which ruled the north-western corner of Syria for years before ousting Assad in a sweeping, largely bloodless campaign last month following a brutal 13-year civil war. Religious studies, a mandatory topic in Syrian schools, teaches two books, one for Muslims and one for Christians. One of the adjustments, made in a first-grade Islamic Studies schoolbook, added an interpretation of a Quranic verse mentioning “those who have earned [Allah’s] anger” and “gone astray” as a reference to “Christians and Jews”. (Source: FT.com)
03 Jan 25. Israel Bombs Syrian Defense Facilities Near Aleppo, Cause 2.5 Magnitude Seismic Event. On Thursday night, Israeli airstrikes targeted Syrian army positions and defense facilities south of Aleppo, marking the latest in a series of Israeli military actions following the ouster of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. The strikes caused significant explosions and reportedly targeted defense factories and a scientific research center in the Al-Safira area, according to multiple sources including the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) and local residents.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a UK-based war monitor, reported that at least seven large explosions were heard during the assault, describing the strikes as extremely powerful. Residents in Al-Safira corroborated these accounts, with one individual telling AFP that the strikes were the strongest they had ever experienced, shaking the ground and illuminating the night sky. The strikes caused seismic readers to register a 2.5 magnitude earthquake in the area. The targeted locations included defense factories and a scientific research center associated with Syria’s military operations under the former Assad regime.
Syrian state television also acknowledged the attack but did not provide specific details. Other reports, such as those from the local news outlet al-Watan Online and Xinhua, highlighted that significant damage was inflicted on key facilities in the region, including research sites critical to military development.
Since the collapse of the Assad government in early December 2024, Israel has conducted numerous airstrikes, reportedly aiming to prevent advanced weaponry from falling into the hands of hostile groups. The SOHR has documented 498 such strikes on Syrian territory since the regime change.
As of now, there have been no confirmed reports of casualties from the attack. However, the intensity of the explosions and the strategic nature of the targeted locations suggest that the strike caused substantial material damage. Syrian authorities and international observers have yet to provide a comprehensive assessment of the aftermath. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
A CNIM Group Company
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–