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Military And Security Developments
May 16.
- Libya: Security, armed conflict risks will remain high in Tripoli despite truce. On 14 May, the Government of National Unity (GNU) announced a truce between rival militias in the capital Tripoli, following two days of heavy clashes in several neighbourhoods. The truce allowed the emergency evacuation of expats attending the ‘Libya Build’ conference, including about 100 Italian citizens. Despite the cessation of hostilities and the deployment of the GNU security personnel, elevated tensions will persist, sustaining the possibility of a resumption in armed conflict across Tripoli and the surrounding towns in the coming days. These risks are augmented by the GNU’s highly limited control over its aligned militias (such as the 444th Brigade) or other semi-autonomous rival groups (such as the Special Deterrence Force). Furthermore, risks of domestic unrest in Tripoli will remain elevated in the coming days, with anti-government protests likely in the main squares later on 16 and 17 May. Amid the currently augmented security posture, the authorities will likely attempt to violently disperse protesters, driving the risk of clashes with GNU forces and allied militias. We assess that this will elevate bystander exposure to tear gas and possibly live ammunition.
- Turkey-Region: Military operations will continue despite PKK disarmament, sustaining security risks. On 15 May, Turkey’s Ministry of National Defense announced that it would continue its cross-border operations against the recently disbanded Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Iraq and Syria. Turkey claims that, despite the PKK’s dissolution, splinter cells in areas such as the Qandil Mountains (Erbil governorate, Iraq) and the semi-autonomous Rojava region of north-east Syria continue to pose a threat to its security. As such, Turkish military operations against former PKK and PKK splinter positions and assets in these areas will likely continue in the coming weeks, including the targeting of cave systems, shelters, and weapons caches. This will sustain elevated security risks to NGO and business personnel in these regions. In the event of intense military operations against these groups, the PKK’s dissolution process will possibly stall, increasing the risk of fracturing and the revival of insurgency operations. We assess that this would highly likely drive attack risks in Turkey, especially near government buildings and businesses facilitating military action, exacerbating ethno-religious tensions and conflict escalation.
May 15.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
- A manhunt for a Palestinian gunman will elevate security and travel disruption risks in Salfit governorate (West Bank, Palestinian Territories), driving the likelihood of Israeli settler attacks in the area.
- An attempt to kill the head of Hamas in Gaza (Palestinian Territories) underscores the elevated security risks near humanitarian infrastructure; there is realistic possibility that a successful assassination will delay Israel’s launch of Operation Gideon’s Chariots.
POLITICAL FORECAST
- Deteriorating food security conditions in Gaza will possibly trigger an uptick in pro-Palestine protest activity in the wider region, as well as across Europe and North America.
- The Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF’s) enforcement of conscription orders for ultra-Orthodox men will increase localised unrest and supply chain disruption risks, though we assess that government stability risks will not critically increase.
- US President Donald Trump announced that he intends to lift sanctions on Syria, bolstering socio-economic health prospects and possibly facilitating Syrian engagement with Israel.
- Diplomatic engagement between the US and Iran continues, underscoring increasing prospects for an interim agreement in the coming months.
- A manhunt for a Palestinian gunman will elevate security and travel disruption risks in Salfit governorate (West Bank, Palestinian Territories), driving the likelihood of Israeli settler attacks in the area. On 14 May, a Palestinian gunman killed one civilian in a small-arms attack against vehicles passing along Route 446 near Bruqin (Salfit). At the time of writing, a manhunt for the perpetrator is ongoing; the IDF has established checkpoints and imposed a curfew in the area and villages around Bruqin. An elevated security posture in Salfit will likely persist in the coming days, sustaining travel disruption and bystander security risks, particularly in proximity to checkpoints. Furthermore, in the coming days, there will be an elevated risk of Israeli settlers conducting retaliatory attacks on Palestinian villages in the area; the risk of cross-fire and arson will elevate security concerns for proximate staff and assets.
- An attempt to kill the head of Hamas in Gaza (Palestinian Territories) underscores the elevated security risks near humanitarian infrastructure; there is realistic possibility that a successful assassination will delay Israel’s launch of Operation Gideon’s Chariots. On 13 May, the IDF conducted a wave of airstrikes near the European Hospital in Khan Yunis (southern Gaza); it specifically targeted Mohammed Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza. According to the IDF, its assets struck underground tunnels near the hospital using 40 bunker buster munitions. The Gazan health authorities allege that the strikes killed at least 16 people and injured over 70 others. At the time of writing, it remains unclear whether the strikes killed Sinwar. In the event that the strikes were successful, there is a realistic possibility that Israel will attempt to exploit the new leadership vacuum as further leverage in ceasefire negotiations, delaying the launch of Operation Gideon’s Chariots. However, Sinwar’s influence in Gaza, as well as his involvement in ceasefire negotiations, was limited compared to his brother, Yahya Sinwar, moderating the likelihood of a significant shift in Hamas’ negotiation position.
- Additional emergency information:
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Deteriorating food security conditions in Gaza will possibly trigger an uptick in pro-Palestine protest activity in the wider region, as well as across Europe and North America. On 12 May, the UN Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) released a report indicating that ‘the entire population’ of Gaza faces ‘acute food insecurity’, underscoring that there is a heightened risk of famine taking hold by September. The Israeli government has contested the findings, citing issues with data collection and processing. Regardless, food security conditions have almost certainly deteriorated since Israel imposed a blockade on all aid deliveries into Gaza on 2 March and will highly likely continue to do so unless these deliveries resume. Within Gaza, increasing food security concerns will elevate the risk of looting targeting NGO facilities, while also increasing the threats to locally engaged staff. In the wider region, deteriorating humanitarian conditions will possibly trigger an uptick in pro-Palestine protests following Friday Prayers on 16 May, particularly in Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey and the West Bank. Reports of famine will also likely sustain attendance at pro-Palestine rallies in Australia, Europe and North America in the coming weeks. Key hotspots will include university campuses and major cities such as Amsterdam (Netherlands), Berlin (Germany), Brussels (Belgium), Paris (France), London (UK), Melbourne (Australia), New York, Seattle and Washington DC (all US). The risk of further protests and related activism will continue to rise as the IDF intensifies airstrikes in Gaza and finalises preparations for Operation Gideon’s Chariots (see above).
- The IDF’s enforcement of conscription orders for ultra-Orthodox men will increase localised unrest and supply chain disruption risks, though we assess that government stability risks will not critically increase. On 13 May, the IDF launched a military police operation to detain individuals who had not responded to conscription orders; they arrested at least 36 individuals, including several ultra-Orthodox men. This marks a substantial escalation in the IDF’s efforts to conscript ultra-Orthodox men amid long-running disputes on the matter (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 8 May 2025). Since July 2024, the IDF has issued approximately 19,000 conscription orders to ultra-Orthodox men; fewer than 2% of recipients have responded, while over 5% have been declared ‘draft evaders’. Further attempts to arrest ultra-Orthodox so-called draft evaders in the coming weeks will likely trigger altercations with the military police, increasing bystanders’ exposure to low-intensity clashes, particularly in ultra-Orthodox population centres such as Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv district), Beit Shemesh and Jerusalem (both Jerusalem district). More broadly, efforts to conscript ultra-Orthodox men will almost certainly trigger anti-conscription demonstrations in the coming weeks, increasing the risk of localised unrest in the vicinity of IDF recruitment centres, particularly in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv). Protesters will also likely attempt to block major thoroughfares (particularly Highways 1 and 4) during demonstrations, elevating the risk of temporary travel and supply chain disruption through central Israel in the coming weeks. Additionally, the ultra-Orthodox Shas and United Torah Judaism (UTJ) parties will likely face increasing pressure from their respective support bases to withdraw from the coalition government. Although there is a realistic possibility that UTJ will announce its partial or nominal withdraw from the coalition in the coming weeks, Shas is unlikely to do so, moderating immediate threats to government stability.
- US President Donald Trump announced that he intends to lift sanctions on Syria, bolstering socio-economic health prospects and possibly facilitating Syrian engagement with Israel. Trump made the announcement during a visit to Saudi Arabia on 13 May. The move likely reflects the US’ alignment with Riyadh vis-à-vis re-integrating Syria into global financial markets. The US listed Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1979, though it significantly expanded sanctions targeting the former president, Bashar al Assad, and his regime in 2011. Although Trump will need congressional approval to repeal the SST designation, the repeal of other sanctions via executive order will likely accelerate Syria’s economic recovery in the coming weeks by facilitating the Syrian Central Bank’s operations and integration into global financial markets. This will allow for the receipt of financial and reconstruction packages from regional partners and international institutions (including the IMF), easing fiscal pressures, facilitating the import of key commodities and reducing domestic unrest risks. The move is also highly likely to reduce compliance risks for US companies seeking to operate in Syria, particularly in the automotive, construction, energy, infrastructure, real estate and retail sectors. Trump also likely conditioned sanctions relief on Syria committing to engage with Israel on potential normalisation. Although formal normalisation remains highly unlikely in the short-to-medium-term, mediated discussions on border demarcation and moderating bilateral tensions will bolster the prospects for Syria’s accession to the Abraham Accords in the coming years.
- Diplomatic engagement between the US and Iran continues, underscoring increasing prospects for an interim agreement in the coming months. On 15 May, President Trump indicated that nuclear negotiations with Iran are progressing well, and that there is (allegedly) an unspecified level of agreement over the terms of a deal to limit Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities. Trump’s statement comes as Iranian officials confirmed that talks with France, Germany and the UK regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) would take place in Turkey on 16 May. Continued diplomatic engagement between Iran, the US and European JCPOA parties will bolster the prospects for an interim agreement in the short term, which would then likely foster negotiations on a comprehensive agreement in the medium-to-long term. Such an agreement would substantially decrease the likelihood of US strikes targeting Iranian nuclear infrastructure, moderating regional tensions and hazard risks. However, negotiations will remain extremely sensitive to disruption and deadlock, particularly regarding Iran’s willingness to dismantle nuclear infrastructure, as well as its support for its regional proxies, particularly Lebanese Hizballah.
- Iraq: Arab League summit will drive disruption, bystander security risks in capital Baghdad. On 17 May, the capital Baghdad will host the 34th summit of the Arab League. The authorities have banned demonstrations in the city from 11 to 20 May. Any protests violating the ban will likely face a heavy-handed police response, driving the risk of sporadic clashes and elevating bystander security risks. A heightened security posture is almost certain in and around Baghdad’s International Zone (Green Zone), specifically near the Republican Palace, driving the risk of arbitrary stop-and-search and detention practices. Leaders will likely congregate at the World Heart Hotel near Jadriya Bridge, driving transport disruption along Qatr al-Nada Street. We assess that an elevated security posture around Baghdad International Airport (BGW) will increase travel disruption risks in its vicinity, possibly driving flight delays. The government will suspend public sector work in the capital on 15 and 18 May to accommodate the summit, likely driving operational business disruption due to reduced access to vital services.
- Syria-US: Lifting of sanctions will improve socio-economic health throughout 2025. On 13 May, US President Donald Trump announced that his administration would remove all sanctions imposed on Syria. The move is likely to accelerate Syria’s economic recovery in 2025 by facilitating the Syrian Central Bank’s operations, including its receipt of financial packages from regional governments and international institutions like the IMF. This will almost certainly ease the public sector salaries crisis and aid the import of strategic commodities this year, reducing domestic unrest risks. The move is also highly likely to reduce compliance risks significantly for US companies accessing the Syrian market this year, particularly in the automotive, energy, fast food, infrastructure, real estate and retail sectors. However, we assess that highly unstable security conditions and the persistent threat of armed conflict in Syria’s western and southern regions will continue to pose threats to new business operations/ventures in the country, particularly in the infrastructure sector.
May 14.
- Israel-Yemen: Evacuation warning highlights elevated security, operational disruption risks. Earlier on 14 May, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokesperson to the Arab Media, Avichay Adraee, issued an indefinite evacuation warning to Hudaydah Port, the Port of Salif and Ras Isa Port (all al-Hudaydah governorate, Yemen). The warning comes amid continued missile attacks by the Iran-backed Houthis against Israel. The latest attempted attack was recorded and intercepted earlier on 14 May. The warning signals an elevated and substantial risk of high-intensity Israeli strikes against the ports in the coming weeks, elevating collateral risks for personnel and assets in their vicinity. Such strikes will also likely increase energy and food security risks in Houthi-held territory, undercutting humanitarian conditions and driving pressure on aid resources. There is a realistic possibility that the strikes will fully disable the ports’ operational capacity, increasing business and supply chain disruption risks. Furthermore, the possibility of Houthi retaliation and secondary impacts from air defences will likely affect risk profiling in the Red Sea. We assess that this will sustain higher insurance costs for maritime vessels and air traffic and drive regional travel disruption.
- Turkey: Further protests are likely following student detentions, driving transport, security risks. On 13 May, the Turkish authorities detained 97 students at Boğaziçi University (Bosphorus University) in Istanbul (Istanbul province). The students, protesting a conference hosting the controversial Islamic preacher Nureddin Yıldız, allegedly attempted to breach a barricade on campus, which injured several police officers. Students will likely protest the detentions on the University’s north campus in Sarıyer and the nearby Bebek neighbourhood of Beşiktaş (all Istanbul) in the coming hours and days. Protests at other universities remain a realistic possibility, including on Istanbul University campuses. There is a realistic possibility that protests will expand to broader anti-government demonstrations, including against the jailing of Istanbul’s mayor, Ekrem İmamoğlu. This will elevate the risk of sporadic clashes between the authorities and demonstrators, driving bystander security risks and disrupting overland movement for business personnel in Istanbul. Although not in central Istanbul, we assess there is a realistic possibility that a planned opposition protest in Istanbul’s Silivri municipality at 2030hrs (local time) later on 14 May will further exacerbate student demonstrations.
May 13.
- Libya: Clashes in Tripoli underscore elevated security, travel disruption risks. On 12 May, armed clashes erupted in the Abu Salim and Mashrou neighbourhoods of the capital Tripoli. They followed the killing of the head of the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) militia, Abdel Ghani al-Kikli. Libya’s Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) declared a state of emergency in the capital and called for residents living in western Tripoli to stay indoors. Additionally, the clashes caused short power cuts across the capital, while Tripoli’s Mitiga International Airport (MJI) suspended its operations. At the time of writing, the GNU’s defence ministry has taken full control over Abu Salim, and the situation has stabilised. Operations at MJI are slowly returning. However, we assess that the resumption of hostilities in the coming days is possible, as the security situation remains fragile, sustaining elevated security and bystander risks, particularly in Tripoli’s western areas and southern suburbs. Furthermore, a resumption of clashes would almost certainly increase air travel disruption risks at MJI and possibly along roads leading to the facility.
- Region-Saudi Arabia: Heightened security posture is likely throughout region, driving disruption. Earlier on 13 May, US President Donald Trump arrived in Riyadh (Saudi Arabia), his first stop in a four-day visit to the Gulf and possibly Turkey (13-16 May). A heightened security posture is almost certain in Riyadh, as well as in Abu Dhabi (UAE), Dubai (UAE), Doha (Qatar) and Istanbul (Turkey) through 16 May, increasing the likelihood of arbitrary stop-and-search and detention practices, alongside transport and supply chain disruption. Trump is likely to focus on economic deals and development, and will possibly also announce progress vis-à-vis the Saudi civil nuclear programme; this is likely to elevate regional tensions, particularly with Iran. We assess there is a realistic possibility that a high-level meeting to mediate a ceasefire in the Russo-Ukrainian war will be held in Istanbul on 15 May, elevating the likelihood of protests and correlated security risks for personnel in the vicinity.
May 12.
- On 11 May, Israel issued an indefinite evacuation warning for several ports in Yemen controlled by the Iranian-backed Houthis, highlighting the severe security risks therein.
- The IDF’s rotation of regular fighting brigades underscores its preparation efforts for Operation Gideon’s Chariots.
- The commemoration of Nakba Day (15 May) by Palestinians in the West Bank and across the region will elevate the risk of attacks and domestic unrest, as well as travel disruption.
POLITICAL FORECAST
- Hamas announced it would release a dual-national US-Israeli hostage, possibly indicating improving prospects for a ceasefire agreement in Gaza.
- Developments in ceasefire and hostage-release negotiations are highly likely to trigger anti-government and pro-hostage-release demonstrations in Israel, increasing temporary operational disruption risks.
- The US’ possible de-linking of nuclear talks with Saudi Arabia and the normalisation of ties between the kingdom and Israel will likely further delay efforts to moderate longer-term regional tensions.
- Nakba Day (15 May) will likely trigger an uptick in pro-Palestine protest activity worldwide, while targeted violence and hostility to foreign investment will also possibly increase.
- Israel’s participation in the Eurovision Song Contest in Switzerland will increase the risk of pro-Palestine protests, underscoring the elevated reputational risks for event-management firms and sponsors.
- Norway announced it would divest from an Israeli fuel company, highlighting sustained corporate governance risks for financial entities linked to Israel.
On 11 May, Israel issued an indefinite evacuation warning for several ports in Yemen controlled by the Iranian-backed Houthis, highlighting the severe security risks therein. The Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF’s) spokesperson to the Arab Media, Avichay Adraee, issued a warning for Hudaydah Port, the Port of Salif and Ras Isa Port (all al-Hudaydah governorate, Yemen). Following the warning, conflicting reports emerged regarding an Israeli strike targeting these locations. However, at the time of writing, we assess that Israel has yet to strike the port facilities. There is a realistic possibility that the warning forms part of an effort to trigger the widespread evacuation of these ports in preparation for significant airstrikes in the coming days. The warning comes amid the Houthis’ continued attempts to target Israel, despite the latest IDF strike on Sanaa International Airport (SAH) on 6 May (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 8 May 2025). On 9 May, a Houthi missile triggered sirens across central Israel, while on 12 May, the IDF intercepted a Houthi missile outside Israeli airspace, which did not trigger sirens. The risk of tit-for-tat attacks will remain elevated in the coming weeks, increasing security risks across Israel related to Houthi missiles and shrapnel. Due to the possibility of further Israeli strikes, security and bystander risks will also remain elevated throughout Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen. These risks will be particularly acute near military and dual-use facilities, including ports and power stations, increasing energy and food security risks in the coming weeks.
- The IDF’s rotation of regular fighting brigades underscores its preparation efforts for Operation Gideon’s Chariots. On 11 May, the IDF announced that the 933rd Nahal Brigade completed its mission in the West Bank (Palestinian Territories) after three months of operations; it will now shift its focus to Gaza. Earlier that day, the IDF confirmed that the 35th Paratroopers Brigade would also deploy to Gaza following five months of operating in Syria. The announcements underscore that the IDF is increasing its preparations for Operation Gideon’s Chariots (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 8 May 2025). These shifts will likely reduce (albeit slightly) the intensity of IDF operations in Syria and the West Bank in the coming days. However, this is highly unlikely to reduce the scale of the IDF’s operations or undermine its capacity within Syria and the West Bank, given the presence of other IDF units therein. More broadly, militants in the West Bank will likely intensify calls for attacks targeting Israeli and Israeli-affiliated entities as a response to the operation. Such calls are likely to exacerbate tensions in the West Bank, as well as the risk of radicalisation within the local population, elevating the likelihood of attacks. In response, there is a realistic possibility that the IDF will pre-emptively intensify its operations in the West Bank ahead of Gideon’s Chariots in the coming weeks. We assess that security and travel disruption risks will consequently increase, particularly near Israeli settlements and IDF positions, as well as along major thoroughfares and near public transport hubs.
- The commemoration of Nakba Day (15 May) by Palestinians in the West Bank and across the region will elevate the risk of attacks and domestic unrest, as well as travel disruption. This assessment applies particularly to major cities such as Hebron (Hebron governorate), Nablus (Nablus governorate) and Ramallah (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate, all West Bank). The risk of strike action and staff absenteeism will also increase, undermining operational continuity for locally engaged firms. In the coming days, the risk of attacks by radicalised Palestinian individuals and militants against Israeli targets in the West Bank and in Israel will also increase. During this period, bystanders will also face elevated risks of exposure to crossfire resulting from attacks targeting the Israeli security forces. Protests around the region are also likely, particularly in Jordan, though any such gatherings will likely remain largely peaceful (see below).
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Hamas announced it would release a dual-national US-Israeli hostage, possibly indicating improving prospects for a ceasefire agreement in Gaza. On 12 May, Hamas announced it would free the last living US-Israeli hostage, Edan Alexander, following direct negotiations with US President Donald Trump’s administration. The US’ direct engagement with Hamas underscores increasing efforts to secure the release of living hostages amid stalled ceasefire negotiations and IDF preparations for a major intensification of ground operations in Gaza as part of Operation Gideon’s Chariots (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 8 May 2025). The US will likely attempt to leverage Alexander’s release to break the sustained deadlock in Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations and gain concessions from Israel on re-authorising humanitarian aid deliveries into Gaza. However, reports indicate that Israel was only informed of the negotiations after their successful conclusion; there is a realistic possibility that this indicates a growing rift between the US and Israel vis-à-vis ceasefire and hostage-release negotiations. Even so, on 12 May, the office of Israel’s prime minister announced that a delegation would attend talks in Qatar scheduled for 13 May. In the coming days, intensifying mediation efforts to establish a ceasefire before Israel launches Operation Gideon’s Chariots will possibly bolster the prospects for a breakthrough in negotiations. However, talks will remain extremely sensitive to deadlock, particularly regarding the length of any potential agreement. We assess this will possibly undermine the prospects for the implementation of a ceasefire prior to the intensification of IDF operations in Gaza.
- Developments in ceasefire and hostage-release negotiations are highly likely to trigger anti-government and pro-hostage-release demonstrations in Israel, increasing temporary operational disruption risks. On 10 May, hundreds of anti-government protesters attended weekly demonstrations calling for hostage releases in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). Subsequently, and preceding Edan Alexander’s release (see above), hundreds of protesters gathered at Hostages Square in Tel Aviv on 12 May, underscoring the organisers’ continued ability to mobilise demonstrations at short notice. In the coming weeks, announcements relating to ceasefire developments and Operation Gideon’s Chariots will highly likely trigger similar demonstrations in major cities, particularly Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Although demonstrations will highly likely remain broadly peaceful, sporadic altercations with the police are possible, moderately increasing bystanders’ exposure to dispersal tactics. Demonstrators will also possibly attempt to block major thoroughfares, including the Ayalon Highway, increasing the risk of sporadic travel and supply chain disruption across Tel Aviv in the coming days.
- The US’ possible de-linking of nuclear talks with Saudi Arabia and the normalisation of ties between the kingdom and Israel will likely further delay efforts to moderate longer-term regional tensions. On 8 May, media reports claimed that the US will no longer require Saudi Arabia to normalise ties with Israel as a condition for civil nuclear co-operation. The fighting in Gaza has complicated and delayed US efforts to facilitate normalisation initiatives between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Concurrently, Iranian advancements towards nuclear power have likely increased Riyadh’s determination to secure its own nuclear capabilities, compounding elevated regional tensions. The US’ decision underscores a shift in policy likely aimed at securing US involvement in the development of the Saudi nuclear programme and avoiding domination by Chinese or Russian entities. However, the delinking of talks will also possibly delay broader efforts by the Trump administration to expand regional engagement in the Abraham Accords. More broadly, Saudi Arabia is unlikely to commit to normalising relations with Israel without nominal concessions regarding the future formation of a Palestinian state, sustaining long-term regional tensions and complex governance conditions for Israeli-linked firms in the broader region.
- Nakba Day (15 May) will likely trigger an uptick in pro-Palestine protest activity worldwide, while targeted violence and hostility to foreign investment will also possibly increase. In the coming days, pro-Palestine protests are highly likely to emerge in the Middle East, North Africa and Turkey region; significant attendance is likely at rallies in major cities in Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen. Protests will likely occur in large public spaces, particularly those in the vicinity of Israeli and/or US embassies and consulates, increasing transport and operational disruption risks. While demonstrations are unlikely to trigger clashes with the police, there is a realistic possibility that participants will attempt to vandalise installations associated with Israel (such as retail outlets), moderately increasing hostility to foreign investment in the short term. More broadly, the day will likely trigger increased attendance at pro-Palestine demonstrations worldwide, particularly in Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the US. Demonstrations on university campuses are particularly likely in the US; any attempt to block access to campuses and buildings (particularly those associated with Israel or Israeli-linked firms) will elevate the risk of clashes with the local police and localised movement disruption. Jewish and Israeli communities worldwide will also face elevated risks of harassment and targeted violence, exacerbating staff safety risks nearby. Additionally, pro-Palestine activist groups will also likely intensify campaigns targeting entities associated with the Israeli government, particularly defence, technology and financial bodies linked to the IDF. Targeted protests, facility infiltration efforts and possible cyber-attack attempts will increase the risk of operational disruption for exposed firms in the coming days, underscoring persistently elevated reputational concerns. The risk of workplace activism (including absenteeism, workplace disputes and facility occupations) will also moderately increase, temporarily increasing labour flexibility and operational continuity risks.
- Israel’s participation in the Eurovision Song Contest in Switzerland will increase the risk of pro-Palestine protests, underscoring the elevated reputational risks for event-management firms and sponsors. On 11 April, pro-Palestine protesters demonstrated against Israel’s participation in the contest during a welcome ceremony in Basel (Basel-Stadt canton, Switzerland). Israel’s representative will participate in a semi-final on 15 May, before attending (and possibly competing in) the final on 17 May. This is highly likely to trigger pro-Palestine protests in Basel in the coming days, particularly if Israel progresses to the final. Although widespread unrest remains unlikely, altercations with the police remain possible, increasing bystanders’ exposure. The Swiss police and security forces will almost certainly adopt an elevated posture around the event, moderating the risk of successful attacks. However, high-profile incidents of pro-Palestine civil disobedience and activism (including broadcast disruption) remain possible. Protest activity and activism targeting the competition highlight the elevated reputational concerns for firms hosting, sponsoring or tangentially associated with high-profile events, including Israeli participants. Such events will face elevated risks of targeted protests and activism in the coming months, increasing the risk of operational disruption.
- Norway announced it would divest from an Israeli fuel company, highlighting sustained corporate governance risks for financial entities linked to Israel. On 12 May, Norway’s sovereign wealth fund announced it had divested from the Israeli fuel company Paz Retail and Energy LTD, as the firm services numerous Israeli settlements in the West Bank (Palestinian Territories). The fund previously divested from the Israeli telecommunications firm Bezeq in December 2024 on similar grounds. The announcement highlights the increasing risk of divestment impacting Israeli and Israeli-linked firms, especially in light of associated reputational risks for international asset management firms. In the coming months, continued settlement expansion in the West Bank will likely result in calls for divestment from Israeli firms, particularly those associated with (or servicing) settlements in the West Bank. This would increase reputational risks for firms in the financial sector. Further divestments from major Israeli entities would also increase the likelihood of broader capital flight and decreasing foreign direct investment (FDI), driving wider socio-economic health concerns in Israel.
- Israel-Palestinian Territories: Hostage release will increase prospects for ceasefire negotiations. On 11 May, Hamas announced it would release Edan Alexander, the last known living US national hostage it holds in Gaza. This will likely happen later on 12 May, following reports that the US special envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, landed in Israel this morning. The announcement comes following negotiations between Hamas and the US (without Israel’s involvement). The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will likely reduce its military activity in Gaza in the coming hours to facilitate Edan’s release, possibly halting operations for a short period. The US administration will likely utilise Edan’s release to jumpstart ceasefire negotiations and to possibly facilitate the resumption of humanitarian aid deliveries into Gaza. While IDF operations in Gaza will likely continue regardless of ceasefire negotiations, we assess there is a realistic possibility that the resumption of negotiations will delay Operation Gideon’s Chariots (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 8 May 2025). Calls for hostage release protests are likely in the coming days, elevating domestic unrest and travel disruption risks, particularly near the Hostages Square in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district).
- Turkey: PKK dissolution will decrease security, socio-economic health risks in south-east. Earlier on 12 May, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) dissolved after more than 40 years of insurgency. The announcement comes following the group’s disarmament on 27 February. The PKK’s decision to dissolve is likely driven by possible political concessions from the government, particularly related to expanded Kurdish rights. This comes amid broader government efforts to garner support from pro-Kurdish parties in parliament to pass constitutional amendments, allowing President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to extend his presidency and weaken opposition support (see Sibylline Special Report – 11 February 2025). The PKK’s dissolution will likely decrease attack risks in Turkey’s Kurdish-majority south-east provinces, possibly increasing business investment in the area, moderating socio-economic health risks. There is a realistic possibility that crowds reacting to the news will gather in public squares and outside municipal buildings in Turkey’s south-east and Iraq’s north-east this evening, elevating localised transport disruption. However, we assess that such gatherings will likely remain peaceful. (Source: Sibylline)
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