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Military And Security Developments
May 09.
- Saudi Arabia-US: Delinking of nuclear and Israel-normalisation talks underscores regional tensions. On 8 May, media reports claimed that the US will no longer require Saudi Arabia to normalise ties with Israel as a condition for civil nuclear cooperation. Over the past two years, the fighting in Gaza has complicated normalisation efforts between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, Iranian advancements towards nuclear power have likely increased Riyadh’s determination to secure nuclear capabilities, underscoring elevated regional tensions. The US decision underscores a shift in policy that is likely aimed at securing its involvement in the development of Saudi nuclear program and avoiding Chinese or Russian involvement. In addition, US involvement will likely give it almost exclusive rights to build and maintain the Saudi nuclear program, while also increasing its oversight. There is a realistic possibility of US-Saudi nuclear talks in the coming weeks. However, concerns over nuclear proliferation and other issues are likely to remain sticking points. As such, we assess it is unlikely that the US-Saudi nuclear program will be announced in the coming months.
- Qatar-Syria-US: Public sector funding will partially ease salaries crisis, reduce domestic unrest risks. On 8 May, Syria’s finance minister announced that Qatar will help pay public sector salaries for the coming three months, facilitated by the US Treasury’s sanctions exemption initiative. However, the US has not yet formally confirmed the sanctions exemption. The Qatari initiative will provide Syria with USD 27 million monthly for the next quarter, though the initiative will not apply to Syrian Defence Ministry or Interior Ministry personnel. These developments are likely intended to ease the ongoing salary crisis in the country and associated domestic unrest risks. However, we assess that further protests by public workers in the capital Damascus will remain likely throughout the year, particularly in front of government facilities and major squares, such as Ayyubids and Abbasids squares. That said, the new initiative signals that the US will likely extend its General License No. 24 (GL24) for another six months to permit further financial transactions related to energy supplies, governance and Central Bank of Syria (CBS) operations, improving socio-economic health.
May 08.
• On 4 May, a Houthi missile landed within the perimeter of Ben Gurion Airport (TLV), prompting Israeli retaliatory strikes, including against Sanaa International Airport (SAH).
• On 6 May, US President Donald Trump announced a truce with the Iran-backed Houthis, partially moderating security risks in Yemen and the Red Sea, though strikes on Israel will likely continue.
• On 5 May, the IDF announced a planned intensification of military operations in Gaza in the coming weeks, including a broad reserve recruitment campaign.
POLITICAL FORECAST
• Israel announced plans to restructure aid delivery mechanisms in Gaza, increasing regulatory framework and operational disruption risks for locally engaged NGOs.
• Plans to increase reservist deployments to Gaza and intensify operations within the enclave will likely drive elevated protest attendance in the coming weeks.
• Ongoing efforts to reform conscription legislation in Israel will increase risks of localised unrest and protests from anti-conscription ultra-Orthodox movements.
• Indirect talks between Israel and Syria will likely moderate bilateral tensions, though normalisation remains unlikely in the coming year.
• The US and Iran will meet for a fourth round of mediated discussions on signing an agreement to limit Tehran’s nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief from Washington DC
• Pro-Palestine protests at universities in the US underscore increased operational disruption and reputational concerns for entities with tangential associations to Israel.
• On 4 May, a Houthi missile landed within the perimeter of Ben Gurion Airport (TLV), prompting Israeli retaliatory strikes, including against Sanaa International Airport (SAH). The Houthi strike hit a road leading to the airport terminal, damaging the road and injuring four people, but not impacting airport operational capacity. The strike followed an uptick in Houthi attacks targeting Israel over the prior weekend. The attack prompted several air carriers to temporarily suspend flights to and from Israel, disrupting travel. The incident highlights the persistent security risks posed by Houthi missiles across Israel, despite the broadly high levels of effectiveness of Israeli air defences, particularly given the possibility of technical failures. The IDF confirmed that both interceptors launched at the missile (Arrow 3 and THAAD) experienced technical failure. There is also a possibility that the alerting system also experienced a technical failure, as the siren was still sounding when the missile hit (the duration of the siren is supposed to indicate the time available to get to shelter).
• Subsequently, on 5 May, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck Houthi infrastructure in Sanaa (Sanaa governorate) on 5 May, including Hudaydah Port, using over 50 munitions in 30 seconds. The following day, on 6 May, the IDF also released an evacuation warning for SAH, striking it shortly after and disabling it, as well as several power stations within Sanaa governorate. The Israeli strikes highlight the likelihood of substantial levels of retaliation in response to any successful Houthi attacks, elevating bystander security risks near military and dual-use infrastructure locations in Houthi-controlled territory and substantial threats to energy security and to regional travel. While the extent of damage to SAH is unclear, combined with damage to Hudaydah Port, there is a realistic possibility that Houthi weapons procurement will be undermined over the coming days. This will possibly result in a short-term reduction in Houthi attacks against Israel over the coming days. That said, further Houthi attacks against Israel remain likely, possibly driving further Israeli retaliation.
• On 6 May, US President Donald Trump announced a truce with the Iran-backed Houthis, partially moderating security risks in Yemen and the Red Sea, though strikes on Israel will likely continue. The Houthis have agreed to withhold attacks on US ships in the Red Sea. While commercial vessels of other countries were not explicitly discussed in the announcement, the Houthis have refrained from attacking commercial vessels since January and will likely continue this practice for at least the coming two to three weeks. Even so, the Houthis explicitly announced that the truce does not include Israel and Israeli-affiliated ships, sustaining moderate risks of misidentification and security risks of maritime vessels in the Red Sea.
• On 5 May, the IDF announced a planned intensification of military operations in Gaza in the coming weeks, including a broad reserve recruitment campaign. The operation, ‘Gideon Chariots’, comprises a substantial deployment of forces into Gaza, primarily northern Gaza, to seize and hold territory within which intensive clearing operations will be conducted. This reflects a shift from the more short-term raids that the IDF have utilised since the renewal of fighting on 18 March. The threat of military escalation is likely designed to pressure Gaza-based militants to make further concessions in hostage negotiations. However, the current plan still falls short of a full force mobilisation and seizure of the entirety of the Gaza Strip, which will possibly follow the completion of Gideon Chariots.
The first stage of the plan in the coming days will likely comprise preparations for the expansion of operations, creating a window of time for progress in ceasefire negotiations. Such preparations will include expanded, but still limited, recruitment of reserve duty soldiers, most of whom will replace regular fighting units in the West Bank and Northern Israel to allow these to shift to Gaza. Israel will also likely prepare areas in south-west Gaza (between the Morag Corridor and the Philadelphi Corridor) for the long-term relocation of much of the Gazan population, including the establishment of logistics centres for aid distribution and checkpoints to filter militants from civilians. This stage will likely end after US President Donald Trump concludes his Middle East tour on 16 May.
The second stage will likely include extensive bombardment from both airstrikes and artillery to prepare the areas for IDF ground troops’ entry. Such strikes will likely heavily damage structures and infrastructure in targeted areas, driving substantial collateral risk. During this stage, the IDF will also issue evacuation orders for hundreds of thousands of Gazans towards the prepared humanitarian areas. Clashes between IDF soldiers and either suspected or actual militants at checkpoints are likely and will drive crossfire risks, compounded by high levels of congestion around these checkpoints. During this stage, Israel will likely gradually resume the provision of aid to Gaza, though the IDF will possibly only secure convoys and specifically designated logistics centres while allowing the evacuation of injured and sick persons outside the strip.
The third stage will likely comprise the mooted ground operations into the recently evacuated areas, aiming to sever connections between Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) units above and below ground. This stage will require prolonged deployments during which time the IDF will seek to isolate the various militant units in the occupied areas in order to neutralise them in a piecemeal fashion. This process will likely take several months.
The duration and shifts between different stages of the planned operation will provide several ‘off-ramps’ for both Hamas and Israel if ceasefire negotiations are successful. Around these points, the likelihood of progress in ceasefire negotiations will likely increase. There are three key points when this might happen, possibly negating the further progress of the operation. These are: during the entirety of the first stage, at the end of the second stage and towards the end of Gideon Chariot, prior to a likely larger reservist recruitment and the further expansion of operations across the entirety of the Gaza Strip.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• Israel announced plans to restructure aid delivery mechanisms in Gaza, increasing regulatory framework and operational disruption risks for locally engaged NGOs. As part of the expansion of IDF operations (see above), the Israeli government announced plans to restructure aid distribution mechanisms within Gaza. Before the aid blockade on 2 March, the IDF verified the contents of aid shipments at multiple border crossings before NGOs transported deliveries to local partners, warehouses or wholesale distribution centres. Israel’s proposal would instead see aid enter Gaza exclusively via the Kerem Shalom border crossing, directly transported to designated areas secured by private contractors before international organisations directly distribute boxes of aid containing several days’ worth of supplies to individuals representing singular family units. Israel stated that the shift away from bulk deliveries and distribution will prevent aid theft by Hamas militants. Several NGOs have criticised the plan, with the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid stating it would undermine the independence and neutrality of aid operations. Israel has not indicated when the plan will enter into force, sustaining regulatory framework concerns for locally engaged NGOs. Additionally, on 7 May, the World Central Kitchen NGO announced it had ceased operations in Gaza due to a lack of supplies amid the ongoing blockade on aid deliveries. As the blockade remains in place, food security conditions within Gaza will almost certainly continue deteriorating, with NGOs facing significantly elevated risks of the looting of storage facilities, operational disruption and violence targeting locally engaged staff.
• Plans to increase reservist deployments to Gaza and intensify operations within the enclave will likely drive elevated protest attendance in the coming weeks. On 3 May, tens of thousands of protesters attended weekly hostage release rallies in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district); this marked the highest attendance in several weeks and underscores increasing anti-government sentiment amid stalled ceasefire negotiations and concerns regarding the wellbeing of hostages held by Hamas. Following the government’s announcement regarding the intensification of IDF operations (see above), hundreds of anti-government protesters gathered outside the Knesset building in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district), triggering low-intensity clashes with the police. The announcement will highly likely trigger substantial attendance at weekly hostage release protests on 10 May, particularly in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Protesters will likely attempt to block major throughfares, temporarily disrupting supply chain continuity; however, protest-related unrest and violence remain highly unlikely.
• Ongoing efforts to reform conscription legislation in Israel will increase risks of localised unrest and protests from anti-conscription ultra-Orthodox movements. On 6 May, IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir ordered the IDF Personnel Directorate to immediately draw up plans to increase the number of draft orders sent to ultra-Orthodox men and increase response rates. The announcement comes after the High Court of Justice ruled that the government had not met its legal obligations to adequately conscript ultra-Orthodox men amid broader capacity constraints on the Israeli security forces (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 28 April 2025). In the coming days, efforts to reform conscription legislation will likely progress in the Knesset, with related announcements highly likely triggering anti-conscription protests and unrest. Ultra-Orthodox protesters are highly likely to target IDF recruitment bases in major cities (particularly Jerusalem and Tel Aviv), increasing risks of localised transport disruption and bystander exposure to low-intensity unrest. Anti-conscription protesters will also likely attempt to block intersections on major throughfares (including Highways 1 and 4), disrupting overland movement and supply chain continuity. Clashes between protesters and the police will elevate collateral and bystander risks, though broad unrest remains unlikely. Broader concerns regarding the IDF’s capacity will also possibly trigger pro-conscription counter-demonstrations, compounding localised travel and operational disruption risks.
• Indirect talks between Israel and Syria will likely moderate bilateral tensions, though normalisation remains unlikely in the coming year. During an official visit to France on 7 May, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa confirmed that indirect talks with Israel are currently taking place through regional mediators. The announcement comes after international media reported UAE-mediated discussions regarding security-related issues, particularly counter-terrorism operations and confidence-building measures. Although the talks are unlikely to result in a normalisation agreement in the coming year, increased diplomatic engagement will likely reduce the rate of Israeli airstrikes targeting government forces and allied factions within Syria in the coming months. This will likely moderate bilateral and broader regional tensions linked to IDF operations in Syria; there is a realistic possibility that long-term engagement will drive an effort to resolve territorial disputes vis-à-vis the Golan Heights, moderating border dispute risks. More broadly, the talks will also likely accelerate sanctions relief from the EU and US, partially improving Syria’s socio-economic health and governance environment in 2025.
• The US and Iran will meet for a fourth round of mediated discussions on signing an agreement to limit Tehran’s nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief from Washington DC. On 5 May, Iranian state media announced a fourth round of nuclear negotiations, likely on 11 May. The announcement comes after Oman announced a temporary pause in high-level talks due to ‘logistical issues’ (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 1 May 2025). Subsequently, on 6 May, US President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire between the US and the Iran-backed, Yemen-based Houthis (see above). Taken together, the announcements likely reflect both parties’ efforts to capitalise on diplomatic momentum and expedite negotiations before the expiry of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)’s snapback clauses in October. In the coming months, the US and Iran will likely sign an interim agreement limiting Tehran’s nuclear activity in exchange for a temporary pause in the US’s expansion of sanctions as part of the ‘maximum pressure’ campaign. Such an agreement would bolster prospects for the signature of a comprehensive agreement (possibly with multi-lateral engagement) thereafter. However, negotiations will remain extremely sensitive to deadlock, particularly with reference to Iranian proxy activity (including the Houthis). Such an agreement would also likely moderate regional tensions and decrease the risks of US strikes targeting Iranian nuclear facilities. Additionally, sanctions relief would likely alleviate significant socio-economic concerns within Iran.
• Pro-Palestine protests at universities in the US underscore increased operational disruption and reputational concerns for entities with tangential associations to Israel. On 6 May, police in Seattle (Washington) arrested 31 pro-Palestine demonstrators after they occupied a building on the campus of the University of Washington. The demonstrators called for the university to sever ties with Boeing due to the company’s contracts with the IDF. The protesters targeted a building within the College of Engineering, to which Boeing made a USD 10 million donation in 2022. Additionally, on 7 May, the police in New York City (New York) arrested at least 70 pro-Palestine protesters after a demonstration inside a library building at Columbia University. Demonstrators called for the university to ‘divest’ from Israel. The incidents underscore sustained reputational risks for entities associated with the Israeli government and the security forces amid the ongoing Israel-Hamas war. Given the likely intensification of IDF operations in Gaza in the coming weeks, entities with tangential connections to Israel (including those receiving donations from high-profile aerospace, technology and transport firms linked to Israel) will likely face elevated risks of targeted pro-Palestine activism, with targeted protests and potential vandalism increasing risks of operational disruption. Additionally, risks of pro-Palestine workplace activism and resulting disputes will also likely increase, elevating labour flexibility and corporate governance concerns.
• Syria-Israel: Indirect de-escalation talks will partially reduce armed conflict risks. On 7 May, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa confirmed that indirect talks with Israel are currently taking place through regional mediators. Media outlets reported that the talks are focused on security, counter-terrorism and confidence-building measures. They come amid persistent Israeli airstrikes that are primarily targeting government-aligned factions in Daraa and Suwayda governorates, as well as the capital Damascus. While we assess that the talks are unlikely to result in a normalisation agreement this year, they will likely reduce the rate of Israeli airstrikes targeting government forces and allied factions in the coming months. This will partially reduce armed conflict risks in southern Syria as well as collateral and shrapnel risks near military facilities. The talks will also likely accelerate the process of implementing EU and US sanctions relief, partially improving Syria’s socio-economic health in 2025. However, attacks by rogue Islamist factions against Israeli forces and Druze factions in Daraa and Quneitra governorates remain possible.
May 07.
• Yemen-US: Ceasefire will moderate security risks in Red Sea; attacks against Israel remain likely. On 6 May, US President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire between the US and the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen. The agreement, mediated by Oman, comprises a commitment by the Houthis to end attacks on US vessels in the Red Sea in exchange for a halt to the US bombing campaign in Yemen. A Houthi spokesperson has emphasised that the deal does not include Israel, underscoring sustained risks for shipping affiliated with Israel as well as misidentification and misfire risks. Even so, as there have been no reports of Houthi attacks on shipping since January, the ceasefire will likely further moderate attack risks on vessels in the Red Sea, mitigating against sustained asset damage and security risks to seafarers. The cessation of US attacks in Yemen will likely moderate critical humanitarian concerns in the country. Despite the agreement, we assess that further Houthi strikes targeting infrastructure in Israel are likely in the coming weeks, driving security threats to business personnel and assets in Israel, including from Israeli interceptions of Houthi missiles.
• Yemen-US: Ceasefire will moderate security risks in Red Sea; attacks against Israel remain likely. On 6 May, US President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire between the US and the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen. The agreement, mediated by Oman, comprises a commitment by the Houthis to end attacks on US vessels in the Red Sea in exchange for a halt to the US bombing campaign in Yemen. A Houthi spokesperson has emphasised that the deal does not include Israel, underscoring sustained risks for shipping affiliated with Israel as well as misidentification and misfire risks. Even so, as there have been no reports of Houthi attacks on shipping since January, the ceasefire will likely further moderate attack risks on vessels in the Red Sea, mitigating against sustained asset damage and security risks to seafarers. The cessation of US attacks in Yemen will likely moderate critical humanitarian concerns in the country. Despite the agreement, we assess that further Houthi strikes targeting infrastructure in Israel are likely in the coming weeks, driving security threats to business personnel and assets in Israel, including from Israeli interceptions of Houthi missiles.
May 02.
• Turkey: Heightened police presence is likely in coming days, driving disruption in Istanbul. On 1 May, protesters clashed with the riot police as the authorities arrested over 400 May Day demonstrators attempting to march on Taksim Square in Istanbul (Istanbul province)’s Beyoğlu district. The government deployed 50,000 police officers, forcibly dispersing demonstrators and blocking access to central areas of the city. Protests were almost certainly exacerbated by the ongoing political crisis in Turkey, which follows the arrest of Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu in March. May Day is a national holiday in Turkey, which routinely sees marches on Taksim Square. As such, demonstrations of this scale and in this locality are unlikely to continue in the coming days. However, we assess that a latent and heightened security posture will likely persist throughout Istanbul in the coming days, elevating disruption to transport and supply chains in the city centre. The security forces will likely employ heavy-handed tactics amid further instances of smaller protests in the coming days, driving bystander security risks to personnel in proximity to protest hotspots such as Taksim Square and government buildings.
• Israel-Syria: Further Druze protests in northern Israel are likely in coming days. On 1 May, several medium-scale Druze protests took place in Israel’s northern district to denounce the attacks against the Syrian Druze near the capital Damascus over the past few days. The protests blocked Highways 6, 85, 65 and 90 at multiple junctions, triggering significant mobility disruption. Several clashes were reported between protesters and drivers. Hours after the protests finished, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike near the presidential palace in Damascus; no casualties were reported. The airstrike is almost certainly a message to the Syrian government (signalling Israel’s determination to protect the Druze) and an attempt to diffuse the Druze unrest inside Israel. However, we assess that the risks of further ethno-religious clashes between government-aligned Islamist factions and the Druze in Damascus’ southern suburbs will remain very high in the coming days. Any resumption of sectarian violence will almost certainly trigger further and larger reactionary Druze protests inside Israel, particularly near Druze majority towns such as Kafr Yasif (Northern district), elevating bystander security risks and travel disruption. (Source: Sibylline)
08 May 25. US Could Lead Gaza After War, Under New US-Israel Plan. The United States and Israel are discussing a plan for Washington to lead a temporary administration in Gaza after the war ends, five sources familiar with the talks told Reuters.
The proposed plan would have a U.S. official overseeing Gaza during a transitional period until the region is demilitarized and a stable Palestinian leadership is established. The model being considered is similar to the Coalition Provisional Authority the U.S. set up in Iraq in 2003 after the toppling of Saddam Hussein.
Sources said the talks are still in the early stages and the U.S. role would depend on conditions on the ground.
The development comes as President Donald Trump prepares to visit several countries in the Middle East. It also follows Israel’s approval of a plan to take full control of the Gaza Strip in a new phase of its war against Hamas. Meanwhile, Israeli airstrikes in Gaza on Tuesday and Wednesday killed 48 Palestinians. One strike targeted a school sheltering displaced families in Al Bureij, killing 33 people, according to Al-Aqsa Martyrs Hospital. Another strike hit a school in the Al-Tuffah neighborhood, east of Gaza City, on Wednesday, killing at least 15 people seeking shelter and wounding 10 others, according to Gaza’s Civil Defense. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said its strikes are aimed at Hamas militants who operate from civilian areas. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
07 May 25. Trump Announces End of US Bombing Campaign in Yemen After Houthis Agree to Cease Attacks in the Red Sea. President Donald Trump announced Tuesday that the United States will stop bombing Houthi rebels in Yemen after the group agreed to stop attacking shipping lanes in the Red Sea and nearby waters.
Speaking from the Oval Office with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, Trump said the Houthis had told the U.S. they “don’t want to fight anymore.”
“We will honor that, and we will stop the bombings,” Trump said. A defense official confirmed to CNN that the U.S. military was ordered on Monday night to halt strikes against the Houthis.
Operation Rough Rider, the U.S. military campaign launched on March 15 in response to Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea, involved more than 1,000 airstrikes and resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Houthi fighters, according to U.S. defense officials.
The campaign has also resulted in significant civilian casualties. A U.S. strike on a detention center for African nationals in Saada killed at least 68 people, while a separate raid on the Ras Isa fuel port left at least 80 dead and 150 injured.
The ceasefire deal between the U.S. and Houthis was brokered by Oman. Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi said talks between the U.S. and Houthi officials in Sana’a led to the agreement.
“[I am] pleased to reiterate that today’s news about the situation in the Red Sea means that diplomatic efforts have led to the end to the conflict between the US and Ansar Allah in Yemen. They will no longer target each other, ensuring freedom of navigation for international commercial shipping in the Red Sea,” Albusaidi wrote on X. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
05 May 25. Israeli leadership votes to expand Gaza ground offensive.
• Summary
• Door open for ceasefire talks as Trump heads to region
• Military will hold territories it seizes, Israeli officials say
• Blockade remains on aid, for now
• Tens of thousands of reservists will be called up
• Humanitarian agencies condemn Israel’s new aid plans
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s security cabinet voted to scale up the offensive against Palestinian militant group Hamas in Gaza to the point of seizing the entire enclave and holding its territories, an Israeli official said on Monday.
A report by Israel’s public broadcaster Kan, citing officials with knowledge of the details, said the new plan was gradual and would take months, with forces focusing first on one area of the battered enclave.
(Source: Reuters)
05 May 25. Houthi Missile Strikes Near Tel Aviv Airport; Netanyahu Vows Retaliation. The planes of the Israeli airline El Al at Ben Gurion Airport in Israel. A missile launched from Yemen by Iran-backed Houthi rebels struck near Ben Gurion International Airport on Sunday morning, prompting a brief suspension of airport operations.
According to reports, the missile landed in a grassy area near Terminal 3, damaging sections of the road and creating a deep crater near the parking lot. Israeli emergency services reported eight injuries, four from the blast and four while seeking shelter.
Flights were halted for about 30 minutes. Several international airlines, including Lufthansa, British Airways, Air France, and Delta, canceled flights to and from Tel Aviv, leaving many passengers stranded. Train services were briefly interrupted but have since resumed.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed the missile was not intercepted. According to the IDF, interception systems were working, but a technical problem with the interceptor caused the failure.
This is the first missile from Yemen to get through Israel’s defense system since fighting escalated in Gaza in March. The IDF said over two dozen missiles and drones from Yemen have been launched at Israel recently, most of which were intercepted.
The Houthi group claimed responsibility for the strike, stating it was a response to what they described as Israel’s genocide against the people of Gaza. They later announced plans to continue targeting Israeli airports as part of a “comprehensive aerial blockade,” and urged airlines to cancel flights to Israel, citing the risk of further attacks. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned of retaliation against the Houthis and Iran. “President [Donald] Trump is right. Attacks by the Houthis emanate from Iran. Israel will respond to the Houthi attack against our main airport and, at a time and place of our choosing, to their Iranian terror masters,” Netanyahu said in a statement posted on X. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
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