Sponsored by Bertin Exensor
www.exensor.com
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–
Military And Security Developments
May 01.
EXPANDED MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS
An expansion and intensification of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations in Gaza is likely in the coming week. On 2 May, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will hold discussions on expanding and intensifying IDF operations in Gaza. The discussion follows operational approval by the IDF Chief of Staff and the Israeli Defence Minister. Netanyahu will likely formally approve these plans at the next security cabinet, to be convened on 4 May. This follows statements by Netanyahu on 1 May that the defeat of Hamas is the first priority in the war, not the retrieval of hostages. This priority clarification and approval of the expansion of the military campaign likely signal Israel’s assessment that ceasefire negotiations are stalled and are unlikely to progress in the current environment. Such an assessment will likely encourage the Israeli government to pursue further military intensification to elevate pressure on Hamas. As such, an escalation in armed conflict in Gaza is likely in the coming two to three weeks and will considerably elevate security risks across the strip.
- On 30 April, the IDF Chief of Staff instructed the military to prepare for strikes on Syrian government targets if violence against Syrian Druze communities continues. Earlier that day, the IDF conducted two drone strikes against government-aligned groups in Rif Dimashq governorate. This follows statements over recent months by the IDF and government officials, including the Prime Minister, committing to protect Syrian Druze and threatening military action in response to violence against the minority group. These strikes were prompted by an outbreak of violence between militants and Druze groups in the town of Jaramana (Rif Dimashq) since 28 April, prompted by footage of an alleged Druze individual insulting the Prophet Muhammad. In the coming weeks, the risk of further outbreaks of violence will remain elevated in Rif Dimashq and particularly the southern suburbs of the capital Damascus. Such risks will be particularly heightened near checkpoints, as well as government and military facilities, driving incidental risks to proximate staff. Such clashes will elevate the risk of Israeli strikes against government forces. However, the IDF will likely prioritise individuals and forces that are affiliated but not directly controlled by the new government before shifting to more direct strikes. While an open armed conflict between Israel and Syria currently remains unlikely, risks of misidentification and misfire will remain high, elevating risks of sporadic clashes and snowballing escalation between the two.
- A large forest fire in the Jerusalem district underlines the elevated risk of operational disruption and safety risks for personnel and assets near areas of high vegetation posed by arson attacks in the coming months. On 30 April, large wildfires broke out near Jerusalem district, prompting an evacuation of population centres and the temporary closure of Highway 1. Israel declared a state of emergency. At the time of writing, there are still at least five active fires. While firefighters are still investigating the cause of the fires, there is a realistic possibility that these were ignited by arsonists as a form of terror attack. Subsequently, the Israeli police announced they had arrested three suspects of arson related to the wildfires, as well as several individuals who called for further arson attacks against Israeli population centres. Rates of arson terror attacks across Israel during the summer months (May-August) have increased in the past two years. Hot weather and elevated risk of arson will increase safety risks to personnel and assets in the coming months, particularly near forests and areas with dense vegetation. Large wildfires will likely constrain emergency response capabilities and elevate risks of air pollution, exacerbating respiratory health risks. Wildfires will also drive travel disruption, impacting business operations and significantly threaten the agricultural sector, possibly impacting food prices in Israel and for exporters.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- NGOs have reported a substantial uptick in looting incidents in Gaza, underscoring sustained threats to locally engaged staff amid worsening humanitarian conditions. On 1 May, the Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations Network (PNGO) reported that incidents of looting targeting aid storage facilities in Gaza have increased in the past month, with five separate incidents on 30 April. One incident involved thousands of displaced civilians breaking into the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) facility in Gaza City to loot pharmaceutical supplies and destroying several vehicles. Since 2 March, Israel has prevented aid deliveries into Gaza, triggering a substantial deterioration in food security conditions. Unless aid deliveries resume in the coming weeks, humanitarian conditions within Gaza will almost certainly continue to deteriorate, triggering increasingly frequent incidents of looting, theft and violent crime targeting NGO facilities. Risks of violent crime targeting individuals based on perceptions of wealth will also increase, compounding security threats to locally engaged staff, particularly foreign nationals
- Ronen Bar will step down as head of the Shin Bet in June, moderating labour flexibility concerns; however, anti-government protests will highly likely continue amid broader supervision quality concerns. On 28 April, Ronen Bar announced he would resign as the head of the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) on 17 June. The cabinet revoked its decision to dismiss Bar, resolving the legal dispute between the Prime Minister and the Attorney-General. Although Bar’s resignation will reduce risks of industrial action from labour unions, anti-government protests are unlikely to decrease in frequency or scale in the coming weeks. Rather, announcements relating to Bar’s successor will likely sustain protest attendance, sustaining travel and temporary operational disruption risks in Israel’s major cities, namely Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). More broadly, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s efforts to dismiss Bar preceding his resignation have also increased concerns regarding the politicisation of senior civil servants’ appointments and dismissals, sustaining broader concerns regarding supervision quality and governance conditions within Israel in the short-to-medium term.
- In the UK, an attempted infiltration at the Israeli embassy in the capital London highlights sustained risks of sole perpetrator attacks targeting Israeli-linked entities. The individual attempted to enter the embassy on 28 April and reportedly carried two knives and a ‘martyrdom note’. The Metropolitan Police subsequently charged the individual with terrorism and weapons offences (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 1 May 2025), underscoring persistent risks of attempted sole perpetrator attacks targeting Israeli-linked entities in the UK. Amid elevated ethno-religious tensions linked to the Israel-Hamas war, Israeli-linked assets and installations will highly likely continue facing elevated risks of targeted violence, increasing bystander and collateral risks in proximate locations. Risks of targeted violence and attacks (including arson, stabbing attacks and vandalism) will also extend to locations associated with the Jewish community, including religious institutions and community centres. This will increase security and bystander risks to local staff. Even so, UK security forces retain substantial capacity to deter and respond to higher-capacity attacks, moderating risks of successful, high-capacity attacks targeting Israeli and Jewish individuals.
- Oman’s foreign minister announced the postponement of the next round of US-Iran nuclear negotiations, possibly driving elevated regional tensions. On 1 May, Oman announced that the talks scheduled for 3 May had been postponed for ‘logistical reasons’. Amid sustained regional tensions (including US attacks against the Iran-backed Houthis), there is a realistic possibility that the postponement indicates that talks have reached a moderate deadlock. On 26 April, the Wall Street Journal reported that previous US-Iran negotiations that day had ended in ‘major disagreements’, indicating that progress towards a temporary agreement is possibly unlikely in the short term. If negotiations have reached a deadlock, the US is highly likely to escalate the ‘maximum pressure’ approach to Iran by expanding and rigorously enforcing sanctions on key Iranian industries, particularly oil and gas. If deadlock and non-engagement persist beyond the coming two weeks, risks of a US and/or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities will increase, compounding risks of conflict escalation. By contrast, Iranian meetings with European delegates to discuss its nuclear programme, possibly underscore diplomatic momentum towards an agreement with the US. On 2 May, Iranian delegates will meet with France, Germany and the UK (the E3) to discuss Tehran’s nuclear programme. The E3 remain signatories to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which aims to limit Iran’s nuclear development programme in exchange for sanctions relief and which will officially expire in October. Iranian engagement with the E3 likely indicates efforts to sustain diplomatic momentum and moderate risks of the E3 pre-emptively triggering the JCPOA’s ‘snapback’ mechanism. This would reinstate UN sanctions on Iran without requiring consensus among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. As negotiations with the US proceed, further engagement between Iran and the E3 will become more likely, increasing prospects for multinational support for a future nuclear agreement. Even so, negotiations will remain highly sensitive to deadlock; if the US and Iran are unable to reach an agreement (including an interim agreement) before Q3, the E3 will possibly initiate efforts to trigger the clause. The reimposition of UN sanctions would almost certainly compound socio-economic health concerns within Iran, increase compliance concerns for regionally engaged firms and drive regional tensions, potentially undermining negotiations with the US in the coming months.
- Syria: Likelihood of further ethno-religious clashes will be significantly heightened in coming days. On 30 April, clashes between Druze militia and government forces continued in the Sahnaya and Ashrafieh Sahnaya areas of Rif Dimashq governorate. On the same day, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted two drone strikes against government-aligned groups in an alleged attempt to protect the Druze minority. This comes a day after clashes involving radical Sunni militia who targeted the Druze town of Jaramana (Rif Dimashq) and checkpoints jointly operated by government forces and allied Druze factions. At the time of writing, clashes have ceased, following mediation efforts by Druze clerics and the arrests of extremist militants on both sides. However, the security environment around the capital Damascus will remain significantly unstable in the coming weeks, particularly within its southern suburbs. We assess that security and bystander risks near checkpoints, as well as government and military facilities, in these areas will remain significantly heightened due to the sustained possibility of a resumption in ethno-religious clashes and Israeli airstrikes. Such risks will also remain elevated along the highways connecting Damascus to Suwayda and Daraa governorates.
- Israel: Fires will drive operational, supply chain risks; sustained blazes are possible in coming days. On 30 April, Israel declared a state of emergency after wildfires broke out near Jerusalem (Jerusalem district), temporarily closing the main Highway 1 between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), which has since reopened. The authorities arrested three people on suspicion of arson, though firefighters continue to investigate the cause of the blaze. Several countries will send firefighting assistance to Israel in the coming hours, likely moderating the spread of the fires. However, strong winds are forecast in the area from 1600hrs to 1900hrs (local time), likely complicating firefighting efforts and driving the risk of sustained blazes and new wildfires. Ongoing fires will likely generate large columns of smoke, exacerbating air pollution and respiratory health risks. Wildfires near major transport arteries will likely continue to disrupt supply chains and business operations. The likelihood of further wildfires will remain elevated throughout the summer months (May-August). We assess that the threat of arson attacks as a form of terrorism will also be elevated, further compounding wildfire risks.
Apr 30.
*Syria: Risk of further sectarian clashes will likely remain elevated throughout 2025. On 28 April, clashes between Sunni and Druze gunmen in the Druze town of Jaramana (Rif Dimashq governorate) killed at least 14 individuals, including government security personnel. The fighting was triggered by footage of a Druze clerk insulting the Prophet Muhammad, which prompted a group of Sunni fighters to attack Jaramana. The fighters also attacked a nearby checkpoint jointly operated by Druze factions and government forces. At the time of writing, augmented government forces have secured the town and clashes have stopped. However, these developments underscore significant ethno-religious tensions and security instability risks in Syria. These risks are further exacerbated by Damascus’ limited control over rogue Islamist factions, which continue to pose a significant threat to religious and ethnic minorities such as the Alawites and the Druze. We assess that the risks of clashes between government forces and these rogue factions will remain high throughout 2025, sustaining security and bystander risks across Syria.
*Yemen-Red Sea: UK-US strikes will elevate maritime attack risks. Late on 29 April, the UK and US conducted a joint military operation against Iran-backed Houthi drone manufacturing facilities in Yemen, south of the capital Sanaa. It marks the first known joint UK-US operation since the Trump administration escalated its air campaign on 15 March. In response, there is a realistic possibility that the Houthis will resume their attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea in the coming weeks, particularly against British, Israeli and US-affiliated ships. The threat of maritime attacks will almost certainly continue disrupting key shipping routes in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, sustaining supply chain delays and increased shipping costs for businesses. UK-US strikes on Houthi assets will likely continue over the coming weeks, sustaining elevated security risks for personnel in proximity to military and dual-use infrastructure, including energy substations, logistical hubs and ports across Yemen.
Apr 28.
- On 27 April, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike against a building in Beirut (Lebanon), underscoring the persistently elevated security risks across the country.
- On 26 April, a large explosion at the port of Shahid Rajaee (Iran) killed at least 40 people and injured over 1,000 others.
- Israel’s possible involvement in the port explosion renders Iranian indirect retaliation a realistic possibility, though major regional escalation is unlikely.
POLITICAL FORECAST
- Anti-government protest activity will likely increase in scale across Israel in the coming days, compounding operational disruption risks during Memorial Day and Independence Day (29 April – 1 May).
- Israel’s High Court of Justice ruled that the government has not met its obligations to conscript ultra-Orthodox men into the IDF, increasing the risk of anti-conscription protests in the coming weeks.
- The International Court of Justice (ICJ) began public hearings on Israel’s aid delivery operations into the Palestinian Territories, moderately increasing protest risks in the short term.
- The International Criminal Court (ICC) will consider whether it has jurisdiction over Israeli nationals in the coming weeks, increasing pro-Palestine protest and legal activism risks.
- The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has elected a deputy chairperson, pointing to moderate succession-planning efforts. However, broader governance reforms in the Palestinian Territories remain unlikely.
- The US government withdrew its objection to a lawsuit against the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), increasing the agency’s legal exposure and undermining its long-term financial stability.
- On 27 April, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike against a building in Beirut (Lebanon), underscoring the persistently elevated security risks across the country. The IDF issued an evacuation warning for the building and its surroundings (namely the Hadath area of Beirut’s Dahieh neighbourhood) approximately one hour before the strike. At the time of writing, there are no reports of any casualties. This is the third IDF strike against Beirut since the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire entered into force in November 2024. It followed strikes on 28 March and 1 April. According to the IDF, the strike targeted stocks of precision missiles and their components. The attack reflects the IDF’s continued monitoring of, and determination to interrupt, Lebanese Hizballah (LH)’s attempts to restore its military strength. Further IDF strikes against LH are likely in the coming weeks, including in Beirut, sustaining elevated security risks across Lebanon. While efforts to avoid substantial collateral damage and high numbers of civilian casualties will likely ensure such strikes remain sporadic, as well as limited and precise, the concentration of LH assets in Dahieh will sustain the risk of strikes impacting residential areas. While the latest strike is unlikely to threaten the current Israel-Hizballah ceasefire, continued and increasingly frequent strikes against Beirut will likely serve as triggers for snowballing escalation. Such escalation, while currently unlikely, would elevate security risks in northern Israel, particularly near the Israel-Lebanon border; the risk of strikes against southern Lebanon and Beirut amid any such escalation would be especially significant.
- On 26 April, a large explosion at the port of Shahid Rajaee (Iran) killed at least 40 people and injured over 1,000 others. Shahid Rajaee is Iran’s largest commercial port and is located approximately 12 miles (20km) to the south-west of Bandar Abbas (Hormozgan province). It handles approximately 80 m tonnes of cargo annually. In 2024, it handled 85% of Iran’s shipping container traffic. State media claims the explosion took place at a facility storing chemical compounds. In the coming days, public health risks, particularly due to chemical inhalation and increased pressure on the emergency services, will likely be elevated. Furthermore, damage to the port is likely to result in severe disruption to port operations in the coming days, including delays to shipments and commodity unloading. Shipments and vessels are likely to be diverted to other smaller Iranian ports, as well as (possibly) to ports in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, raising the likelihood of port congestion and driving the risk of transit delays (as well as higher costs) in the coming weeks.
- Israel’s possible involvement in the port explosion renders Iranian indirect retaliation a realistic possibility, though major regional escalation is unlikely. The explosion follows warnings by Israeli military officials that the window of opportunity to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities is closing, amid concerns that the ongoing US-Iran nuclear talks will not result in the full dismantling of Iran’s nuclear programme. The Iranian authorities subsequently claimed they repelled a complex cyber-attack on their infrastructure on the same day as the explosion. There is currently no evidence of Israel’s involvement in the explosion. However, given the delivery of materials needed for the production of missile fuel by two Chinese vessels to the port earlier in the year, Israel likely identified the site as a key target, meaning it possibly did conduct sabotage. As Israel is unlikely to act openly against US interests, it is unlikely to conduct direct strikes on Iran during the negotiations. However, there is a realistic possibility that ongoing anxieties about Iranian weapons will drive covert action, including sabotage. While Iran remains reluctant to blame Israel openly for the explosion, it will possibly still conduct covert sabotage operations against Israel and Israeli-affiliated entities in the coming weeks. This will possibly include efforts to sabotage shipments of companies affiliated with Israel in the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf (though the hijacking of ships by Iran remains unlikely).
- Iran-Region: Port explosion will elevate operational, supply chain disruption. On 26 April, a large explosion at the Shahid Rajaee Port, approximately 12 miles (20km) south-west of the city of Bandar Abbas (Hormozgan province), killed at least 40 people and injured over 1,000 others. The authorities declared three days of mourning following the explosion. According to state media, the explosion occurred at several containers after a fire at a chemical depot, elevating health risks related to chemical inhalation. The port is Iran’s largest commercial port; in 2024, it handled 85% of the country’s shipping container traffic. The explosion will likely elevate operational disruption in the port and undermine local emergency response capabilities over the coming days. The authorities will likely divert shipping containers to other smaller ports in the coming days, likely increasing strain on these ports and driving delays. Furthermore, the explosion will elevate wider risks for regional shipping in the coming days, possibly forcing the re-routing of shipments to other ports in the region, such as in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. We assess that this will increase transit times and costs, driving further delays, possibly increasing disruption to global supply chains and rolling costs to industries in the coming weeks.
- Turkey: Opposition crackdown will drive domestic unrest risks, underscores democratic backsliding. On 26 April, the authorities detained 51 people as part of a corruption investigation into the opposition-run Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (IBB), which governs the municipal affairs of Istanbul province. It comes amid the government’s crackdown on members of the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) following the arrest of Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu in March, which was highly likely politically motivated. The crackdown continues to underscore significant democratic backsliding and deteriorating human rights conditions in Turkey. The detentions will likely spark demonstrations and drive domestic unrest risks in Istanbul (Istanbul province) and possibly in the capital Ankara, elevating the risk of arbitrary detentions and sporadic clashes between demonstrators and the authorities. Further detentions of opposition figures are highly likely, exacerbating anti-government sentiment and increasing the likelihood of further restrictions on expression and elevated political repression, driving regulatory and operational risks for companies in Turkey. We assess that this will likely drive increased criticism from global partners, augmenting diplomatic tensions. (Source: Sibylline)
30 Apr 25. Royal Air Force participates in operation targeting a Houthi military facility in Yemen. On 29 April 2025, UK forces participated in a joint operation with US forces against a Houthi military target in Yemen. This action was in line with long-standing policy of the UK government, following the Houthis initiating their campaign of attacks in November 2023, threatening freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, striking international ships, and killing innocent merchant mariners. Careful intelligence analysis identified a cluster of buildings, used by the Houthis to manufacture drones of the type used to attack ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, located some fifteen miles south of Sanaa. Royal Air Force Typhoon FGR4s, with air refuelling support from Voyager tankers, therefore engaged a number of these buildings using Paveway IV precision guided bombs, once very careful planning had been completed to allow the targets to be prosecuted with minimal risk to civilians or non-military infrastructure. As a further precaution, the strike was conducted after dark, when the likelihood of any civilians being in the area was reduced yet further. All of our aircraft subsequently returned safely. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
28 Apr 25. US says it’s hit more than 800 targets in Houthi bombing campaign. The U.S. military has hit more than 800 targets in Yemen during a 40-day airstrike campaign against the Houthis, a terrorist group threatening commercial ships in the region for more than a year.
“We will continue to increase the pressure and further disintegrate Houthi capabilities as long as they continue to impede freedom of navigation,” U.S. Central Command, conducting the operation, wrote in a statement Sunday.
Since the campaign began March 15, the Pentagon has released scant details about its progress, how much it’s costing and the number of civilians harmed. In its statement, CENTCOM argued the hesitancy draws from an effort to protect “operational security,” though it released far more regular updates during a separate airstrike campaign last year.
“These strikes have killed hundreds of Houthi fighters and numerous Houthi leaders, including senior Houthi missile and UAV officials,” the statement said.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has said the goal is to reopen commercial shipping in the Red Sea, an important waterway for global trade, but one that’s nearly shut down since the fall of 2023. After Israel began its war in Gaza, the Houthis began targeting such vessels with attack drones and ballistic missiles, leading companies to reroute along lengthier and more expensive paths. During the recent airstrike campaign, Houthi ballistic missile attacks have fallen by 69% and kamikaze drone attacks have fallen by 55%, according to Central Command. While diminished, these strikes are still discouraging commercial shipping companies from returning to their old routes. , CENTCOM also didn’t account for the costs involved in the operation, which has involved a bevy of American military assets. The U.S. now has two carrier strike groups operating in the region, a force usually reserved for major crises, such as the threat of a full regional war or escalation with Iran. It’s also sent new fighter, bomber and air defense units to the region over the last month. The surge has concerned at least some Democrats in Congress, who worry that the Pentagon is using scarce munitions that should be preserved for a potential conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific. In December 2023, the Biden administration launched its own effort to reopen global shipping: a multi-country task force called Operation Prosperity Guardian. The response involved sending U.S. military vessels to escort commercial ships in the Red Sea, alongside a separate bombing campaign against the Houthis. It largely failed to reassure shipping companies that the route was again safe. (Source: Defense News)
——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
A CNIM Group Company
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-