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Military And Security Developments
Apr 24.
- On 22 April, the Syrian government arrested two Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) officials in the capital Damascus, likely preceding a wider crackdown on Palestinian-affiliated militant groups in the coming weeks.
- On 20 April, the Lebanese authorities announced that they had arrested several individuals who planned to conduct cross-border attacks into Israel, signalling increased action against rogue militant groups.
- In the past week, the IDF slightly expanded its operations in the West Bank (Palestinian Territories), likely in preparation for Israel’s Memorial and Independence days, elevating travel disruption and bystander security risks.
- Security risks stemming from rocket, drone and cyber attacks will be elevated preceding Israel’s Memorial and Independence days.
POLITICAL FORECAST
- Hamas rejected an Israeli ceasefire proposal; a breakthrough remains unlikely in the short term.
- Humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate in Gaza (Palestinian Territories), increasing the threats to NGO staff and sustaining elevated regional tensions.
- The Israeli government’s efforts to dismiss the head of the Shin Bet will sustain the risk of anti-government protests in the coming weeks; possible industrial action will undermine operational continuity.
- Despite moderate restructuring efforts, the Palestinian Authority (PA) remains unlikely to engage in substantial reforms, moderating prospects for improved governance conditions in the Palestinian Territories.
- Israel refused entry to 27 French lawmakers, likely due to their pro-Palestine activism; this highlights the increasing risk of scrutiny for politically active individuals travelling to Israel and the Palestinian Territories.
- The US has implemented additional sanctions on Iran’s oil industry; however, despite sustained tensions, negotiations will likely continue in the coming weeks.
- On 22 April, the Syrian government arrested two Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) officials in the capital Damascus, likely preceding a wider crackdown on Palestinian-affiliated militant groups in the coming weeks. One of the PIJ officials is the local operations commander for the group. The arrests likely reflect efforts to mitigate against the risk of airstrikes by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in and around Damascus, where the IDF previously targeted PIJ operatives in residential neighbourhoods. Furthermore, the arrests are likely part of a broader attempt by the Syrian government to comply with US security demands in return for limited sanctions relief. In the coming weeks, the Syrian security forces will likely engage in a wider crackdown on PIJ cells and other smaller Palestinian militant groups. Such a crackdown will elevate the risk of sporadic clashes between the security forces and militants across Syria, increasing bystander security risks. However, there is a realistic possibility that the new Syrian government will instead opt to exile PIJ operatives in the coming weeks, moderating such risks.
- On 20 April, the Lebanese authorities announced that they had arrested several individuals who planned to conduct cross-border attacks into Israel, signalling increased action against rogue militant groups. Additionally, during the raid in Sidon (South governorate), the Lebanese Army confiscated several rockets and launchers; local media reports indicate the individuals were affiliated with Hamas. The Lebanese Armed Forces previously conducted a raid in Sidon on 16 April, where they arrested Palestinian-affiliated militants who were involved in cross-border rocket attacks on Israel in late March. The arrests highlight increased efforts from the Lebanese authorities to neutralise rogue militant groups whose activity is increasing pressure on the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire. Rogue militant groups, particularly Palestinian-affiliated entities, will likely continue their efforts to destabilise the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire in the coming weeks, particularly during Israel’s Memorial and Independence days (29 April to 1 May). During this time, the risk of cross-border rocket fire targeting northern Israel will remain elevated, particularly in areas close to the Israel-Lebanon border. Israel is highly likely to retaliate to such attacks, elevating the risk of airstrikes across Lebanon, including in the capital Beirut. However, any strike targeting the capital is highly likely to be very limited and precise; it would likely be aimed at Beirut’s southern Dahieh suburb. More broadly, however, such armed exchanges are unlikely to break the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire.
- In the past week, the IDF slightly expanded its operations in the West Bank (Palestinian Territories), likely in preparation for Israel’s Memorial and Independence days, elevating travel disruption and bystander security risks. The IDF is likely to continue increasing the intensity of its counter-terrorism operations in the West Bank in the coming days, including through raids and arrests. Such operations are highly likely to occur throughout the West Bank, particularly in its northern governorates, and to a lesser extent in Hebron and Bethlehem governorates. These operations will likely compound already-heightened ethno-religious tensions associated with Israel’s Memorial and Independence days, increasing the risk of domestic unrest and travel disruption across the West Bank in the coming weeks. Furthermore, the risk of attacks by militants and radicalised individuals will also increase in the coming week. Perpetrators are likely to target IDF positions in the West Bank, including checkpoints and border crossings, elevating bystanders’ exposure to crossfire. Attacks targeting Israeli settlements, Israeli-plated vehicles and public transport hubs, as well as key highways and roads, remain a realistic possibility. While the Israeli security forces will likely adopt an augmented posture in the West Bank throughout next week, the likelihood of terror attacks targeting civilians in Israeli cities will remain elevated, particularly in Central and Jerusalem districts.
- Security risks stemming from rocket, drone and cyber attacks will be elevated preceding Israel’s Memorial and Independence days. The likelihood of rockets being launched across the border by regional militant groups, including Iranian-backed groups, will remain elevated in the coming weeks. Gaza-based militants are likely to increase their efforts to launch rockets targeting Israeli population centres. Due to militants’ degraded capabilities, these risks are likely to be most elevated for population centres in the Gaza Envelope and Israel’s Southern district, though sporadic and limited fire targeting central Israel remains possible. The likelihood of cross-border rocket launches by militant groups in Lebanon and Syria targeting northern Israel will also be elevated (see above), though these will likely remain limited to the immediate vicinity of the Israel-Lebanon and Israel-Syria borders. The likelihood of exposure to missiles, drones and shrapnel resulting from attacks by the Yemen-based Iran-backed Houthis will also be elevated. Given the high altitude of Houthi rocket launches and IDF interceptions, alerts due to such launches will likely trigger sirens across Israel simultaneously, elevating operational disruption risks. Furthermore, the risk of attacks by militants and radicalised individuals in Israel and the West Bank will also be elevated in the coming week, particularly from 29 April to 1 May. Perpetrators are likely to target public transport hubs and vehicles, as well as highways and crowded places; they are most likely to use firearms and car-ramming tactics. Nonetheless, attacks involving IEDs also remain a realistic possibility. Due to the significance and proximity of both Israeli holidays, there is also an elevated risk of cyber attacks targeting Israeli businesses, as well as affiliated entities. These attacks are likely to involve mostly website-defacing and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. However, more sophisticated attacks, including those involving social engineering, phishing and malicious malware (and which are supported by state actors), remain a realistic possibility, elevating the risks facing business operations in the coming week.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Hamas rejected an Israeli ceasefire proposal; a breakthrough remains unlikely in the short term. On 17 April, a Hamas spokesperson rejected an Israeli-proposed ceasefire agreement, which would have established a multi-week truce in exchange for the release of ten living hostages. Local media reported that Hamas has instead proposed a multi-year truce in exchange for the release of all remaining hostages. This proposal is highly unlikely to facilitate a major breakthrough in negotiations, sustaining deadlock and undermining prospects for conflict de-escalation in the short-to-medium term.
- Humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate in Gaza (Palestinian Territories), increasing the threats to NGO staff and sustaining elevated regional tensions. On 23 April, the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that since the IDF suspended aid deliveries into Gaza on 2 March, food prices have increased by over 50%; it also reported that 95% of surveyed NGOs had reduced their operations in the enclave. In the coming weeks, locally engaged NGOs will almost certainly continue facing critical operational disruption risks, while rising food insecurity will increase staff exposure to common and violent crime. Unless the IDF resumes aid deliveries into Gaza in the coming weeks, humanitarian conditions will almost certainly continue to deteriorate, compounding the threat to life and sustaining elevated regional tensions. Also on 23 April, Germany, France and the UK (the ‘E3’) called for Israel to resume aid deliveries into Gaza immediately, underscoring rising bilateral tensions and possibly pre-empting further reviews of arms export licenses from the E3.
- The Israeli government’s efforts to dismiss the head of the Shin Bet will sustain the risk of anti-government protests in the coming weeks; possible industrial action will undermine operational continuity. On 22 April, Ronen Bar filed an affidavit with the High Court of Justice as part of hearings into Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s efforts to dismiss him as director of the Shin Bet (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 24 March 2025). In the affidavit, Bar alleges that Netanyahu is attempting to dismiss him based on his reluctance to show ‘personal loyalty to the Prime Minister’. Although Bar indicated that he would leave his position following the court’s ruling in the case, the affidavit will highly likely exacerbate tensions between Bar and Netanyahu; the latter will possibly attempt to dismiss Bar pre-emptively in the coming weeks. This would almost certainly trigger large-scale anti-government protests in major cities, particularly Haifa (Haifa district), Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), substantially increasing operational and supply chain disruption risks for locally engaged firms. The Histadrut Labour Federation (Israel’s largest union) will also likely call for a nationwide strike if Netanyahu violates court rulings vis-à-vis Bar’s dismissal. Such a strike would significantly disrupt operational continuity across highly unionised sectors, particularly transport, education and construction; broader knock-on effects would consequently impact private sector operations. More broadly, anti-government protests (including protests calling for hostage releases) will almost certainly continue in the coming days, with larger gatherings likely to emerge on Israel’s Memorial and Independence days (29 April to 1 May). Police efforts to disperse protests will possibly trigger low-intensity clashes, though wider unrest remains unlikely.
- Despite moderate restructuring efforts, the Palestinian Authority (PA) remains unlikely to engage in substantial reforms, moderating prospects for improved governance conditions in the Palestinian Territories. On 23 April, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) convened a two-day meeting of its Central Council to select a vice chairperson for its Executive Committee (EC). PA President Mahmoud Abbas currently serves as chairperson and there has not been an EC vice chairperson since 1967. The creation of the vice chair reflects moderate PA efforts to comply with increasing pressure from international partners (particularly Egypt and Jordan) to engage in substantial reforms and to establish a succession plan for Abbas, given his advanced age. However, numerous non-Fatah parties have boycotted the council meeting, underscoring its limited scope and capacity to trigger broader reforms within the PLO and PA. In the coming months, high-level factionalism and entrenched corruption will likely continue undermining prospects for significant PA reform efforts, while governance conditions are highly unlikely to improve within PA-controlled territory. Additionally, during a speech at the meeting, Abbas called Hamas ‘sons of dogs’ and called for the group to release all Israeli hostages, to end the Israel-Hamas war and to give up control of Gaza. The statement will likely further compound long-standing tensions between Fatah and Hamas; such tensions are highly likely to continue undermining long-term efforts to foster reconciliation between the groups or to achieve consensus regarding the administration of Gaza, sustaining governance concerns in the Palestinian Territories.
- Israel refused entry to 27 French lawmakers, likely due to their pro-Palestine activism; this highlights the increasing risk of scrutiny for politically active individuals travelling to Israel and the Palestinian Territories. On 18 April, Israel’s interior ministry revoked the visas of 27 French left-wing lawmakers, including one senator and four deputies from the French parliament, before their scheduled official visit on 20 April. The authorities deemed the lawmakers a ‘threat to the Israeli state’, likely due to their association with numerous pro-Palestine initiatives. The move highlights increasing diplomatic tensions between Israel and France, particularly as Paris moves to recognise a Palestinian state, possibly as early as June. The revocation also underscores increasing scrutiny over individuals associated with pro-Palestine activism when travelling to Israel. Although visa revocations have so far been limited to politicians and lawmakers, this scrutiny will likely extend to business, academia and NGO personnel in the coming months, increasing travel disruption and staffing risks. This, in turn, will likely elevate transport disruption and operational risks for international organisations operating in Israel (and particularly in the Palestinian Territories), especially advocacy NGOs employing foreign nationals.
- The US has implemented additional sanctions on Iran’s oil industry; however, despite sustained tensions, negotiations will likely continue in the coming weeks. On 22 April, the US Department of the Treasury sanctioned Seyed Asadoollah Emamjomeh, a high-profile Iranian national who owns numerous firms engaged in the sale, transport and delivery of Iranian liquified petroleum gas (LPG). The sanctions underscore the US’ continued application of its ‘maximum pressure’ campaign targeting Iran amid ongoing nuclear negotiations (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 14 April 2024). Although Iran’s foreign ministry stated that the sanctions demonstrate Washington DC’s ‘lack of good faith’, the measures are unlikely to undermine ongoing diplomatic engagement between high-level delegations. However, as the US continues to expand and enforce sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports, compliance concerns for regionally engaged firms, particularly in the finance, energy and shipping industries, will remain elevated. More broadly, further rapid expansions of US sanctions on Iran will increase the risk of a temporary deadlock during ongoing negotiations, driving regional tensions and moderating the prospects for an interim US-Iran nuclear agreement in the coming weeks.
- Jordan: Muslim Brotherhood ban will trigger unrest, elevate security, bystander risks. On 23 April, the authorities officially banned the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and confiscated several of its assets. The security forces also raided the offices of the MB’s political arm, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the largest political grouping in the parliament. The move comes days after the government announced it foiled a plot by MB members to conduct attacks inside the kingdom using missiles and drones. In the coming weeks, the government will likely conduct a wide crackdown on MB and IAF members, likely triggering significant domestic unrest (including anti-monarchy protests by Islamist factions). The risk of clashes with security personnel and pro-monarchy groups will be elevated during these events, raising bystander risks in the capital Amman. We also assess there is a realistic possibility that King Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein Al-Hashemi will dissolve the parliament in the coming month, partially elevating policy risks throughout 2025.
- Turkey: Operational disruption, domestic unrest risks are elevated amid earthquake’s aftermath. On 23 April, a powerful 6.2 magnitude earthquake struck the Sea of Marmara at 1249hrs (local time). Tremors impacted Turkey’s most populous city, Istanbul (Istanbul province), causing widespread disruption. Over 200 people were injured. There are currently no reported deaths. Minor aftershocks are likely to continue in the coming days, though a second strong earthquake is unlikely. As the emergency services consider the damage to buildings and transport networks, we assess that businesses will continue to face substantial operational disruption risks. Additionally, intermittent disruption impacting telecommunications and internet services will likely persist. This will likely drive knock-on supply chain disruption in the coming days, elevating financial risks for business. Furthermore, schools are closed (through 25 April), which will drive immediate disruption for personnel vis-à-vis childcare needs, as well as for managers due to resultant staff absenteeism and short-term labour flexibility concerns. With the government admitting that 1.5 m building units are non-compliant with modern seismic regulations in Istanbul, we assess that further anti-government protests in the city are likely in the coming weeks, elevating domestic unrest risks.
Apr 23.
- Syria-US: Wider crackdown on Palestinian groups will likely elevate security risks, ease sanctions. On 22 April, the Syrian government arrested two Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) officials, including the local operations commander, in the capital Damascus. While the government did not clarify the reason for the arrests, we assess that the move is likely an attempt to comply with the US security demands in return for limited sanctions relief. Such a move will also possibly mitigate the threat of Israeli airstrikes against the capital, which previously targeted PIJ operatives in residential neighbourhoods. We assess that the new Syrian government will likely conduct a wider crackdown on PIJ cells in the coming weeks, as well as other smaller Palestinian militant groups backed by Iran. Clashes during these campaigns are likely, elevating overall security and bystander risks throughout the country. However, there is a realistic possibility that the government will exile PIJ operatives to Iraq in the coming weeks, mitigating these risks.
(Source: Sibylline)
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