NEWS IN BRIEF – MIDDLE EAST – CONFLICT

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Military And Security Developments

 

Apr. 20.

 

18 Apr 25. Statement From Chief Pentagon Spokesman Sean Parnell Announcing the Consolidation of Forces in Syria Under Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve. Recognizing the success the United States has had against ISIS, including its 2019 territorial defeat under President Trump, today the Secretary of Defense directed the consolidation of U.S. forces in Syria under Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve to select locations in Syria. This consolidation reflects the significant steps we have made toward degrading ISIS’ appeal and operational capability regionally and globally. This deliberate and conditions-based process will bring the U.S. footprint in Syria down to less than a thousand U.S. forces in the coming months. During the last ten years, the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS has made major gains, including those which led to the territorial defeat of ISIS in 2019. Additionally, U.S. Central Command has launched dozens of air strikes over the last year to further degrade ISIS capabilities and deny them the ability to regain strength.  As this consolidation takes place, consistent with President Trump’s commitment to peace through strength, U.S. Central Command will remain poised to continue strikes against the remnants of ISIS in Syria. We will also work closely with capable and willing Coalition partners to maintain pressure on ISIS and respond to any other terrorist threats that arise.   The threat of terrorism is not confined to the Middle East, and we will be vigilant across every continent to ensure that ISIS has nowhere to hide. We are committed to ensuring our partners’ ability to further degrade ISIS and other terrorists within the region. An essential line of effort in degrading ISIS strength is reducing the populations of displaced and detained ISIS-linked individuals in camps and detention facilities in northeast Syria; we call on the international community to repatriate their nationals. The Department of Defense continues to maintain a significant amount of capability in the region and the ability to make dynamic force posture adjustments based on evolving security situations on the ground. We will provide more updates as they are available. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

20 Apr 25. The U.S. State Department on Thursday accused Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co. Ltd., a Chinese satellite firm linked to China’s military, of directly supporting Iran-backed Houthi fighters with imagery used to target U.S. and international vessels in the Red Sea.

 

20 Apr 25. The Israeli military says “professional failures” led to the killing of 15 paramedics and first responders in an incident in Gaza in March, according to an investigation released Sunday. The group – most of whom worked for the Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS) – were shot dead before being buried in a mass grave, sparking international condemnation. The Israeli probe identified several failures during the incident, as well as breaches of orders and a failure to fully report the incident, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said in a statement. The IDF said the troops did not engage in “indiscriminate fire” during the incident, but they opened fire on what they believed to be a “tangible threat” amid what the military called “operational misunderstandings.” As a result of the investigation, the commanding officer of the 14th Brigade received a letter of reprimand, while the deputy commander of the Golani Reconnaissance Battalion involved in the incident was dismissed from his position. The IDF relieved the deputy commander because of his responsibility for the incident and for providing an “incomplete and inaccurate report” about what happened. “The IDF regrets the harm caused to uninvolved civilians,” a statement read. (Source: CNN)

Apr 17.

• US airstrikes against the Yemen-based Houthis will persist amid preparations for possible ground operations against the group by the Yemeni government in the coming months.
• Hamas will likely claim to have lost contact with additional hostages in the coming days in a bid to reduce Israeli airstrikes on Gaza (and to compound internal pressure on the Israeli government).
• The possible partial withdrawal of US forces from Syria in the coming months will increase the risk of an Islamic State (IS) resurgence.

POLITICAL FORECAST

• Despite reported progress in ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas, an agreement remains unlikely in the short term, sustaining the risk of armed conflict.
• The Israeli government announced that aid deliveries into Gaza would only resume via private entities, compounding humanitarian concerns regarding food, water and energy security in the enclave.
• On 16 April, local media reported a resurgence in anti-Hamas protests in Beit Lahia (northern Gaza); demonstrators were apparently calling for an end to Hamas’ control of the enclave.
• An augmented observance of Jewish prayers in and around the al-Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem will likely increase ethno-religious tensions in the Jerusalem area, particularly preceding the last night of the Passover period (12-19 April).
• The US issued new sanctions targeting Iranian-linked Chinese entities, underscoring the continued application of the ‘maximum pressure’ campaign amid nuclear negotiations.
• Pro-Palestine activism groups will continue to target Israeli nationals with legal complaints during overseas travel, underscoring the persistent legal-exposure risks facing associated individuals.
• US airstrikes against the Yemen-based Houthis will persist amid preparations for possible ground operations against the group by the Yemeni government in the coming months. On 14-15 April, US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted dozens of intensive airstrikes against Houthi infrastructure in Yemen. Targets included Houthi barracks and weapons depots on Kamaran Island in the Red Sea (al-Hudaydah governorate), as well as military bases near the al-Jawf junction (al-Jawf governorate) that connects Houthi supply lines from the capital Sanaa to Ma’rib governorate. CENTCOM strikes also targeted Houthi underground facilities, weapons depots, missile launch sites and command and control (C2) centres in Amran, al-Bayda and Dhamar governorates. The strikes come amid (claimed) preparations by Yemen’s Internationally Recognised Government (IRG) to recapture the western coast of Yemen (including Hudaydah Port) in co-ordination with the US and several Gulf countries. Simultaneously, the UAE-backed Joint Forces on the West Coast (a pro-IRG militia) also stated that they are ready to liberate Houthi-controlled territories. While details are limited, we assess that such an operation remains possible in the coming months and would significantly elevate regional instability. While any such operation is likely to receive US aerial assistance and logistical backing from the UAE, it is unlikely to enjoy Saudi Arabia’s official support; we assess the kingdom will be keen to moderate the risk of a resumption of Houthi attacks against Saudi cities, which would impact tourism and businesses. In the event of the UAE supporting such an offensive, we assess that Houthi retaliatory missile and drone strikes targeting major ports and cities in the UAE would be highly likely, triggering bystander and security risks across the emirates.
• Hamas will likely claim to have lost contact with additional hostages in the coming days in a bid to reduce Israeli airstrikes on Gaza (and to compound internal pressure on the Israeli government). On 15 April, Hamas’ armed wing, the al-Qassam brigades, alleged to have lost contact with a group of militants holding the Israeli-US hostage Edan Alexander following an Israeli strike on their location in Gaza. While al-Qassam’s claims are possibly accurate, the group is highly likely to issue similar announcements in the coming days to exacerbate concerns about hostage safety, compounding unrest in Israel driven by hostages’ families. However, these tactics are unlikely to reduce the rate and scope of Israeli airstrikes on Gaza or to stall the ongoing preparations for wider ground operations against the remaining Hamas cells in Khan Younis and Gaza City.
• The possible partial withdrawal of US forces from Syria in the coming months will increase the risk of an Islamic State (IS) resurgence. On 15 April, Israeli media reported that US forces will begin withdrawing from Syria by mid-June. However, unnamed US officials estimate that the Pentagon will reduce the number of troops to no fewer than 1,000 personnel (essentially marking a return to the US deployment size prior to its recent increase in 2024). Regardless, we assess that any partial withdrawal of US forces from Syria will moderately increase the risk of an IS resurgence, particularly in the Badia desert region (central Syria). Although there has been no significant uptick in attacks by the group since the ousting of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, IS will continue its attempts to exploit any security vacuum in rural Syria. As such, a partial withdrawal would increase the likelihood of IS attacks against Syrian, Kurdish and US forces, as well as attacks against minorities and religious sites. Yet regardless of which scenario manifests, the new government in Damascus will continue to increase its co-ordination with the US in relation to counter-terrorism efforts, and to work closely with Kurdish forces (which are holding thousands of IS fighters in detention centres).

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• Despite reported progress in ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas, an agreement remains unlikely in the short term, sustaining the risk of armed conflict. On 16 April, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu convened the security cabinet to discuss hostage-release negotiations; on 17 April, a Hamas spokesperson stated the group would ‘soon’ respond to an Israeli ceasefire proposal (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 14 April 2025). Despite sustained diplomatic engagement, long-standing disputes relating to the length of any potential ceasefire and Hamas’ possible disarmament will likely continue to undermine efforts to reach an immediate agreement. Additionally, concerns over Hamas’ capacity to deliver hostages, underlined by claims regarding Edan Alexander (outlined above), will further undermine the prospects for successful talks.
• The Israeli government announced that aid deliveries into Gaza would only resume via private entities, compounding humanitarian concerns regarding food, water and energy security in the enclave. On 16 April, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz stated that Israel will only allow humanitarian aid deliveries into Gaza to resume through ‘civilian companies’; Katz did not state when this policy will come into effect. Israel halted all aid deliveries into Gaza on 2 March as part of efforts to maximise pressure on Hamas to agree to a temporary ceasefire and hostage releases. If implemented, this would mark a major shift in aid delivery and distribution operations in Gaza, which are almost exclusively administered by NGOs. The policy would increase regulatory framework risks for locally engaged NGOs and critically restrict their organisational capacity. Additionally, it is highly unlikely that private entities would be able to acquire sufficient capacity quickly enough to replicate existing aid-distribution operations, given widespread security and staffing concerns. Consequently, the policy would almost certainly exacerbate food, water and energy insecurity in Gaza, while compounding longer-term public health, socio-economic and governance concerns.
• On 16 April, local media reported a resurgence in anti-Hamas protests in Beit Lahia (northern Gaza); demonstrators were apparently calling for an end to Hamas’ control of the enclave. As humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate, such demonstrations will likely become more frequent, compounding operational disruption risks for NGOs. On 17 April, the Wall Street Journal also reported that Israel’s restrictions on aid deliveries have significantly undermined Hamas’ revenue from extortion, racketeering and black-market profiteering, limiting its capacity to pay militants (and aligned civil security force personnel). Such conditions will likely further undermine governance conditions within Gaza, compounding wide-spread unrest, violent crime and security threats to local staff.
• An augmented observance of Jewish prayers in and around the al-Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem will likely increase ethno-religious tensions in the Jerusalem area, particularly preceding the last night of the Passover period (12-19 April). On 16 April, Israeli security force personnel escorted approximately 180 Jewish Israelis into the al-Aqsa Mosque compound; generally, groups of Jewish individuals visiting the compound are limited to 30 at a time. On 17 April, several other Israeli Jewish individuals visited the site and violated local ordinances banning Jewish prayers at the compound. The visits highlight the increasing permissiveness of the Israeli police of Jewish religious observances in and around the compound; this is highly likely to increase ethno-religious tensions within Jerusalem’s Old City (Jerusalem governorate). Such tensions will elevate the risk of localised clashes and unrest, particularly preceding the end of the Passover period. The risk of clashes and targeted violence will increase security concerns for individuals within the Old City, while also increasing bystanders’ exposure to crossfire, particularly in crowded public spaces and religious sites.
• The US issued new sanctions targeting Iranian-linked Chinese entities, underscoring the continued application of the ‘maximum pressure’ campaign amid nuclear negotiations. On 16 April, the US Treasury Department sanctioned the China-based independent refinery Shandong Shengxing Chemical for its role in purchasing Iranian crude oil. The treasury also sanctioned several companies and vessels responsible for facilitating Iranian oil shipments to China as part of Iran’s ‘shadow fleet’. The announcement underscores US President Donald Trump’s ‘maximum pressure’ policy approach to Iran amid negotiations relating to Iran’s nuclear programme. Following an initial round of talks on limiting Iran’s nuclear capabilities in exchange for sanctions relief on 12 April, representatives for Iran and the US will meet for further discussions on 19 April (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 14 April 2025). The sanctions are highly unlikely to undermine ongoing diplomatic engagement but will sustain sanction-exposure risks for regionally engaged firms, particularly in the energy, shipping and finance sectors. In the coming months, Washington DC will likely continue expanding sanctions on entities associated with Tehran, particularly those that are allegedly facilitating Iran’s nuclear development, oil exports, missile production and drone manufacturing. We assess these measures will sustain broader compliance concerns, particularly for firms operating in the UAE.
• Pro-Palestine activism groups will continue to target Israeli nationals with legal complaints during overseas travel, underscoring the persistent legal-exposure risks facing associated individuals. On 15 April, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar met with UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy during a private visit to London (UK). Subsequently, on 16 April, the pro-Palestine Hind Rajab foundation announced it had filed for a UK arrest warrant for Sa’ar for perpetrating ‘war crimes’ in Gaza. Although private prosecution is highly unlikely to result in Sa’ar’s arrest, the filing highlights the elevated risks of pro-Palestine organisations initiating legal proceedings against Israeli nationals associated with the government and/or the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) during overseas travel. In recent months, pro-Palestine activism groups have also filed similar complaints against IDF personnel (including reservists) during travel to Belgium, Brazil, the Netherlands and the UK, underscoring increased legal-exposure risks for Israeli nationals who have recently completed military service in the Palestinian Territories. We assess that legal-exposure risks will remain elevated in the coming months; the risk of questioning and detention by the authorities will also extend to friends and family members of individuals subjected to such complaints. Efforts to detain Israeli nationals amid such matters will almost certainly increase diplomatic tensions between Israel and the arresting states, increasing the risk of temporary ambassadorial recalls and restricted access to embassy services therein.
• Iran-US-China: New sanctions are unlikely to undermine nuclear talks. On 16 April, the US Treasury Department issued a new set of sanctions targeting Iran’s oil exports to Chinese refineries. The sanctions target the China-based independent refinery Shandong Shengxing Chemical for its role in purchasing Iranian crude oil, including from a front company for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The treasury also imposed additional sanctions on several companies and vessels responsible for facilitating Iranian oil shipments to China as part of Iran’s ‘shadow fleet’. However, we assess that the new treasury decisions are unlikely to undermine the ongoing nuclear talks between Washington DC and Tehran, as they are broadly consistent with US President Donald Trump’s ‘maximum pressure’ policy. As such, the sanctions will almost certainly be leveraged as a political tool during the negotiations. Systems have been set up to facilitate such trade in a way to avoid being impacted by sanctions. We assess that this will sustain the risk of sanctions on firms involved in facilitating such trade, increasing compliance risks to ensure that sanctioned firms are not involved in supply chains.
• Tunisia: Protests will likely persist over the weekend, driving bystander security risks to personnel. On 15 and 16 April, hundreds of Tunisians protested in Mezzouna (Sidi Bouzid governorate) and the capital Tunis after a school wall collapse killed three teenage students in Mezzouna. Demonstrators said the collapse reflects the authorities’ neglect of public services and infrastructure and called on the government to resign. Protests are highly likely in Mezzouna later on 17 April and throughout the weekend, underscoring public dissatisfaction with deteriorating socio-economic conditions in Tunisia. Demonstrators will likely burn tyres and block public roads and intersections, driving transport and supply chain disruption. As a result, a heightened security posture will highly likely persist, elevating incidents of sporadic clashes between protesters and the security forces. The authorities will likely employ heavy-handed tactics, including using tear gas, driving threats to the health and safety of any proximate staff. Businesses in the area will likely remain closed, driving local operational and financial risks. We assess that there is also a realistic possibility of larger protests in Tunis this weekend.

Apr 15.

• Algeria-France: Expulsion of diplomats will exacerbate tensions, impact businesses. On 14 April, the Algerian authorities ordered 12 French consular staff members to leave the country amid ongoing diplomatic tensions that have persisted over recent months (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 12 March 2025). The move comes in response to French prosecutors indicting three Algerians, including a consular official, over the kidnap of an Algerian dissident in Paris (France) last year. The expulsion of the French diplomats will likely encourage French Interior Minister Bruno Retailleau and other hardliners to pursue a more robust response, possibly including the partial restriction of immigration agreements. Such a move would significantly elevate the risks of further diplomatic ruptures. By contrast, the Algerian government will likely seek to continue reducing the volume of imported French commodities this year and limit the role of French investors through the non-renewal or revocation of operational licenses. This will particularly affect French telecommunications, water management, railways, banking, pharmaceuticals, construction materials and automotive manufacturing companies in Algeria. However, we assess that the complete severance of bilateral trade relations between both countries remains unlikely.

Apr 14.

• The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) encirclement of Rafah and establishment of the Morag Corridor, separating Rafah from Khan Yunis, underlines elevating conflict risks across Gaza. The establishment of the new corridor on 12 April will almost certainly consolidate the IDF’s control over the Gaza Strip, while IDF clearing operations will likely elevate population displacement, exacerbating strains on humanitarian resources. This comes amid statements from Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz that Israel intends to consolidate control over additional areas of Gaza, notably highlighting Beit Hanoun (northern Gaza). These operations will likely drive misidentification and crossfire risks to proximate NGO personnel. Such risks are further underlined by recent statements from the Israeli Air Force (IAF) confirming strikes on over 35 targets in Gaza since 13 April, including Al-Ahli Arab Hospital in Gaza City. Israeli officials claim to have been targeting Hamas militants who were using the hospital to plan attacks. While there were no reported casualties, the emergency department was unable to function, and other structures were damaged. This will likely drive additional stress on Gaza’s health system, reducing access to critical medical treatment for personnel. Israel will likely continue targeting militants at key infrastructure sites, including hospitals and schools, sustaining bystander security risks to personnel on the ground.
• The 14 April letter signed by thousands of graduates of the IDF’s elite Talpiot training programme, supporting calls for the end of the Israel-Hamas war, underlines mounting fatigue within the IDF, compounding security risks. The letter supports demands for the government to prioritise hostage releases over the continuation of the Israel-Hamas war issued in a 10 April letter from IAF veterans. On 11 April, 250 reserve members of the IDF intelligence outfit Unit 8200 also supported the IAF’s letter. In response, the IAF has moved to dismiss 60 active reservists, whom Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accused of being funded by organisations attempting to overthrow his government. The letters will possibly undermine the IDF’s short-term capacity to maintain discipline and order among its ranks, which will likely be exacerbated by increasing levels of fatigue among reservists, many of whom have faced multiple call-ups to the front line. This will likely continue to drive instances of non-reporting among reservists, undermining the IDF’s military and defence capabilities, in turn augmenting security risks throughout Israel.
• The 13 April interception of a Houthi missile targeting Israel underlines persistent direct missile attack and shrapnel risks. The Iran-backed Houthi militia claimed to have fired two ballistic missiles towards a military base in Ashdod (Southern district) and Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV, Tel Aviv district). The IDF claims that only one missile reached Israel, and the second likely fell short. Local media reports indicate shrapnel from the interception fell in Hebron (Hebron governorate) but caused no injuries or major damage. The Houthis continue to target Israel frequently, often triggering rocket sirens across the country. These attacks will likely continue in the coming weeks, despite the US’ sustained military campaign in Yemen. The risk of attacks will remain especially heightened over Passover (12-19 April), elevating security and travel disruption risks across Israel. The IDF is likely to intercept most missiles, however, falling shrapnel will continue to drive security risks across Israel and in its neighbouring countries.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• Negotiations between Israel and Hamas reportedly continue at pace, though a breakthrough remains unlikely in the short term. On 14 April, members of the Tikvah Forum (a group representing several hostages’ families) claimed that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had indicated negotiations currently centre on an Israeli proposed temporary ceasefire in exchange for the immediate release of ten hostages. Local media reports indicate that Hamas has requested several days to consider the offer, moderating prospects for an imminent breakthrough. As such, protest activity in Israel calling for the government to secure hostage releases will likely continue in the coming days. On 12 April, hundreds of protesters participated in anti-government protests in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), with smaller demonstrations continuing in Jerusalem on 13 and 14 April. In the coming week, small-scale anti-government protests will likely continue targeting government ministers’ public and private residences, increasing risks of localised travel disruption, particularly in Jerusalem’s Rehavia neighbourhood. Larger-scale demonstrations will likely take place on 19 April to coincide with the last night of Passover (12 April – 19 April), though these are likely to remain broadly peaceful.
• The US and Iran participated in negotiations on limiting Iran’s nuclear development programme, with further talks bolstering prospects for a preliminary agreement in the coming months. Talks reportedly progressed well and both parties announced plans to meet for further talks on 19 April in an unspecified location. This marks the highest-level engagement between the US and Iran since the signature of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. The US is likely aiming to formalise an agreement with Iran by Q3 2025, amid increasing concerns that the JCPOA will expire before an agreement is made. Although the US withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, the agreement’s ‘snapback’ remains in place for all other signatories (China, the EU, France, Germany, Russia and the UK), allowing parties to unilaterally (re-)impose economic sanctions on Iran if it violates its treaty commitments. The JCPOA will expire on 18 October 2025; after this time, sanctions application will require approval from the UN Security Council. Given concerns that China and/or Russia will possibly veto efforts to impose broad sanctions against Iran in the medium- to long-term, the US is highly likely to push for an agreement before this deadline. There is a realistic possibility that Iran and the US will sign a preliminary agreement to limit Iran’s nuclear development capabilities in the coming months; however, negotiations will remain extremely sensitive and prone to deadlock and brinkmanship. During negotiations, the US will pressure Iran to significantly limit its uranium enrichment activities, reduce support for its regional proxies and limit its production of drones and missiles. While Iran will possibly agree to partially dismantle some of its more advanced enrichment facilities, it is highly unlikely to agree to significant limitations on capabilities it classifies as part of its nuclear energy programme. Additionally, though Iran will possibly nominally agree to reduce its support for its proxy network (particularly the Yemen-based Houthis), it is highly unlikely to reduce material support for key proxies, particularly Lebanese Hizballah (LH) and various Iraq-based factions, in the short term. Israel’s rhetoric towards Iran, particularly regarding the possibility of a direct strike targeting its nuclear facilities will also possibly act as a spoiler during negotiations, compounding regional tensions and moderating prospects for an agreement in the short term.
• The US announced it would participate in the development of Saudi Arabia’s civil nuclear industry, though prospects for Israel-Saudi Arabia normalisation remain low in the short term. On 13 April, US Energy Secretary Chris Wright stated the US would sign a preliminary agreement to develop Saudi Arabia’s civil nuclear industry, including with participation from US commercial entities. Although the US’ statement does not explicitly mention whether the deal relates to broader efforts to facilitate normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia, it is highly likely that the agreement reflects US efforts to expedite normalisation through granting concessions to Saudi Arabia in key areas. In the coming years, there is a realistic possibility that a broader US-Saudi agreement on nuclear capabilities will facilitate normalisation. However, progress towards such an agreement will almost certainly hinge on additional factors, particularly Israeli commitments on Palestinian statehood and developments in Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Additionally, Riyadh is highly unlikely to announce any such plans in the coming months to mitigate domestic unrest, particularly as IDF operations continue in Gaza.
• The European Commission announced an increased support package for the Palestinian Authority, possibly improving long-term socio-economic health prospects in the West Bank. On 14 April, the European Commissioner for the Mediterranean announced that the EU will increase financial support for the Palestinian Authority (PA) through a three-year package of grants and loans worth approximately USD 1.8 bn. Financial disbursements will be conditioned on the PA implementing anti-corruption measures and broader reforms. The announcement comes amid a high-level political dialogue between several EU Foreign Ministers and PA Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa in Luxembourg. The announcement highlights the European Commission’s efforts to improve relations with the PA and increase internal co-ordination, given substantial divergence between member states’ positions on the possible formation of a Palestinian state and relations with Israel. Increasing financial support for the PA will possibly improve socio-economic conditions in the West Bank in the long term, particularly by facilitating the regular payment of civil servants, reducing risks of industrial action. However, entrenched corruption and clientelism within the PA will likely delay loan and fund disbursement in the short- to medium-term, moderating prospects for improved operational and socio-economic conditions. However, socio-economic health is highly unlikely to improve in Gaza as a result of the support package, given the PA’s limited role in administering the enclave and ongoing IDF ground operations.
• An arson attack targeting a high-profile Jewish politician in the US possibly underscores elevated risks of targeted violence and vandalism during Passover (12 April – 19/20 April). At approximately 0200hrs (local time) on 13 April, a sole perpetrator targeted the official residence of Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro with an arson attack. Although the attack did not result in any injuries, the residence incurred substantial damage, resulting in the governor and his family’s evacuation. Police detained the suspected perpetrator and a federal investigation to determine their motive is ongoing at the time of writing. There is a realistic possibility that the attack is linked to Shapiro’s social media posts showing his family’s Passover celebrations several hours prior. The attack highlights elevated risks of violence targeting Jewish individuals amid elevated ethno-religious tensions linked to the Israel-Hamas war. Given ongoing celebrations of Passover (12 April to 19 April in Israel; to 20 April worldwide), risks of violence targeting high-profile Jewish individuals and installations will remain particularly elevated in the coming days, increasing security and bystander exposure risks. Locations publicising details of Passover gatherings and celebrations, particularly those that are open to the public, will face elevated risks of targeted protests, vandalism and possible attacks, compounding security risks and incidental risks, particularly in cities and neighbourhoods with significant Jewish populations in Europe and North America.
• Saudi Arabia-US: Nuclear deal will likely be tied to prospective normalisation agreement with Israel. On 13 April, US Energy Secretary Chris Wright stated the US would sign a preliminary agreement to develop Saudi Arabia’s civil nuclear industry, including with participation from US commercial entities. However, to date, Riyadh hasn’t agreed to clauses that restrict the development of nuclear arms, raising the risk of nuclear proliferation as Saudi Arabia seeks to counteract risks of expanding Iranian regional influence as a result of its own nuclear programme. We assess that any wider nuclear agreement between the US and Saudi Arabia will possibly be tied to a prospective Saudi-Israeli normalisation agreement within the next two years. However, it is highly unlikely that Riyadh will officially announce any such plans in the coming months to mitigate domestic unrest. Furthermore, any US-Saudi nuclear deal will possibly prompt other Gulf countries, such as Bahrain and Qatar,  to pursue similar programs, likely increasing geopolitical tensions with Iran. We assess that such tensions will likely undercut co-operation with Iran in the energy sector, but are unlikely to result in military confrontation.
• Syria-Region: Captagon crackdown will moderate diplomatic tensions, security risks. On 12 April, the Syrian authorities announced they had seized almost four m captagon pills during a raid on a warehouse in the coastal city of Latakia (Latakia governorate). The seizure underscores the new government‘s ongoing efforts to dismantle the country’s captagon trade, worth an estimated USD 10 bn per year. Such efforts will likely reduce diplomatic tensions between Syria and the Gulf States, increasing the likelihood of improved economic co-operation and increased foreign investment for post-war reconstruction, mitigating humanitarian concerns. It will likely also reduce security risks tied to substantial cross-border smuggling along Syria’s borders, moderating instances of gang militarisation and the proliferation of organised crime. The crackdown will likely continue to threaten job security for thousands of informal workers in Syria, exacerbating socio-economic risks in the short term. However, sanctions relief will likely drive economic opportunities in key sectors like agriculture and energy. We assess that the reduced influx of captagon into the Gulf will likely lower its availability in the informal economy, moderating poor labour practices and human rights risks. (Source: Sibylline)

 

16 Apr 25. US Allegedly Plans Syria Withdrawal, Raising Concerns Over Turkish Expansion. The United States has informed Israel that it will begin a phased withdrawal of its forces from Syria within two months, Israeli outlet Ynet reported Tuesday.  According to the report, Israeli officials were briefed on the timeline earlier this week. Despite efforts by Jerusalem to persuade Washington to maintain its troop presence, a senior Israeli official told Ynet that those attempts were unsuccessful, though discussions continue in hopes of modifying or delaying the decision. According to Turkish outlet Türkiye Today, early signs of the withdrawal have already been observed on the ground. Videos circulating on social media show U.S. military convoys transporting equipment from bases in southern Hasakah toward the Syrian-Iraqi border at al-Yarubiyah. The trucks, which reportedly entered Syria empty from northern Iraq, are believed to be involved in early logistical preparations for the exit of American forces. Approximately 2,000 U.S. troops remain in Syria, where they have been stationed at strategic points in the country’s east and north. These forces have supported counterterrorism operations and deterred Iranian and Turkish advances since their initial deployment in 2014.  Israeli officials view their presence as a stabilizing factor and fear that the withdrawal could embolden Turkish ambitions in Syria. Israeli defense leaders are particularly concerned about the possibility of Turkish military deployments into central and eastern Syria, especially near Palmyra and the T-4 airbase, areas that would affect Israeli air operations and regional deterrence. The T-4 airbase has recently come under Israeli airstrikes following reports that Turkey plans to take control of the facility. Last week, Israeli and Turkish officials held talks in Azerbaijan aimed at managing growing tensions. According to Israeli sources, the government delivered a clear message that any Turkish move to establish permanent bases in Syria, particularly far from Turkey’s border, would be viewed as a serious provocation. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

15 Apr 25. Saddam Haftar’s visit to Ankara marks shift in Turkey’s Libya policy.  In a visit carrying symbolic weight, Maj. Gen. Saddam Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA) Ground Forces, met with senior Turkish officials in Ankara on April 4, 2025 — the anniversary of Libya’s second civil war that began in 2018. Haftar, son of eastern Libyan strongman Khalifa Haftar, was hosted by Turkish Land Forces commander Gen. Selçuk Bayraktaroğlu. Defence Minister Yaşar Güler also held talks with him. The visit marks a rare instance of direct contact between the Turkish Armed Forces and the LNA, which were on opposing sides during Libya’s most recent civil conflict. The meeting comes shortly after reports that U.S. oil giant Chevron has expressed interest in exploring a 47,000 km² area south of Crete. The designated area overlaps with Libya’s claimed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and aligns with Greece’s position based on the equidistance principle, as seen in the so-called Seville Map. Greek officials have called this development a “game changer” and a sign of U.S. support for their maritime claims. According to Serhat Süha Çubukçuoğlu, a senior fellow at the Abu Dhabi-based TRENDS Research and Advisory consultancy, the timing of Haftar’s visit is no coincidence.

“It appears to be Ankara’s response to Greece’s moves in the Eastern Mediterranean,” he said. The visit signals a growing dialogue between Turkey and the Benghazi-based government, which had previously rejected a 2019 maritime memorandum of understanding signed between Ankara and the Tripoli government.

Çubukçuoğlu noted that Haftar agreed in principle to procure Turkish-made armed unmanned aerial vehicles and receive training and equipment for LNA forces. If this cooperation progresses, it could revive the stalled maritime deal and pave the way for Turkish hydrocarbon activity in Libyan waters—similar to Turkey’s recent moves in Somalia. Turkish Ministry of Defence sources described the visit as a step toward reconciliation and national unity in Libya. During the Second Libyan Civil War, Turkey provided military support to the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. This included the deployment of drones and personnel, helping the GNA repel Haftar’s forces and recapture strategic sites such as the al-Watiya airbase in 2020. The latest engagement with the LNA appears to indicate a recalibration of Ankara’s policy to include outreach to eastern Libyan actors. (Source: Defense News Early Bird/Defense News)

 

17 Apr 25. Israel to Keep Troops in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria ‘Indefinitely.’ Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announced Wednesday that Israeli troops will remain in “security zones” established in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, regardless of any ceasefire or peace agreements.

“Unlike in the past, the [Israeli military] is not evacuating areas that have been cleared and seized,” Katz said in a public statement. He added that Israeli forces would stay in these buffer areas “in any temporary or permanent situation,” echoing similar statements from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

According to Israeli officials, the military has now converted approximately 30% of Gaza into what it terms an “operational security perimeter.”  Since resuming offensive operations on March 18, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have launched strikes on over 1,200 targets and advanced across large parts of northern and southern Gaza. The declaration comes as ceasefire negotiations with Hamas falter. Hamas has insisted it will not release the remaining hostages unless Israel commits to a full withdrawal from Gaza and agrees to a lasting ceasefire.  Katz also reaffirmed Israel’s blockade of humanitarian aid into Gaza. “No humanitarian aid will be allowed into Gaza,” he said, describing it as a pressure tactic against Hamas.  Culture Minister Miki Zohar added on X (formerly Twitter) that “only hellfire should be poured on the makers of terrorism until the last hostage returns.” (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————