Sponsored by Bertin Exensor
www.exensor.com
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–
Military And Security Developments
Apr 11.
- Iraq: Upcoming parliamentary elections will likely increase corruption risks, exacerbate factionalism. On 10 April, fighters from a tribal unit within the Iran-backed Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) alleged that their commander was forcing them to gather voter ID cards for the next parliamentary elections or face losing their salaries. The development underscores the significant risks of compulsory voting, human rights violations and political corruption which will elevate during the buildup to the elections in November. These risks will exacerbate the current political rifts and internal competition between the PMF groups. As such, a unified agreement within the PMF regarding the backing of specific political figures is unlikely. Each group within the organisation will likely back up its own candidates, including Sunni and Kurdish figures, contingent upon their respective interests and agendas in the coming months. We assess that any increased rift within the Iran-backed organisation, which also faces a likely restructuring by a new law, will likely increase threats to the position of its head, Falih Al-Fayyadh, elevating risks of internal unrest and inter-faction clashes in the coming months.
Apr 10.
- On 9 April, the IDF warned that Lebanese Hizballah (LH) is attempting to rebuild an underground weapon production site in Choueifat (Mount Lebanon governorate, Lebanon), highlighting risks of further Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes in the Beirut area.
- Iran’s delivery of long-range missiles to Iraqi militias reflects efforts to deter Israel and US strikes while diversifying its retaliatory capabilities.
- Officials associated with Yemen’s Internationally Recognised Government (IRG) have called for a ground offensive against the Iran-backed Houthis, signalling elevated risks of armed conflict in the coming months.
POLITICAL FORECAST
- In Israel, the High Court of Justice ruled that the government must resolve disputes relating to the dismissal of Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar by 20 April, sustaining protest risks.
- The US government confirmed Mike Huckabee’s appointment as Ambassador to Israel on 9 April, likely compounding ethno-religious tensions in the West Bank.
- Iran and the US will begin negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme in the coming days, though an agreement remains unlikely in the short term.
- Israel and Turkey began negotiations to de-escalate tensions linked to military operations in Syria, though broader regional tensions will likely remain elevated. • On 9 April, the IDF warned that Lebanese Hizballah (LH) is attempting to rebuild an underground weapon production site in Choueifat (Mount Lebanon governorate, Lebanon), highlighting risks of further Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes in the Beirut area. The IDF warning comes amid recent reports that Iran is increasingly using maritime smuggling routes and the Port of Beirut to deliver weapons and assets to LH. In the coming weeks, LH’s continued efforts to re-arm via facilities in the capital Beirut will increase risks of IDF strikes in and around the city, particularly in the Dahieh area. Amid a broader crackdown on LH’s smuggling infrastructure and the loss of key smuggling routes through Syria, Iran will possibly shift its smuggling activity to proxies in Lebanon and Gaza by employing routes via Egypt, Libya or Sudan and through the Mediterranean Sea. Such activity will likely trigger increased IDF Navy operations in the Mediterranean Sea in the coming months. Likely operations include raids and strikes against maritime vessels, increasing misidentification and travel disruption risks.
- Iran’s delivery of long-range missiles to Iraqi militias reflects efforts to deter Israel and US strikes while diversifying its retaliatory capabilities. According to news media on 8 April, Iran has recently transferred an unspecified number of long-range, surface-to-surface, Arqab (also known as Paveh and Quds 351) cruise missiles with a range of 1,025 miles (1,650km), in addition to a number of shorter-range Jamal 69 ballistic missiles. Iran-backed Iraqi militias have been using these weapons to target Israel throughout 2024. The reports come ahead of planned nuclear negotiations between Iran and the US in Oman on 12 April (see POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS) and amid increasingly hawkish US rhetoric threatening Iran with military action in recent weeks. The delivery indicates that Iran is increasing preparations for a potential retaliation against Israeli or US airstrikes on critical infrastructure, particularly a response employing its regional proxies without direct action. Although renewed negotiations will likely decrease risks of an imminent regional escalation (including direct strikes between Israel and/or the US and Iran) in the coming week, direct Israeli and US strikes targeting Iranian assets in the region, including nuclear facilities, will remain a realistic possibility throughout 2025. The likelihood of such strikes will increase in the coming months, particularly if the US perceives that Iran is not productively engaging in negotiations.
- Officials associated with Yemen’s Internationally Recognised Government (IRG) have called for a ground offensive against the Iran-backed Houthis, signalling elevated risks of armed conflict in the coming months. On 8 and 9 April, local media reported that IRG officials have called for such an offensive amid an ongoing US airstrike campaign against the Houthis. The calls also come after meetings between IRG military officials with US and Saudi military officials in early April. There is a realistic possibility that the IRG is preparing a ground operation targeting the Houthis in the coming months. Iran is unlikely to openly or actively support the Houthis in such an event due to ongoing nuclear negotiations with the US and the risks of US attacks directly targeting Iran. However, Saudi Arabia is unlikely to support such an offensive, moderating prospects for an imminent mobilisation. Even so, the risk of resumed armed conflict between the Houthis and the IRG will likely continue gradually increasing in the coming months, particularly as US strikes continue to degrade the Houthis’ capabilities by targeting communication, training and weapon infrastructure as well as its leaders, operatives and weapon caches.
- Additional emergency information:
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- In Israel, the High Court of Justice ruled that the government must resolve disputes relating to the dismissal of Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar by 20 April, sustaining protest risks. On 8 April, the High Court ruled that Bar must remain in office until the government and the Attorney General reach an agreement on resolving the legal dispute related to his dismissal. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has argued that his office can unilaterally dismiss Bar, while the Attorney General’s office has indicated that Netanyahu must consult an advisory committee before doing so. The High Court ruled that the government must resolve the dispute by 20 April. The case reflects long-standing tensions linked to the role and influence of Israel’s judiciary, amid broader reform efforts from the coalition government. Developments in the ongoing dispute between Netanyahu, Bar and the Attorney General will highly likely trigger anti-government protests, particularly if Netanyahu violates the High Court’s injunction on announcements regarding Bar’s potential replacement. Though demonstrations will likely remain broadly peaceful, protesters will likely attempt to block major thoroughfares, particularly through Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), possibly triggering altercations with police forces and disrupting overland movement. Counter-demonstrations are also likely, compounding movement disruption risks and moderately increasing risks of low-intensity clashes between protesters. In the long term, concerns relating to whether the government can unilaterally dismiss senior civil servants (such as the State Comptroller, the Attorney General and the head of the Bank of Israel) will possibly increase governance and supervision quality concerns for locally engaged firms.
- The US government confirmed Mike Huckabee’s appointment as Ambassador to Israel on 9 April, likely compounding ethno-religious tensions in the West Bank. Huckabee has frequently supported the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the recognition of Israel’s territorial claims in the Golan Heights (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 14 November 2024). Huckabee’s appointment will likely embolden expansionist and extremist Israeli settlers to construct further settlement outposts in the West Bank and conduct attacks on Palestinian civilians in nearby population centres. Continued settlement expansion and inter-communal clashes will almost certainly increase already elevated ethno-religious tensions, increasing security and bystander risks in proximity to settlements throughout the West Bank.
- Iran and the US will begin negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme in the coming days, though an agreement remains unlikely in the short term. On 12 April, high-level Iranian and US delegations will meet in Oman to discuss possibly limiting Tehran’s nuclear development programme. During negotiations, the US will likely call for Iran to significantly limit its uranium enrichment activities, reduce its support for regional proxies and limit its production of drones and missiles. While Iran will possibly agree to partially dismantle some of its more advanced enrichment facilities, it is highly unlikely to agree to significant limitations on its nuclear programme, particularly capabilities it classifies as part of its nuclear energy programme. Additionally, though Iran will possibly nominally agree to reduce its support for its proxy network, it is highly unlikely to substantially reduce material support for regional proxies in the short term. This will elevate risks of deadlock within mediated discussions, undermining prospects for an agreement in the short term. If negotiations fail to progress in the coming months, risks of direct US and Israeli airstrikes targeting Iranian military assets, critical infrastructure and nuclear facilities will increase. More broadly, the US will highly likely maintain its ‘maximum pressure’ approach to Iran while negotiations take place by rigorously implementing sanctions targeting Iran’s key nuclear programme and oil exports. This will likely sustain socio-economic health concerns within Iran while compounding sanctions exposure risks and compliance concerns for regionally engaged firms, particularly in the banking, energy, shipping and technology industries.
- Israel and Turkey began negotiations to de-escalate tensions linked to military operations in Syria, though broader regional tensions will likely remain elevated. On 9 April, Israel and Turkey began negotiations on establishing a deconfliction line and associated mechanisms in Syria, following a period of elevated bilateral tensions. Since the fall of former president Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the IDF has conducted numerous airstrikes targeting military facilities and infrastructure in Syria as part of efforts to facilitate the ‘demilitarisation of southern Syria’. These efforts have increased diplomatic tensions with Turkey, which has significantly expanded its military presence in Syria in recent months. Although we continue to assess that direct clashes between Israel and Turkey remain unlikely, bilateral tensions significantly increased after the IDF conducted a series of airstrikes targeting military airports and airbases in Syria’s Hama and Homs governorates on 2 April (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 3 April 2025). These strikes were likely part of Israeli efforts to prevent Turkey from taking control of key positions and deploying air defence systems in them; this would limit the IDF’s freedom of action in Syria. Successful talks will likely moderate risks of clashes between the Israeli and Turkish forces stemming from target misidentification and miscommunication. Even so, the negotiations are highly unlikely to resolve broader bilateral tensions, particularly relating to IDF operations in Gaza and Turkey’s increasing regional influence (particularly in Syria).
- Syria: Assumption of government control over Kurdish territories signals increased stability. On 9 April, the Syrian government reached an agreement with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to assume control over the Tishrin Dam (Aleppo governorate). The area proximate to the dam was a key front for clashes between the SDF and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) in the past few months. Also on 9 April, more SDF groups were reportedly preparing to leave the Al-Ashrafiyah and Sheikh Maqsoud neighbourhoods in Aleppo (Aleppo governorate); these areas were de-facto controlled by the Kurds following the ousting of former president Bashar al-Assad. The developments signal significant progress in the implementation of the ceasefire agreement between Damascus and the SDF. Further security co-ordination between the two is highly likely in the coming weeks, in which the Kurdish forces will hand over control of key security positions along the Euphrates River to the government. This will likely reduce the rate and scope of SDF-SNA clashes, increasing stability in northern Syria. However, as long as Damascus lacks full control over the northern regions, we assess that risks of armed conflict between both sides will remain elevated.
- Iraq: Power-sharing agreement will moderate socio-economic health, government stability risks. Earlier on 10 April, local media reported that the Kurdistan Region of Iraq’s (KRI) two main political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), will hold talks on 12 April to finalise negotiations on power-sharing within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Since the KRI parliamentary elections in October 2024, the KDP and PUK have failed to form a government, underscoring continued challenges. However, a deal remains a realistic possibility in the coming months, moderating government stability and socio-economic health risks and improving governance conditions in the KRI. It will likely mitigate risks to KRI oil exports, moderating reliance on local tax income. This will possibly free up public spending, reducing delays to Kurdish civil servant wages and moderating domestic unrest risks. However, the KDP and PUK will almost certainly continue to command their own security bodies (Peshmerga). We assess that this will sustain security gaps and lack of cohesion when tackling local security threats posed by Islamic State (IS) and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) splinter groups.
Apr 09.
- Yemen-US: Red Sea attacks will likely continue despite Iran-US negotiations. On 7 April, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth indicated that the US military campaign against the Iranian-backed Houthis will continue and intensify in the coming weeks. The comment comes amid the renewal of nuclear negotiations between the US and Iran, which are set to take place in Oman on 12 April. According to Lebanese Hizballah (LH)-affiliated media, the Houthis have ignored the US’ recent offer to stop the bombing campaign in return for the Houthis stopping their attacks on US warships in the Red Sea. We assess that the Houthis will continue their attacks in the Red Sea in the coming weeks, despite the negotiations between Iran and the US. While the intensity of the US campaign will likely reduce the Houthis’ capabilities to perform frequent attacks in the Red Sea and against Israel, the Yemen-based group remains capable of sporadic attacks. Furthermore, while the Houthis are likely to prioritise US Navy ships, we assess that security risks for other maritime vessels crossing the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait will remain elevated.
- Region-US: Humanitarian concerns will be sustained despite limited reinstatement of USAID funding. On 8 April, internal emails from the US Agency for International Development (USAID) revealed that the US administration intends to reinstate financial assistance to the UN World Food Programme (WFP) in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. This comes a day after USAID announced further cuts to its emergency assistance for Syria and Yemen, following the suspension of most USAID programmes on 24 January. The move will likely mitigate against food security risks and temper socio-economic health risks for vulnerable refugees living in temporary accommodation in Jordan and Lebanon, as well as internally displaced individuals in Syria. However, the overall impact of previous cuts will remain significant. These include disruption to critical water and irrigation projects in Jordan, which will in turn exacerbate water security risks; they will also undermine Syria’s efforts to rebuild health infrastructure and emergency services, sustaining public health risks. Furthermore, we assess that the halting of infrastructure projects in Iraq will continue to drive unemployment and financial pressure for businesses.
Apr. 08.
- Iran-US: Nuclear discussions will reduce regional tensions, security risks. On 7 April, US President Donald Trump announced that the US would enter direct talks with Iran over its nuclear programme. In response, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that he would attend indirect talks with US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff in Oman on 12 April. Trump threatened severe consequences for Iran if discussions failed. A successful resumption of Iran-US nuclear negotiations would moderate the risks of regional escalation and US-Israeli strikes on Iranian assets in the short term. There is a realistic possibility such a resumption would also reduce the risk of Iranian proxy attacks on Israeli and Western assets in the region, moderating security and business operational disruption risks in Israel and neighbouring countries, including Iraq. However, we also assess there is a sustained risk that the US will employ military pressure on Iran in the event Washington DC perceives that Tehran is not sufficiently receptive to negotiations, or is unwilling to make concessions.
- Israel: Hearing on Shin Bet head’s dismissal will raise domestic unrest, supervision quality risks. On 8 April, the Israeli Court of Justice began hearings on the dismissal of Ronen Bar, the head of Israel’s internal security agency (the Shin Bet). Under the law, the government can dismiss the head of the Shin Bet following a hearing and the involvement of the Advisory Committee for the Appointment of Senior Civil Service Officials. However, in Bar’s case, the government did not involve the committee, and as such possibly did not conduct a satisfactory hearing. Protesters opposing the move gathered outside the Supreme Court building in Jerusalem’s Givat Ram neighbourhood (Jerusalem district). Protests and counter-protests are likely to continue throughout the day, mainly concentrated around the Supreme Court building, though they will not elevate domestic unrest and travel disruption risks significantly. If the court rules against the government, we assess that pro-government protests will likely increase in Jerusalem, driving moderate travel disruption in the city. In the unlikely event that the government does not abide by the court ruling, mass anti-government protests and a general strike across Israel –particularly in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) – are highly likely, elevating the risk of clashes with the police.
Apr 07.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
- The largest Hamas rocket salvo against Israel since the ceasefire broke injured at least seven individuals; an elevated risk of further rocket strikes will likely persist through Passover (12-19 April).
- A second Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile defence battery arrived in Israel on 5 April, boosting long-range air defence capabilities.
- On 4 April, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted an unmanned aircraft vehicle (UAV) east of Israel, likely launched by the Iran-backed Houthis.
- The suspension of an IDF battalion vice-commander on 6 April reflects some efforts to address a mounting discipline challenge, though substantial improvements are unlikely, sustaining human rights risks.
POLITICAL FORECAST
- Humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate in Gaza, compounding risks of violence against locally engaged NGO staff.
- A general strike in the West Bank (Palestinian Territories) underscores the increasing influence of militant groups as IDF operations continue in Gaza.
- Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu travelled to the US on 6 April to meet with US President Donald Trump amid efforts to moderate the socio-economic impact of tariffs on Israeli exports.
- Anti-government protest activity will highly likely continue in Israel’s major cities in the coming weeks, sustaining broader operational disruption risks.
- Increasing tensions between Israel and the UK will likely drive travel disruption risks for British nationals associated with pro-Palestine activism.
EXPANDED MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS; The largest Hamas rocket salvo against Israel since the ceasefire broke injured at least seven individuals; an elevated risk of further rocket strikes will likely persist through Passover (12-19 April). On 6 April, Hamas militants in Deir al-Balah, central Gaza, launched ten rockets targeting southern Israel, triggering sirens in population centres in and around Ashdod, Ashkelon (both Southern district) and Gan Yavne (Central district). The IDF intercepted five rockets, with one rocket hitting a residential area in Ashkelon, causing material damage to cars and residential buildings, injuring at least seven lightly due to shrapnel. Following the attack, the IDF issued an evacuation order to residents in parts of Deir al-Balah before conducting strikes targeting launchers and militant infrastructure in those areas. In the coming weeks, Gaza-based militants will likely launch further rocket strikes, particularly on Passover Eve (12 April) and throughout the Passover holiday (12-19 April). There is also a realistic possibility Hamas rocket strikes will target central Israel during this period; such strikes are particularly likely on 12 April, elevating security risks for personnel.
- A second Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile defence battery arrived in Israel on 5 April, boosting long-range air defence capabilities. The battery will likely be operational within a week. Its delivery comes amid heightened regional tensions and threats by US President Donald Trump to attack Iran if it does not co-operate on a nuclear agreement with the US. The battery will increase Israel’s air defence capabilities against long-range missiles, partially mitigating threats from Iran-backed Houthis (and possibly Iran) ahead of the Passover holiday period. An escalation in regional tensions, including direct strikes between Israel and/or the US and Iran, remains a realistic possibility through 2025. While the Iranian regime indicated willingness to engage in indirect talks with the US, the likelihood of escalation will increase in the coming weeks without a significant development in nuclear talks.
- On 4 April, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted an unmanned aircraft vehicle (UAV) east of Israel, likely launched by the Iran-backed Houthis. Previous patterns regarding IDF air defence capabilities indicate that UAVs represent a higher risk profile compared to long-range ballistic missiles due to their manoeuvrability in the air and the altitude at which they travel (which makes them harder to detect). While it is most likely the attack was launched by the Houthis, there remains a realistic possibility that it came from other pro-Iranian militias in the region, such as those in Iraq. Despite highly capable Israeli air defence systems, attack risks by these groups will likely increase during the Passover period (12-19 April), elevating security and travel disruption risks across Israel. Long-range attacks targeting Israel will also increase security and travel disruption risks for neighbouring countries including Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria, particularly due to the risk of exposure to shrapnel.
- The suspension of an IDF battalion vice-commander on 6 April reflects some efforts to address a mounting discipline challenge, though substantial improvements are unlikely, sustaining human rights risks. The vice-commander, a reservist with the rank of Major, has been suspended until an investigation is completed into a 4 April incident in which service personnel under her command vandalised Palestinian vehicles in Qusra (Nablus governorate) seemingly without cause. The IDF will likely enforce disciplinary measures and penalties on all the service members involved in the incident. The service members initially claimed they were following procedure likely referring to a practice of decommissioning any stolen car found within the Palestinian territories. However, such measures are unlikely to resolve an apparent weakening of discipline among IDF troops when on deployment within the Palestinian territories, sustaining elevated human rights, miss-fire and misidentification risks for bystanders in the proximity of IDF operations.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate in Gaza, compounding risks of violence against locally engaged NGO staff. On 3 April, the World Food Programme announced the closure of all UN-supported kitchen and bakery facilities in Gaza due to flour and fuel shortages. The close comes after Israel halted all deliveries of humanitarian aid (including flour) into Gaza on 4 March. The closures will almost certainly compound increasing food security risks and trigger further price surges in food staples. Such trends will substantially increase risks of opportunistic and planned theft targeting NGO convoys, premises and staff, increasing security risks for locally engaged staff. Although the Ynet media outlet reported earlier on 7 April that limited humanitarian aid deliveries into Gaza would possibly resume in the coming days, the IDF subsequently refuted these reports, sustaining critical supply chain disruption risks for NGOs operating in Gaza. That said, we assess that the IDF will likely authorise the resumption of aid deliveries into Gaza in the coming month. However, this is unlikely to moderate risks of attacks targeting aid convoys and distribution points, which will almost certainly continue facing risks of militant and organised criminal co-option amid critical humanitarian conditions.
- A general strike in the West Bank (Palestinian Territories) underscores the increasing influence of militant groups as IDF operations continue in Gaza. On 7 April, numerous Palestinian businesses in the West Bank began a general strike to protest the IDF’s continued operations in Gaza. The strike has substantially disrupted private-sector operations in the West Bank, while strike-related protests have emerged in numerous locations, including East Jerusalem (Jerusalem governorate) and Ramallah (Ramallah and al Bireh governorate). The strike was called by the Palestinian National and Islamic Forces, a coalition of Palestinian groups including Hamas on 6 April. Broad participation highlights the increasing influence of militant organisations in the West Bank, underscoring elevated risks of radicalisation and militant recruitment, particularly as IDF operations continue in Gaza. This trend will highly likely sustain elevated risks of attacks in the West Bank and Jerusalem areas in the coming weeks, primarily targeting Israeli security personnel and fixed positions such as checkpoints, outposts and public transport hubs. Attack risks will be particularly acute during the Passover holiday (12 April-19 April), driving crossfire risks to bystanders. In the coming weeks, humanitarian conditions in Gaza will highly likely continue deteriorating, sustaining risks of further attacks, protests and strike action in the West Bank.
- Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu travelled to the US on 6 April to meet with US President Donald Trump amid efforts to moderate the socio-economic impact of tariffs on Israeli exports. On 2 April, US President Donald Trump announced 10% baseline tariffs on most goods imported into the US as well as higher levies for countries with large trade deficits with the US. Israel faces a 17% tariff on goods exported to the US, likely increasing regulatory framework and supervision quality concerns for Israel-based firms exporting goods to the US. This will substantially increase risks of supply chain disruption in the coming weeks, particularly in the medical technology and pharmaceuticals industries as well as across the technology industry more broadly. In the coming months, tariff implementation will also increase risks of a broader decrease in US demand for Israeli exports. Since the US is Israel’s largest trading partner, this would likely compound broader socio-economic health concerns within Israel. Amid broader global market volatility, shares on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange have fallen substantially in recent days; the benchmark TA-125 index fell 3.8% on 6 April and 3.1% upon opening earlier on 7 April. In the coming days, Netanyahu will highly likely attempt to negotiate tariff relief during meetings with Trump and administration officials during his visit to the capital Washington DC. Given strong bilateral relations and reciprocal foreign direct investment, there is a realistic possibility that Netanyahu will secure moderate tariff concessions and possibly moderate longer-term socio-economic concerns within Israel. However, changes to tariff policy and levies will sustain risks of rapid regulatory framework changes for Israel-based exporters, sustaining compliance concerns and operational disruption risks.
- Anti-government protest activity will highly likely continue in Israel’s major cities in the coming weeks, sustaining broader operational disruption risks. On 4 April, over 5,000 protesters gathered in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) to call for the government to repeal conscription exemptions for ultra-Orthodox men. On 5 April, approximately 1,000 demonstrators gathered in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) for weekly protests calling for further hostage releases. Hundreds of protesters also gathered outside Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s residence in Jerusalem earlier on 7 April to mark 18 months since the 7 October 2023 attacks. The anti-government demonstrations moderately disrupted movement through the Rehavia area and will highly likely continue in the coming hours. More broadly, anti-government demonstrations are highly likely to continue in the coming days, increasing travel and operational disruption risks in major cities. On 8 April, the High Court will convene a hearing on Netanyahu’s efforts to dismiss the head of the Shin Bet, Ronen Bar. This will highly likely trigger anti-government protests, particularly around the court’s premises in Jerusalem, increasing risks of altercations with the police and possible counter-demonstrators. Anti-government protestors will also highly likely call for demonstrations targeting Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV; Tel Aviv district) upon Netanyahu’s return from the US on 9 April, increasing risks of temporary disruption to travel into and out of the facility. Although hostage release protests will likely proceed on 12 April, celebrations to mark the beginning of the Passover holiday (12-19 April) will possibly result in decreased attendance, moderating risks of operational disruption. Even so, protesters in Tel Aviv will likely engage in high-profile acts of civil disobedience, such as erecting and burning large-scale Seder tables in Hostages’ Square and/or establishing encampments outside government buildings, sustaining risks of travel disruption through the city centre in the coming days.
- Increasing tensions between Israel and the UK will likely drive travel disruption risks for British nationals associated with pro-Palestine activism. On 5 April, the Israeli border authorities denied entry to and subsequently deported two UK MPs travelling to Israel and the West Bank as part of a parliamentary delegation. Israel claimed the MPs intended to provoke anti-Israel activity, likely based on their pro-Palestine activism. The move underscores elevated diplomatic tensions between Israel and the UK linked to IDF operations in Gaza; tensions will highly likely continue rising in the coming weeks as the UK’s Metropolitan Police considers a dossier implicating British nationals within the IDF regarding the possible perpetration of war crimes in Gaza. Amid elevated tensions, the UK will likely increase scrutiny of arms export licenses to Israel in the coming weeks, increasing compliance concerns and supply chain disruption risks for firms engaged in defence, technology and transport sectors. Additionally, the MPs’ deportations highlight increasing risks of travel disruption for individuals associated with pro-Palestine activism if they attempt to enter Israel. Although cases of refused entry and deportation have primarily impacted political figures to date, there is a realistic possibility that restrictions will extend to individuals within the private sector, particularly those with connections to NGOs and academia. Travel restrictions will likely undermine labour flexibility and operational continuity, particularly for firms employing large numbers of foreign nationals.
- Israel-UK: Denial of entry for UK MP underscores diplomatic tensions, drives operational risks. On 5 April, the Israeli authorities denied entry to and subsequently deported two UK MPs who were travelling to Israel and the West Bank as part of a parliamentary delegation. Israel claimed the MPs intended to provoke anti-Israel activity. The move underscores elevated diplomatic tensions between Israel and the UK, which will likely intensify in the coming weeks as the UK’s Metropolitan Police considers a dossier implicating British members of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) regarding the committing of war crimes in Gaza. These tensions will likely drive increased scrutiny from the UK on arms export licenses, elevating risks to companies in the defence sector. Furthermore, the deportations highlight increased barriers to individuals travelling to Israel who are associated with pro-Palestine causes. Most cases thus far have been against political representatives. However, we assess that there is a realistic possibility such restrictions will impact the private sector, adversely impacting business and NGO personnel, driving travel delays and elevating knock-on operational and financial risks arising from staff and service shortages.
- Palestinian Territories: General strike will elevate domestic unrest, radicalisation, attack risks. Earlier on 7 April, Palestinian businesses in the West Bank launched a general strike to protest Israel’s denial of aid and offensive operations in Gaza. The strike follows calls on 6 April from the Palestinian National and Islamic Forces, a coalition of Palestinian groups including Hamas. Over the past week, the food shortage in Gaza resulted in increasing armed clashes between Hamas operatives and local clans, further elevating bystander security risks across the strip. The strike in the West Bank highlights the increasing influence of Palestinian militant organisations and rising radicalisation risks, elevating attack risks. Attacks will likely target Israeli security personnel and fixed positions such as checkpoints, outposts and public transport hubs, driving crossfire risks to bystanders. Despite the likely resumption of aid into Gaza in the coming month, we assess that attack and domestic unrest will remain elevated throughout the West Bank in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)
10 Apr 25. Hezbollah ready for talks with Lebanese government on defence strategy, MP says. Hezbollah lawmaker Hassan Fadlallah said on Thursday the Iran-aligned group is ready to enter talks with the Lebanese government on a national defence strategy, with the focus on ensuring the removal of Israeli troops from Lebanon’s territory. U.S.-backed President Joseph Aoun, who pledged to establish a state monopoly on the control of arms when he took office in January, is set to start talks with Hezbollah about its weapons arsenal, three Lebanese political sources told Reuters. One of the world’s most heavily armed non-state groups, Hezbollah emerged severely weakened from the 2024 conflict with Israel, which was triggered by the Gaza war. The group suffered heavy losses including the killing of its top leaders and thousands of its fighters. The blow was compounded when its ally Bashar al-Assad was toppled from power in Syria, cutting the group’s supply lines from Iran. In a televised speech, Fadlallah said: “We have expressed our readiness for dialogue to find a defense strategy for Lebanon.” (Source: Reuters)
10 Apr 25. The UK welcomes the formation of the new Syrian government: UK statement at the UN Security Council. Statement by Jess Jambert-Gray, UK Deputy Political Coordinator, at the UN Security Council meeting on Syria. 10 April 2025 (Transcript of the speech, exactly as it was delivered)
I will make three points.
First, since this Council last met, Syria has made further positive progress in its political transition. The UK welcomes the announcement on the formation of the new Syrian government. And we look forward to the protection of human rights, unfettered access of humanitarian aid, the safe destruction of chemical weapons and the combatting of terrorism and extremism. The government’s formation marks an important milestone in the transition. We hope this spirit of inclusive representation will be carried forward in state institutions and in any further appointments, including to the Legislative Committee, and to a clear timeline for the next phases of the transition. The UK stands ready to work with the Syrian government to this end and to support an inclusive, stable and prosperous future for the Syrian people. Second, this opportunity for stability is being threatened by the continued violence.
We are concerned by Israeli strikes and incursions into Syria, with reports of civilian deaths. These actions risk destabilising Syria and the wider region. And this is in no one’s interest. We recognise Israel’s focus on protecting the security of its borders and its people, but the actions it takes must be proportionate and in line with international law. We call on all actors to uphold the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, respect Syrian territorial integrity and prioritise diplomacy over force. Third, it is the Syrian people who will suffer the most from this worrying escalation. After fourteen years of tyranny and conflict at the hands of the Assad regime, the Syrian people still face a staggering humanitarian crisis. And that is why the UK has recently pledged up to $207m in critical humanitarian assistance. Our focus should now be on supporting Syrians to rebuild their country. Therefore we call on all parties to ensure that humanitarian access remains possible across Syria and that civilian lives are protected. The UK will continue to work with our international partners to support Syrians as they look to build a better future. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
09 Apr 25. US Airstrikes in Yemen Reportedly Kill Houthi Intelligence Chief. A senior Houthi intelligence official, Abdul Nasser Al-Kamali, was reportedly killed in recent U.S. airstrikes in Yemen, according to Saudi news outlet Al-Hadath.
“A photo of intelligence leader Abdul Nasser Al-Kamali, who the Houthis announced was killed in a US raid,” the news outlet said in a post on X on Tuesday.
The Houthis’ intelligence directorate spokesperson said on Telegram that the U.S. had launched 11 airstrikes targeting the capital Sana’a and its surrounding areas but it did not confirm the death of Kamali, who served as head of the Houthis’ intelligence directorate. Local reports said some strikes hit underground Houthi weapons facilities near Mount Nuqum in Sana’a. U.S. B-2 bombers may have taken part in the operation, though that remains unconfirmed. Nine additional airstrikes have been reported in the neighboring Mar’ib region. The U.S. did not confirm Kamali’s death. The U.S. Central Command has released few details about its operations against the Houthis since launching the strikes on March 15. On Monday, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said the strikes would continue until the Houthis stop launching attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea. “We are not going to relent,” said Hegseth, “and it’s only going to be more unrelenting until the Houthis declare they will stop shooting at our ships.” (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
08 Apr 25. Israel Revises Account of Fatal Shooting of 15 Palestinian Medics in Gaza. Israel’s military has admitted it gave a false account of a March 23 incident in Rafah, Gaza, in which 15 Palestinian medics were killed. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) originally claimed the emergency vehicles were moving “suspiciously” without lights, but later said that account was incorrect. The military made the admission after The New York Times published a video that appeared to show that the emergency vehicles of the Palestinian Red Crescent and Civil Defense teams, carrying paramedics and first responders, had their emergency lights on. The video also showed the teams moving slowly and clearly marked as medical responders. Following the release of the video, the IDF said it will reinvestigate the incident: “All claims, including the documentation circulated about the incident, will be thoroughly and deeply examined to understand the sequence of events and the handling of the situation,” the IDF said. The medics were responding to an earlier airstrike on March 23 when Israeli troops opened fire on them. According to survivors and UN officials, the emergency crews were shot “one by one.” Their bodies—eight Red Crescent paramedics, six Civil Defence first responders, and one UN staff member—were later discovered in a shallow grave in Rafah, next to the wreckage of ambulances, a fire truck, and a UN-marked vehicle. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
A CNIM Group Company
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–