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Military And Security Developments
Apr 04.
Israel-Lebanon: Strike in Sidon underscores elevated security risks in coming days. Earlier on 4 April, the IDF conducted an airstrike in Sidon (South governorate) targeting Hassan Farhat, commander of Hamas’s western arena in Lebanon. The strike was likely motivated by a concern regarding increased attack risks from Palestinian militants, including within Lebanon, ahead of the upcoming Passover holiday (12-19 April). These strikes will likely continue and possibly increase over the coming 14 days, elevating bystander risks, particularly on roads in southern Lebanon. However, such strikes risk placing increasing strains on the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire signed in November 2024. This latest strike marks just the latest in a series of strikes in recent months which have violated the ceasefire agreement by striking north of the Litani River. While Israel has claimed such action is justified by Hizballah’s violations of the agreement, continued strikes north of the Litani River will raise the risk of further armed escalation. However, we assess that a full resumption of hostilities and ceasefire collapse remains unlikely in the coming weeks.
Apr 03.
* Clashes between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and local Syrian militants in Daraa governorate (Syria) highlight the risk of further armed escalation.
* On 2 April, the IDF launched an intensive airstrike campaign targeting military airports across Syria; further such operations will likely drive tensions with Turkey.
* On 2 April, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu confirmed that the IDF is constructing a new corridor in southern Gaza.
* On 23 March, the IDF allegedly killed 15 Palestinian medics and rescue workers in southern Gaza, underscoring the severe security and misidentification risks in the strip.
* On 2 April, the IDF published a summary of its operations in the West Bank during the Ramadan period, noting an 80% decrease in militant attacks compared to last year’s Ramadan period.
* The IDF’s second strike against Beirut (Lebanon) has sustained ongoing conflict escalation risks, though a full resumption of hostilities remains unlikely.
POLITICAL FORECAST
* The ‘Qatargate’ investigation will drive further anti-government protest risks in Israel; it will possibly also drive tensions between Qatar and Egypt.
* The deadlock in ceasefire negotiations will likely persist in the coming weeks, driving significant armed conflict risks.
* Food shortages in Gaza will increase the risk of armed clashes between the Hamas authorities and local clans.
* Egypt will possibly increase its efforts to mediate between the US and Yemen-based Houthis through indirect talks in the coming weeks, though such negotiations are unlikely to reduce US strikes in the short term.
* Clashes between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and local Syrian militants in Daraa governorate (Syria) highlight the risk of further armed escalation. On 2 April, the IDF’s Brigade 474 conducted clearing operations in the Tasil area (Daraa) to destroy military infrastructure and to confiscate weapons. During the operation, local Syrian militants opened fire on the IDF, prompting a small-arms engagement in which the IDF called in artillery and air support. Local reports claim that during the clashes, mosques were used to issue calls for jihad against the Israeli forces. The incident underscores the increasing risk of armed clashes between IDF troops and Syrian militants and the likelihood of greater radicalisation among the Syrian public. We assess these risks will continue increasing in the coming weeks, prompting further IDF operations in southern Syria in which the risk of misidentification will be elevated, particularly in Darra.
* On 2 April, the IDF launched an intensive airstrike campaign targeting military airports across Syria; further such operations will likely drive tensions with Turkey. The IDF targeted a military airport in Hama (Hama governorate) and the T-4 airbase in Homs governorate. This marks the second strike against T-4 in recent days and is consistent with our previous assessment concerning the elevated risks around military airports in Syria (Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 27 March 2025). The IDF also conducted strikes near Damascus (Syria), targeting the Barzah military research facility and additional military infrastructure. Local reports claim the IDF strike on the miliary airport in Hama killed 15 members of the Syrian defence ministry and completely disabled the airport’s operational capabilities. The strikes likely constitute an Israeli attempt to block Turkish moves to deploy air defence systems in Syria and to take control of key airbases in the coming weeks. However, the strikes are unlikely to prevent Turkey from increasing defence and logistical support to the Syrian government. With IDF strikes against Syrian military bases unlikely to cease in the coming months, we assess that geopolitical tensions with Turkey are likely to rise, increasing the risk of further diplomatic fallout, and therefore impacting trade. However, direct military confrontation between Israel and Turkey remains highly unlikely.
* On 2 April, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu confirmed that the IDF is constructing a new corridor in southern Gaza. The Morag Corridor will cross between Rafah and Khan Yunis and is likely the reason for the large evacuation order that the IDF issued on 31 March. Together with the Netzarim Corridor in central Gaza and the Philadelphi Corridor on the Gaza-Egypt border, the new corridor will further consolidate the IDF’s control over the strip. The establishment of the new corridor is likely to involve intense IDF clearing operations and the demolition of structures in the area, further elevating population displacement and worsening humanitarian conditions in the strip. Additionally, there is a realistic possibility that in the coming months the IDF will work to establish another corridor between Deir al-Balah and Khan Yunis (or to the north of the Netzarim Corridor).
* On 23 March, the IDF allegedly killed 15 Palestinian medics and rescue workers in southern Gaza, underscoring the severe security and misidentification risks in the strip. The IDF confirmed the incident, claiming that they opened fire on the ambulances and fire engines because their approach had not been co-ordinated, raising concerns over a possible attack. Additional reports alleged that some of the workers were later found handcuffed, indicating they were shot after their arrest. The incident highlights the severe threat to life and the possibility of misidentification across the strip, including for humanitarian workers, particularly near areas undergoing ongoing active military operations.
* On 2 April, the IDF published a summary of its operations in the West Bank during the Ramadan period, noting an 80% decrease in militant attacks compared to last year’s Ramadan period. During Ramadan this year, the IDF arrested 401 terrorism suspects, confiscated 105 weapons, conducted over 1,500 offensive operations and killed 13 militants. It is likely that the actual figures are even higher, as the information disclosed by the IDF does not include operations by the Valley Territorial Brigade (Brigade 417), which operates within the Jordan Valley region of the West Bank. Regardless, the IDF report will likely be taken as vindication of the Israeli security forces’ assessment that periods of intense military operations in the West Bank reduce militant attack risks. This will elevate the likelihood of further intensive military operations in the West Bank in the coming days in preparation for Passover (from the evening of 12 April to 19 April).
* The IDF’s second strike against Beirut (Lebanon) has sustained ongoing conflict escalation risks, though a full resumption of hostilities remains unlikely. On 1 April, the IDF killed at least four people in a strike on a nine-story building in Beirut’s Dahieh neighbourhood, which severely damaged the building’s top three floors. According to the IDF, the strike targeted Hassan Badir, a Lebanese Hizballah (LH) operative who operated as part of Unit 3900, a joint LH and Iranian Quds Force unit. Unit 3900 co-operates with Palestinian militant organisations to support, plan and launch attacks against Israeli targets in Israel and around the world. The unit operates in various countries and territories; the West Bank is one of its key theatres of operation. The IDF claimed the strike was necessitated by Badir’s involvement in a plan to attack Israeli civilians abroad (imminently). Nevertheless, the strike in Beirut, which was the second in days (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 31 March 2025), will sustain elevated tensions and the risk of armed conflict escalation in the coming days. While the resumption of full hostilities between Israel and LH remains unlikely, retaliatory rocket strikes by militant cells against northern Israel and sporadic IDF strikes in and around Beirut remain a realistic possibility in the coming weeks.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
* The ‘Qatargate’ investigation will drive further anti-government protest risks in Israel; it will possibly also drive tensions between Qatar and Egypt. On 1 April, Israeli media reported further details about the ongoing investigation into what is known as ‘Qatargate’ (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 31 March 2025). According to the court filings, two of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s aides, with the help of a US lobbying company, played a role in positively spinning Doha’s role as a facilitator in the negotiations between Israel and Hamas. Investigations also showed that Qatar wanted Urich to spread negative messaging through the media about Egypt’s role in these negotiations, and to portray Cairo as an unfair broker. These developments will likely drive further anti-government protests in Israel in the coming weeks, given Netanyahu’s central position in the investigation. Furthermore, ‘Qatargate’ will possibly trigger further tensions between Doha and Cairo in the coming months, which will likely (albeit partially) impact their co-ordination during hostage deal talks. However, we assess the investigations are unlikely to trigger a major political and diplomatic crisis between Egypt and Qatar.
* The deadlock in ceasefire negotiations will likely persist in the coming weeks, driving significant armed conflict risks. On 2 April, unnamed Hamas officials stated that the group would not respond to or engage with Israel’s latest counter-proposal to the mediators’ (Egypt and Qatar’s) offer for a ceasefire in Gaza. The counter-proposal reportedly involves Hamas releasing half of the living hostages and half of the dead hostages held in Gaza in exchange for a 50-day ceasefire. Instead, Hamas reaffirmed its agreement with the mediators’ original plan, which would extend the ceasefire for another 50 days in exchange for only five living hostages, while Israel released 250 Palestinian prisoners and 2,000 other individuals arrested after 7 October 2023. On the same day, a Palestinian official stated that Hamas wants a permanent ceasefire agreement in which it will release all hostages and cede governance of Gaza to independent Palestinian technocrats. However, Israel previously rejected this proposal, alleging it would provide Hamas with a chance to rebuild its military capacity in the enclave. The present deadlock in negotiations underscores Israel’s new maximum pressure strategy in Gaza to enforce concessions under fire. However, Hamas is unlikely to agree to similar Israeli proposals involving the release of large numbers of hostages and risk losing its main leverage in any prospective talks. This deadlock will exacerbate armed conflict risks in Gaza in the coming weeks, including medium-to-large-scale ground operations in several parts of the enclave and the establishment of new security corridors (see Military and Security Forecast).
* Food shortages in Gaza will increase the risk of armed clashes between the Hamas authorities and local clans. On 2 April, armed clashes erupted between Hamas and local clans in the Shuja’iyya neighbourhood in northern Gaza after Hamas killed one of the sons of the Hassanin clan’s chief. The chief’s son was killed earlier that day by the Hamas police, who then opened fire after failing to disperse a crowd that had broken into a UNRWA warehouse where Hamas stores flour, whereupon they stole approximately 20,000 sacks. Similarly, on 1 April, the Hamas police killed another notable person affiliated with the prominent Abu Samra clan. They used live ammunition to disperse residents in Deir al-Balah in central Gaza who were lining up to buy flour and who refused to leave after the flour ran out. Clan members later captured the shooter and publicly executed him. These incidents highlight elevated anti-Hamas sentiment and the risk of armed clashes between the local population and Hamas operatives in Gaza amid a growing food crisis. This crisis is likely to continue gradually increasing in line with Israel’s withholding of aid from Gaza following the ceasefire collapse, elevating humanitarian concerns across the strip. Further incidents of armed clashes as well as Hamas’ crackdown on protests and outbreaks of domestic unrest are likely in the coming weeks, exacerbating bystander security risks across the strip.
* Egypt will possibly increase its efforts to mediate between the US and Yemen-based Houthis through indirect talks in the coming weeks, though such negotiations are unlikely to reduce US strikes in the short term. On 3 April, Arabic media, citing Egyptian officials, reported that Cairo is seeking a possible mediatory role between the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen and the US administration. This comes days after a Houthi delegation arrived in Cairo to hold unprecedented talks with Egyptian intelligence officials over the escalation in the Red Sea and US strikes against the group. The developments are consistent with Egypt’s decision to keep communication channels open to the Houthis despite the maritime attacks that have disrupted Suez Canal operations. This has enabled Cairo to capitalise on its recent détente with Iran to enhance security co-ordination with the Houthis and to mitigate against the risks facing ships heading to Egyptian ports. As such, Egypt is unlikely to take part in any US-led military action against the group. However, even if Egypt is able to secure indirect talks, we assess these are unlikely to reduce US strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen in the medium term, as the US views such strikes as a key part of its maximum pressure strategy against Iran and its regional proxies/allies.
Apr 02.
- Iran-US: US military buildup in Middle East and Indian Ocean will elevate tensions with Iran. On 1 April, the Pentagon confirmed that it deployed additional air squadrons and military assets to the Middle East, extended the Harry S Truman Carrier Strike Group’s mission and deployed another aircraft carrier to the region amid elevated tensions with Iran. On the same day, Iranian military officials threatened a preemptive strike targeting the recently stationed B2 bombers at the Diego Garcia airbase in the Indian Ocean. While the increasing US military buildup will almost certainly elevate the ongoing geopolitical tensions, we assess that a US strike on Iran is currently unlikely in the next two weeks. Similarly, despite Iranian warnings of a preemptive strike, it is unlikely that Iran has the military capacity to target the Island meaningfully (primarily due to the vast distances involved). This enhanced US security posture is almost certainly part of efforts to pressure Iran into a new nuclear agreement. However, the risks of direct confrontation will remain very high in the coming months, with possible US strikes on Iranian assets elevating the risk of Iranian retaliation targeting US bases and maritime traffic in the Gulf.
Apr 01.
- Lebanon-Israel: IDF strike on Beirut points to escalation risks, though ceasefire breakdown is unlikely. Earlier on 1 April, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed at least three people in a strike on a residential building in Beirut’s (Lebanon) southern Dahieh neighbourhood. The IDF stated they targeted a Lebanese Hizballah (LH) operative who was assisting Hamas operations. The strike came days after Israel struck Beirut for the first time since November 2024 in retaliation for rocket attacks targeting northern Israel. There is a realistic possibility of further IDF airstrikes in and around Beirut in the coming weeks as tensions increase between Israel and Lebanon. However, a collapse in the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire remains unlikely in the short term. However, if the frequency of strikes in Beirut increases over the coming months, this will likely drive conflict escalation and elevate the risk of a ceasefire breakdown. Israel will also likely continue to target LH and militant infrastructure in southern Lebanon in the coming days, sustaining substantial collateral damage risks for proximate staff and assets, while exacerbating already critical socio-economic and humanitarian concerns.
- Iraq: Integration of rogue Shia militias will reduce attack risks but sustain exposure to US sanctions. On 30 March, Iraqi security officials stated that Iraq’s remaining rogue militias (mostly Shia) would be fully integrated within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) after the Eid al-Fitr holiday (31 March – 2 April). The process will possibly be completed in the coming weeks. The move will likely moderately increase the PMF’s command and control over armed groups, which, given its co-operation with the Iraqi security forces, will likely partially reduce attack risks in Iraq. However, as the PMF is largely backed by Iran and remains outside full government control, the move is highly unlikely to satisfy demands by the US for Baghdad to dismantle Iranian-backed groups, sustaining the risk of US sanctions against Iraq this year. Any such sanctions are likely to impact the logistics and banking sectors, elevating the risk of operational disruption, which will possibly extend to oil companies and the energy sector.
Mar 31.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
- On 31 March, the IDF issued its largest evacuation order to the residents of Rafah since the resumption of fighting, indicating the launch of a large-scale operation in the area.
- A breakdown in the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire is unlikely following an IDF strike on a building in Beirut (Lebanon), though further strikes against northern Israel will increase the risk of escalatory crossfire.
- Near-daily missile attacks by the Iranian-backed Houthis are likely to continue, sustaining incidental threats to staff and assets throughout Israel, particularly central areas.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OVERALL FORECAST
- Developments in the ‘Qatargate’ investigation underscore corruption and will drive government stability risks.
- Anti-government protests over several issues, including demands for the release of hostages held in Gaza, judicial reform and efforts to remove Ronen Bar as the head of the Shin Bet, will likely continue across Israel over the coming week.
- Hamas’ crackdown will likely sustain a reduction in anti-Hamas protests, though anti-Hamas sentiment will likely remain elevated, possibly pushing the group to make concessions in ceasefire negotiations in the coming weeks.
- A ceasefire remains unlikely in the short term despite Hamas agreeing to mediator terms.
- While US President Donald Trump’s letter to Iran announcing a two-month deadline for nuclear negotiations and a US force deployment to Diego Garcia highlight elevated regional tensions, an immediate US strike remains unlikely.
- On 31 March, the IDF issued its largest evacuation order to the residents of Rafah since the resumption of fighting, indicating the launch of a large-scale operation in the area. The IDF Spokesperson to Arab Media, Avichay Adraee, posted an evacuation warning to all residents of the municipalities of al-Nasr and al-Shawka, as well as eastern and western regional areas and the neighbourhoods of al-Salam, al-Manara and Qizan al-Najjar. The post also indicates that the IDF intends to resume intense operations in the area; it has ordered residents to evacuate to the al-Mawasi area on the strip’s southern coast. The evacuated area covers a large territory between Rafah and Khan Yunis, where the IDF has not previously deployed ground forces. Mass population displacement and likely IDF clearing operations in the area will further elevate humanitarian concerns in the strip. Heavy clashes between the IDF and militants in the area are also likely, elevating exposure to crossfire and misidentification risks for NGO staff.
- A breakdown in the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire is unlikely following an IDF strike on a building in Beirut (Lebanon), though further strikes against northern Israel will increase the risk of escalatory crossfire. On 28 March, the IDF intercepted two rockets launched from southern Lebanon targeting Kiryat Shmona (Northern district). This marked the second instance of rocket fire from Lebanon since the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire. Later that day, the IDF issued evacuation orders for (and shortly afterwards hit) a building in Beirut’s Hadath neighbourhood. The initial strike on Kiryat Shmona was likely conducted by rogue militant groups. While Lebanese Hizballah (LH) denies any involvement with these groups, the Israeli government claims that LH is responsible for attacks and militancy in southern Lebanon. As such, and in addition to the strike in Beirut, the IDF has also increased its targeting of LH infrastructure and forces in southern Lebanon. Despite the IDF strike in Beirut, a collapse of the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire remains unlikely. However, further incidents of cross-border rocket fire targeting northern Israel remain possible. Such incidents are likely to prompt further IDF airstrikes in southern Lebanon; there is also a realistic possibility of IDF strikes in and around Beirut. While such strikes will likely remain sporadic, a gradual increase in their frequency is possible and will elevate the risk of snowballing escalation in the coming months.
- Near-daily missile attacks by the Iranian-backed Houthis are likely to continue, sustaining incidental threats to staff and assets throughout Israel, particularly central areas. On 30 March, shrapnel from an intercepted Houthi ballistic missile scattered across Eshtaol, Highway 375, the Shimshon Interchange, Ta’oz and Tzur Hadassah (all Jerusalem district). Additionally, Palestinian media reported shrapnel in Hebron (Hebron governorate). The shrapnel caused moderate damage to private houses and cars, but no casualties. The Iranian-backed Houthis have continued to target Israel on an almost daily basis, frequently triggering rocket sirens across Israel, particularly in central areas. These attacks are likely to continue. Despite IDF interceptions, they will also continue to drive incidental security risks across the country, mainly due to shrapnel.
- While US President Donald Trump’s letter to Iran announcing a two-month deadline for nuclear negotiations and a US force deployment to Diego Garcia highlight elevated regional tensions, an immediate US strike remains unlikely. The US Navy has also delayed the withdrawal of the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier from the region by a month, creating an overlap period in April during which both the USS Harry S. Truman and the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carriers will be deployed to the region. These moves likely reflect force projection efforts, as the Trump administration seeks to increase pressure on Iran to engage in negotiations. However, these developments also come amid recent testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 26 March by the Commander of the US Strategic Command outlining that Iran has reduced the time for enriching weapons-grade uranium to less than a week. As such, there remains a realistic possibility that the US is also preparing for strikes against Iranian targets in 2025. Unless there are significant developments in nuclear negotiations, this risk is likely to continue gradually increasing in the coming weeks. There is also a realistic possibility in the next two months that the US will perform a staged attack on Iranian assets, initially targeting relatively low-impact military assets instead of Iran’s nuclear facilities to increase pressure (and also to signal the credibility of its threat). Such assets are likely to include Iranian vessels in the Red and Arabian seas, as well as (possibly) Iranian proxy infrastructure throughout the region, particularly in Iraq. Such strikes will elevate the risk of regional escalation, with Iranian proxies possibly responding with a resumption of attacks on US forces in the region.
- Turkey: Large-scale protests in Ankara, Istanbul will drive compliance, human rights risks. On 29 March, hundreds of thousands of protesters gathered in Maltepe district in Istanbul (Istanbul province), to demonstrate against the imprisonment and suspension of Istanbul’s mayor Ekrem Imamoglu. In recent days, large-scale protest action has continued at a high level of frequency within Istanbul and the capital Ankara. However, it has increasingly reduced across the rest of the country. Frequent protests will likely continue, particularly targeting the Istanbul Municipal Palace in Istanbul and Çankaya district in Ankara. The authorities did not engage with protesters during Saturday’s demonstration, possibly signalling a willingness from the central government to moderate ongoing tensions, mitigating domestic unrest risks. However, a Swedish journalist was arrested for terror charges on 28 March following his coverage of anti-government protests, underscoring a significant deterioration of human rights in Turkey and detention risks for foreign nationals. We assess that further arrests of foreign nationals are possible, driving regulatory and compliance risks for companies operating in Turkey.
- Syria: New cabinet will reduce government instability risks; threat of domestic unrest will persist. On 30 March, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa announced a new government, appointing 23 ministers led by himself. The defence and foreign ministers in the former caretaker cabinet were retained; both served as key commanders in the now-dissolved Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) paramilitary group. While the government is largely seen as ethnically and religiously diverse, the Kurdish Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) stated that the cabinet failed to represent all Syrians by excluding the Kurds. Following this statement, there is a possibility that the current political rift will partially delay the full integration of the AANES into the new Syrian state. However, the cabinet formation is unlikely to undermine the recent ceasefire agreement between Damascus and the Kurdish-led Syria Democratic Forces (SDF). While the new cabinet will reduce government instability risks in 2025, we assess that domestic unrest threats will persist throughout the year due to ailing socio-economic health, economic uncertainty and inflation.(Source: Sibylline)
04 Apr 25. Iran Pulls Troops from Yemen as US Bombing Escalates. Iran has ordered its military personnel to leave Yemen, effectively cutting off direct support to the Houthi rebel group, British news outlet The Telegraph reported. The move comes as the United States continues daily airstrikes against the Iran-backed fighters. A senior Iranian official told the newspaper that the decision aims to prevent a direct confrontation with the U.S., especially if an Iranian soldier were to be killed. According to the official, Iran’s leaders are also holding fewer discussions about regional groups like the Houthis and their attention is now focused on how to respond to U.S. threats.
“After [Hassan] Nasrallah and [Bashar al-] Assad fell, the prevailing view here is that the Houthis cannot survive much longer — they have months, maybe days,” the official was quoted as saying.
Tensions between the U.S. and Iran have escalated following Washington’s recent designation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. The announcement, made on March 4, was swiftly followed by a large-scale bombing campaign that began on March 15, with U.S. airstrikes targeting Houthi missile systems, air defenses, and drone launchers. In response, the U.S. has bolstered its military presence in the region. Aircraft carriers have moved closer to the Gulf, and at least six B-2 bombers—capable of carrying nuclear weapons—have been deployed to Diego Garcia, a U.S. base strategically positioned within range of both Yemen and Iran. Iran, in turn, has reinforced its defenses, deploying missiles and infantry to the Persian Gulf islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
04 Apr 25. Israel to Seize Large Areas of Gaza as Military Operation Expands. Israel’s military will take over more parts of Gaza, Defense Minister Israel Katz said Wednesday, as the country steps up its campaign against Hamas.
“Operation ‘Might and Sword’ in Gaza is expanding,” Katz said in a statement. He called for a large evacuation of Gaza’s population and urged residents to turn against Hamas to help secure the return of hostages.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu confirmed that Israeli forces were “seizing territory, striking terrorists, destroying infrastructure.”
“We are now dividing the strip and increasing the pressure step by step, so that they will give us our hostages. And as long as they do not give them to us, the pressure will increase until they do,” Netanyahu said.
Netanyahu also announced Israel would take control of the “Morag Axis,” a new corridor similar to the Philadelphi Corridor along the Egyptian border, to tighten control over Gaza and isolate it further. The Morag Corridor refers to the former settlement of Morag, located between the cities of Khan Younis and Rafah in southern Gaza. The Philadelphi Corridor is a 14-kilometer (8.7-mile) strip of land along Gaza’s southern border with Egypt. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
04 Apr 25. Israel Hits Syrian Air Bases, Including T4, Amid Turkey’s Takeover Plans. Israel carried out a wave of airstrikes across Syria on Wednesday, targeting key military installations in the cities of Damascus and Hama. According to the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), the strikes also targeted the T4 air base, which Turkey is reportedly planning to take over and use for drone operations and air defense systems. In a post on X, the IDF said the attacks were aimed at destroying military infrastructure that could pose a threat to Israel. “We will continue to operate to remove any threat to Israeli civilians.” According to Syrian state media and local officials, the strikes hit the military airport in Hama, destroying warplanes and helicopters. The scientific research center in Damascus’ Barzeh neighborhood, which Israel has claimed was involved in the development of guided missiles and chemical weapons, was also targeted. At least 13 people were reportedly killed in the recent Israeli attack. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
02 Apr 25. Turkey to Deploy Air Defense Systems, Drones at Syria’s T4 Base. Turkey has started taking control of Syria’s Tiyas air base, known as T4, and plans to install air defense systems there, according to sources cited by Middle East Eye and other regional outlets. The T4 base is located between Homs and Palmyra and was used by the Syrian military under former President Bashar al-Assad. Since Assad’s removal, the base has been targeted multiple times by Israeli airstrikes. According to an Israeli defense official, the strikes were meant to send a message to Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa that Israel will not tolerate any restrictions on its operational freedom in Syrian airspace. Sources familiar with the plans told Middle East Eye that Turkey will deploy a Hisar air defense system to T4. “Once the system is in place, the base will be reconstructed and expanded with necessary facilities,” the source said. Additionally, sources have revealed that Turkey is considering the deployment of Russian-made S-400 air defense systems at the base during its construction, though this would require approval from Moscow. Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 previously led to U.S. sanctions and its removal from the F-35 fighter jet program in 2019. In addition to air defenses, Turkey also plans to station surveillance and armed drones at the site, including models with extended strike capabilities. In a report by The Jerusalem Post, citing Western intelligence, it was revealed that Turkey aims to position itself as Syria’s defense provider by securing a presence at the T4 base. The report also confirmed Turkey’s plans to deploy drones at the site.
A senior Israeli official told The War Zone that Israel views the Turkish presence at T4 as a threat to its ability to carry out airstrikes in Syria.
“The establishment of a Turkish Air Force base in Palmyra, Syria could heighten regional tensions and increase the risk of conflict with Israel,” the source said. “Given Israel’s ongoing efforts to prevent hostile military entrenchment in Syria, any significant Turkish military presence, especially in strategic locations like Palmyra, could be perceived as a threat to Israeli security interests.”
Defense journalist Babak Taghvaee, citing Israeli military sources, reported that recent Israeli airstrikes on the T4 air base have delayed the Turkish Air Force’s operations there. His sources also said that Israel will continue targeting the base if Turkey attempts to resume operations. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
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