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Military And Security Developments
Mar 28.
28 Mar 25. Israel Kills Senior Hezbollah Commander in Southern Lebanon Strike. An Israel Air Force (IAF) strike killed Ahmad Adnan Bajjiga, a battalion commander in Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Forces, during an overnight operation, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said Thursday. According to the IDF, the strike—executed by the 91st Division—targeted Bajjiga’s vehicle in the Derdghaiya region in Southern Lebanon. Israel accused him of orchestrating attacks on Israeli troops and civilians and continuing to plan operations despite the ceasefire. The IDF released footage of the strike, showing the targeted vehicle in Derdghaiya, near Maaroub.The IDF said it also conducted another strike targeting a group of Hezbollah operatives spotted moving weapons in the Yohmor area. Lebanon’s Health Ministry reported that three men were killed in the attack. A separate Israeli airstrike on the village of Touline killed five people, including a child, and wounded ten others, according to Lebanon’s National News Agency. The recent Israeli attacks came days after six rockets were launched from Lebanon toward Israel. Three rockets crossed the border and were intercepted over the town of Metula. Israel said it could not confirm who fired them but responded by hitting Hezbollah command posts and rocket launchers. Hezbollah denied firing the rockets and said it remains committed to the ceasefire agreed in November. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
Mar 27.
* On 25 March, between five and eight Syrian gunmen launched a small-arms attack against IDF troops from the Golan Reconnaissance Company on patrol near Kuwaya (Daraa governorate, Syria).
* On 27 March, the IDF conducted airstrikes near Latakia (Latakia governorate, Syria).
* IDF troops likely breached protocol when they killed a Palestinian whom they suspected was planning to carry out a stone-throwing attack; this reflects declining discipline and an elevated risk of misidentification and misfire, particularly in the West Bank.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OVERALL FORECAST
* The UN announced that it will reduce its presence in Gaza, underscoring critical humanitarian and security concerns.
* Anti-government protest activity continues at pace in Israel, sustaining the risk of operational and travel disruption in the coming days.
* On 25 March, Israel’s Knesset adopted the 2025 state budget, moderating threats to government stability.
* The Israeli government has adopted controversial legislation to reform the judiciary, elevating unrest risks and long-term supervision quality concerns.
* The end of the Ramadan period (28 February to 30 March) will moderately increase operational disruption risks in the Jerusalem area, which will be compounded by rising socio-economic health risks in the West Bank.
* OVERALL FORECAST: Amid deteriorating governance conditions, anti-Hamas protests broke out in Gaza (though the Hamas-controlled security forces will likely crack down on demonstrations in the coming days).
* On 25 March, between five and eight Syrian gunmen launched a small-arms attack against IDF troops from the Golan Reconnaissance Company on patrol near Kuwaya (Daraa governorate, Syria). The IDF returned fire, including with air and artillery support, killing at least four assailants. A new militant group, the Islamic Resistance Front of Syria, claimed responsibility for the attack on social media. However, at the time of writing, this claim remains unconfirmed. It is likely that the armed gunmen were residents of Kuwaya and launched their attack in response to IDF troops breaching the village’s boundaries. The clashes reaffirm our previous assessment that the risk of armed clashes between the IDF and local elements in Syria will gradually increase as long as the IDF remains in Syria. In the coming weeks, tensions between IDF troops and local Syrian residents in Daraa, Suwayda and Quneitra governorates (all Syria) will likely continue to grow; as such, further armed clashes are likely. Over the coming months, there is a realistic possibility that local militant organisations expressly focused on counteracting the IDF’s presence in Syria will emerge, further elevating the risk of armed conflict. However, we assess that a direct confrontation between Israel and the Syrian government remains unlikely.
* On 27 March, the IDF conducted airstrikes near Latakia (Latakia governorate, Syria). The IDF targeted ammunition warehouses in Minet el-Beida (Latakia); no injuries were reported. Additionally, on 25 March, the IDF conducted airstrikes against the Tadmur and T4 military airbases (both Homs governorate, Syria). The IDF last struck these airbases on 21 March. It is likely that Israel will continue to target these bases in the coming weeks to prevent them from being able to support weapons smuggling. Additionally, the strikes indicate the elevated security risks near military airports in Syria, particularly southern Syria. These bases were identified as possible sites for a Turkish deployment in Syria. As such, there is a realistic possibility that Israel will target infrastructure in southern Syria that is liable to be used to support the logistical and military build-up of Turkish forces in the coming weeks, so as to delay an expansion of Turkish forces in Syria. Even so, a confrontation between Israel and Turkey remains highly unlikely, though sporadic disagreements between the Israeli and Turkish air authorities over, for example, flight paths remain possible, elevating regional tensions.
* IDF troops likely breached protocol when they killed a Palestinian whom they suspected was planning to carry out a stone-throwing attack; this reflects declining discipline and an elevated risk of misidentification and misfire, particularly in the West Bank. On 26 March, IDF troops shot and killed a masked Palestinian individual armed with stones whom they suspected of planning to attack cars along Route 60 near Huwara (Nablus governorate). It is unlikely that the individual posed a significant threat to the security forces and therefore the application of lethal force likely breached IDF protocols. The incident highlights the likely loosening of discipline among IDF combat forces against the backdrop of continued fighting and increasing militant threats in the West Bank. We therefore assess that the risk of misidentification and misfire by IDF troops is elevated, particularly in the West Bank.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
* The UN announced that it will reduce its presence in Gaza, underscoring critical humanitarian and security concerns. On 25 March, a UN spokesperson confirmed that it would withdraw approximately a third of its international staff from Gaza given significant threats to staff safety. This marks the first UN staff drawdown of the Israel-Hamas war and underscores the critical threats to NGO staff operating in Gaza amid the resumption of IDF operations in the enclave. Although the partial withdrawal is unlikely to undermine UN operations in Gaza critically in the short term, there is a realistic possibility that UN agencies and locally engaged NGOs will announce broader staff withdrawals in the coming weeks. Such withdrawals would almost certainly limit civilians’ access to humanitarian aid and services, compounding food security, water security and public health concerns and increasing pressure on the remaining services in Gaza in the medium-to-long term.
* Anti-government protest activity continues at pace in Israel, sustaining the risk of operational and travel disruption in the coming days. Anti-government activists have continued to mobilise protests in recent days, with daily demonstrations attracting thousands of participants in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district). On 25 March, demonstrators calling for the government to secure additional hostage releases conducted a sit-in near the National Library in the Government Quarter, which remained broadly peaceful. However, also on 25 March, the police arrested at least six anti-government protesters outside the Knesset building during demonstrations opposing the government’s efforts to adopt the 2025 state budget and to reform the judiciary. In the coming days, protest activity is highly likely to continue at pace, with significant demonstrations likely taking place in major cities on 29 March. Although hostage-release protests will likely remain broadly peaceful, broader anti-government protest activity will likely trigger low-intensity clashes with the police, particularly those attempting to disperse informal roadblocks along major thoroughfares. While widespread unrest is unlikely, increasing protest activity and policing tactics will increase operational, travel and supply chain disruption risks, particularly in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district).
* On 25 March, Israel’s Knesset adopted the 2025 state budget, moderating threats to government stability. The budget includes substantial concessions to ultra-Orthodox parties within the coalition, including increased funding for religious schools, despite substantial cuts to other areas of government spending, such as education and healthcare. The budget will likely moderate investor concerns regarding government stability, though it is unlikely to alleviate broader concerns linked to the economic fallout from the Israel-Hamas war. In the coming months, substantially elevated military spending, relatively stagnant economic growth and various tax increases will likely sustain broader socio-economic health concerns in Israel. Even so, investor confidence is unlikely to decrease critically in the short term; broad capital flight also remains unlikely.
* The Israeli government has adopted controversial legislation to reform the judiciary, elevating unrest risks and long-term supervision quality concerns. On 26 March, the Knesset adopted the judicial reform bill, which changes the make-up of the judicial selection committee and increases the legislature’s influence over judicial appointments. The bill is highly controversial. The issue of judicial reform was a key trigger for substantial anti-government protests preceding the 7 October 2023 attacks. The law will enter into force after the election of the next Knesset, with polls currently scheduled for late 2026; numerous opposition parties have stated they will reverse the law if they form a majority coalition government thereafter. The legislation’s passage is highly likely to exacerbate anti-government sentiment in Israel, increasing participation in protests in major cities, particularly hostage-release demonstrations on 29 March (see above). If implemented, the legislation will also increase supervision quality and corporate governance risks for locally engaged firms.
* The end of the Ramadan period (28 February to 30 March) will moderately increase operational disruption risks in the Jerusalem area, which will be compounded by rising socio-economic health risks in the West Bank. Attendance at Friday Prayers at the al-Aqsa Mosque compound will likely increase on 28 March, elevating the risk of altercations between attendees and Israeli security force personnel. Eid al-Fitr celebrations on 30-31 March will increase the risk of travel disruption; there will also be a moderate risk of unrest in the Old City and East Jerusalem, though widespread violence remains unlikely. The risk of unrest will likely be moderately elevated across the West Bank due to recent announcements by the Palestinian Authority (PA) that due to a lack of available funds it will not pay out salaries in time for Eid, impacting public’s capacity to celebrate the holiday fully. Amid deteriorating governance conditions, anti-Hamas protests broke out in Gaza (though the Hamas-controlled security forces will likely crack down on demonstrations in the coming days). On 25 March, hundreds of protesters participated in anti-Hamas rallies in Beit Lahia and Khan Yunis to call for an end to the Israel-Hamas war and Hamas’ rule in Gaza. Demonstrations continued on 26 and 27 March and also emerged in the Jabalia, Nuseirat and Shuja’iyya areas. Demonstrations of any kind, particularly those opposing Hamas, are extremely rare in Gaza and highlight the group’s decreasing ability to deter unrest (as well as its deteriorating civil enforcement capabilities). On 25 March, local media also began circulating statements attributed to several prominent Shuja’iyya-based clans, calling for a popular uprising against Hamas. In the coming days, protesters are highly likely to call for further demonstrations, increasing the risk of unrest, particularly in Beit Lahia and Khan Yunis. However, the Hamas-controlled security forces are highly likely to crack down on these demonstrations and to employ violent dispersal methods, including beatings and live ammunition. This will significantly increase security and crossfire exposure risks for locally engaged staff, particularly NGO staff operating in crowded public spaces. To deter further unrest, the Hamas-controlled security forces are also highly likely to detain individuals associated with the protests, increasing the risk of harassment, assault and torture for targeted individuals. These practices will compound broader human rights concerns within Gaza, and reduce protesters’ capacity to undermine Hamas’ civil administrative capabilities significantly. More broadly, long-standing tensions between Hamas and non-aligned clans will also likely undermine efforts to establish functional civil governance structures in the medium-to-long-term.
* UK: Pro-Palestine activism will continue to drive security risks for banking, defence, insurance firms. On 26 March, Palestine Action (PA) activists targeted two of the insurance company Allianz’s offices in Bristol (Bristol county), spraying red paint and smashing windows. These incidents represent a continuation of PA’s disruptive campaign against Allianz and other businesses with alleged connections to the Israeli weapons manufacturer Elbit Systems. On 24 March, PA activists in Birmingham (West Midlands county) also vandalised a truck owned by Hinks Haulage, a logistics company that transports cargo for Elbit’s factory in Leicester (Leicestershire county). We assess that PA activists will highly likely continue targeting companies perceived to have connections with Elbit Systems. Banking, defence and insurance firms likely face the most significant risks. On-site protests, intrusions, sit-ins and vandalism will remain the most common tactics. The group will also likely continue to sabotage (sporadically) electricity supplies for sites and use vehicles to break through security barriers, driving operational and physical safety risks for staff and assets.
* Israel: Law overhauling judicial selection committee will elevate domestic unrest, supervision risks. On 27 March, the Israeli Knesset passed a controversial bill that changes the make-up of the judicial selection committee, granting politicians more power over the selection of judges. The legislation also gives veto rights to committee members over the appointment of lower court judges. The law will enter into force after the election of the next Knesset, with polls currently scheduled for late 2026. Legislation on judicial reform is highly controversial among the Israeli public and was one of the main triggers for anti-government protests before 7 October 2023. As such, an uptick in domestic unrest across Israel is likely in the coming days, particularly over the weekend, with Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) and Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) remaining major protest hotspots. Travel disruption in these cities is highly likely, while the use of excessive police force is a realistic possibility, elevating bystander security risks. Over the longer term, we assess the legislation will elevate the risk of politicisation within Israel’s judicial system, raising supervision quality risks as well as the likelihood of further credit rating downgrades (consequently impacting investor confidence and socio-economic health prospects).
* Turkey: Appointment of interim Istanbul mayor will moderate socio-economic health risks. On 26 March, the opposition-run Municipal Council of Istanbul elected an interim mayor, Nuri Aslan, to administer the city while the former mayor, Ekrem Imamoglu, awaits trial over highly likely politicised corruption charges. This follows Imamoglu’s arrest on 23 March, which has driven ongoing protests and domestic unrest throughout Turkey (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 26 March 2025). Aslan is a member of the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), the same party as Imamoglu. His election will likely mitigate against the risk of long-term disruption to the implementation of infrastructure projects and drive continuity in the council’s provision of essential services throughout Istanbul, moderating socio-economic health risks in the city. While the CHP’s retention of council operations will also likely mitigate against local governance and policy risks, ongoing demonstrations caused by ?mamo?lu’s detention will likely drive a short-term reduction in tourism to Istanbul. We assess this will likely elevate operational and financial risks for businesses in the city, especially those in the tourism and hospitality sectors.
Mar 26.
* Syria-Israel: Further clashes between Syrian militants, IDF are likely in the coming weeks. On 25 March, a group of between five to eight armed Syrians attacked Israel Defense Forces (IDF) troops from the Golan Reconnaissance Company while on patrol near the Syrian village of Kuwaya (Daraa governorate). The IDF returned fire and conducted airstrikes and artillery shelling, killing at least four individuals. Responsibility for the attack was claimed on social media by a new group named the Islamic Resistance Front of Syria. While the group’s ideology is unclear and its claim unconfirmed, Iranian ties remain a possibility. Given the significantly fragile security situation in Daraa, Suwayda and Quneitra governorates, further clashes between local militants and the IDF are highly likely in the coming weeks. This will elevate the already elevated risks of armed conflict in southern Syria, sustaining regional instability. However, we assess that direct clashes between the Syrian government forces and the IDF remain unlikely as Damascus will likely prioritise diplomatic pressure over military action to stop Israeli incursions.
* Palestinian Territories: Hamas crackdown is likely amid anti-war protests, driving security risks. On 25 March, hundreds of Palestinians protested in Beit Lahia (North Gaza governorate), chanting anti-Hamas slogans and demanding an end to the Israel-Hamas war. Further concentrated protests are likely in North Gaza and Khan Yunis governorates later on 26 March following anonymous calls to demonstrate on Telegram, moderately elevating the threat of limited domestic unrest. Demonstrations of any sort are highly uncommon in Gaza, especially those against Hamas, underscoring a deterioration in the group’s civil enforcement response capabilities since the beginning of the war. Despite this, the Hamas-controlled security forces will likely crack down on further protests using violent dispersal methods, including beating and possibly using live fire against participants. This will drive significant bystander security risks for NGO personnel in proximity to protests, almost certainly exacerbated by Israel’s recent resumption of military operations in the Strip. We assess that the authorities will also likely implement arbitrary arrest practices, driving the risk of assault and (in the worst cases) torture of personnel as well as exacerbating already dire human rights risks.
Mar 25.
* UAE: Foiled cyber attacks are unlikely to undermine investor confidence. On 24 March, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Cyber Security Council stated that it recently foiled cyber attacks that targeted 634 entities in the country, spanning both the public and private sectors. The attacks aimed to leak data from vital and strategic national sectors through a breach in Oracle Cloud’s servers that affected approximately 140,000 entities globally. The council clarified that emergency cyber systems have been activated across the country in co-ordination with the relevant authorities to safeguard the UAE’s cyber space. Cyber attacks targeting UAE corporations and government entities are common. However, these are unlikely to undermine investor confidence in the Emirati market in 2025 as the UAE has one of the most advanced cyber security infrastructures in the region. That said, attacks by Iran-sponsored hackers remain a significant threat to the UAE’s financial and media sectors, as well as to other Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia. This threat will highly likely increase in the event of any geopolitical escalation between Iran, Israel and the US this year.
* Turkey: Investor confidence will be damaged by political unrest, sustaining inflation, financial risks. Later on 25 March, Turkish finance and treasury officials will hold a call with international investors after the Turkish lira (TRY) hit a record low last week. This led the authorities to sell nearly USD 14bn in foreign currency, ban short selling and ease buyback rules and follows large, nationwide protests after the authorities detained and imprisoned Istanbul’s opposition mayor Ekrem ?mamo?lu. Investor confidence will likely continue to falter despite government initiatives, impacting foreign direct investment (FDI), sustaining high inflation and driving financial risks for businesses. This will possibly influence the government to tighten its fiscal policies, including those outlined in its Medium Term Program (MTP) for 2025-2027, such as supporting green and digital transformation. Deviations from economic reform will increase risks of rating downgrades and further degradation of investor confidence, increasing borrowing costs and triggering capital outflows. We assess that this will possibly further weaken the lira and exacerbate inflationary pressures.
Mar 24.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
* On 22 March, unidentified militants launched six rockets from Arnoun and Yohmor (both Nabatieh governorate, Lebanon) towards Metula (Northen district, Israel), prompting IDF strikes in southern Lebanon.
* On 23 March, the IDF killed Ismail Barhoum, Hamas’ head of financial affairs and recently appointed Prime Minister in Gaza (according to Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz) in a strike on the Nasser Hospital in Khan Yunis, southern Gaza.
* On 24 March, a sole perpetrator killed one civilian in a car ramming and small-arms attack near Yokneam Illit (Northern district).
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OVERALL FORECAST
* CORRECTION: In the Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 20 March 2025, a typographical error resulted in a misquote of a statement by the A.P. Møller – Mærsk shipping company; we meant to write that the company stated it had not transported arms or ammunition to Israel during the Israel-Hamas war.
* A breakthrough in ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas remains unlikely in the coming days, moderating prospects for conflict de-escalation in Gaza.
* In the past week, anti-government protest activity has continued to increase in Israel’s major cities, underscoring elevated operational disruption risks.
* In Israel, efforts to dismiss the Director of the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) will drive risks of strike action in the coming weeks.
* The Israeli government regularised the status of 13 settlement neighbourhoods in the West Bank, increasing risks of intercommunal clashes and settler attacks in the coming months.
* OVERALL FORECAST: Israel continues to prepare for full mobilisation of its ground forces, indicating likely escalation in the coming two weeks if there is no significant development on ceasefire negotiations.
Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon
The IDF buffer zone and airstrikes in the Gaza Strip
Time to find shelter in the event of rocket launches
Operational shelters in Tel Aviv
* On 22 March, unidentified militants launched six rockets from Arnoun and Yohmor (both Nabatieh governorate, Lebanon) towards Metula (Northen district, Israel), prompting IDF strikes in southern Lebanon. The IDF intercepted three rockets, while the remaining three fell within Lebanese territory. Lebanese Hizballah (LH) denied involvement in the incident and there is a realistic possibility that the perpetrators are rogue militant cells or Palestinian factions affiliated with or directed by Hamas Lebanon. In response to the rocket fire, the IDF conducted two waves of strikes across southern Lebanon on 22 March, targeting LH military infrastructure. The IDF targeted over 22 locations, mostly in southern Lebanon and Lebanon border areas, including Al-Khiyam, Arnoun, Houla, Markaba and Yohmor (all Nabatieh), Al-Nabi Shayth and Qasr (both Baalbek-Hermel governorate), and Kfar Tebnit, Tyre and Ziqbin (all South governorate). The IDF will likely sustain elevated strike activity in southern Lebanon in the coming days, increasing collateral risks near militant infrastructure. However, a complete collapse of the Israel-LH ceasefire and the return of direct armed conflict between Israel and LH remains unlikely. Similarly, strikes in the Lebanese capital Beirut also remain unlikely.
* On 23 March, the IDF killed Ismail Barhoum, Hamas’ head of financial affairs and recently appointed Prime Minister in Gaza (according to Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz) in a strike on the Nasser Hospital in Khan Yunis, southern Gaza. The strike marks the fourth senior member of Hamas’ political bureau killed since the resumption of hostilities on 18 March. Earlier on 23 March, the IDF killed Manar Abu Khater in Khan Yunis, who was Hamas’ director of education at the eastern Khan Younis education directorate. Additionally, on 22 March, the IDF killed Salah al-Bardawil in Khan Yunis, who headed Hamas’ Planning and Development ministry. Israel will likely continue targeting Hamas’ political leadership in the coming days, including in sensitive locations such as hospitals and designated humanitarian zones. These will sustain significantly elevated security risks for bystanders, including NGO personnel, in the coming days.
* On 24 March, a sole perpetrator killed one civilian in a car ramming and small-arms attack near Yokneam Illit (Northern district). The assailant, Karem Jabarin, a resident of the Arab-majority town Ma’ale Iron (Haifa district), rammed his car into a bus station in HaTishbi Junction on Route 66. Subsequently, the assailant stabbed a soldier at the station, stole his rifle and opened fire on passing cars. Israeli border guards shot and killed Jabarin. Amid the IDF’s resumption of operations in Gaza, the risk of attacks by radicalised individuals targeting civilians across Israel will remain elevated in the coming weeks, particularly near public transport hubs, key highways, junctions and gas stations in major cities.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
* A breakthrough in ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas remains unlikely in the coming days, moderating prospects for conflict de-escalation in Gaza. On 24 March, a Hamas official stated that the group had ‘responded positively’ to a proposal from mediators regarding a temporary ceasefire extension in exchange for the resumption of humanitarian aid deliveries into Gaza and the release of five hostages. Despite this statement, however, we continue to assess that negotiations are unlikely to progress significantly in the coming days due to deadlock over the duration of any potential ceasefire period. Consequently, the IDF will likely continue escalating military pressure on Hamas with further airstrikes and expanding ground operations in Gaza. This is highly likely to continue undermining humanitarian conditions within the enclave, with reports of medical equipment, food and fuel shortages likely sustaining pro-Palestine protest activity in the wider region in the coming weeks. Hamas is also highly likely to increase pressure on the Israeli government by conducting rocket attacks and releasing footage of hostages held in Gaza, likely sustaining anti-government protests in Israel, particularly on 29 March.
* In the past week, anti-government protest activity has continued to increase in Israel’s major cities, underscoring elevated operational disruption risks. Since 17 March, anti-government activists have mobilised small-scale demonstrations in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv daily. Demonstrations have centred on opposing the government’s efforts to dismiss the Director of the Shin Bet, Ronen Bar (see below), and calling for the government to secure additional hostage releases from Gaza. Protest attendance significantly increased on 21 and 22 March, with thousands of protesters attending rallies in Beersheva (Southern district), Haifa (Haifa district), Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Raanana (Central district). Although demonstrations remained broadly peaceful, police clashed with several protestors in Jerusalem on 22 and 23 March, resulting in at least three arrests. In Jerusalem, demonstrators have also established an encampment on Gaza Street, which remains in place at the time of writing. The encampment has substantially disrupted movement through the Government Quarter and police will possibly employ heavy-handed tactics to disperse the encampment in the coming days, increasing risks of bystander exposure to altercations, tear gas and water cannon use in central Jerusalem. In the coming days, protest activity will likely continue at pace, with large-scale demonstrations likely on 29 March. Demonstrations will likely remain peaceful, though will increase operational and supply chain disruption risks for locally engaged firms.
* In Israel, efforts to dismiss the Director of the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) will drive risks of strike action in the coming weeks. On 21 March, the cabinet voted unanimously to dismiss Ronen Bar as Director of the Shin Bet by 10 April; however, the High Court of Justice subsequently issued a temporary injunction preventing his dismissal and scheduled a hearing on the matter for 8 April. Also on 21 March, Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara informed the government that it cannot dismiss Bar until her office determines whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu can appoint a replacement due to potential conflicts of interest. On 23 March, the cabinet also voted to begin dismissal proceedings for Baharav-Miara. Efforts to dismiss Bar and Baharav-Miara are highly likely to continue triggering anti-government protests in the coming weeks, particularly in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv), elevating risks of travel and supply chain disruption (see below). Although widespread unrest remains unlikely, the High Court’s hearing on Bar’s dismissal is highly likely to trigger above-average attendance at protests in Jerusalem on 8 April, increasing risks of altercations with police and possible counter-demonstrators. More broadly, efforts to dismiss Bar will also possibly trigger industrial action and undermine operational continuity in the coming weeks. On 21 March, the Histadrut labour federation (Israel’s largest union) announced that it would not ‘sit idly’ if the government violates the court’s injunction, while the Israel Business Forum (representing employees from 200 of Israel’s largest private sector companies) stated it would ‘shut down the economy’ if Bar is dismissed before 10 April. Labour flexibility risks will likely remain elevated for both public and private sector entities in the coming week, increasing operational disruption risks, particularly for businesses operating in highly unionised sectors such as transport.
* The Israeli government regularised the status of 13 settlement neighbourhoods in the West Bank, increasing risks of intercommunal clashes and settler attacks in the coming months. On 23 March, the Israeli security cabinet approved a decision to establish 13 existing settlement neighbourhoods as independent entities. The decision regularises the status of the neighbourhoods, many of which were initially established as outposts expanding the size of existing settlements. The settlements are located throughout the West Bank, though are primarily concentrated in the Bethlehem, Jerusalem and Ramallah and al Bireh governorates. The decision is highly likely to facilitate settlement expansion efforts in the newly-formed entities over the coming months, exacerbating already elevated ethno-religious tensions in the central West Bank and increasing risks of intercommunal clashes, including in and around the Jerusalem area (Jerusalem governorate). The ruling is also highly likely to embolden expansionist Israeli settlers to construct additional outposts in the broader West Bank, increasing regional tensions and human rights concerns. Extremist settlers will also possibly increase the rate of attacks targeting Palestinian civilians in the coming weeks, increasing security and bystander risks for locally engaged staff, particularly those engaged in rural development and agricultural projects.
OVERALL FORECAST
Israel continues to prepare for full mobilisation of its ground forces, indicating likely escalation in the coming two weeks if there is no significant development on ceasefire negotiations. On 23 March the IDF redirected the 36th Armoured Division from the northern front to southern Israel. The division, which is subordinate to the IDF Northern Command recently completed military manoeuvres in Lebanon and a long period of operational activity in the northern sector. The division has now been reallocated under the IDF Southern Command and is likely to begin preparations, including training before entering Gaza. Given footage of tank formations in the area, there is a realistic possibility that the division is already at advanced stages of preparation and that it will be ready to be fully mobilised in the coming days. Recent reports by Israeli sources indicate that the IDF intends to mobilise five divisions in preparation for large-scale ground operations in Gaza, and that only two further divisions are required before the force is fully mobilised.
This staged resumption of fighting (with targeted ground raids already ongoing) is likely designed to pressure Hamas to make concessions in ceasefire negotiations before substantial forces are again deployed to the strip. However, once large-scale ground operations begin, withdrawing these forces again will likely be politically challenging for Netanyahu’s government, with internal pressure to secure new military objectives driving increased demands by Israeli negotiators during ceasefire talks. This will increase the risks of further stalemate and delays in any ceasefire negotiations. Once the IDF mobilise its forces, they will likely target the recapture of northern Gaza. In this event, a large portion of the Palestinian population who returned to the area during the ceasefire is highly likely to be again displaced, this will significantly increase humanitarian concerns and risks of harm to the civilian population, including NGO staff. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Mar 25. US Launches Fresh Airstrikes on Houthi Strongholds After Attacks on USS Harry Truman, Israel. The U.S. military launched fresh strikes on Houthi bases, facilities, and command centers in Saada Governorate, northern Yemen, early Wednesday, according to reports.
“The U.S. military launched a new series of airstrikes early Wednesday morning, targeting militia barracks and hideouts east of Saada city and Al Salem district in the same governorate,” Al-Ain reported.
Houthi-affiliated Al-Masirah TV claimed that 17 U.S. airstrikes hit Saada Governorate, with two more targeting neighboring Amran. The outlet also alleged that a hospital building in Saada was struck for the second time in a week. Houthi health officials reported two civilian injuries, denouncing the attack as “a full-fledged war crime.” (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
21 Mar 25. Cuashub.com said today that US downs more than a dozen Houthi drones as Red Sea conflict escalates. U.S. warships intercepted and shot down around a dozen drones launched by Yemen’s Houthi rebels after President Donald Trump ordered a wave of airstrikes on the country, killing at least 31 people and injuring more than 100 others. The airstrikes, carried out on Saturday, targeted Houthi-controlled areas in response to the group’s persistent attacks on shipping lanes in the Red Sea. According to Houthi officials, one strike hit two residential homes in northern Saada province, killing four children and a woman. Trump defended the U.S. military action, calling it a “decisive and powerful” response to the Houthis’ ongoing threats. The rebel group has been targeting ships with Israeli affiliations in an attempt to pressure Israel into ceasing its war in Gaza. The Houthis, however, claimed to have launched a counterattack on the USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group using missiles and drones. Two U.S. officials, speaking anonymously, refuted this claim, stating they were not tracking any such attack. A senior U.S. official noted that while roughly a dozen drones were launched by the Houthis, all were shot down “well before” they posed any real threat. Additionally, one Houthi missile reportedly failed and crashed into the sea off Yemen’s coast, prompting no response from the US Navy. Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree claimed that the group’s forces had carried out a “qualitative military operation,” targeting the U.S. warship and its escorts with 18 ballistic and cruise missiles alongside drones. However, US officials dismissed these claims, stating that no attacks on the aircraft carrier had been detected.
Tensions in the Red Sea have escalated in recent months as the U.S. and its allies – including the UK and Israel – have launched multiple strikes on Houthi targets. The rebel group had temporarily halted attacks on Israeli-linked vessels but recently resumed operations, citing Israel’s refusal to allow humanitarian aid into Gaza.
Trump warns of further escalation
On Saturday, Trump announced a further escalation, vowing to intensify airstrikes if the Houthis did not cease their attacks.
“Hell will rain down upon you like nothing you have ever seen before!” he warned in a statement on Truth Social. He also directed a message to Iran, a known supporter of the Houthis, stating that the US “will hold you fully accountable, and we won’t be nice about it!”
The U.S. and other Western nations have long accused Iran of supplying the Houthis with weapons, including missiles and drones. The U.S. Navy has previously seized Iranian-made missile components allegedly bound for the Yemeni rebel group. Despite mounting international pressure, the Houthis remain defiant, with deputy head of the group’s media office, Nasruddin Amer, declaring that U.S. strikes would not deter their operations.
“Sanaa will remain Gaza’s shield and support and will not abandon it no matter the challenges,” Amer stated.
The Red Sea conflict has had widespread economic ramifications, forcing global shipping companies to reroute vessels away from the Suez Canal, increasing transit times and costs. The latest escalation raises concerns that further disruptions could impact global trade routes and fuel broader regional instability. https://cuashub.com/en/content/us-downs-more-than-a-dozen-houthi-drones-as-red-sea-conflict-escalates/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
A CNIM Group Company
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