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Military And Security Developments
Mar 22.
22 Mar 25. Israel strikes Lebanon in response to cross-border rocket fire.
Mar 21.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
* On 18 March, Israel resumed military operations in the Gaza Strip (Palestinian Territories); it launched an intense airstrike campaign.
* On 19 March, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched targeted raids to regain control over the Netzarim Corridor in central Gaza.
* On 20 March, the IDF intercepted a Houthi missile outside Israeli airspace, triggering sirens across central Israel (including Jerusalem district).
* On 20 March, Gaza-based militants launched three rockets from Khan Yunis against central Israel.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OVERALL FORECAST
* The Israeli government likely aims to maximise military pressure on Hamas to secure further hostage releases, though ceasefire negotiations are unlikely to progress significantly in the short term.
* The IDF issued renewed evacuation orders in Gaza, driving displacement and increasing demand for humanitarian services, amid elevated risks for NGO staff.
* Increasing anti-government protest activity in Israel will drive elevated operational and supply chain disruption risks in major cities, amid moderately rising risks of low-intensity clashes.
* The Otzma Yehudit party rejoined the Israeli coalition government, moderating threats to government stability.
* Corporate governance and reputational risks will increase for firms associated with the Israeli government in the coming months.
OVERALL FORECAST: The resumption of fighting in Gaza and recent US strikes against the Houthis have elevated the likelihood of Iran-backed militants resuming attacks against regional US forces and Israel.
On 18 March, Israel resumed military operations in the Gaza Strip (Palestinian Territories); it launched an intense airstrike campaign. According to the Hamas-run health ministry, the airstrikes killed at least 400 people. Subsequently, an IDF spokesperson for Arabic media called for the evacuation of Gazan residents from areas close to the Israel-Gaza buffer zone, including Abasan al-Kabira, al-Jadidah, Beit Hanoun and Khirbet Khuza’a. The airstrikes signalled the end of the unofficial ceasefire, significantly elevating security risks across Gaza, particularly near militant positions, IDF positions and the Israel-Gaza buffer zone. The resumption of the conflict will also elevate security risks for humanitarian-designated zones, including infrastructure such as hospitals.
* On 19 March, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched targeted raids to regain control over the Netzarim Corridor in central Gaza. Subsequently, several similar raids have been conducted across Gaza, including in Beit Lahia (northern Gaza) and Bani Suheila (southern Gaza). Targeted and limited IDF ground operations across Gaza are likely to continue in the coming days; they will likely focus on areas close to the Israel-Gaza buffer zone, as well as the Netzarim and Philadelphi Corridors, driving misidentification and crossfire risks in proximate areas.
* On 20 March, the IDF intercepted a Houthi missile outside Israeli airspace, triggering sirens across central Israel (including Jerusalem district). At least 13 individuals en route to shelters were injured as a result of panic-induced accidents. This is the second missile in 48 hours that the Iran-backed group has launched at Israel; the IDF intercepted the first over Saudi Arabia on 18 March. While no damage was reported on this occasion, the incident underscored that rocket and shrapnel risks are also liable to impact regional countries. The Iranian-backed Houthis are likely to continue targeting Israel in the coming weeks, elevating security and operational disruption risks across the country. Such strikes will drive exposure to shrapnel, even when interceptions take place outside Israeli airspace (shrapnel can be carried considerable distances when interceptions take place at high altitudes). Furthermore, Houthi missile launches are likely to prompt temporary closures of Israeli airspace, impacting flights over Israel and driving sporadic travel disruption risks in Israel (and neighbouring countries).
* On 20 March, Gaza-based militants launched three rockets from Khan Yunis against central Israel. The IDF intercepted one rocket, while the two others fell in an open (uninhabited) area However, shrapnel fell in four locations in Rishon LeZion (Central district), though it caused no damage to property or life. The risks stemming from rockets and shrapnel across Israel, particularly in the Gaza Envelope and the wider Southern district, and to a lesser extent in central Israel, will remain elevated in the coming days. In addition, the risk of operational disruption will also remain elevated across Israel (including Central) in the coming weeks due to sirens and likely recruitment drives for military reserves.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
* The Israeli government likely aims to maximise military pressure on Hamas to secure further hostage releases, though ceasefire negotiations are unlikely to progress significantly in the short term. After high-intensity IDF operations resumed in Gaza on 18 March, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that further ceasefire negotiations with Hamas would only proceed ‘under fire’. The statement underscores the Israeli government’s efforts to secure a temporary extension to the ceasefire and a hostage-release agreement by significantly increasing military pressure on Hamas. Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar subsequently stated that such pressure was necessary to break the deadlock in negotiations, which have not progressed in recent weeks. Although delegations representing both Israel and Hamas have reportedly continued to attend mediated talks since operations in Gaza resumed, a renewed agreement remains unlikely in the short term.
* The IDF issued renewed evacuation orders in Gaza, driving displacement and increasing demand for humanitarian services, amid elevated risks for NGO staff. After resuming high-intensity airstrikes in Gaza on 18 March, the IDF ordered civilians to evacuate immediately from areas near the buffer zone in the vicinity of the Gaza–Israel barrier, particularly in North Gaza and Khan Yunis governorates. In the coming days, the IDF will almost certainly issue further evacuation orders and limit movement along the Salah al-Din road; these ordinances are highly likely to trigger significant displacement within Gaza, increasing demand for NGO services and humanitarian aid. However, as Israel has not re-authorised aid deliveries into Gaza, NGO staff will almost certainly face significant resource scarcity, increasing the risk of altercations and violence at distribution points, as well as looting and theft targeting storage facilities. More broadly, NGO personnel operating in Gaza are highly likely to continue facing critical threats to life amid conflict re-escalation. On 20 March, the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) stated that at least five staff members had died in Gaza since 18 March, including one at a UN site in the Deir al Balah facility. Continued airstrikes, ordnance detonation and clashes between IDF personnel and Hamas militants will sustain critical security threats to locally engaged staff, particularly in recently evacuated areas.
* Increasing anti-government protest activity in Israel will drive elevated operational and supply chain disruption risks in major cities, amid moderately rising risks of low-intensity clashes. From 18 to 20 March, thousands of protestors calling for the government to secure hostage-releases gathered in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Approximately 40,000 protesters attended rallies in Tel Aviv on 18 March, marking the largest demonstration in several months. In Jerusalem, protesters temporarily blocked Highway 1 on 19 March and broadly disrupted movement through the Rehavia area. Although the demonstration remained broadly peaceful, the police arrested 12 attendees for attempting to break through security cordons. The police also arrested one counter-protester for bringing a weapon to the demonstration while a taxi driver intentionally drove over a protester on Herzog Street and dragged them under their vehicle for approximately 50m. These incidents underscore the elevated risk of altercations associated with escalating anti-government protest activity, particularly in the Jerusalem area. Smaller-scale protests continued along Gaza Street on 20 March, with the police employing batons, water cannons and ‘skunk water’ to disperse demonstrators. In the coming days, an elevated protest attendance is highly likely in major cities; large-scale demonstrations will almost certainly take place on 22 March. Although protests will likely remain broadly peaceful, attempts by the police to disperse demonstrators blocking major roads are highly likely to trigger low-intensity altercations, increasing threats to bystanders. More broadly, protests are highly likely to disrupt overland movement along major thoroughfares, particularly Highways 1 and 20, increasing operational and supply chain disruption risks in the coming days.
* The Otzma Yehudit party rejoined the Israeli coalition government, moderating threats to government stability. After the IDF resumed high-intensity airstrikes against Gaza, the leader of the Otzma Yehudit, Itamar Ben Gvir announced that his party would rejoin the government coalition (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 20 January 2025). The party’s inclusion increases the coalition’s majority to 68 in the 120-seat Knesset, moderating longer-term government stability risks. On 19 March, Netanyahu also re-instated Ben Gvir as Minister of National Security; Netanyahu likely conditioned this appointment on Ben Gvir’s ability to rally his party’s support for the 2025 state budget. The Knesset must vote to adopt a budget by 31 March or the government will automatically dissolve, triggering a general election. In the coming days, Netanyahu is highly likely to continue to make policy concessions to coalition members to secure sufficient support for the budget; this comes amid tensions with ultra-Orthodox coalition partners linked to the conscription legislation (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 17 March 2025). Although legislative concessions will moderately elevate policy and regulatory framework risks in the short term, the government will likely adopt budget legislation before the 31 March deadline, moderating imminent threats to government stability.
* Corporate governance and reputational risks will increase for firms associated with the Israeli government in the coming months. On 18 March, the A.P. Møller – Mærsk shipping company publicly stated that it had transported arms or ammunition to Israel during the Israel-Hamas war. The statement comes after the Kritiske Aktionærer investment group presented a motion during Mærsk’s annual general meeting (AGM) to ban any arms shipments to Israel. Amid the re-escalation of the Israel-Hamas war, firms associated with the sale, transport or servicing of military-related cargo transiting to and from Israel are highly likely to face increased shareholder scrutiny and reputational concerns, increasing corporate governance risks. High-profile firms linked to the Israeli government and the IDF will also face increased risks of targeted activism from pro-Palestine groups, underscoring broader threats to brand image. In the coming months, these risks will also remain elevated for firms with tangential links to the Israeli government, including those providing services to firms associated with Israel (such as banking facilities, property management services or insurance coverage).
OVERALL FORECAST
The resumption of fighting in Gaza and recent US strikes against the Houthis have elevated the likelihood of Iran-backed militants resuming attacks against regional US forces and Israel. While Iran-backed Iraqi militias are unlikely to resume attacks targeting Israel or US forces in the region due to previous Israeli threats to target Iraqi militias (and the current highly hostile posture of the US government), there remains a realistic possibility of rogue cells conducting sporadic attacks. While attacks of this nature are unlikely to prompt Israeli strikes on Iraq, the targeting of US troops will likely result in US retaliation, elevating collateral risks for staff and assets in proximity to militant positions and command centres.
The resumption of the conflict in Gaza will also compound the risk of sole-perpetrator attacks in Israeli cities. Militant organisations in Gaza and the West Bank are likely to escalate recruitment efforts and calls for action, driving the risk of radicalisation across Palestinian society in Israel and the West Bank, thereby increasing attack risks. Attacks are likely to target public transport, including hubs and stations, as well as crowded areas and key highways. It is likely that the IDF will increase operations and its erection of checkpoints across the West Bank in an effort to mitigate against these risks. However, this will compound radicalisation risks and drive the targeting of checkpoints and other IDF positions in the West Bank, elevating risks for proximate staff and assets in the coming days. The risk of domestic unrest, particularly after Friday prayers, will also be elevated across the West Bank.
- Tunisia: Major policy risk remains low following sacking of prime minister. On 20 March, Tunisian President Kais Saied sacked Prime Minister Kamel Maddouri, replacing him with Sara Zaafarani, the former minister of equipment and housing. This comes a month after Saied sacked Finance Minister Sihem Boughdiri amid economic stagnation and a persistent migration crisis. While the sackings will partially increase government instability, we assess they will not trigger major policy risks in the country, where President Saied is the de-facto primary policymaker. However, the decisions also underscore prevailing economic uncertainty, compounded by Saied’s decision to sever ties with the IMF this month, which has undermined future financial agreements with the organisation. As such, we assess that the Tunisian economy will remain partially stagnant through 2025, increasing the risk of domestic unrest throughout the year amid a shortage in key commodities. However, Saied is also likely to sack further ministry heads in the coming months as a temporary measure to mitigate against growing domestic dissent against his policies.
Mar 20.
* Syria-Lebanon: Risk of armed conflict along border remains high despite ceasefire agreement. On 19 March, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) entered the border town of Hawsh al-Sayyid Ali, which straddles the border with Syria (Baalbek-Hermel governorate, Homs governorate). This occurred after the Syrian forces withdrew. The LAF also announced it closed four illegal border crossings in the governorate used by smuggling networks. These developments come two days after Beirut and Damascus agreed on a ceasefire, ending heavy clashes between the Syrian government forces and Lebanese clans and smugglers affiliated with Lebanese Hizballah (LH). However, the security situation along the Akkar and Baalbek-Hermel governorate’s borders with Syria will remain highly fragile in the coming months. This will sustain the risks of armed conflict resumption between the Syrian government forces and the LH smuggling networks. The latter remain very active in the region and significantly armed. That said, we assess that any resumption of such clashes is unlikely to trigger direct conflict between the LAF and the Syrian forces as both sides are co-ordinating to dismantle the LH networks in the area (which remains a key node to the group’s military infrastructure).
* Syria-Lebanon: Risk of armed conflict along border remains high despite ceasefire agreement. On 19 March, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) entered the border town of Hawsh al-Sayyid Ali, which straddles the border with Syria (Baalbek-Hermel governorate, Homs governorate). This occurred after the Syrian forces withdrew. The LAF also announced it closed four illegal border crossings in the governorate used by smuggling networks. These developments come two days after Beirut and Damascus agreed on a ceasefire, ending heavy clashes between the Syrian government forces and Lebanese clans and smugglers affiliated with Lebanese Hizballah (LH). However, the security situation along the Akkar and Baalbek-Hermel governorate’s borders with Syria will remain highly fragile in the coming months. This will sustain the risks of armed conflict resumption between the Syrian government forces and the LH smuggling networks. The latter remain very active in the region and significantly armed. That said, we assess that any resumption of such clashes is unlikely to trigger direct conflict between the LAF and the Syrian forces as both sides are co-ordinating to dismantle the LH networks in the area (which remains a key node to the group’s military infrastructure).
* Turkey: Arrest of opposition leader will drive significant market instability, undermine confidence. Following the arrest of opposition leader Ekrem ?mamo?lu on 19 March, the Turkish lira (TRY) depreciated by at least 14.5% to a record low, highlighting market concern over the likely politicised nature of the charges. This fall is the worst since Turkey’s last financial crisis in 2023, with reports indicating that the country’s central bank sold nearly USD 10 bn in foreign currency in an effort to stabilise the market. These events will almost certainly undermine investor confidence in Turkey’s markets and government policy. This will likely reduce foreign direct investment (FDI) in Turkey, likely sustaining high inflation risks and driving financial risks for businesses. There is a realistic possibility that a further escalation in democratic backsliding and state repression will increase exposure to political unrest, prompting multinational companies to relocate from Turkey and elevating the risk of capital flight. We assess that this would undercut economic growth and reduce corporate tax revenue for the government, elevating socio-economic risks in the coming months.
Mar 19.
* Israel-Palestinian Territories: Under-fire negotiations will significantly increase armed conflict risks. Earlier on 19 March, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu effectively announced that the Israel-Hamas ceasefire is over and that any negotiations will now take place amid continuous fighting. At the time of writing, the resumption of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza is restricted to an aerial and (limited) artillery offensive. Israel is likely to resume fighting in stages so as to build pressure on Hamas and to allow it to make concessions before fully resuming ground operations. Despite such efforts, Hamas remains unlikely to surrender hostages without long-term guarantees. As such, a return to the ceasefire is unlikely. We assess the aerial campaign is likely to continue in the coming days; ground operations will likely restart within the next two weeks, initially in the form of small raids before a full mobilisation. This would significantly undermine humanitarian conditions and raise security risks for NGO personnel. The resumption of fighting will almost certainly increase domestic unrest in Israel, as well as in neighbouring countries (particularly Jordan and Turkey).
* Turkey: Arrest of likely presidential candidate will drive domestic unrest risks, human rights concerns. Earlier on 19 March, the authorities detained Istanbul’s opposition mayor Ekrem ?mamo?lu on corruption and terror charges. ?mamo?lu’s arrest comes a day after Istanbul University annulled his degree on a technicality, which, if upheld, would block him from running in presidential elections. Turkey’s largest opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), was expected to name ?mamo?lu as its candidate for the 2028 election in the coming days. ?mamo?lu’s detention and the removal of his degree are almost certainly politically motivated, underscoring significant democratic backsliding and deteriorating human rights conditions in Turkey. V’s arrest is highly likely to spark demonstrations and to drive domestic unrest risks in the capital Ankara, as well as Istanbul (Istanbul province) and southern and south-western coastal cities. The Istanbul Governor’s Office has imposed a four-day ban on public gatherings, exacerbating the risk of arbitrary detentions emanating from protest activity in Istanbul, and elevating the likelihood of sporadic clashes between demonstrators and the authorities. We assess that protests in major cities will highly likely drive localised supply chain and operational disruption for businesses.
Mar 18.
* Israel-Palestinian Territories: Conflict escalation is almost certain as IDF strikes Hamas targets. Earlier on 18 March, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched an intense airstrike campaign against Hamas targets in Gaza. According to Hamas, the strikes killed at least 400 people, including several senior Hamas officials. Following the strikes, the IDF ordered Palestinian residents close to the buffer zone near the Gaza–Israel barrier (specifically in North Gaza and Khan Yunis governorates) to evacuate immediately. The strikes likely signal the official end of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire and will almost certainly drive conflict escalation between Israel and Hamas. The evacuation order underscores a realistic possibility of resumption of ground operations in Gaza in the coming days. These will significantly increase cross-fire and misidentification risks to civilians and NGO personnel. Further airstrikes are highly likely in the coming hours, elevating the risk of serious injury and infrastructure damage in proximity to known militant assets. We assess that the ceasefire breakdown will almost certainly exacerbate humanitarian concerns in Gaza, elevating critical energy, food and water security risks for civilians and personnel.
Mar 17.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
* On 16 March, cross-border clashes erupted between the Syrian interim government forces and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) on the Syria-Lebanon border.
* On 16 March, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) uncovered a weapon cache in Nur Shams (Tulkarm governorate) with a United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) vest, elevating threats to NGO operations and staff safety.
* On 16 March, Israeli prosecution filed an indictment against an Arab Israeli who planned a small-arms attack in Jerusalem’s Old City (Jerusalem governorate) during Ramadan.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OVERALL FORECAST
* Israel and the US refused a Hamas offer to release dual-national hostages as ceasefire negotiations fail to progress.
* Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced he will dismiss the director of the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), increasing risks of anti-government protests in the coming days.
* The Israeli government must adopt a state budget by 31 March, elevating risks of brinkmanship within the coalition government, particularly regarding conscription legislation.
* Israel facilitated a religious pilgrimage for numerous Syrian Druze leaders into the Golan Heights, compounding bilateral tensions with the Syrian government.
* OVERALL FORECAST: The US’ large-scale airstrike campaign against the Iran-backed Houthis will likely continue over at least the coming weeks, elevating security risks in Yemen and the Red Sea.
* On 16 March, cross-border clashes erupted between the Syrian interim government forces and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) on the Syria-Lebanon border. The clashes followed an accusation by the Syrian government that LH members crossed into Syria on 15 March, kidnapped three Syrian soldiers near Zeita Dam (Homs governorate) and killed them in Lebanon. While LH denied involvement in the incident, the Syrian interim government deployed additional forces to the Syria-Lebanon border on 16 March and shelled several LH sites in the Beqaa valley (Baalbek-Hermel governorate). One such incident killed at least one civilian in Qasra (Baalbek-Hermal) according to LH-affiliated media and prompted the evacuation of the town. Subsequent LH cross-border retaliation killed at least five Syrian soldiers. At the time of writing, clashes have ceased; however, heightened tensions remain on the Syria-Lebanon border. There is a realistic possibility that the kidnappers belonged to one of the area’s LH-affiliated smuggling networks, though it possibly acted on its own volition. In recent weeks, there has been an escalation in both efforts to smuggle weapons into Lebanon and contrasting Syrian government counter-smuggling operations. These trends, combined with the recent clashes, will sustain elevated armed conflict risks on the Syria-Lebanon border, driving cross-fire and collateral risks therein, including in Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley and Baalbek-Hermel governorates as well as Syria’s Homs governorate. Population displacement from border communities will also further elevate socio-economic and humanitarian concerns in southern Lebanon, particularly in large urban centres over the coming days.
* On 16 March, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) uncovered a weapon cache in Nur Shams (Tulkarm governorate) with a United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) vest, elevating threats to NGO operations and staff safety. Militant use of NGOs’ and media news’ branded equipment will compound elevated misidentification risks in the West Bank, particularly during clashes between the IDF and militants. Furthermore, the discovery of an NGO or media organisation’s branded equipment in use by militants will elevate the risks of Israel sanctioning or banning these organisations’ activities within the country. This will elevate risks for business operations, including the revocation of entry visas and work permits and denial of staff entry into Israel upon arrival.
* On 16 March, Israeli prosecutors filed an indictment against an Arab Israeli who planned a small-arms attack in Jerusalem’s Old City (Jerusalem governorate) during Ramadan. Last month, the Israeli Police and Shin Bet forces arrested the suspect and his brother, both residents of Jadeidi-Makr (Northern district), for planning a small-arms attack at the Damascus Gate in Jerusalem’s Old City. The plot highlights elevated ethno-religious tensions and radicalisation risks among Israel’s Arab community (particularly among Israel’s Muslim population) in response to Israeli security operations and restrictions on access to the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound during Ramadan (28 February to 30 March 2025). This will elevate the risk of terror attacks in Jerusalem during Ramadan, particularly in Jerusalem’s Old City and East Jerusalem (also to a lesser extent in Jerusalem district) driving cross-fire and broader bystander risks to staff therein. A heightened security presence will sustain elevated travel disruption risks and exposure to sporadic altercations in these areas as well.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
* Israel and the US refused a Hamas offer to release dual-national hostages as ceasefire negotiations fail to progress. On 15 March, Hamas released a statement indicating it would release a living US-Israeli hostage and the remains of four unidentified hostages (all dual nationals) to facilitate further ceasefire negotiations. Israel immediately rejected the proposal; US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff characterised the proposal as ‘disingenuous’. The proposal likely reflects Hamas’ efforts to undermine co-operation between the US and Israel amid extended ceasefire negotiations and undercut possible US support for the possible resumption of IDF operations in the coming weeks. Despite these efforts, however, the US and Israel continue to advocate for the implementation of the so-called ‘Witkoff proposal’. This proposal includes extending the Phase One ceasefire until 19 April, with Hamas releasing an unspecified number of living and deceased hostages. On 16 March, Israeli representatives travelled to Egypt to attend further rounds of negotiations. However, without a major breakthrough, substantial progress towards a formal ceasefire extension remains unlikely in the coming days.
* Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced he will dismiss the director of the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), increasing risks of anti-government protests in the coming days. On 16 March, the Prime Minister’s Office announced that Netanyahu would convene a cabinet meeting on 18 March to vote on dismissing Ronen Bar as head of the Shin Bet. The announcement comes two weeks after the Shin Bet published an internal inquiry into its failures to prevent the 7 October 2023 attacks; the report partially attributes blame for the attacks to the Israeli government’s policies preceding the attacks, which it characterises as facilitating Hamas’ armament and fundraising efforts. On 17 March, numerous anti-government protest groups called for demonstrations on 18 and 19 March to oppose efforts to dismiss Bar. Large-scale protests will highly likely emerge in the coming days, particularly in the Rehavia neighbourhood in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and central Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). Although demonstrations will likely remain peaceful, large-scale attendance will elevate risks of travel and supply chain disruption along key thoroughfares, particularly Highway 1 and Highway 20. Universities and schools will also possibly announce closures to allow students to attend demonstrations; such closures will elevate risks of staff absenteeism for locally engaged firms, elevating labour flexibility and operational disruption risks. In the coming days, there is also a realistic possibility that the Histadrut labour federation (Israel’s largest union) will call for strike action related to the announcement; industrial action would substantially elevate risks of operational disruption, particularly in highly unionised sectors such as transport. Though protest activity is unlikely to continue indefinitely, on 16 March, the attorney general stated that Netanyahu cannot unilaterally dismiss Bar until her office establishes the ‘factual and legal basis’ of such a decision. Efforts to determine the legality of Bar’s dismissal will possibly trigger protracted disputes regarding his tenure, sustaining risks of temporary upticks in anti-government protests in the coming weeks.
* The Israeli government must adopt a state budget by 31 March, elevating risks of brinkmanship within the coalition government, particularly regarding conscription legislation. On 19 March, the Knesset will consider the Arrangements Law, a precursor to legislation adopting the 2025 state budget. The Knesset must adopt the state budget before 31 March or the government will automatically dissolve, triggering a general election. In the coming days, coalition parties will highly likely continue leveraging concerns regarding government stability to secure concessions on various policy initiatives, such as conscription legislation, settlement expansion in the West Bank (Palestinian Territories) and the resumption of IDF operations in Gaza. Critically, ultra-Orthodox parties will highly likely threaten to vote against the budget unless the government adopts legislation exempting ultra-Orthodox men from conscription into the IDF. Although brinkmanship from the Shas and United Torah Judaism (UTJ) parties will likely delay the adoption of budget legislation, the Likud-led government will likely leverage divisions within the ultra-Orthodox parties to secure sufficient support for budget legislation without adopting legislation that violates its legal obligations to expand conscription eligibility, per a Supreme Court ruling in June 2024 (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 9 January 2025). Although this will likely moderate imminent threats to government stability, nominal changes to conscription practices will elevate risks of protests and unrest in ultra-Orthodox population centres, particularly those in Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv district), Beit Shemesh and Jerusalem (both Jerusalem district). More broadly, the government will also possibly agree to minor legislative or regulatory changes to consolidate support from individual members of the Knesset (MKs), increasing regulatory framework and supervision quality risks in the short term.
* Israel facilitated a religious pilgrimage for numerous Syrian Druze leaders into the Golan Heights, compounding bilateral tensions with the Syrian government. On 14 March, the Israeli authorities allowed a delegation of approximately 100 Druze leaders to visit religious shrines in the Golan Heights (Northern district). This marks the first such pilgrimage for Syrian Druze since Israel took control of the territory in 1967. Prior, on 13 March, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent 10,000 packages of food aid to Druze communities in Suwayda governorate (Syria). In the coming weeks, Israel will likely continue efforts to develop positive relations with the Syrian Druze community as part of broader efforts to bolster the perceived legitimacy of its operations in southwest Syria. Such efforts will highly likely drive substantial tensions with the newly-formed Syrian government, though escalation into direct armed conflict remains unlikely in the short to medium term.
The US’ large-scale airstrike campaign against the Iran-backed Houthis will likely continue over at least the coming weeks, elevating security risks in Yemen and the Red Sea. US airstrikes on 15 and 16 March killed at least 53 people and injured over a hundred, according to the Houthi-run health ministry. The strikes, a response to Houthi threats to resume attacks on Israeli shipping in the Red Sea, targeted military and dual infrastructure, including power stations in Dahyan (Saada governorate), Taiz (Taiz governorate) and the capital Sanaa. Given US pledges to continue the campaign until freedom of navigation in the area is restored, further airstrikes are likely in the coming weeks. This will elevate collateral risks to staff and assets in proximity to military and dual-use infrastructure including ports and power stations. Attacks on dual-use infrastructure are highly likely to elevate energy, food and water security risks across Yemen in the coming weeks, increasing humanitarian concerns. In response, the Houthis will likely increase their targeting of US naval vessels as well as possibly broaden their targeting campaign to include all western-affiliated maritime vessels, elevating risks for assets, business operations, global supply chains and staff safety. There is a realistic possibility that the Houthis will also target Israel, elevating security and bystander risks due to shrapnel and aerial ordnance in Israel and neighbouring countries (particularly Egypt) in the coming weeks.
The airstrikes also prompted a series of large-scale rallies opposing the US and Israel in major cities across Yemen including Al Hudaydah (Al Hudaydah governorate), Amran (Amran governorate), Dhamar (Dhamar governorate), Saada (Saada governorate) and the capital Sanaa. Further US airstrikes targeting locations in Houthi-controlled territory will likely trigger additional protests, elevating risks of operational and supply chain disruption for locally engaged firms, particularly NGOs transporting aid through the Al Hudaydah Port facility. Further protests will also possibly escalate into unrest targeting installations perceived as being associated with the US, including NGO premises. Increasing hostility to foreign investment will also elevate risks of violence targeting locally engaged staff, particularly foreign nationals associated with the US. Such individuals will also face elevated risks of detention deportation and surveillance from the Houthi-controlled authorities, increasing labour flexibility and operational disruption risks.
* Israel-Palestinian Territories: Conflict escalation is almost certain as IDF strikes Hamas targets. Earlier on 18 March, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched an intense airstrike campaign against Hamas targets in Gaza. According to Hamas, the strikes killed at least 400 people, including several senior Hamas officials. Following the strikes, the IDF ordered Palestinian residents close to the buffer zone near the Gaza–Israel barrier (specifically in North Gaza and Khan Yunis governorates) to evacuate immediately. The strikes likely signal the official end of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire and will almost certainly drive conflict escalation between Israel and Hamas. The evacuation order underscores a realistic possibility of resumption of ground operations in Gaza in the coming days. These will significantly increase cross-fire and misidentification risks to civilians and NGO personnel. Further airstrikes are highly likely in the coming hours, elevating the risk of serious injury and infrastructure damage in proximity to known militant assets. We assess that the ceasefire breakdown will almost certainly exacerbate humanitarian concerns in Gaza, elevating critical energy, food and water security risks for civilians and personnel.
* Iran-US: Trump’s threats elevate risks for maritime vessels in Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea. On 17 March, US President Donald Trump threatened that he would hold Iran responsible for any attack carried out by the Houthis in Yemen. The threat comes following the beginning of an intense US airstrike campaign against the Iran-backed group on 15 March. While Iran’s continued military support for the Houthis, including intelligence for targeting vessels, grants it considerable influence on their decision-making, it does not control Houthi actions. The Houthis are unlikely to cease attacks on shipping in the Red Sea in the coming days. Regardless, a US attack on Iranian territory currently remains unlikely, with the US most likely to pressure Iran by seizing, or possibly striking, Iranian vessels in the Arabian and Red Seas, elevating regional tensions. Such incidents will raise the risk of Iranian retaliation against US-affiliated vessels in the Persian Gulf. We assess that increased harassment and possible attempted hijackings of vessels near Iranian waters will drive operational disruption and elevate security risks for assets and crews.
* Syria: Clashes with Hizballah-affiliated clans will sustain armed conflict risks along Lebanon border. On 16 March, Syria’s defence ministry accused Lebanese Hizballah (LH) of kidnapping and killing three Syrian security personnel. The announcement came shortly after local media reported earlier clashes between the two sides along the Lebanese border near the Zeita Dam (Homs governorate). However, LH later denied any connection to the events. That said, there is a realistic possibility that the kidnappers belonged to one of the LH-affiliated smuggling networks in the area, which also kidnapped Syrian soldiers in February. These networks remain active along the border with Homs governorate and are backed by local Lebanese clans. We assess that Damascus will highly likely conduct further security campaigns in the coming weeks to consolidate its control over the border and dismantle captagon and weapon smuggling networks. However, we assess that the rugged terrain and the hostility of LH-affiliated Lebanese clans along the border will highly likely undermine the effectiveness of such operations, sustaining armed conflict risks through 2025.
*Yemen-US: Further Houthi attacks on vessels in Red Sea are almost certain, increasing security risks. Earlier on 17 March, the Iran-backed Houthis claimed to have targeted the USS Harry S Truman in the Red Sea for the second time in under 24 hours. The claim follows US airstrikes across Yemen on 15 March, which killed at least 53 people according to the country’s Houthi-run health ministry after the Houthis announced last week that they would resume attacks on Israeli vessels in the Arabian and Red Sea. The US will highly likely continue strikes across Yemen in the coming days, likely impacting key logistics hubs, increasing energy, food and water security risks for in-country personnel and elevating significant country-wide humanitarian concerns. Houthi attacks on Western-affiliated vessels will almost certainly increase in the coming days, driving significant personnel security risks both from direct strikes on vessels and shrapnel from US-Coalition interceptions of Houthi missiles and drones in the Red Sea. We assess that this will also likely exacerbate global supply chain risks, driving business operational and financial disruption. (Source: Sibylline)
20 Mar 25. Israel Resumes Ground Offensive in Gaza and Advances on Strategic Netzarim Corridor. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced Wednesday that it had carried out “targeted ground activities” in Gaza and had partially regained control of the strategic Netzarim Corridor, which divides the strip.
The announcement comes a day after Israel launched airstrikes in Gaza that ended a two-month ceasefire with Hamas.
“Over the past 24 hours, IDF forces have begun a focused ground operation in the center of the Gaza Strip and in the south,” IDF’s post on X reads.
The IDF said its recent operations aim to expand the so-called “security perimeter” between Gaza and Israel and establish a “partial buffer zone” separating the northern and southern parts of the Gaza Strip.
Western aid officials reported that a private security company responsible for securing checkpoints in the Netzarim Corridor withdrew overnight, allowing Israeli troops to move in at dawn on Wednesday. Officials said four Israeli bases have been reoccupied, making travel across Gaza nearly impossible.
Israel’s recent military action comes as Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz released a video message to Gaza residents warning that the return of hostages and the removal of Hamas from power are necessary to avoid further escalation. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
20 Mar 25. CENTCOM Strikes Houthi Strongholds in Yemen for Fourth Straight Day, Targeting Leadership Sites and Weapons Depots. The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) launched overnight airstrikes on Houthi positions in Yemen, targeting sites in Saada province, where Houthi leaders are reportedly hiding, and the Red Sea port of Hodeidah, according to Houthi media.
In a statement on X, CENTCOM confirmed that it is carrying out “continuous operations against Iran-backed” Houthis but did not provide further details.
Houthi-run Al Masirah TV reported over 10 U.S. airstrikes on various locations, including the Al-Safra district in Saada. According to Yemeni sources, the district, which contains weapons storage and training sites, is one of the group’s most heavily fortified military strongholds.
Open-source reports claim that the recent U.S. strikes also hit Houthi missile platforms and weapons warehouses across Yemen, including in Sana’a.
During recent operations, a U.S. fighter jet shot down multiple Houthi drones using the AGR-20 FALCO Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS), a laser-guided rocket. A video released by CENTCOM captures the drones being intercepted and destroyed mid-flight.
Meanwhile, the Houthis’ military spokesperson said that cruise missiles and drones targeted the USS Harry S. Truman carrier group, marking the fourth attack within 72 hours.
On Wednesday, President Trump renewed his warning to Iran to halt support for the Houthis as he claimed that the group continues receiving supplies from Iran.
“Reports are coming in that while Iran has lessened its intensity on military equipment and general support to the Houthis, they are still sending large levels of Supplies. Iran must stop the sending of these supplies immediately. Let the Houthis fight it out themselves. Either way they lose, but this way they lose quickly,” Trump said in a post on Truth Social.
“Tremendous damage has been inflicted upon the Houthi barbarians, and watch how it will get progressively worse — It’s not even a fair fight, and never will be. They will be completely annihilated!” he added.
Earlier this week, Trump said that any Houthi retaliation would be considered an attack by Iran. The warning comes following U.S. airstrikes on Houthi drone, missile, and air defense systems in Yemen, which the Houthis claim resulted in 53 deaths. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
17 Mar 14. Hegseth Says Campaign Against Houthis Will be ‘Unrelenting’ Until Hostilities Cease. During a media interview yesterday, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said the U.S. military will continue to tactically engage Iranian-backed Houthis until they stop acting aggressively against U.S. ships in the region.
Hegseth commented on the topic following President Donald J. Trump’s order for U.S. Central Command to launch multiple airstrikes against Houthis in Yemen, March 15, 2025.
“Freedom of navigation is basic; it’s a core national interest,” Hegseth said, adding that the current campaign is about restoring deterrents in the region in addition to freedom of navigation.
“The minute the Houthis say, ‘We’ll stop shooting at your ships [and] we’ll stop shooting at your drones,’ this campaign will end but, until then, it will be unrelenting,” he continued.
Hegseth also said the airstrikes were meant to draw Iran’s attention.
“The message is clear to Iran … Your support of the Houthis needs to end immediately. We will hold you accountable as the sponsor of this proxy, and I echo [the president’s] statement [that] we will not be nice about it,” Hegseth said.
The Houthis have been acting aggressively in the Red Sea region since October 2023, when a U.S. Navy destroyer had to intercept three land-attack cruise missiles fired by the Houthis toward Israel.
Since then, the Houthis have launched over 100 drone and missile attacks targeting American and allied ships in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, resulting in many commercial ships having to alter their routes to avoid the region at a tremendous commercial cost.
Hegseth likened the severe economic impact of the Houthi aggression in the region to “being held hostage by a terrorist organization” and then pointed out that the Trump administration has indeed labeled the Houthis as such.
“To the Houthis: [the airstrikes weren’t] a one-night thing … This is about stopping the shooting at assets in that critical waterway to reopen the freedom of navigation, which is a core national interest of the United States,” Hegseth said, before again reemphasizing that Iran needs to “back off” from enabling the Houthis.
Hegseth said Iran and its additional military proxies — including Hamas and Hezbollah — are in a “weakened state.”
“But it doesn’t mean they still don’t have the desire [for aggression],” he said, adding that Iran will never be allowed to have a nuclear weapon.
“Iran must get that clear message and negotiate the end of their pursuit for nuclear weapons because … President Trump has said clearly that they will not get a bomb,” Hegseth said. (Source: U.S. DoD)
17 Mar 14. U.S. Punches Back at Iran-Backed Houthi Terrorists in Yemen. In the Red Sea, Iran-backed Houthi terrorists have been for years attacking U.S. ships and other nations, disrupting legal commerce for all seafaring nations.
Chief Pentagon Spokesman Sean Parnell said today during his first public briefing at the Pentagon that the U.S. Central Command, at the direction of President Donald J. Trump, launched a series of attacks at key terrorist Houthi targets in Yemen, March 15, 2025.
“Over the weekend, U.S. Central Command forces initiated a series of operations consisting of precision strikes against Iran-backed Houthi targets across Yemen to restore freedom of navigation and re-establish American deterrence,” Parnell said.
The Houthis, he said, have been targeting U.S. military ships and aircraft as well as commercial ships and the ships of other nations.
“They threaten our personnel overseas,” he said. “Houthi terrorists have launched missiles and one-way attack drones at U.S. warships over 170 times and at commercial vessels 145 times since 2003.”
The U.S., Parnell said, will continue to use “overwhelming, lethal force” against the terrorist Houthi targets until the U.S. achieves its goals.
“There is a very clear end-state to this operation, and that begins the moment that the Houthis pledge to stop attacking our ships and putting American lives at risk,” he said.
Right now, he added, it’s not apparent the Houthis are interested in stopping attacks against U.S. targets.
“Firing at U.S. military personnel in the region and shooting at our ships and … drones and putting American lives at risk is not a good way to end this conflict,” Parnell said. “The Houthis could stop this tomorrow if they to stop shooting at people. But they’ve clearly chosen not to do that. And so, this campaign will be relentless to degrade their capability and to open up shipping lanes in the region and to defend our homeland.”
Air Force Lt. Gen. Alexus G. Grynkewich, director for operations for the Joint Staff, said that, under the president’s direction, U.S. Central Command began precision strike operations against the Houthis to restore freedom of navigation and American deterrence.
“The initial wave of strikes hit over 30 targets at multiple locations, degrading a variety of Houthi capabilities,” he said.
Included among those targets were terrorist training sites, unmanned aerial vehicle infrastructure, weapons manufacturing capabilities and weapons storage facilities.
“It also included a number of command-and-control centers, including a terrorist compound where we know several senior Houthi unmanned aerial vehicle experts were located,” Grynkewich said.
He added that operations struck additional headquarters locations, March 16, 2025, as well as weapons storage facilities, and Houthi detection capabilities that were previously used to threaten maritime shipping.
“The operation continues and will continue in the coming days until we achieve the president’s objectives,” Grynkewich added.
In Yemen, he said, Houthi military casualties might be calculated in dozens, but those are initial estimates. Currently, there is no indication of civilian casualties from the U.S. attacks.
The Houthis claim to have fired on the USS Harry S. Truman, a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier based out of Norfolk, Virginia, but Grynkewich said that is hard to confirm.
“Quite frankly, it’s hard to tell because while we’re executing precision strikes, they missed by over 100 miles,” he said. “I would question anything that they claim to the press that they’re doing or not doing. It’s very hard to tell … just based on the level of incompetence they’ve demonstrated.” (Source: U.S. DoD)
18 Mar 25. Israel Gaza Live: More than 325 reported killed in Israeli.
Summary
* Israeli air strikes hit dozens of targets in Gaza
* Palestinian authorities say at least 326 killed
* Israel says Hamas refused to release hostages
* Hamas says Israel overturned ceasefire deal
* Read our full roundup here
The United Nations’ Humanitarian Coordinator for the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Muhannad Hadi, said in a statement: “Waves of airstrikes occurred across the Gaza strip since the early hours of the morning … This is unconscionable. A ceasefire must be reinstated immediately.”
How many hostages are left in Gaza?
There are 59 hostages still held in Gaza.
Israeli authorities believe fewer than half of them are still alive.
During the first phase of the ceasefire, 33 Israeli hostages and five Thai nationals were returned in exchange for some 2,000 Palestinian prisoners. (Source: Reuters)
18 Mar 25. Fighting Between Syria’s New Regime and Hezbollah Along Syria-Lebanon Border Intensifies. Clashes intensified Monday along the Syria-Lebanon border between Syrian forces and Hezbollah-aligned fighters.
The ongoing violence along the border follows the abduction and killing of three Syrian soldiers in Lebanon on Sunday. Syria had accused Hezbollah of the attack, which the group denied. In response, Syrian forces shelled Hezbollah positions, triggering prolonged clashes near Al-Qasr and Housh al-Sayyid Ali.
According to reports, fighting continued in Baalbek-Hermel Governorate prompting Syria to send reinforcements, including tanks and artillery, near Homs and the Syria-Lebanon border.
The Lebanese Army also joined the fighting and deployed special forces in Baalbek-Hermel Governorate following the order of Lebanese President Joseph Aoun.
Aoun earlier vowed to secure Lebanon’s borders, saying: “We will not allow this situation to continue. I have given clear orders to respond to sources of fire.” He had also ordered Foreign Minister Youssef Raji, currently at a Brussels conference on Syria, to engage with the Syrian delegation to resolve the crisis. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
18 Mar 25. Israel has restarted its war against Hamas, launching air strikes that killed at least 300 people and injured dozens more. The IDF confirmed this morning it had “resumed fighting” with Hamas after talks on further hostage releases stalled, bringing an end to a ceasefire that lasted two months. The “extensive strikes” targeted mid-ranking military commanders, leadership officials and terrorist infrastructure belonging to Hamas, The Telegraph understands. Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, promised “increasing military strength”, while Israel Katz, the defence minister, said “the gates of hell” would remain open in Gaza until all hostages were set free. The military action would continue “as long as necessary” and would “expand beyond air strikes”, the IDF added.
Hamas said Israel had resumed its “aggression” against civilians and that by overturning the ceasefire agreement in an “unprovoked escalation”, Mr Netanyahu was “exposing hostages in Gaza to unknown fate”. The Hamas-run health ministry said 326 people had died, including the group’s minister for information. Hours before the strikes, the UK accused Israel of breaking international law for the first time since the start of the conflict in Gaza. David Lammy, the Foreign Secretary, said Mr Netanyahu’s country had committed “a breach of international law”, in a significant hardening of the British position. (Source: Daily Telegraph)
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