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Military And Security Developments
Mar 15.
15 Mar 25. Iraq’s Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani confirmed Friday that Iraqi security forces, with support from the U.S.-led coalition, killed Abdallah Makki Muslih al-Rufay’i, also known as Abu Khadija, a senior leader within the Islamic State (IS). Al-Sudani announced the news in a social media post, describing the operation as Iraq’s continued “victories over the forces of darkness and terrorism,” He also stated that Abu Khadija was “one of the most dangerous terrorists in Iraq and the world,” emphasizing the continued efforts of Iraqi intelligence services to combat IS remnants.Iraqi special forces later confirmed that al-Rufay’i was killed Thursday in an airstrike in Iraq’s Anbar desert. The operation reportedly followed a two-year effort by the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) to track his movements, with intelligence breakthroughs emerging in the past six months. During this period, Iraqi security forces carried out a series of targeted raids against IS cells, including the codenamed ‘Lions’ Leap’ operation in the Hazimi area of the Anbar desert last August. That operation resulted in the deaths of key IS leaders and the recovery of phones, documents, and other materials that provided critical leads to al-Rufay’i’s whereabouts. The Kurdistan Regional Security Council reportedly supported the operation by arresting and transferring an individual linked to Abu Khadija. Information obtained from this individual enabled INIS to pinpoint al-Rufay’i’s location. The U.S.-led coalition under Operation Inherent Resolve provided technical intelligence support and air surveillance, which guided the operation leading up to the fatal strike. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
15 Mar 25. Turkish police detained five individuals accused of spying for Iranian intelligence in a coordinated operation across multiple cities, authorities confirmed Friday. The Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office announced that the arrests took place in Istanbul, Antalya, and Mersin as part of a joint investigation by Turkish security forces and the National Intelligence Organization (MIT). The detainees include three Turkish citizens and two foreign nationals, though officials did not disclose their nationalities. According to Turkey’s state-run Anadolu Agency, the suspects were allegedly engaged in “military and political espionage.” Authorities believe they gathered intelligence on military bases and strategically significant locations in Turkey and abroad, which they then transmitted to Iranian intelligence operatives. The investigation also indicated the suspects had communicated with members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) intelligence division. The detentions come at a time of growing tensions between Turkey and Iran. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan recently criticized Iran’s use of regional militias in Syria, calling the policy destabilizing and warning of potential repercussions. “If you are attempting to destabilize a third country, other nations may reciprocate by supporting groups within your own borders,” Fidan said earlier this month. The remarks prompted both countries to summon each other’s diplomats. Espionage cases linked to Iran have surfaced in Turkey multiple times in recent years. In September 2022, Turkish authorities arrested four Iranian citizens in Istanbul for alleged espionage, forgery, and human trafficking. Earlier in June 2022, Turkish and Israeli intelligence services foiled an alleged Iranian plot to kidnap and assassinate Israeli tourists in Istanbul, leading to the detention of several Iranian and Turkish operatives. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
Mar 14.
14 Mar 25. Syria: Constitutional declaration will mitigate government stability risks despite controversial articles. On 13 March, Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, signed a constitutional declaration that will serve as a governing document during a five-year political transition period. The declaration ensures the separation of the legislative, executive and judicial branches. However, the document controversially stipulates that the president must be a Muslim and that Islamic law will be the primary source of legislation. Furthermore, the president will directly appoint a third of the parliament, with the remaining members appointed by a committee (which al-Sharaa will also appoint). While several Kurdish parties initially opposed the declaration, this is unlikely to cause a major rift between the Kurds and Damascus or to undermine the ceasefire agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the government. Regardless, a spike in domestic unrest remains a realistic possibility given opposition from secular activists. However, we assess that any such protests are likely to be small in scale, sporadic and largely non-violent; they will mainly be concentrated in the capital Damascus. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Mar 25. Iran-US: Sanctions are unlikely to moderate nuclear activity; vessel seizures are increasingly likely. On 13 March, the US imposed sanctions on Iranian Minister of Petroleum Mohsen Paknejad and several Hong Kong-flagged vessels operating as part of Iran’s ‘shadow fleet’. The move is consistent with the Trump administration’s broader ‘maximum pressure’ campaign against Tehran, and aims to drive Iranian oil exports to zero in order to curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions. However, the sanctions are unlikely to persuade Iran to moderate its nuclear programme, sustaining significant nuclear safety and regional stability risks throughout 2025. As such, further sanctions are likely in the coming weeks, driving increased compliance and regulatory risks for energy, logistics and shipping companies operating in the region. Furthermore, businesses suspected of facilitating the trade of Iranian oil will likely face reputational and financial risks. US seizures of vessels transporting Iranian oil will likely increase in the coming months, prompting Iran to retaliate with seizures of its own. We assess this will likely drive delays to crude oil deliveries and threats to critical energy supply chains. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Mar 25. Libya, where US and Russia joust, could test Trump-Putin vibes. Donald Trump turned geopolitics on its head this month with his determination to do business with Vladimir Putin while pouring scorn on America’s allies. But there is one country in the world where tense competition between the United States and Russia continues apace, keeping the Cold War vibe alive with no nod to rapprochement. The February visit came after Haftar and his sons, Saddam and Khaled, paid a call to Russia’s close ally Belarus, a sign of ever closer ties with Moscow. Jalel Harchaoui, an analyst at the RUSI think tank in London, said U.S. attempts to win over Haftar were being led by the Pentagon. “The Biden administration had no real policy to peel him away from the Russians, and the Trump administration has had no time for Libya, so the Pentagon is conducting its own diplomacy here,” he said. Visitors from U.S. Africa Command who held ground targeting exercises as two B-52H Stratofortress bombers flew overhead invited military personnel from Haftar’s forces as well as from Eastern Libya, which is run by a separate government in Tripoli. The two sides of the country split in 2014, three years after the ousting for former leader Muamar Ghadaffi.
“Haftar tells the U.S. he would work with them but says Russia gives him air defenses and military training. The U.S. tells him it would give him more if only he would distance himself from Russia,” said Harchaoui.
After the U.S. visit, Russia’s deputy defense minister, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, was back in eastern Libya for another of his frequent visits.
“Meanwhile at Libya’s Brak al-Shati airbase, the number of Russians stationed there has risen from 300 to approximately 450 since November,” said Harchaoui.
Ben Fishman, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said he was “very skeptical” about Haftar turning away from Russia. (Source: Defense News)
Mar 13.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
- Late on 10 March, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched its largest airstrike campaign against Syria in the past two months.
- On 11 March, the Iranian-backed Houthis announced they would resume attacks on Israeli-affiliated maritime vessels in the Arabian and Red seas.
- On 13 March, an IDF airstrike against a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) command and control centre in Damascus (Syria) killed at least one person and injured eight others.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OVERALL FORECAST
- Despite continued negotiations, a major breakthrough in ceasefire talks between Israel and Hamas remains unlikely in the coming days.
- The International Court of Justice (ICJ) will host public hearings regarding Israel’s obligations to facilitate aid deliveries into the Palestinian Territories, increasing the risk of pro-Palestine protests in the Netherlands.
- A UN report into sexual violence in the Palestinian Territories will sustain the risk of pro-Palestine protest activity and elevate legal exposure risks for Israeli nationals travelling abroad.
- The arrest of a high-profile pro-Palestine activist in New York (US) will increase the risk of protest activity and workplace activism in the US.
- OVERALL FORECAST: Despite moderately warming bilateral relations, normalisation between Israel and Lebanon remains highly unlikely in the short term.
- Late on 10 March, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched its largest airstrike campaign against Syria in the past two months. The IDF used over 60 munitions and 22 fighter jets to strike over 41 targets in southern Syria. The targets included military infrastructure, bases, headquarters, weapons caches and equipment belonging to the former Syrian regime’s armed forces, as well as radar and early detection systems. In addition to broader IDF efforts to prevent militants from establishing a stable and substantial presence in Syria (see below), the IDF is likely to continue attempting to destroy the weapons and military infrastructure of the former regime, particularly in southern Syria. This will sustain an elevated likelihood of further airstrikes near military infrastructure across Syria, particularly southern Syria, driving collateral risks for proximate staff and assets. While IDF strikes are currently unlikely to prompt active armed conflict with Syria’s interim government, the risk of lower-level clashes with aligned forces will gradually escalate in line with sustained strikes, driving misidentification risks and exposure to crossfire in border regions.
- On 11 March, the Iranian-backed Houthis announced they would resume attacks on Israeli-affiliated maritime vessels in the Arabian and Red seas. The announcement comes after the expiration of the group’s 10 March deadline to secure the resumption of aid deliveries into Gaza. A resumption of Houthi attacks would also elevate security risks for non-Israeli-affiliated vessels due to the risk of misidentification. An increasing rate of attacks in the Arabian and Red Seas would elevate operational and business disruption risks due to increased insurance costs, a change of shipping routes and the overall threat to assets and crew. These risks will remain elevated in the coming weeks and will increase further in the event of a resumption of armed hostilities in Gaza, which we assess remains likely in the coming four weeks. A resumption of Houthi attacks would also increase security risks within Israel stemming from Houthi missile and drone strikes targeting population centres.
- On 13 March, an IDF airstrike against a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) command and control centre in Damascus (Syria) killed at least one person and injured eight others. The IDF claimed that PIJ used the centre to plan attacks against Israel. The impetus for launching a strike against the Syrian capital likely reflects mounting Israeli concerns about the risk of Palestinian terrorist groups establishing an active presence in Syria. The IDF is likely to sustain operations to counteract this perceived risk, driving elevated security and bystander risks related to airstrikes across Syria, including in Damascus and other large cities. While reports indicate the command centre was on the edge of the capital, strikes in more central and densely populated areas remain possible.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
- Despite continued negotiations, a major breakthrough in ceasefire talks between Israel and Hamas remains unlikely in the coming days. At the time of writing, mediated discussions on extending the Israel-Hamas ceasefire continue in Qatar. The talks are reportedly centred on a US and Israeli-backed proposal to extend ‘Phase One’ by 60 days in exchange for the release of ten hostages. However, on 13 March, US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff departed Qatar to engage in negotiations related to the war in Ukraine; without Witkoff’s engagement, negotiations between Israel and Hamas are unlikely to progress substantially in the coming days.
- The International Court of Justice (ICJ) will host public hearings regarding Israel’s obligations to facilitate aid deliveries into the Palestinian Territories, increasing the risk of pro-Palestine protests in the Netherlands. On 12 March, the ICJ announced it would begin a series of public hearings on 28 April as part of its advisory proceedings on Israel’s legal obligations in the Palestinian Territories. The announcement comes after the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in December 2024 calling for the ICJ to issue an advisory opinion on whether Israel has violated international law by ‘preventing’ aid deliveries into Gaza. The public hearings are highly likely to trigger pro-Palestine protests outside the ICJ premises in The Hague (Netherlands) on 28 April; disclosure of evidence (particularly emotive content shared via social media) will also elevate the risk of a broader uptick in related protest activity, particularly in Europe, the Middle East, North Africa and North America. In the coming months, South Africa will likely cite the court’s advisory opinion in its case against Israel regarding its obligations under the 1948 Genocide Convention at the ICJ. This will likely extend court proceedings, sustaining longer-term protest risks in these regions. Even so, while the ICJ’s advisory opinions are legally binding, there is no formal enforcement mechanism, moderating the likelihood that a finding calling for increased aid provision will improve humanitarian conditions in the Palestinian Territories, particularly in Gaza.
- A UN report into sexual violence in the Palestinian Territories will sustain the risk of pro-Palestine protest activity and elevate legal exposure risks for Israeli nationals travelling abroad. On 13 March, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) released a report alleging that IDF personnel have engaged in ‘widespread and systematic’ sexual violence during operations in Gaza and the West Bank since 2023. The report also states that IDF ground operations in Gaza have ‘intentionally’ destroyed healthcare facilities and constitute ‘genocidal acts’; Israel is not a member of the UNHRC and disputes the report’s content. Although the UNHRC’s reporting is not legally binding, states party to South Africa’s case against Israel at the ICJ (see above) will likely cite the report during court proceedings, compounding the risk of pro-Palestine protests in the coming weeks. More broadly, pro-Palestine activism groups will possibly leverage the report’s contents to file additional complaints against Israeli nationals travelling abroad; in recent months, groups such as the Hind Rajab Foundation have filed numerous such complaints against Israeli nationals for allegedly committing war crimes during their military service in the Palestinian Territories (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 6 January 2025). Such complaints and investigations will increase legal exposure risks for Israeli nationals travelling overseas in the coming months; we assess they face an elevated risk of questioning and detention by investigating authorities, and that this risk extends to friends and families of individuals subject to such complaints. These risks will remain particularly elevated in the coming months and will be most acute in states where courts retain universal jurisdiction, particularly those with active pro-Palestine protest movements.
- The arrest of a high-profile pro-Palestine activist in New York (US) will increase the risk of protest activity and workplace activism in the US. On 11 March, hundreds of demonstrators gathered in the Morningside Heights area of New York City (New York) to demonstrate against the arrest of Mahmoud Khalil on 8 March. Khalil previously led numerous pro-Palestine protests at Columbia University and faces possible deportation due to allegations from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that such activity is incompatible with US foreign policy. On 12 March, hundreds of protesters also gathered outside the US Federal Court in Manhattan (New York City) during an initial hearing on Khalil’s case. In the coming weeks, court proceedings and developments in Khalil’s case are highly likely to trigger further demonstrations, particularly in New York City and on university campuses with active pro-Palestine protest movements. Although altercations with the police remain possible, widespread protest-related unrest remains unlikely, moderating collateral risks for proximate installations. In the coming months, the DHS will likely increase its scrutiny of foreign nationals engaging in pro-Palestine protest activity, increasing the risk of arrest and deportation for affected individuals and triggering further episodes of protest activity. Firms employing foreign nationals will possibly face elevated regulatory scrutiny, while the risk of workplace activism will also increase, in turn elevating labour flexibility and temporary operational disruption risks.
OVERALL FORECAST
Despite moderately warming bilateral relations, normalisation between Israel and Lebanon remains highly unlikely in the short term. On 11 March, representatives from France, Israel, Lebanon and the US met in Naqoura (South governorate) to discuss possible efforts to demarcate the Israel-Lebanon border. Subsequently, the office of the Israeli prime minister confirmed that Israel and Lebanon will hold mediated talks to resolve long-standing border disputes, as well as to diffuse tensions related to the IDF’s continued presence in southern Lebanon and possibly to secure the release of several Lebanese nationals jailed in Israel. The announcement highlights increasing diplomatic efforts by mediators (namely the US and France) to facilitate the normalisation of relations between Israel and Lebanon. Despite these efforts, negotiations on border demarcation will likely be lengthy, complex and highly contentious, with normalisation remaining highly unlikely in the short term. Additionally, demonstrable progress towards normalisation is highly likely to exacerbate tensions between the newly formed Lebanese government and Lebanese Hizballah (LH), sustaining long-term concerns regarding government stability, ethno-religious tensions and possible clashes between government- and LH-aligned militant factions.
- Syria-Canada: Sanctions waiver to moderate socio-economic health risks over the coming year. On 12 March, the Canadian government announced plans to ease sanctions on Syria amid efforts by the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led interim government to normalise relations with the international community. Canada’s foreign ministry also nominated a non-resident ambassador to Syria and said it would provide USD 59 m in new funding for humanitarian assistance. The measures aim to support the sustainable delivery of aid and local redevelopment efforts, contributing to the long-term moderation of socio-economic health risks and humanitarian concerns in Syria while being key to government continuity and reducing domestic unrest and risks. However, state violence against the Alawite community in recent days underscores ongoing security and political risks for minorities. Such events will likely drive delays to sanctions relief from other countries and the restoration of deeper economic ties. We assess that they will likely sustain energy, food and water security risks throughout Syria in the coming three months.
- Syria: Threats of insurgency will persist in the coming months, driving risks of sectarian killings. On 12 March, pro-Assad militias in Barmiya (Tartus governorate) launched a new attack targeting the government forces, killing nine security personnel. On the same day, other pro-Assad militias carried out another attack against a government fuel truck convoy on the road linking Latakia (Latakia governorate) with Baniyas (Tartus governorate). This came the same day local media reported new sectarian killings committed by government-affiliated militias targeting Alawites in the coastal region despite the reduced intensity of the crackdown on pro-Assad militias. The developments underscore the persistent threat of insurgency against Damascus in the region, incited by former military figures in the Al-Assad government capitalising on Alawite grievances. As such, Damasus will likely continue its clearing operations in the coming weeks (though on a smaller scale), sustaining high risks of armed conflict and instability. We assess that the presence of jihadist elements within the new state institutions will continue to drive high risks of sectarian killings during these security campaigns despite the government’s attempts to mitigate such incidents.
Mar 12.
- Yemen-Region: Resumption of Houthi attacks will drive global supply chain, security risks. On 11 March, the Iranian-backed Houthis announced they would resume attacks on Israeli vessels in the Arabian and Red seas, including those in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden. The group’s spokesperson stated attacks would continue until Israel allowed aid, food, and medicine to enter Gaza. As such, attacks on Israeli and Western-affiliated vessels will likely increase in the coming days and weeks, driving disruption to key shipping routes, while also elevating operational and financial risks for businesses and straining global supply chains. Israel and the US-led coalition will likely respond to attacks with airstrikes against infrastructure in Yemen. Such strikes would likely target ports like al Hudaydah, as-Salif and Ras Isa (all al Hudaydah governorate), driving collateral risks for assets and staff near military sites and elevating the risk of conflict escalation. We assess that such strikes will increase energy, food and water security risks in Houthi-controlled areas for civilians, including in-country personnel, elevating humanitarian concerns.
Mar 11.
- Iraq-region: Counter-terrorism co-operation will temper IS attack risks, drive arbitrary detentions. On 10 March, Iraq’s and Iraqi Kurdistan’s security agencies arrested a suspected terrorist in Sulaymaniyah (Sulaymaniyah governorate, Iraq) and destroyed several key sites in Saladin and Kirkuk governorates (both Iraq) during joint operations against Islamic State (IS). This came after Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein warned of the growing threat posed by IS at a security co-operation summit in Amman (Jordan) on 9 March. As joint counter-terrorism efforts between Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Turkey increase in the coming weeks, a heightened security posture is likely along Iraq’s borders, driving the risk of arbitrary detentions and cross-border transport disruption. The establishment of a joint operations room will likely enable real-time intelligence sharing between Iraq and its neighbours, reducing the likelihood of future attacks and international terrorism risks posed by IS. There is a realistic possibility that the Iraqi Air Force (IQAF) will increase airstrikes against IS positions in Kirkuk in the coming weeks, driving security risks for personnel on the ground, as well as proximate business assets.
- Syria: Agreement with Kurds will mitigate against security risks, regional instability. On 10 March, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian government signed a ceasefire agreement. While the government has not engaged in wide clashes with the SDF, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA, a government ally) has been fighting the Kurds since the ousting of the former president, Bashar al-Assad. As such, the agreement will likely bring a gradual cessation of hostilities between the two groups in northern Syria, though disengagement along the Euphrates front will be highly challenging. This will, in turn, significantly reduce the likelihood of a Turkish operation against Syria’s Kurds in 2025. Notably, the agreement also includes broad principles regarding the integration of the SDF’s military and civil organisations into new state institutions. However, it is not clear if Kurdish military forces will join the Syrian defence ministry as a bloc or if they will be completely dissolved. Furthermore, we assess the agreement will gradually reduce domestic unrest risks among Arabic tribes across SDF territories amid the deployment of government forces and Damascus’ control of border crossings, airports, and oil fields.
Mar 10.
- The maintenance of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) troops in the Philadelphi Corridor beyond the withdrawal deadline will drive conflict escalation risks. Despite having agreed (as part of Phase One) to withdraw all IDF troops from the Philadelphi Corridor (along the border between Egypt and Gaza) by 9 March, the IDF continues to occupy this corridor at time of writing. Israel’s refusal to comply with the agreement comes after Defense Minister Israel Katz said on 27 February that the corridor would remain a buffer zone, citing security concerns. Hamas has accused Israel of violating the ceasefire, compounding rising risks of conflict resumption given the failure to extend Phase One or move decisively to Phase Two. Negotiations over the Phase Two of the ceasefire have been stalled for weeks. If the ceasefire breaks down (which remains a realistic possibility in the next two weeks), the risk of rocket attacks across Israel will also increase. This includes attacks launched by the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen. A continued Israeli presence in the corridor would likely trigger large-scale protests in major cities like Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), elevating security risks and travel disruption. Israel’s military presence in the corridor also breaches the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, likely straining diplomatic relations with Egypt.
- Iran-backed Houthis have threatened the resumption of Red Sea attacks, driving maritime security risks in the region. On 7 March, the Houthis said they would resume their attacks on vessels in the Red Sea if Israel did not allow aid into Gaza within four days (10 March). Israel has blocked the entry of aid trucks into the strip since 2 March, attempting to pressure Hamas into freeing the remaining hostages. The Houthis will likely resume operations against West-affiliated vessels in proximate waters, driving maritime security risks. Subsequent moderate disruption to key Red Sea and Gulf of Aden shipping routes in the coming days and weeks will increase supply chain, financial and operational risks to companies operating in the region. There is also a realistic possibility of direct rocket and missile attacks from the Houthis against key infrastructure in Israel, including military and energy sites across the country, increasing security and operational risks in major cities such as Haifa (Haifa district), Jerusalem (Jerusalem district), and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). In the event of a resumption in hostilities, Israel and the US-led coalition will likely retaliate with airstrikes on Houthi infrastructure in Yemen, driving bystander security risks in proximity to military assets and elevating risks of conflict escalation.
- Clashes and mass killings in Syria will likely drive increased Israeli operations in southern Syria, driving security risks. On 8 March, the IDF said it had conducted several targeted raids in southern Syria during the previous week, destroying numerous weapons caches. This follows local reports of major clashes and mass killings committed by government-affiliated militias during a crackdown targeting the Alawite communities in Latakia and Tartus governorates (both Syria) on 7 and 8 March. The clashes have elevated the risk of further armed conflict and increased threats of attacks against government assets. As such, Israel will likely augment its posture in southern Syria in the coming days and weeks amid concerns about Syria’s deteriorating security situation and the capacity of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led government to secure its southern border. Furthermore, the risks of outbreaks of limited conflict between the Syrian government forces and the IDF will increase over the coming months, significantly elevating bystander security risks near military sites and government facilities across Syria. However, a full-scale armed confrontation between Israel and Syria remains unlikely.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Israel halted all electricity exports into Gaza, reflecting efforts to maximise pressure on Hamas during ceasefire negotiations; energy and water security risks will almost certainly increase. On 9 March, Israel’s Energy Minister Eli Cohen ordered the Israel Electric Corporation (IEC) to immediately suspend electricity sales to power stations in Gaza. Although electricity has not been widely available in Gaza since October 2023, the IEC has provided partial access to mains electricity to facilitate the operation of several water desalination plants in the enclave. The suspension will increase water security risks in Gaza in the coming days, exacerbating broader concerns regarding humanitarian conditions following the suspension of aid deliveries on 2 March (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 3 March 2025). These moves underscore ongoing Israeli efforts to maximise pressure on Hamas during ongoing ceasefire extension negotiations. In the coming weeks, humanitarian conditions in Gaza are highly likely to continue deteriorating, increasing risks of renewed pro-Palestine protests in the broader region and major cities worldwide. There is also a realistic possibility that South Africa will cite the aid and electricity suspensions as evidence of genocidal intent in its ongoing case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Developments in the case will also possibly trigger further protests, particularly in European capitals.
- Despite renewed engagement in ceasefire negotiations, sustained tensions between Israel and Hamas will sustain risks of deadlock and conflict resumption. On 9 March, an Israeli delegation departed for Qatar to attend mediated ceasefire talks. US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff will also attend the talks. Despite renewed engagement, however, negotiations will remain prone to deadlock, particularly regarding US and Israeli proposals to temporarily extend Phase One of the ceasefire agreement. Hamas has repeatedly stated that Israel must commit to implementing Phase Two to secure further hostage releases. Risks of conflict resumption in Gaza will continue increasing in the coming days without a substantial breakthrough regarding ceasefire transition or extension.
- There was a moderate uptick in protest attendance in Israel’s major cities, highlighting sustained travel disruption risks as ceasefire talks continue to stall. On 8 March, thousands of protesters gathered in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), resulting in several temporary road closures. Smaller-scale demonstrations also emerged in Kfar Saba, Netanya and Rehovot (all Central district). In Tel Aviv, demonstrators also established an encampment outside the Ministry of Defense headquarters on Begin Street; the encampment will remain in place indefinitely. As ceasefire negotiations continue to stall, the encampment will likely act as a gathering point for anti-government protesters in the coming days and weeks, increasing risks of temporary travel and supply chain disruption through central Tel Aviv. Also on 8 March, activists opposing the government’s efforts to reform the judiciary and dismiss the Attorney General called for the remobilisation of weekly anti-government protests. Protest organisers have called for supporters to gather on Kaplan Street in Tel Aviv on Saturdays and then merge with hostage-release demonstrations. Although anti-judicial reform protests are unlikely to attract large-scale attendance, longer-lasting demonstrations in Tel Aviv will increase the risks of extended operational and travel disruption. Even so, demonstrations are highly likely to remain peaceful, moderating unrest risks.
- In the US, increasing scrutiny of pro-Palestine protests at major universities will elevate risks of funding suspensions and further protests. On 7 March, the US government announced the suspension of over USD 400 m in funding for Columbia University (New York city, New York) for its ‘inaction’ on antisemitism and harassment of Jewish students. Students at Columbia have frequently engaged in pro-Palestine protests on university premises, which US President Donald Trump has characterised as supporting Hamas and reflecting broader antisemitic sentiment. In the coming weeks, federal agencies will highly likely increase scrutiny of high-profile universities experiencing pro-Palestine protests, particularly those that saw related unrest in 2024 (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 2 May 2024). This will possibly result in funding cuts, grant suspensions and pressure to crack down on protest activity, increasing reputational concerns for affected institutions. Additionally, on 8 March, the US immigration authorities detained an Algerian national who led a series of high-profile, pro-Palestine protests at Columbia University in 2024. The arrest comes as the US Department of Homeland Security increases scrutiny of foreign nationals participating in pro-Palestine protests. On 9 March, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that the administration would move to deport alleged Hamas supporters, highlighting increasing risks of regulatory scrutiny for foreign nationals (including permanent residents) and firms employing targeted individuals. In response, the National Students for Justice in Palestine called for pro-Palestine protests on all major US university campuses from 11 March. Although significant attendance remains unlikely, sporadic pro-Palestine protests and attempts to occupy campus buildings will elevate risks of clashes.
- Restrictions to attendance at Friday prayers in the al-Aqsa Mosque compound will elevate risks of unrest in Jerusalem’s Old City (Jerusalem governorate), increasing security and bystander risks. On 6 March, the Israeli government announced restrictions to Palestinian civilians’ attendance at Friday prayers at the al-Aqsa Mosque compound during Ramadan (between 28 February and 30 March). The ordinances limit attendance to men aged over 55, women aged over 50 and minors aged under 12; attendees must receive a permit and make their way through security screenings to attend prayers on 7, 14, 21 and 28 March. However, in the coming weeks, efforts to enforce restrictions will highly likely increase congestion in the compound’s vicinity, elevating travel disruption risks in Jerusalem’s Old City. On 7 March, approximately 90,000 individuals attended prayers in the compound without significant unrest. However, in the coming weeks, efforts to deny entry to the compound will sustain risks of altercations between attendees and the Israeli security forces, increasing bystander risks. Such altercations will also possibly escalate into broader clashes and unrest, increasing security and collateral risks in the Old City and wider East Jerusalem area. The Israeli security forces will almost certainly adopt an elevated posture throughout the city to enforce the restrictions and deter unrest. Amid elevated ethno-religious tensions, we assess there is an increased risk of sole-perpetrator attacks targeting security force personnel and positions, particularly low-capacity attacks such as stabbings and car rammings. Developments regarding regulation enforcement will also be highly sensitive to mis-, dis- and mal-information (MDM) campaigns (particularly on social media platforms), driving ethno-religious tensions and risks of hostility to foreign investment in the Palestinian Territories and the broader region.
- In Israel, Purim celebrations will increase operational disruption risks in major cities and possibly trigger altercations in the Jerusalem area. From 13 March to 14 March, Jewish communities will observe Purim. Although the religious observance is not a public holiday, participation in public celebrations will result in numerous road closures and diversions, disrupting overland movement. Risks of sole-perpetrator and low-capacity militant attacks targeting parades and celebrations will also increase, particularly in locations in close proximity to the West Bank. The security forces will almost certainly adopt an elevated posture around public parades and celebrations, as well as at checkpoints and border crossings with the West Bank, compounding travel disruption risks. Although this posture will likely mitigate risks of successful high-capacity attacks, as Purim celebrations often involve civilians setting off firecrackers and dressing up in costumes, possible perpetrator misidentification will increase the risk of the security forces inadvertently targeting civilians, particularly in crowded locations. In Jerusalem, the co-incidence of Purim and Friday prayers will elevate risks of altercations and clashes between hard-right Israeli activists attending prayers at the Western Wall and individuals observing Friday Prayers within the al-Aqsa Mosque compound. Possible altercations will drive security and bystander risks while sustaining already elevated ethno-religious tensions in the city. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Mar 25. Israel’s Strike in Syria’s Deraa Province Targets Military Sites and Radar Installations. The Israel Air Force (IAF) launched a series of airstrikes on military sites in Syria’s southern province of Deraa late Monday night, targeting military headquarters and weapons depots, the Israeli military confirmed Tuesday. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said the operation is aimed at eliminating potential security threats to Israel. Aside from “headquarters and military sites containing weapons and military equipment belonging to the Syrian regime in southern Syria,” the IDF strikes also targeted “radar systems and detection equipment used to build an aerial intelligence picture,” according to IDF’s statement. State-run Syrian Arab News Agency reported that “Israeli occupation aircraft carried out several strikes on the surroundings of the towns of Jbab and Izraa in the north of Deraa.” Two Syrian security sources, speaking to Reuters, reported that at least six strikes hit a military base in Jbab, while another eight targeted a former Syrian army facility in Izraa. The U.K.-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) confirmed that 17 Israeli airstrikes struck two former Syrian military installations: Artillery Regiment 89 and the 12th Brigade. These installations were previously under Assad’s control before his regime collapsed late last year. The observatory reported that no casualties have been recorded so far. Following Monday’s strikes, Israeli security officials relayed a message to Syria’s transitional government, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, through intermediaries. The message made clear that Israel would not tolerate the Sunni rebel group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) or other armed factions using former Syrian military installations to build new bases.
“Any attempt to do so will be met with direct military action,” the officials stated.
Israel’s military operations in Syria have significantly increased since Assad’s fall. SOHR reported that Israeli forces carried out more than 500 air attacks on Syrian targets between December 8 and December 31, 2024. In the first two months of 2025 alone, Israel has conducted at least 21 documented strikes. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated last month that southern Syria must be fully demilitarized. He also warned that his government would not tolerate the presence of forces from the new government in Damascus, led by al-Sharaa, near Israeli territory. Last week, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz labeled al-Sharaa “a jihadist terrorist of the al-Qaeda school,” citing reports of mass killings linked to his forces. On Monday, Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar echoed the same sentiments, calling the new regime “pure evil.” In an interview with Reuters, Sharaa called Israel’s accusations against him and Syria “nonsense.”
“They are the last ones who can talk,” he said, pointing out the massive civilian death toll in Israel’s brutal war on Gaza, in which at least 61,000 people have been killed. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
11 Mar 25. Syria Signs Agreement to Integrate US-Backed SDF into State Structure. The Syrian interim government signed an agreement with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, (SDF) which includes a ceasefire and the integration of the U.S.-backed forces into Syria’s army. Under the terms of the agreement of the deal, signed by Syrian interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa and SDF General Commander Mazloum Abdi on Monday, all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria—including border crossings, airports, and oil and gas fields—will come under central government control by the end of the year. The pact also guarantees constitutional rights for Syria’s Kurdish population, including the right to use and teach their language, which had been restricted under Assad’s rule. Additionally, it promises citizenship to stateless Kurds and facilitates the return of hundreds of thousands of displaced individuals to their homes.
Syria’s agreement with SDF, which has maintained control over large parts of northeastern Syria since 2015, comes months after its leadership dissolved its military and security agencies and announced that all armed factions in the country would be disbanded and integrated into a newly created national army, operating under the supervision of the Ministry of Defense.
The agreement was announced amid the unrest in Syria’s coastal region, where government forces have been battling insurgents loyal to the former Assad regime.
Earlier on Monday, the Syrian Defense Ministry declared an end to the military operation against Assad’s loyalists after achieving the “neutralization of security threats” in Latakia and Tartous provinces.
While security forces ended the military operations in these provinces, they continue to search for sleeper cells and remnants of the insurgency loyal to Assad, according to the Syrian Defense Ministry.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported on Monday that nearly 1,500 people had been killed in the violence since Thursday. Among the fatalities, the Observatory noted, were at least 745 civilians, 125 members of the Syrian security forces, and 148 fighters loyal to Assad. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
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