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NEWS IN BRIEF – ISRAEL – HAMAS CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

01 Dec.

  • Israel-Hamas ceasefire expires prompting a renewal of hostilities in Gaza and rocket launches towards southern Israel.
  • Low-level cross-border clashes between the IDF and Lebanese Hizballah resume in line with events in Gaza.
  • Ethno-religious tensions persist in the West Bank at elevated levels as Israeli settlers and Palestinians clash, while the IDF continues operations at pace.
  • The Israel-Hamas ceasefire expired at 0700hrs (local time) on 1 December, triggering a resumption of hostilities in Gaza and a resurgence of rockets towards Israel. Negotiations fell through because Hamas failed to provide Israel with a list of acceptable hostages and rocket launches towards the Gaza envelope began before the official end of the ceasefire, leading to a resumption in conflict. The IDF also resumed air and artillery strikes in southern Gaza locations in Khan Yunis and Rafah. Additionally, on 1 December the IDF published an online map dividing Gaza into over 1000 numbered areas and called on Palestinian civilians to adhere to evacuation orders issued for their specific locations, underscoring preparations for further intense strikes across Gaza including southern Gaza.
  • On 1 December, cross-border rocket fire resumed in northern Israel, underscoring an uptick in clashes between the IDF and Hizballah and affiliated militants. Additionally, on 30 November unconfirmed reports claim that the IDF shelled several locations linked to Hizballah in Lebanon’s Nabatieh governorate following a drone incursion into Israel. The current rate and intensity of fire towards Israel remains low compared to pre-ceasefire levels and is concentrated in areas close to the Israel-Lebanon border. However, clashes are likely to gradually resume and increase in frequency and intensity over the coming days, elevating security and bystander risks across northern Israel.
  • Ethno-religious tensions remain elevated in the West Bank, with clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinians underscoring elevated bystander risks. Over the past 24 hours, Israeli settlers reportedly set fire to several Palestinian vehicles in Jalud (Nablus governorate) and uprooted numerous trees in Kafr al-Dik (Salfit governorate) during clashes with Palestinian residents. Further localised clashes are highly likely, sustaining elevated physical security and bystander risks for individuals and assets in proximity to Israeli settlements throughout the West Bank.
  • On 30 November, unconfirmed reports claimed there was an explosion in a Houthi missile base in Jabal Attan, near Sanaa. First reports alleged this was the result of a targeted attack however the US confirmed it was not responsible for the explosion and no other party has taken responsibility. There is a realistic possibility the attack was carried out by Israel to pre-empt a possible uptick in attacks from the Houthis towards Israel. This is likely to elevate regional tension and security risks for ships passing near Yemen, particularly Israeli-linked vessels.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • The expiration of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire has reportedly disrupted the flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza, exacerbating significant socio-economic and humanitarian concerns. While eyewitness reports indicate that no aid trucks have passed through the Rafah border crossing since the ceasefire ended at 0700hrs, no official statements regarding the crossing’s operational status have been made at the time of writing. While humanitarian aid will likely continue passing into Gaza over the coming days, albeit at reduced levels, the resumption of clashes and IDF airstrikes will likely further disrupt the delivery and distribution of aid, particularly given Rafah’s volatile security risk environment. Humanitarian organisations will face significantly elevated operational and collateral risks, with restrictions to aid distribution exacerbating significant food, water and energy insecurity, particularly in northern Gaza.
  • Israel’s reported plans to assassinate Hamas officials overseas are highly likely to sustain elevated regional tensions, straining diplomatic relations. On 1 December, the Wall Street Journal reported that unnamed Israeli officials have approved plans for Israel’s security services (Mossad) to conduct targeted assassinations against Hamas officials in Lebanon, Qatar and Turkey. While security service resources will likely remain focused on operations in Gaza, the West Bank and northern Israel for the duration of the Israel-Hamas war, long-term efforts to neutralise Hamas’ leadership and assassinations conducted on foreign soil will likely as flashpoints for escalating regional tensions and diplomatic ruptures, particularly with Qatar. While reported assassination plans are unlikely to significantly impact current ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas (mediated by Qatar), there is a realistic possibility of persistently elevated diplomatic tensions undermining progress in longer-term negotiations.
  • Clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinians in the West Bank continue to moderately elevate tensions between the US and Israel, though are unlikely to significantly impact diplomatic relations.  On 1 December, US President Joe Biden announced that the US would impose a visa ban on Israeli settlers suspected of perpetrating violence against Palestinian civilians in the West Bank. Though this announcement highlights moderately increasing tensions between the Israeli and US governments, it is unlikely to indicate imminent or significant policy changes from the Biden administration vis-à-vis the Israel-Hamas war. As the Biden administration continues to face significant domestic pressure to moderate its support of Israel, there is a realistic possibility of further, moderate policy changes relating to Israel’s actions in the West Bank. However, substantial shifts in diplomatic and military relations remain highly unlikely.

Israel-Palestinian Territories: Resumption of hostilities in Gaza increases physical security risks. On 1 December, after negotiations to agree on a ceasefire extension and an accepted list of hostage returnees failed, Hamas launched rockets towards the Gaza envelope at 0542hrs (local time). Israel intercepted the launches a few hours before the official end of the ceasefire at 0700hrs. Fighting in, and strikes on, Gaza have resumed. However, the current fire rate and targeting remain limited to the Gaza envelope, likely due to continued efforts to reach another ceasefire deal, as well as IDF ground operations in Gaza. The resumption of hostilities will elevate the risk of rocket attacks across Israel’s South, Centre and North districts, both from Gaza-based militants as well as from Lebanese militants. Severe security risks will persist in northern Gaza, but IDF strikes and increased security risks in southern Gaza are also highly likely.

30 Nov.

  • Israel-Hamas ceasefire extended by 24 hours to 0700hrs on 01 December as negotiators reach a last-minute agreement.
  • Clashes on the Israel-Lebanon border between IDF and Hizballah and/or affiliated militants continue at a low intensity and frequency, in line with levels seen throughout the ceasefire.
  • The IDF continues raids and arrests throughout the West Bank, as a terror attack kills three civilians and injures 11 others in Jerusalem.
  • Over the past 24 hours, the Israel-Hamas ceasefire was extended until 1 December, 0700hrs (local time). Additionally, on 29 November, unconfirmed reports claimed a limited violation of the ceasefire by Gazan militants, resulting in limited clashes with the IDF and the deaths of three militants. Hurdles in the agreement on the current extension underline its fragile nature and the readiness of both sides to resume hostilities if additional extensions are not agreed.
  • Clashes between Israel and Hizballah and/or affiliated militants on the Israel-Lebanon border continued at the low rate observed since the start of the ceasefire. On 30 November, there was one drone incursion and one instance of rocket fire, both from Lebanon into Israel. Unconfirmed reports claim the IDF returned fire on southern Lebanon. The incidents highlight the fragility of the current lull in hostilities on the border. There is a realistic possibility of further sporadic clashes around future hurdles in ceasefire extension negotiations between Israel and Hamas. Clashes are likely to resume in the event of the ceasefire ending or breaking down, elevating security and bystander risks in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, particularly in locations close to the border or to military positions.
  • On 30 November, two Palestinian gunmen affiliated with Hamas killed three Israeli citizens and wounded 11 during a shooting attack in Jerusalem. The attack was conducted at a bus station in Givat Shaul Interchange, 0.3 miles (490 metres) from Jerusalem Central Station and 1.1 miles (1.8km) from the Israeli Knesset. The two gunmen, brothers from East Jerusalem, used an assault rifle and a handgun, and both were killed on the scene by off-duty soldiers and an armed civilian. Following the attack, the IDF raided the brothers’ residence in the Sur Baher neighbourhood, arrested family members for questioning and heightened the security presence around Jerusalem.
  • Car ramming attack on a checkpoint in the Jordan Valley, injuring two IDF soldiers in north-east West Bank highlights a slight uptick in attacks by Palestinian militants in the West Bank over the past 24 hours. Overnight, IDF raids and operations resulted in clashes with Palestinians in the Bethlehem, Nablus, Ramallah and al-Bireh and Tulkarm governorates.
  • Elements of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) have vowed to target US troops over winter. Ashab al-Kahf issued the warning on 28 November, alongside an image of what appeared to be US soldiers carrying an injured comrade. The group stated they would continue to use missiles and drones to target US forces, which would be consistent with the demonstrated capabilities and tactics of militant groups in Iraq since the start of the Israel-Hamas conflict.
  • On November 29, a US vessel intercepted a Houthi drone launched from Yemen. Following threats by Houthis that Israel-associated vessels are legitimate targets, the Houthis have conducted a number of attacks in-line with attempts to assert influence over the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. As such this incident is entirely consistent with recent Houthi activity. USS Carney shot down the Iranian-made drone while escorting a convoy in the area. There were no injuries or damage to the ships as a result of the incident.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • Humanitarian aid continues to enter Gaza via the Rafah border as the ceasefire holds, though elevated humanitarian concerns persist as the ceasefire deadline approaches. Over the past 24 hours, approximately 200 trucks of passing into Gaza, including four carrying fuel and three delivering cooking gas. While the ceasefire agreement continues to facilitate increased aid delivery and has moderately reduced critical food, water and energy insecurity in Gaza, limited aid deliveries to northern Gaza have sustained elevated humanitarian concerns therein. As and when the current ceasefire agreement ends, resumed hostilities will almost certainly disrupt and restrict the continued delivery of humanitarian aid, exacerbating deteriorating humanitarian conditions throughout Gaza. Furthermore, given the realistic possibility of the IDF expanding the ground offensive into southern Gaza over the coming weeks, humanitarian operations will face elevated operational and collateral risks, further restricting access to aid services within the enclave.
  • On 29 November, Saudi Arabia reportedly offered to increase investment in Iran in return for moderating armed proxy group activity, underscoring elevated concerns of regional conflict escalation. The proposal, which has reportedly been in development since early October, aims to provide financial incentives for Iran to moderate allied militants’ activity and prevent a further escalation of hostilities, particularly between the IDF and Hizballah. Discussions also reportedly focused on limiting Iranian-linked militant groups active in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, amid efforts to de-escalate regional tensions following numerous Iranian proxy attacks on US military locations and the seizure of an Israeli-linked vessel by Yemen-based Houthis on 19 November. This proposal is unlikely to be adopted over the coming days and is unlikely to significantly impact regional militant activity in the short term.
  • On 29 November, German police announced the arrests of two individuals on suspicion of targeting a Christmas market with homemade incendiary devices in an Islamist terror attack. Two individuals allegedly linked to Islamic State (IS) planned to conduct a vehicle ramming attack and use Molotov cocktails to target civilians at a Christmas market in Leverkusen (North Rhine-Westphalia state). Suspects also reportedly discussed attacking a synagogue before selecting the market as a target. The incident reflects elevated ethno-religious tensions relating to the Israel-Hamas conflict and underscores heightened risks of sole perpetrator and/or Islamist attacks, particularly targeting individuals and locations associated with Israel and/or Jewish communities throughout Europe. Additionally, high-visibility attacks on civilians in crowded public spaces, including Christmas markets, public transport hubs and religious venues remain a remote possibility over the coming month, particularly in Belgium, France, Germany and the UK.

FORECAST

The Israel-Hamas ceasefire is highly likely to remain in place over the coming 24 hours, though a resumption of hostilities after the 1 December deadline remains a possibility. While there is a realistic possibility of sporadic clashes between the IDF and Gaza-based militants over the coming 24 hours, negotiations to extend the ceasefire agreement will almost certainly continue. However, further instances of parties attempting to maximise leverage by pushing ceasefire renewal to the last-minute will sustain risks of the agreement lapsing and hostilities temporarily resuming in Gaza. In the period immediately following ceasefire termination, there will likely a significant uptick in Hamas militant activity, including the firing of multi-rocket barrages towards population centres in central and southern Israel, elevating physical security and bystander risks therein. IDF operations will almost certainly continue focusing on securing and clearing locations in northern Gaza, particularly in Jabalia and northern Gaza City, and will resume airstrikes. Even so, given significant international pressure, there is a realistic possibility that negotiations to establish further ceasefire agreements will continue regardless, increasing the likelihood that both the IDF and Hamas moderate the scale and intensity of operations to leave room for manoeuvre in talks.

Following the terror attack in Jerusalem, IDF operations in the West Bank will likely increase in scale and intensity, elevating the risk of clashes. The IDF’s elevated security posture will likely include erecting additional checkpoints and increasing scrutiny of vehicles at border crossings, while raids and arrest sweeps will likely continue triggering clashes in unrest hotspots including Bethlehem, Hebron, Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, Ramallah and Tulkarm. There is a realistic possibility of additional sole perpetrator and/or Hamas militant attacks over the coming days, sustaining elevated physical security and bystander risks for individuals throughout the West Bank. While attacks will likely continue predominantly targeting Israeli security personnel and/or installations, busy public spaces and transit nodes are also possible targets. Furthermore, in the event of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire failing, an increase in demonstrations and clashes with security forces is highly likely, elevating bystander risks. There is also a realistic possibility of an uptick in militant activity, including by West Bank-based Hamas militants, threatening to raise the intensity and prevalence of violence.

Despite sporadic clashes on the Israel-Lebanon border, significant escalation remains unlikely for as long as the Israel-Hamas ceasefire holds. However, sporadic clashes and cross-border attacks remain a realistic possibility, sustaining security risks in northern Israel and southern Lebanon. While the resumption of hostilities when the ceasefire ends remains likely, there is a realistic possibility these hostilities will remain limited in their intensity and gradually escalate depending on the success of future ceasefire negotiations. However, a complete breakdown of both the ceasefire and negotiation would likely escalate clashes back to pre-ceasefire levels, with a realistic possibility of intense rocket barrage in the hours after this event.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

  • A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
  • High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
  • Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
  • Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
  • An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
  • US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
  • Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
  • The ongoing IDF ground operation into Gaza expands beyond the northern area of the enclave

*Hamas-affiliated militants shooting in Jerusalem reflects elevated security risks. On 30 November, three Israeli citizens were killed and 11 wounded in a shooting terror attack at a bus station at Givat Shaul Interchange, 0.3 miles (490 metres) from Jerusalem Central Station and 1.1 miles (1.8km) from the Israeli Knesset. The attack was carried out by two Palestinians from Sur Baher, East Jerusalem, affiliated with Hamas, using a rifle and a handgun. The attack reflects the elevated security and bystander risks in the West Bank and Jerusalem amid the backdrop of growing tensions following IDF operations in the West Bank and Gaza. The attack is likely to increase Israeli security forces’ posture and operations in Jerusalem and the West Bank. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that the lull in fights in Gaza allows Hamas to direct more resources and co-ordinate with operatives in the West Bank. This is likely to further elevate attack risks across Israel, particularly in the West Bank and Jerusalem targeting transport hubs, crowded areas and religious sites.

28 Nov.

  • The Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement is set to expire on 30 November; negotiations to extend the agreement continue, despite isolated attacks on IDF personnel in Gaza on 28 November.
  • Clashes between IDF and Hizballah and/or affiliated militants on the Israel-Lebanon border continue at a low intensity and frequency, as observed since the beginning of the ceasefire.
  • The IDF continues to augment its security posture in the West Bank, while ethno-religious tensions between Palestinians and Israeli settlers remain elevated.

Over the past 24 hours, two instances of clashes between the IDF and unidentified militants occurred in Gaza, though the ceasefire continues to hold. On 28 November several IDF personnel were injured in northern Gaza in two instances of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks carried out by militants. However, while both Israel and Hamas highlighted these incidents as ceasefire violations, the agreement continues to hold and no further incidents have been recorded.

  • No clashes between the IDF and Hizballah and/or affiliated militants have been reported on the Israel-Lebanon border over the past 24 hours. This is in line with trends observed since the beginning of the ceasefire, though several unconfirmed reports of IDF strikes on Lebanese territory will sustain the likelihood of clashes resuming over the coming 24 hours. A resumption of hostilities will increase security risks in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, particularly in locations in proximity to the border as well as IDF locations and installations associated with Hizballah militants.
  • IDF operations continued overnight in the West Bank, with a continued moderate uptick in armed clashes involving firearms and IEDs. In the past 24 hours, numerous raids, arrests and subsequent clashes were reported in unrest hotspots including the Jenin, Qalqilya and Tubas governorates. Additionally, overnight, the Hamas’ West Bank military faction, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, clashed with the IDF near the Yitzhar settlement, south of Nablus.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • Negotiations between Israel and Hamas to extend the ceasefire beyond 30 November continue, though no agreement has been reached, sustaining risks of conflict resumption. Hamas has reportedly suggested a four-day extension to the ceasefire, though the success of negotiations will be conditional on Hamas’ capacity to credibly commit to further hostage releases. There is a realistic possibility that an extension of the ceasefire will be agreed shortly following the end of the current ceasefire, leaving several hours uncovered by a truce. Additionally, significant international pressure and US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s visit to Israel on 30 November increase the likelihood of negotiations continuing over the coming days, even in the event of clashes resuming.
  • The Israel-Hamas ceasefire continues facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid into Gaza via the Rafah border crossing, though significant socio-economic concerns remain. Over the past 24 hours, approximately 200 humanitarian aid trucks have passed into Gaza, including eight containers carrying fuel and cooking gas. While increased aid flows have moderately alleviated critical humanitarian conditions over the past six days, restrictions to fuel deliveries continue to undermine energy security and access to key services, particularly in northern Gaza. In the event of a ceasefire extension, deliveries of humanitarian aid will likely continue at elevated levels, while a ceasefire termination will almost certainly limit humanitarian operations within Gaza, escalating food and water insecurity throughout the enclave. Deteriorating humanitarian conditions throughout Gaza have also reportedly exacerbated tensions between the civilian population and the Hamas-led governing authority, amid reports of rising criminality and ineffective governance. Challenges to Hamas’s authority, particularly in southern Gaza, will likely undermine efforts to co-ordinate hostage releases and negotiate further ceasefire agreements while elevating risks of disruption to the delivery of humanitarian aid.
  • Despite tensions within the Israeli unity government, threats to government stability remain low. On 29 November, Minister of National Security of Israel Itamar Ben Gvir threatened to withdraw his Otzma Yehudit party from the coalition government if the IDF does not resume operations in Gaza over the coming days. An indefinite pause of the IDF ground offensive is highly unlikely and Ben Gvir’s statement is unlikely to significantly impact government stability or elevate policy risk. Even so, this statement underscores persistent tensions within the governing coalition which will likely remain elevated as ceasefire negotiations continue.
  • The Israel-Hamas ceasefire was extended for an additional 48 hours beginning 28 November, with ongoing efforts by parties and international mediators to extend it further.
  • Hostilities between the IDF and Lebanese Hizballah (Hizballah) remain low and in line with trends observed throughout the ceasefire. Gradual resumption of hostilities during the ceasefire remains a realistic possibility, sustaining security risks near the Israel-Lebanon border.
  • The IDF continues its operations in the West Bank, with a drill focusing on Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate and the surroundings of Jerusalem scheduled for 28 November. Clashes near Ofer Prison, from which Palestinian prisoners are released as part of the ceasefire deal, have become a reoccurring event.
  • The IDF and Palestinian militants in Gaza continue to adhere to the ceasefire, with no rocket launches from Gaza towards Israel in the past 24 hours. On 27 November, the Israel-Hamas ceasefire was extended for a further 48 hours. However, with IDF troops continuing to hold positions within Gaza, there have been some limited instances of low-intensity and sporadic clashes. While such clashes are unlikely to trigger a breakdown in the ceasefire agreement, they highlight elevated tensions and the persistent risk of incremental escalations which will increase the possibility of a ceasefire termination, though this remains a low-likelihood scenario. Risks of the ceasefire suddenly breaking down due to delays or arguments between Israel and Hamas, will persist over the coming 24 hours, sustaining physical security risks throughout Israel.
  • Clashes between IDF and Hizballah and/or affiliated militants in the Israel-Lebanon border remain low in intensity and frequency, in line with trends observed since the beginning of the ceasefire. Over the past 24 hours, no cross-border attack has been claimed by Hizballah and no rocket sirens were activated in northern Israel. However, Lebanese media outlets reported IDF shelling targeting the outskirts of Ayta ash Shab (South governorate) on the evening of 27 November; the IDF has claimed it was not aware of this incident. Instances of sporadic rocket fire and clashes on the Israel-Lebanon border and proximate areas remain a realistic possibility, despite Hizballah’s apparent adherence to the Israel-Hamas ceasefire. These will sustain elevated security risks in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, particularly near the border and IDF/Hizballah positions.
  • IDF operations in the West Bank continue on trend, with recurrent clashes and domestic unrest in the proximity of Ofer Prison. On 28 November, the IDF reportedly used an anti-tank missile during several hours of armed clashes with Palestinian militants during a raid in Tubas (Tubas governorate). Additionally, on 28 November, the IDF announced it will perform a military drill in the territory of the Benjamin Brigade, which is responsible for Ramallah and al-Bireh governate and the surrounding Jerusalem area, highlighting the increasing security posture in the central West Bank.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • The Israel-Hamas ceasefire continues to hold, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid into Gaza via the Rafah border crossing. Over the past 24 hours, approximately 200 humanitarian aid trucks have passed into Gaza, though deliveries into northern Gaza remain restricted. Despite allegations from Hamas’ leadership that humanitarian aid is not reaching Gaza City, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) confirmed the delivery of water, food and medical aid to seven of its locations in northern Gaza. On 27 November, the Al Shifa hospital also announced the partial re-opening of several departments, though access to urgent medical services remains highly restricted. While the increased flow of aid has moderately alleviated critical humanitarian conditions over the past five days, the resumption of hostilities following the termination of the ceasefire is highly likely to further undermine food, water and energy security, particularly in northern Gaza.
  • On 28 November, the head of the Israeli security services (Mossad) and the head of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) travelled to Doha (Qatar) for further ceasefire negotiations. The meetings, which highlight ongoing diplomatic efforts to secure hostage releases and extend the ceasefire beyond 29 November, likely included discussions of expanding hostage releases to include male hostages. While there is a realistic possibility of further ceasefire extensions, the success of negotiations will be conditional on Hamas’ capacity to locate and gather hostages within Gaza for release amid communications challenges.
  • Late on 27 November, the Israeli war cabinet approved the amended state budget for 2023-2024, which released limited coalition funds and increased defence and war-related spending. The spending move has been criticised by the National Unity party and by Economy Minister Nir Barkat for not adequately cutting spending unrelated to the Israel-Hamas war and for not releasing more coalition funds. These spending changes, which include releasing funds for ultra-Orthodox religious schools and Israeli settlements in the West Bank, will now be voted on in the Knesset. While the amended budget will likely pass, elevated tensions within the emergency government and domestic pressure to cut non-military spending will likely delay the budget’s approval. Following the cabinet vote, anti-government protesters blocked the entrance to the Finance Ministry in Jerusalem on 28 November, highlighting domestic opposition to the spending changes. Over the coming days, there is a realistic possibility that further protests opposing the budget amendment will occur in major urban centres, including Haifa, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, though violent clashes with security forces are unlikely.

*Somalia: Maritime hijacking, ballistic missiles underline greater regional threats to shipping. On 27 November, the US Pentagon claimed that the five individuals behind the attempted 26 November hijacking of a commercial vessel in the Gulf of Aden are likely of Somali origin. This assessment comes despite the fact that two ballistic missiles fired from Houthi-held territory in Yemen, landed ten nautical miles (11.5 miles, 18.5km) away from a US warship while it was assisting the targeted tanker. If the Hijackers were Somali this would likely indicate either that criminal groups in Somalia are exploiting instability tied to the Houthi threat to target vessels associated with Israel, or that militant groups in Somalia are seeking to support Houthi operations against Israel. Regardless, this trend threatens to further increase physical security risks for ships moving through the Red Sea, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the Gulf of Aden and along the Somali coast throughout the duration of the Israel-Hamas war.

*US: House of Representatives affirms Israel support amid risks from Iran-based threat groups. On 28 November, the US House of Representatives approved two resolutions, the first calling on Hamas to release all hostages in Gaza and the second affirming Israel’s right to exist as an independent state. The Hamas resolution passed in a 414-0 vote, while the Israel resolution gained 421 votes with one rejection and one abstention. On the same day, federal authorities took control of an investigation into multiple hacking incidents targeting US water facilities that were using Israeli-made technology. The hacks are suspected to be from Iran-based cyber threat groups. This underscores the increased threat against critical US infrastructure in the short-to-medium term, heightened by the Israel-Hamas war and attacks by Iran-linked militant groups against US military assets in the Middle East. Still, the House resolutions signal that Iran-based attacks will not impede US support for Israel in the short term, with supplemental military aid to Israel likely to pass Congress in the coming days.

28 Nov.

*Israel: New threat actor underscores persistent security risks to Israeli critical sectors. On 27 November, the security firm, Intezer, reported on a threat actor, ‘WildCard’, using custom malware to target Israeli critical sectors since 2021. Their first campaign targeted the Israeli education sector, using a backdoor (‘SysJoker’). The group has developed their malware arsenal, including the development of SysJoker malware variants that mimic legitimate software and a new custom backdoor (‘RustDown’). WildCard also improved its detection evasion abilities, underscoring the latent risk posed to Israeli organisations. RustDown is written in Rust coding language, highlighting a shift in WildCard’s malware development, likely increasing challenges to detection and analysis. There is a realistic possibility that WildCard is connected to a year-long cyber operation between 2016 and 2017 that targeted the Israel Electric Company, which would indicate that the group was active as early as 2016. As geopolitical tensions in the Middle East remain heightened, particularly in relation to the Israel- Hamas conflict, Israeli entities will continue to face elevated security risks.

27 Nov.

  • The ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas continues to hold despite several disagreements including on the list of hostages to be released on 27 November. There is a realistic possibility that an extension will be announced today.
  • Significant reduction in hostilities between the IDF and Lebanese Hizballah (Hizballah) and/or affiliated militants in the past 72 hours likely to hold as long as the Israel-Hamas ceasefire remains in force.
  • The seizure of an Israeli-linked vessel off the Gulf of Aden on 26 November and its release by the US Navy reflect persistent security risks along shipping routes passing close to Yemen, despite the Israel-Hamas ceasefire.
  • Apart from several disagreements and delays on 25 and 27 November, the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement continues to hold on its fourth and final day. In the past 24 hours, Gaza-based militants did not launch any rockets towards Israel, underlining the extent of Hamas’ control over Gaza-based militant factions, including the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).
  • Releases of Palestinian prisoners in the West Bank continue to draw gatherings in Jerusalem and Ramallah, triggering localised clashes with security forces. Since 24 November, 117 Palestinian prisoners have been released by Israeli authorities into the West Bank, under the terms of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire. Related gatherings and celebrations have been reported throughout the West Bank, primarily in Jerusalem and Ramallah. Although demonstrations were peacefully dispersed in Jerusalem on 25 November, Israeli security forces employed tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse attendees in Ramallah on 25 and 26 November, resulting in several injuries. Further gatherings are highly likely over the coming days, sustaining elevated physical security and bystander risks due to the persistent possibility of clashes with security forces.
  • Clashes between the IDF and Hizballah and/or affiliated militants on the Israel-Lebanon border reduced substantially during the Israel-Hamas ceasefire over the past 72 hours. Over the past 24 hours, no launches from Lebanon towards Israel were reported and there was one unconfirmed instance of IDF shelling a location outside Marwahin (South governorate).
  • Services at Damascus International Airport (DAM) were again disrupted on 26 November by an alleged Israeli airstrike launched hours after DAM resumed operations. The strike reportedly damaged the airport runaway shortly after the airport finished repairs from a previous IDF strike in October. Additionally, Israel also reportedly hit a Syrian air defence system located at the Mezzeh Military Airport. The strikes are consistent with Israel’s efforts to sabotage the transfer of weapons to Hizballah through Syria. Such strikes will sustain the risk of retaliation from Iranian-backed militants with sporadic rocket fire into Israel’s northern district.
  • On 26 November, an Israeli-linked vessel was briefly hijacked off the coast of Yemen before being secured by the US Navy. The attackers briefly seized the Liberian-flagged Central Park, managed by Zodiac Maritime, before the vessel was secured by a US Navy ship. The US Navy later reported that two ballistic missiles fired from Yemen landed ten nautical miles (11.5 miles or 18.5km) away from the US warship while it was assisting the tanker. While no group immediately claimed responsibility for this incident, it was likely perpetrated by Yemen-based Houthis. This incident underscores elevated regional tensions and physical risks for ships moving through the Red Sea, Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden areas, driven by the Israel-Hamas war. Vessels linked to Israel, including flagged and unflagged ships, will continue to face elevated risks of surveillance, harassment and hijacking over the coming weeks, though direct missile or drone strikes on vessels remain unlikely.
  • On 25 November, the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hizballah announced it would reduce its attacks against US forces in Iraq and Syria until the end of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire. The move is likely to increase US pressure on Israel to extend the ceasefire after its official end on 0001hrs (local time) on 28 November. However, the announcement does not rule out attacks completely, sustaining security and bystander risks in Iraq and Syria, particularly near locations of US forces.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • On 25 November, significant delays to hostage releases underscored a key vulnerability of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire, though the agreement continues to hold. The release of hostages was delayed by Hamas leadership, amid accusations that Israeli authorities restricted humanitarian aid deliveries to Gaza and violated the terms of the ceasefire. Despite moderate delays, 13 Israeli hostages were received by the IDF overnight from 25-26 November, and a further 14 hostages were released on 26 November. Seventeen Thai hostages have also been released over the past three days, following direct negotiations between the Thai government and Hamas, facilitated by Iran. Negotiations over the release of hostages on 27 November continue, likely underlining elevated tensions over the number and identity of hostages to be released as well as the possibility of extending the ceasefire. There is a realistic possibility such disagreements will delay the release of today’s batch of hostages.
  • Over the past 72 hours, humanitarian aid has continued to enter Gaza via the Rafah border crossing, with limited supplies passing into northern Gaza. During the ceasefire, approximately 200 aid trucks, including fuel trucks, are reportedly entering Gaza per day, moderately alleviating significant food, water and fuel insecurity therein. The UN has announced that since the ceasefire began, at least 61 aid trucks have passed into northern Gaza to support its operations and provide food, water and medical aid. However, fuel deliveries into northern Gaza remain highly restricted, sustaining critical energy insecurity. On 26 November, the IDF also reported that Hamas is also restricting the flow of aid into northern Gaza by erecting checkpoints on the Salah al-Din road. Continued disruption to overland movement into northern Gaza remains highly likely, restricting the delivery of aid and sustaining critical food, water and energy insecurity.
  • On 27 November, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich announced moderate changes to the 2023/4 budget to increase defence and war-related spending over the coming months. The changes include the redirection of NIS 17bn (USD 4.5bn) of government spending towards defence, and the reallocation of NIS 13.5bn (USD 3.6bn) towards war-related civilian needs. These changes reflect elevated pressure from opposition leader Benny Gatz, who sits in the Israeli war cabinet, to cut non-military government spending and reduce discretionary spending agreed during the government coalition’s formation. Smotrich also announced the allocation of NIS 2bn (USD 530m) for establishing and arming community defence groups in both Israel and the West Bank. The proliferation of weapons into civilian defence groups will likely increase the occurrence of violent clashes and the escalation of disputes between civilians, particularly in the West Bank given already-heightened ethno-religious tensions, while also straining diplomatic relations with the US.
  • On 26 November, three students of Palestinian descent were shot and injured in Burlington (Vermont), highlighting elevated risks of targeted attacks amid elevated ethno-religious tensions in the US. The incident was reportedly a sole-perpetrator attack, and the suspect has been detained. Over the coming weeks, there is a realistic possibility of further acts of violence targeting individuals of Palestinian descent or associated with Palestine, particularly once the ceasefire agreement ends. Developments in hostage releases as well as the resumption of rocket fire from Hamas militants targeting Israeli population centres in central and southern Israel will likely act as flashpoints for further acts of targeted violence in the US, and further sole perpetrator attacks cannot be ruled out.
  • Yemen: Seizure and release of ship highlight sustained security risks despite Israel-Hamas ceasefire. On 26 November, armed assailants seized the Liberian-flagged tanker ‘Central Park’ near the Gulf of Aden, releasing it later on 27 November, following intervention by the US Navy. The tanker is managed by the London-based Zodiac Maritime, which is linked to an Israeli businessman. US officials noted that during the incident, two ballistic missiles, launched from Yemen, landed ten nautical miles (11.5 miles or 18.5km) away from the US warship aiding the tanker. The seizure attempt and the subsequent missile launch highlight the continued tensions and physical risks for ships moving through the Red Sea, Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden areas, resulting from the Israel-Hamas war, despite the current ceasefire. Further attacks are likely, though, the current attack pattern remains sparse and indicates a low-intensity harassment campaign. (Source: Sibylline)

 

01 Dec 23. Israel ‘obtained Hamas plans for Oct 7 attack more than a year before.’ Blueprint codenamed ‘Jericho Wall’ reportedly contained battle plans for attacks in Israel, but it was dismissed as unrealistic. Israeli officials reportedly saw a blueprint for Hamas’s October 7 massacre more than a year before it was carried out, prompting fresh questions about intelligence failures over the attack that claimed 1,200 lives.

The New York Times reported that Israeli intelligence bosses were passed a 40-page battle plan for the attacks, but dismissed it as unrealistic.

The document, codenamed “Jericho Wall”, reportedly contained plans for gliders to enter Israel from Gaza, automatic machine guns on the border and the use of drones to eliminate security cameras.

Those methods were used by Hamas on October 7, allowing the terror group to overwhelm Israeli defences, killing and kidnapping civilians in southern kibbutzim and at a music festival.

The newspaper reported that the plan was “circulated widely among Israeli military and intelligence leaders”, but dismissed as aspirational and beyond the military capabilities of the group.

“It is not yet possible to determine whether the plan has been fully accepted and how it will be manifested,” a military assessment reportedly said.

It is thought that if the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) had taken action to prevent the tactics from being deployed on October 7, the attack could have been foiled.

Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, is facing questions over the failure of the Israeli intelligence services – which are among the most sophisticated in the world – to detect and prevent the massacre.

Mr Netanyahu initially blamed his military and intelligence chiefs in a tweet, before deleting it amid domestic political backlash.

Asked on Nov 7 why he had failed to prevent the attacks, he told ABC News: “It’s a very good question, because the first task of government is to protect the people and, clearly, we didn’t live up to that. We had a big, big setback.”

The New York Times reported that the Israeli military’s Gaza division concluded last year that Hamas had “decided to plan a new raid, unprecedented in its scope”, followed by a “large-scale manoeuvre” inside Israeli territory.

Military officials were also aware of a plan to overwhelm the Israeli border wall, with the Jericho Wall document quoting the Quran: “Surprise them through the gate. If you do, you will certainly prevail.”

(Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

28 Nov 23. Israeli defence firm Elbit ramps up output to meet demand for war. Israeli defence electronics firm Elbit Systems (ESLT.TA) said on Tuesday it had boosted supplies to Israel’s military due to the country’s war with Hamas militants, as it reported higher quarterly profit.

Elbit, one of Israel’s largest defence contractors, said that over the past six weeks it has had to contend with 2,000 of its staff, or 15% of its workforce in Israel, being called for reserve duty and that has slightly disrupted its supply chain.

But deputy CEO Joseph Gaspar said Elbit has been round the clock to meet demand by Israel’s military and other customers.

Israel’s Defence Ministry had asked Elbit to increase quantities, make earlier deliveries of existing contracts and shift development programmes for field use, he added.

“They are asking us to do that and we do our best of course to support it,” he told Reuters.

“That actually accelerates the introduction of new products into the Army, Air Force etc … Looking forward this will probably continue in the near future as well.”

Still, more than 80% of Elbit’s revenues are outside of Israel and Gaspar said it was working to ensure supplies are delivered from Israel and via subsidiaries in Europe, where one-third of sales are from, and the United States.

“We remain focused on maintaining our commitments to our customers around the world,” said CEO Bezhalel Machlis.

Elbit supplies hundreds of products to Israel’s Defence Ministry, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), artillery, munitions and electronic warfare systems.

“Elbit Systems has ramped up its production in support of the Israel MOD and Israel’s security forces,” said Machlis.

In the third quarter, Elbit said it earned $1.65 per diluted share excluding one-time items, up from $1.40 per share a year earlier but lower than expectations of $1.70 based on LSEG data.

Elbit’s Nasdaq-listed shares fell 2.7% to $206.82.

Due to higher interest rates, financial expenses rose to $35.7m, from $16.4m a year earlier, while revenue increased to $1.5bn from $1.35bn, with aerospace revenue up 24%.

Elbit’s board said the company would pay a dividend of 50 cents per share for the third quarter, the same as in the second quarter, to be paid on Jan. 8.

Its orders backlog reached $16.6bn, up nearly $2bn over the past year, which Gaspar said would be “transformed into the revenue and eventually to the bottom line”.

Through the first nine months, Elbit recorded revenue of $4.4bn. Gaspar said it was on track to reach annual sales of $6.5-7bn by early 2026, along with an operating margin of 10%. (Source: Reuters)

 

27 Nov 23. US Navy downs one-way attack drones launched from Yemen. Twice. The US Navy destroyer USS Thomas Hudner (DDG-116) shot down “multiple one-way attack drones” last week while operating in the Red Sea, the second time the warship has intercepted such drones in the past eight days, according to a statement from US Central Command.

No damage was sustained by the vessel and, indeed, it remains unclear whether it was the target of the drones, launched by Iranian-supported Houthi rebels in Yemen. Another drone, launched on 15 November, was also destroyed by Hudner. Prior to this, USS Carney (DDG-64) shot down a number of drones and cruise missiles launched from Yemen towards Israeli targets on 19 October, since when there have been a number of attacks against US forces, bases and assets. For more information: https://t.co/TqXuaKsgwe (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company

 

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