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NEWS IN BRIEF – ISRAEL – HAMAS CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Nov 24.

*US Protests Likely to target US Defense Firms.

EVENT

In the coming days, multiple protests are planned in opposition to the role of US defence sector firms amid the ongoing Israel-Hamas war. In Nassau County on 26 November, a pro-Palestine march organised by a local chapter of the Democratic Socialists of America will target the Northrop Grumman facility in Hicksville (New York) to protest the firm’s provision of weapons to Israel. On 30 November, a planned protest organised by the Raytheon Anti-War Campaign will take place at Boston Common in central Boston (Massachusetts) to demand a prolonged ceasefire while calling on Raytheon to stop sending arms to Israel.

SIGNIFICANCE                                                              • Protests and vandalism targeting defence sector firms and weapons manufacturers have materialised in multiples US cities. So far, this activity has been concentrated in the northeastern US – the state of Massachusetts in particular, which has also seen high protest activity and polarisation on university campuses. However, recent developments signal a notable shift in the strategy of pro-Palestine activists, from a focus on pressuring US government officials to the defence sector.

  • Our monitoring indicates that climate activist groups have coalesced with other groups focused on pro-Palestinian and labour activism, consolidating a wider activist movement with an ability to mobilise larger demonstrations for a variety of left-wing causes.
  • These shifting activism trends come amid the backdrop of increased media scrutiny and commentators criticising the US government’s defence spending and provision of military aid to Israel. High social and political polarisation will also possibly punctate this criticism in the run-up to the 2024 elections.

FORECAST

There is an increased risk to on-site security related to protests at defence sector firms in the short term, particularly for those perceived to be involved in the ongoing Israel-Hamas war. This includes the realistic possibility of vandalism, traffic disruption and impeded pedestrian movement at protest sites. These will moderately increase threats to employee safety, with possible upticks in harassment. Heightened security measures will, however, reduce the possibility of protest-related disruption or violence. There is a low likelihood of counter-protests or clashes.

There is a realistic possibility that protesters will bolster efforts to block supplies at key on-site entry points in the near term, elevating operational risks. In the near term, on-site protests will likely hamper the entry and exit of defence equipment and materials, elevating operational concerns. While it is likely that supply chain risks will remain contained, blockades at points of entry to corporate offices, manufacturing or logistics hubs are possible. There is also a realistic possibility that protesters could also target various nodes within the supply chain, including ports. There is a realistic possibility that workers from organisations outsourced by defence companies, such as logistics and shipping companies, will face similar acts of protest activity targeting material perceived to be linked to the Israeli war effort. Operational risks are elevated as a result.

There is a heightened reputational risk to defence sector firms involved in the Israel-Hamas war in the short-to-medium term. There is a realistic possibility that as awareness of a firm’s tangential involvement in the conflict grows (including through possible social media activism), more constituents will appeal to their representative in Congress to limit overall defence spending and aid to Israel. Should hostilities intensify in the Palestinian Territories following the Israel-Hamas ceasefire announced on 22 November, further criticism of the US defence sector will almost certainly follow. While this will not impact current defence exports or contracts, as the 2024 election cycle approaches, defence spending and aid, particularly to Israel, is likely to become a more salient issue.

  • Ceasefire agreement between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Hamas entered into force at 0700hrs (local time) on 24 November.
  • IDF continues large raids and arrest operations in the West Bank; combined with an uptick in settler violence, heightened ethno-religious tensions will sustain risks of unrest and sole perpetrator attacks.
  • Humanitarian aid crossing the Rafah border has increased as the ceasefire has come into effect, moderately alleviating humanitarian concerns.
  • The four-day Israel-Hamas ceasefire came into force at 0700hrs (local time) on 24 November and at time of writing appears to have been successfully implemented. However, IDF spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari has repeatedly stated that the war is not over, and the suspension of hostilities in Gaza is temporary. Despite rocket fire from suspected dissident Gaza militants targeting the Gaza envelope at 0715hrs (local time) on 24 November, the ceasefire remains in place.
  • Before the ceasefire came into effect on 24 November, the IDF launched a final operation on the Indonesian Hospital in Beit Lahia following increased activity. Overnight from 23-24 November the IDF reportedly shelled the Indonesian Hospital, targeting its power generators, preceding a raid which took place hours before the ceasefire agreement came into force at 0700hrs. The IDF claims to have struck 300 Hamas positions on 23 November. These strikes included an operation in Jabalya which uncovered tunnel shafts and weapons caches and an airstrike on targets in Khan Yunis, southern Gaza, which killed Hamas commander Amar Abu Jalalah. The IDF has stated its forces will be stationed in unpopulated areas throughout the ceasefire but will continue administrative and logistical movements on the Netzarim axis and along Gaza’s coastal road. The IDF have also specified that Gazans will be allowed to move from northern Gaza to the south via the Salah al-Din Road during the ceasefire, though movement towards northern Gaza will be restricted.
  • Raids and arrests increased in frequency in the West Bank during the 24 hours in the run-up to the ceasefire agreement. On 23 November, the IDF arrested dozens of Palestinians in large-scale operations conducted across the West Bank. Clashes have continued at the elevated frequency and intensity observed over the past three days, with the northern West Bank acting as a particular hotspot for violence. Most prominently is the Nablus governorate which in the last 24 hours saw clashes near the Balata camp in which an IDF bulldozer was targeted with an IED on 23 November. Clashes in Nablus’ Old City on 24 November also injured one Palestinian and damaged two vehicles and a shop. Ethno-religious tensions between Palestinians and Israeli settlers have also escalated in the past 24 hours, with at least two Palestinian agricultural sites damaged by settlers and reports of Israeli praying in the al-Aqsa Mosque compound on 23 November, for the second time this seven days.
  • Clashes on the Israel-Lebanon border have moderately decreased in the past 24 hours compared to recent days. Despite reductions, however, rocket strikes from within Lebanese territory continued. In response to Hizballah militants firing 48 Katyusha rockets at the IDF base in Ein Zeitim (Northern district) on 23 November, the IDF has conducted numerous air, artillery and drone strikes on militant positions in Lebanon’s Nabatieh and South governates. No injuries have been reported at the time of writing. Since the Israel-Hamas ceasefire came into effect there have been no reported instances of cross-border rocket fire targeting IDF locations or civilian population centres in Israel’s north, though this trend is unlikely to continue over the coming days.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • Amid the Israel-Hamas ceasefire, the flow of humanitarian aid through the Rafah border crossing has increased, moderately addressing elevated humanitarian concerns in Gaza. On 24 November, approximately 230 aid trucks, including four fuel tankers and four cooking gas trucks are expected to enter Gaza, with Egyptian border authorities announcing that 200 trucks of aid and 130,000 litres of fuel will enter Gaza per day for the duration of the ceasefire. Given restrictions to aid deliveries since 7 October, significantly elevated food, water and energy insecurity persists throughout the enclave, particularly in northern Gaza. Increased aid flows will likely facilitate humanitarian operations from the United Nations and various NGOs over the coming days and moderately address critical food, water and fuel shortages in the short term. However, deliveries will almost certainly continue being subject to intense inspection by Israeli authorities, sustaining the likelihood of disruption to cross-border goods movement. Additionally, despite a temporary increase in deliveries,  significantly elevated humanitarian concerns will almost certainly persist over the coming weeks, particularly following the conclusion of the ceasefire.
  • On 24 November, Israeli authorities will release 39 Palestinian prisoners under the ceasefire agreement, likely elevating unrest risks in the West Bank. 24 female and 15 minor prisoners currently held in the Megiddo, Damon and Ofer prisons will be released into the West Bank and East Jerusalem after 13 Israeli hostages slated for release from Gaza are identified at the Hatzerim Airbase (Southern district). The prisoners’ release will likely trigger celebrations and solidarity demonstrations in the West Bank, particularly in the Jerusalem and Ramallah areas, while delays to the exchange will increase the likelihood of domestic unrest therein. Given the IDF’s elevated security posture in the West Bank and announcements that celebratory gatherings will be immediately dispersed, violent clashes with security forces over the coming 24 hours cannot be ruled out, elevating physical security and bystander risks in affected areas.
  • On 23 November, the Israeli Communications Minister called for the Israeli government to boycott the Haaretz newspaper, underscoring an increasingly hostile media environment. Communications Minister Shlomo Karhi has called for the Israeli government to halt all payments and advertising engagements with Haaretz after accusing the outlet of undermining the ‘goals of the [Israel-Hamas] war’. While the proposal has not formally been adopted, Kahri’s statement underscores an increasingly hostile media environment in Israel and elevated threats to civil liberties. On 13 November, the Israeli government passed emergency regulations allowing the Communications Ministry to immediately suspend operations of foreign news outlets and media organisations deemed to be undermining the war effort. While these regulations do not pertain to domestic entities, such as Haaretz, there is a realistic possibility the Israeli government will make further efforts to limit civil liberties and the freedom of expression during the conflict. This threat will be particularly elevated for outlets associated with left-wing and pro-Palestinian entities.
  • Overnight from 23-24 November, at least 85 Jewish graves were defaced in Charleroi, Belgium highlighting elevated risks of antisemitic violence and vandalism, particularly in Western Europe. The incident, which included the theft of numerous religious symbols, underscores persistent threats to locations and installations associated with the Jewish community and Israel, which face elevated risks of similar instances of vandalism, including criminal damage, arson and looting. There is a realistic possibility of violence targeting Jewish and Israeli individuals over the coming weeks, particularly as the Gaza Health Ministry releases updated casualty figures during the Israel-Hamas ceasefire. There is a realistic possibility of developments in the ceasefire, particularly isolated clashes between the IDF and militants within Gaza, acting as flashpoints for further acts of violence and sole perpetrator attacks throughout Europe, particularly in Belgium, France, Germany and the UK.

FORECAST

There is a realistic possibility of rocket barrages fired by dissident groups and clashes with the IDF in Gaza over the coming days, increasing pressure on the ceasefire agreement, which remains fragile. Sporadic rocket fire from Gaza toward Israel remains a realistic possibility, while restrictions on civilian movement from southern to northern Gaza will elevate risks of clashes. These will carry a persistent risk of driving allegations of ceasefire violations between the signatories. Furthermore, disputes over Red Cross access to hostages in Gaza will likely present further risks to the stability of the ceasefire. While currently, both Hamas and Israel appear to be committed to the deal, there is a realistic possibility that this commitment will reduce as the ceasefire continues and forces prepare their positions for the resumption of fighting. Furthermore, once the ceasefire comes to an end, hostilities and IDF ground operation are almost certain to resume, as the IDF currently retain forces in Gaza.

Clashes are likely to continue in the West Bank as the IDF increases operations in the area, including arrests and raids. In the past 24 hours widespread arrests conducted by the IDF and clashes inflammatory interactions between Palestinians and Israeli settlers have further escalated already-heightened ethno-religious tensions across the West Bank. Events surrounding the release of Palestinian prisoners under will likely fuel further unrest over the coming days, triggering an uptick in risks of clashes, elevated militant activity and sole perpetrator attacks. Although armed clashes will likely remain concentrated in hotspots such as Jenin, Nablus and Tulkarm, there is a realistic possibility of unrest and clash spillover, elevating bystander and security risks throughout the West Bank. There is also a realistic possibility of ongoing clashes between Palestinians and Israeli settlers, combined with insufficient Israeli security force response, will further elevate risks of sole perpetrator attacks in the West Bank and Jerusalem, particularly against Israeli security personnel.

Cross-border clashes will likely continue at reduced levels across the Israel-Lebanon border in the coming 24 hours. Although no exchanges of cross-border fire between the IDF and Lebanese Hizballah have been reported since the ceasefire began, further instances of rocket launches from Hizballah and/or allied militants based in Lebanon are likely over the coming days, while further IDF air, artillery and drone strikes in Lebanese territory cannot be ruled out. A reduction in cross-border clashes will likely be driven by Hizballah efforts to maintain a more stable negotiation environment for potential extensions to the Israel-Hamas ceasefire. Even so, while the rate of clashes will remain reduced over the coming days, as Hizballah is not party to the Israel-Hamas ceasefire a complete cessation of strikes is highly unlikely. As such, elevated physical security and bystander risks will persist throughout northern Israel over the coming days, particularly for locations in proximity to IDF positions and close to the Israel-Lebanon border.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

  • A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
  • High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
  • Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
  • Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
  • An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
  • US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
  • Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
  • The ongoing IDF ground operation into Gaza expands beyond the northern area of the enclave

Nov 23.

  • A ceasefire between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Hamas will enter into force at 0700hrs (local time) on 24 November.
  • The IDF is continuing with clearing operations in Gaza; it reportedly handed an evacuation order to the Indonesian hospital in Beit Lahia.
  • Clashes between the IDF and Lebanese Hizballah experienced an uptick following an Israeli airstrike that killed the son of Lebanese Hizballah’s parliamentary leader. Despite the implementation of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire, clashes are likely to continue (though at a reduced rate).
  • The IDF is continuing with clearing operations in Gaza in preparation for the ceasefire (which has been delayed until 24 November). It is reportedly issuing evacuation orders to the Indonesian hospital in Beit Lahia. Over the past 24 hours, the IDF moderately expanded its offensive operations in Jabalia, while also conducting clearing operations in the Sheikh Zayed neighbourhood. Numerous clashes with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) militants have been reported, primarily in Gaza City and on the outskirts of Jabalia. The IDF continues to issue advisories for residents in Gaza City (particularly those in the Jabalia and Shujaiyya neighbourhoods), urging them to evacuate before 1600hrs (local time). Additionally, the IDF facilitated an operational pause in the al-Salam and al-Manara neighbourhoods in Khan Yunis between 1000hrs and 1400hrs.
  • The rate of clashes recorded in the West Bank has remained elevated over the past 24 hours; intense clashes in Tulkarm resulted in the deaths of six militants. Following a drone strike against Tulkarm on 21 November, militants from the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade and the al-Quds Brigade detonated at least five IEDs against IDF personnel during clashes on 22 and 23 November. On 23 November, the IDF also arrested at least 15 individuals during a raid at the al-Arroub refugee camp (Hebron governorate), which resulted in localised clashes. On 22 November, a peaceful demonstration also took place outside the German consulate in Ramallah; participants were protesting against the German government’s support of Israel amid the Israel-Hamas war.
  • On 23 November, there was an uptick in hostilities along the Israel-Lebanon border. This uptick is likely in response to an Israeli airstrike on 22 November which killed five Lebanese Hizballah militants, including the son of the group’s parliamentary leader. By 1200hrs on 23 November, Lebanese Hizballah militants had launched at least ten cross-border attacks into Israel, including a barrage of 48 rockets targeting the IDF’s Ein Zeitim base, located to the north of Safed (Northern). Hostilities will likely remain elevated until the Israel-Hamas ceasefire enters into force, though a full-scale de-escalation along the Israel-Lebanon border remains unlikely even after the ceasefire begins.
  • On 22 November, the IDF intercepted a cruise missile targeting Eilat. It was likely launched by Iranian-backed Houthis based in Yemen. The missile, which was intercepted by an F-35 fighter jet, did not enter Israeli airspace. Also on 22 November, US military forces announced that they intercepted several drones over the Red Sea. While we cannot confirm their intended target(s), Eilat is the likely choice. Such activity is in line with previously observed trends of sporadic, low-intensity attacks carried out by Yemen-based Houthis; it does not represent a significant escalation.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • On 22 November, the Israeli National Security Council announced that the implementation of the ceasefire will be delayed until 24 November. The ceasefire will reportedly commence at 0700hrs on 24 November; the first group of hostages will be released at 1600hrs. Delays to the ceasefire have been attributed to issues pertaining to logistics and disagreements regarding the Red Cross’ access to hostages. While there is a realistic possibility of further delays, the agreement is highly likely to be implemented in the coming days.
  • On 22 November, senior Hamas, Hizballah and PIJ officials met with Iranian and Lebanese representatives in Beirut (Lebanon) to discuss the Israel-Hamas ceasefire. The talks likely reflect efforts to increase (moderately) co-ordination between Iranian-aligned groups active in Lebanon and to prevent a further escalation of cross-border hostilities. While the meeting is unlikely to alter the frequency and intensity of cross-border clashes substantially, there is a realistic possibility that co-ordination between Hamas, Hizballah and PIJ leadership will partially moderate militant activity during the ceasefire period in an effort maintain a more stable negotiation environment for possible ceasefire extensions. Despite the meeting, cross-border clashes and rocket launches from Lebanon and Syria into Israel will almost certainly continue in the coming days.
  • On 23 November, the German police conducted raids on fifteen Hamas-linked properties in four federal states. The raids come amid increasing efforts by German law enforcement to identify and neutralise entities linked to Hamas, Lebanese Hizballah and Iran due to concerns about potential militant activity. Elevated ethno-religious tensions driven by the Israel-Hamas war will likely continue to exacerbate these concerns across Europe, particularly in Belgium, France, Germany and the UK. While attacks by groups connected to Lebanese Hizballah and/or Iran remain unlikely, sole-perpetrator attacks and/or targeted antisemitic violence are possible, particularly in locations with significant Jewish populations.

FORECAST

Despite delays, the ceasefire will almost certainly be implemented in the coming 48 hours. While hostage releases have been delayed until at least 24 November, there is a realistic possibility of further temporary delays given disputes over the Red Cross’ access to hostages. Nonetheless, the Israeli authorities continue to engage in negotiations, which increases the likelihood of a resolution. While militant activity in Gaza is highly likely to decrease in the coming days due to the agreement, a sporadic uptick in rocket launches immediately preceding the ceasefire is possible, sustaining elevated security risks across Israel. In the event of the ceasefire deal collapsing, there is a realistic possibility of increased clashes between the IDF and Palestinian militants in Gaza. If the ceasefire collapses, Hamas militants would likely launch extensive rocket barrages towards Israeli population centres (particularly those in central Israel). In addition, the IDF would almost certainly resume operations in Gaza, particularly in proximity to hospital compounds in northern Gaza identified as Hamas command nodes; an expansion of IDF ground operations into southern Gaza would also be possible.

Clashes between the IDF and Lebanese Hizballah and/or allied militants based in Lebanon will likely continue over the coming days, though there is a realistic possibility that hostilities will moderately subside due to the ceasefire. Elevated tensions and retaliatory cross-border clashes are likely to continue at previously observed rates, particularly following IDF strikes against southern Lebanon that resulted in Lebanese Hizballah casualties. Although Lebanese Hizballah is not party to the Israel-Hamas ceasefire, there is a realistic possibility that the frequency and intensity of cross-border clashes and rocket fire targeting IDF locations will moderately decrease during the ceasefire. Nevertheless, the threat of rocket fire and drone incursions targeting northern Israel will almost certainly persist in the coming days, sustaining elevated threats in areas close to the Israel-Lebanon border, especially IDF positions. Sporadic instances of rocket fire targeting civilian population centres further from the border, including Acre, are possible.

Depending on developments regarding hostage releases, there is a realistic possibility of elevated domestic unrest in the West Bank triggering clashes with the security forces. Over the coming days, the successful implementation of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire and the release of 150 Palestinian prisoners held in Israel will likely result in demonstrations and celebrations in the West Bank, particularly in Bethlehem, Hebron, Jenin, Nablus and Ramallah. Israeli security personnel have been instructed to disperse such gatherings, increasing the likelihood of clashes and the use of tear gas, live ammunition and/or heavy-handed disbursement techniques. Consequently, elevated physical security and bystander risks will persist in the vicinity of demonstrations throughout the West Bank. Despite the ceasefire agreement, there is a realistic possibility that West Bank-based militant groups will escalate their rate of attacks against Israeli security personnel and increase the intensity of clashes in an effort to draw IDF resources from operations in Gaza and fix them in the West Bank. The risk will be most elevated in previously noted unrest hotspots, including Jenin, Nablus Qalqilya and Tulkarm, while attacks in proximity to checkpoints and border crossings are also possible.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

  • A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
  • High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
  • Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
  • Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
  • An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
  • US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
  • Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
  • The ongoing IDF ground operation into Gaza expands beyond the northern area of the enclave

*Israel-Lebanon: Short-term uptick in hostilities are likely following airstrike in southern Lebanon. On 22 November, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) struck Lebanese Hizballah targets in Lebanon’s South governorate, killing five operatives. Among them was the son of the head of Lebanese Hizballah’s parliamentary bloc. The group launched at least ten cross-border attacks into Israel earlier on 23 November in response to the airstrike, including 48 rockets targeting the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s Ein Zeitim base north of Safed (Northern district). The group indicated that it is planning to adhere to the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. This likely means it will reduce hostilities along the Israel-Lebanon border. However, Israel’s continued strikes against Lebanese Hizballah and delays to the ceasefire’s implementation are likely to elevate the risks of an uptick in clashes in the coming 24 hours and before the ceasefire enters into force. These will sustain elevated security risks in northern Israel and southern Lebanon in the coming days. There is a realistic possibility that hostilities will continue, albeit at a reduced intensity, after the ceasefire enters into force in the coming 72 hours.

Nov 22.

  • The Israeli cabinet approved a four-day ceasefire with Hamas in exchange for the release of 50 hostages held in Gaza. The agreement includes provisions for extensions if further hostages are released. Hamas officials state the agreement will come into force at 1000hrs (local time) on 23 November.
  • The Israeli Defense Force’s (IDF) ground offensive has continued to centre around Jabalia. Although the Indonesian Hospital remains surrounded, operational focus has shifted towards conducting manoeuvres in the surrounding neighbourhoods.
  • Clashes between the IDF and Lebanese Hizballah on the Israel-Lebanon border and with Palestinians and militant groups in the West Bank have persisted at rates observed over the past several days and are likely to continue despite the expected ceasefire coming into effect in the next 24 hours.
  • The IDF continues clearing operations in Gaza, likely in preparation for the ceasefire. The IDF performed targeted raids in Beit Hanoun and in Jabalia’s Sheikh Zayed neighbourhood, while also conducting strikes on Hamas military targets on the coastline. Additionally, the IDF remains fixed in its position outside the Indonesian Hospital in Beit Lahia and in the al-Shifa hospital complex. The IDF has issued numerous advisories for residents in Jabalia and Shujaiya to evacuate before 1600hrs (local time) on 22 November. The IDF also announced a temporary suspension of military activity from 1000hrs-1400hrs (local time) in Khan Yunis, southern Gaza.
  • On 21 November, Jordan announced it had increased its military presence on the Israel-Jordan border, likely to deter spillover of the Israel-Hamas war. The move is likely designed to mitigate the risk of escalation along the Israel-Jordan border by attempting to prevent the cross-border movement of militants planning attacks or smuggling weapons.
  • A moderate uptick in clashes has been recorded in the West Bank over the past 24 hours in tandem with IDF operations, mostly concentrated in northern areas. The IDF continues to conduct raids and arrests throughout the West Bank, most notably conducting coordinated raids in the Bethlehem governorate overnight from 21-22 November. The operation led to the arrest of at least 11 Palestinian individuals with multiple injuries reported. Additionally, the IDF also reportedly raided the Putin Foundation for Culture and Economics in Bethlehem, and the Ibdaa Cultural Centre and building of the Fatah movement in Dheisheh Camp (Bethlehem governorate).
  • Exchanges across the Israel-Lebanon border in the last 24 hours remain consistent with those observed in the previous reporting period. Lebanese Hizballah continues to target IDF positions with anti-tank guided missiles and mortar fire, while several drone sightings over populated areas have been noted. No casualties or successful strikes on civilian areas have been reported. Lebanese Hizballah claim that an IDF strike in southern Lebanon killed three Al-Mayadeen journalists, and have declared their intention to retaliate for the deaths.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • On 22 November, the Israeli cabinet approved a four-day ceasefire agreement with Hamas in exchange for the release of 50 hostages held in Gaza. The agreement is split into two clauses: firstly, 50 Israeli hostages will be released in exchange for a four-day ceasefire and the release of 150 Palestinian prisoners held in Israel; secondly, the IDF will extend the ceasefire by 24-hour extensions for every 10 additional Israeli hostages released, up to a maximum of 10 total days. Although the Israeli government has not announced when the ceasefire will come into force, Hamas official Moussa Abu Marzouk stated that the ceasefire will begin at 1000hrs (local time) on 23 November. Hostage releases will almost certainly take place in phases over the coming days.
  • On 22 November, the Israeli government announced that the ceasefire agreement with Hamas will facilitate an increase in humanitarian aid deliveries into Gaza via the Rafah border crossing, moderately addressing significant energy, food and medical challenges. Although the ceasefire will likely increase the volume of aid crossing the border, concerns that Hamas and PIJ will capitalise on the ceasefire to regroup and rearm militants will almost certainly sustain stringent inspection of humanitarian aid passing into Rafah. This will likely result in delays and disruption to distribution.
  • On 21 November, Saudi Arabia reiterated calls for an international arms embargo on Israel, underscoring elevated regional tensions and the realistic possibility of broader regional economic disruption over the coming weeks. During the extraordinary BRICS summit hosted on 21 November, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman also called for an immediate ceasefire and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The proposal is unlikely to impact Israel’s security force capacity, as it is highly unlikely to be adopted by the US, Israel’s primary security and defence partner. Even so, there is a realistic possibility Saudi Arabia and its allies will moderately escalate efforts to isolate Israel economically as the ground offensive in Gaza continues. Broader disruptions to Israel’s regional trade relations cannot be ruled out, though restrictions on oil exports remain unlikely in the short to medium term.
  • On 21 November, two Bahrain government websites were targeted with cyber-attacks from Hamas-linked threat actors, underscoring elevated cyber risks throughout the region. The attacks reportedly targeted Bahrain because of Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa’s condemnation of Hamas during a speech on 17 November. While these attacks have not impacted the Bahrain government’s operations or accessibility of services, they underscore elevated cyber risks for both public sector and government-linked entities in the region. Statements from public figures that are perceived to support Israel will likely act as flashpoints for operations by threat actors linked to Hamas, Hizballah and Iran.
  • Israel-Lebanon: Gaza ceasefire will likely lower escalation risks; elevated security risks remain. On 22 November, Israel agreed to enter into a four-day ceasefire with Hamas and also to exchange Palestinian prisoners in return for several Israeli hostages. The ceasefire is likely to enter into force in the coming 48 hours. While the ceasefire does not apply to the conflict between Israel and Lebanese Hizballah, it is likely to lower hostilities along the Israel-Lebanon border due to the likely reduction of attacks by Hamas militants based in Lebanon. However, there remains a realistic possibility of rockets being launched sporadically by dissident Hamas and/or Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) militants based in Lebanon into Israel. Furthermore, tensions between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Hizballah are likely to continue. They will sustain elevated security and bystander risks in northern Israel and southern Lebanon in the coming week, particularly in the vicinity of border areas.

Nov 21.

  • The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) claims to have successfully encircled Jabalia. It also reports that over 250 airstrikes targeted Gaza in an apparent uptick in operations. In addition, the IDF has introduced a plan to allow the return of Israeli residents to population centres which are located more than 2.5 miles (4km) from Gaza.
  • A ceasefire and hostage swap agreement between Israel and Hamas continues to progress with Qatari and Hamas officials signalling that a deal is close; an announcement in the next 24-48 hours is a realistic possibility.
  • The gradual intensification of hostilities between the IDF and Lebanese Hizballah and/or affiliated militants along the Israel-Lebanon border continues; Israel is increasing the frequency of its strikes hitting deeper into Lebanon compared to the previous week.
  • The IDF claims to have successfully encircled Jabalia. It also reports that more than 250 targets were struck by the Israeli Air Force (IAF), reflecting an uptick in operations over the past 24 hours. The IDF has also continued to hold its position around the Indonesian Hospital in Beit Lahia. It is currently unclear whether the IDF will withdraw troops or continue to hold captured positions in the event of a ceasefire. The IDF continues to implement temporary tactical suspensions of military activities on an almost daily basis. The latest tactical pause took place between 1000hrs and 1400hrs (local time) on 21 November in the Tal al-Sultan neighbourhood, west of Rafah.
  • The IDF announced that it will approve the return of citizens to population centres which are located 2.5 miles (4km) or further from Gaza in the coming days. The plan, set out by the IDF Home Front Command, likely reflects the ongoing negotiations for a ceasefire. Any failure in the negotiations or a cessation of the yet-to-be-confirmed ceasefire will likely prompt a reassessment of this plan.
  • IDF operations in the West Bank continue on trend, while settler violence targeting Palestinian communities continues to increase gradually. Of note, unconfirmed reports claim that settlers disguised as IDF troops raided the home of a journalist in al-Rakeez (Hebron governorate). Repeated clashes between settlers and Palestinian communities in the West Bank are likely to sustain elevated ethno-religious tensions and security risks in the area.
  • Cross-border tit-for-tat attacks along the Israel-Lebanon border against IDF positions mirrored the elevated levels observed in recent days. The IDF continued to conduct strikes against Lebanese Hizballah and affiliated militant groups and/or infrastructure deeper inside Lebanese territory compared to the previous week. These strikes and subsequent retaliation from Lebanese Hizballah and/or affiliated militants are likely to continue in the coming week; any uptick in violence will raise the risk of misidentification (as well as incidental security threats in southern Lebanon and northern Israel).

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • Ceasefire and hostage release negotiations between Israel and Hamas have continued over the past 24 hours, with Hamas representatives stating that a ceasefire agreement is close. The deal is likely to include the release of Israeli hostages in exchange for a multi-day ceasefire in Gaza and the release of a limited number of Palestinian prisoners. There is a realistic possibility of an agreement being announced in the coming days.
  • UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres has called for a multi-stakeholder approach to supporting Gaza after the conflict. Guterres believes that a strengthened Palestinian Authority (PA) should assume responsibility for Gaza as part of a transition towards a two-state solution. He also stated that the PA should not be propped up by the IDF, but that it should instead be supported by the international community. In particular, he has called for engagement by the US and regional Arab nations, rather than a UN force. However, the prospects for such an arrangement are highly limited. Israeli President Netanyahu has already claimed that the PA is unfit to govern the strip. Furthermore, Israel would almost certainly oppose troop deployments by Arab countries, a proposal for which there is limited evidence of regional support.
  • The Rafah border crossing between Egypt and Gaza remains operational, with the movement of aid and people broadly consistent with recent trends. On 21 November, at least 50 aid vehicles, nine ambulances and two fuel trucks crossed the Rafah border into Gaza. This marks the continuation of deliveries permitted by the Israeli cabinet on 19 November to support the operations of international organisations. The limited movement of permitted people out of Gaza also continues, as evidenced by the movement of some 240 dual nationals into Egypt. The passage of several extremely vulnerable persons in need of medical support was also permitted (28 premature infants passed into Egypt). However, despite the continued and substantial decline of medical support within Gaza, the passage of people with a medical emergency will likely remain highly limited.
  • Following talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, representatives of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and diplomats from other Arab and Islamic States met with Irish Taoiseach Leo Varadkar to discuss the ongoing Israel-Hamas war. As with previous meetings, the talks represent a symbolic act of solidarity and are unlikely to result in any short-term policy changes. Ireland’s opposition to the IDF campaign in Gaza is well known and the state has already called for a ceasefire. The delegation of Arab and Islamic representatives is due to continue its tour and will hold talks with UN Security Council (UNSC) members France, Russia, the UK and the US in the coming days to push for a UNSC resolution-backed ceasefire. However, unanimous action by the UNSC remains unlikely (the US is likely opposed to a legally binding ceasefire).

*Israel-Palestinian Territories: Security risks from rockets will remain elevated regardless of ceasefire approval. Earlier on 21 November, Ismail Haniyeh, the chairman of Hamas’s political bureau, announced that the group is approaching a truce agreement with Israel amid ongoing Qatari-mediated negotiations. However, while anonymous Israeli officials have unofficially confirmed these claims, there has been no official response to the statement from Israel. The IDF continues its operations in Al-Shifa Hospital, and any ceasefire lasting several days will harm its efforts. As such, it is likely that Israel will try to buy time before officially accepting such a ceasefire. Nevertheless, there is a realistic possibility that some form of ceasefire will be announced in the coming 24-48 hours. While a ceasefire will reduce rocket attack threats over Israel, any agreement will likely be fragile, and there is a realistic possibility that dissident militant factions in Gaza will continue to launch rockets sporadically during the ceasefire. This will sustain security and bystander risks emanating from rocket launches towards Israel.

Nov 20.

  • The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continues to advance towards hospitals in northern Gaza, including the Indonesian Hospital; IDF operations also continue at the al-Shifa hospital complex.
  • An uptick of strikes by Lebanese Hizballah and/or affiliated militants against IDF positions, including the 91st Division base, will increase retaliatory and escalation risks. However, the full opening of a front along the Israel-Lebanon border remains unlikely.
  • The seizure by the Iranian-backed Houthis of a shipping vessel co-owned by an Israeli businessman in the Red Sea reflects the elevated risks facing international trade corridors, as well as heightened regional tensions.
  • The IDF is continuing to advance towards various hospitals in Gaza City; it is also conducting operations at the al-Shifa hospital complex. Additionally, the IDF is reportedly within 100m of the Indonesia Hospital in Bait Lahia in northern Gaza. Further IDF operations and clashes with Hamas militants in the vicinity of the Indonesian Hospital will elevate bystander security risks in the area, as well as likely international condemnation.
  • Rocket fire from Gaza towards Israel persists at previously observed (moderate) levels; it continues to focus on the Gaza envelope. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) will likely continue to allocate resources to the fighting in northern Gaza while rationing ammunition. This has almost certainly resulted in the observed reduction in missiles targeting southern and central Israel in the past week. However, the risk remains elevated across Israel due to the possibility of sporadic rocket launches.
  • Over the past 24 hours, violent clashes in the West Bank continued at a slightly reduced frequency, though the use of small arms during such incidents has become more widespread. On 20 November, a shooting against an IDF convoy was reported in az-Zawiya (Salfit governorate) in the north-west of the West Bank. Subsequently, the IDF erected roadblocks at key points (such as the az-Zawiya bridge) and raided locations in az-Zawiya, Bruqin and Kafr ed-Deek (all Salfit). These operations resulted in two arrests and two injuries. Similar operations continued throughout the weekend. They have been marked by robust security measures, including checkpoints and raids carried out in the vicinity of attacks across the West Bank. The increased IDF presence in hotspot areas has also reduced the number of large protests in the West Bank, though ethno-religious tensions and the risk of an attack remain elevated.
  • Cross-border attacks between the IDF and Lebanese Hizballah and/or affiliated militants continue to increase in intensity, particularly those targeting IDF positions. On 20 November, Hizballah hit the IDF’s Biranit military base (which serves as the command centre for the 91st Division) reportedly with Burkan (Volcano) missiles, causing widespread damage. At time of writing, no casualties or injuries were reported. Following the attack, Hizballah launched 25 rockets and three suicide drones towards IDF positions close to the Israel-Lebanon border, triggering sirens in nearby Israeli population centres. Additionally, on 19 November, Hizballah and/or affiliated militants fired at least ten mortar shells at IDF positions near Shlomi (Northern district). These strikes reflect the uptick in hostilities along the border, as well as the elevated risk of IDF retaliation.
  • On 19 November, the Yemen-based Houthis seized a Japanese-operated freighter which is partially owned by an Israeli businessperson; the vessel was transiting the Red Sea at the time. Houthi militants ‘fast-roped’ onto the deck of the Galaxy Leader freight ship from a helicopter, taking 25 crew members hostage, none of whom are Israeli. Since 14 November, Houthi officials have repeatedly threatened to target Israeli vessels in the Red Sea, elevating the threats facing flagged and non-flagged vessels. However, this marks the first vessel seizure during the Israel-Hamas war. Negotiations to secure the release of hostages and the vessel are reportedly ongoing.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • Qatari-mediated ceasefire and hostage release negotiations have continued over the past three days; US officials claim that the participants are nearing an agreement. Despite these claims, the IDF and the Israeli government continue to state that negotiations are not nearing completion. While there is a realistic possibility that ceasefire terms will be announced in the coming days, the IDF continues to release information to support claims that Hamas is using hospitals for militancy purposes; specifically, hostages were reportedly taken to and/or held at the al-Shifa hospital complex following their abduction on 7 October. There is a realistic possibility that revelations regarding the locations of hostages, as well as their treatment and well-being, will impact ceasefire negotiations.
  • Over the past 72 hours, the IDF has continued to try to secure numerous hospitals throughout Gaza, limiting access to medical services and sustaining elevated international tensions. At the time of writing, IDF personnel, NGO delegations and WHO staff continue to evacuate the al-Shifa hospital complex. On 18 November, the NGO Medicines Sans Frontières (MSF) reported that a convoy evacuating individuals from the hospital complex was attacked close to the Wadi Gaza checkpoint; one person was killed while another was injured. The identity of the attacker(s) has not been confirmed. Access to medical services in Gaza continues to be highly restricted, particularly in northern Gaza where clashes between IDF units and Hamas militants continue to sustain severe physical security and bystander risks.
  • On 17 November, trucks carrying approximately 26,000 litres of fuel crossed the Rafah border into Gaza. The delivery has moderately alleviated pressure on Gaza’s communication infrastructure, partially restoring phone and internet services following a telecommunications blackout from 16 to 17 November. The delivery of the fuel was likely authorised due to increasing pressure from the US to allow fuel deliveries for humanitarian operations into Gaza and Israeli concerns that depleted fuel supplies for sewage and water treatment facilities would trigger outbreaks of communicable and waterborne diseases. On 19 November, the Israeli cabinet authorised the delivery of 140,000 litres of fuel through the Rafah border crossing every 48 hours; the deliveries are to be used by international organisations, including the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Humanitarian aid continues to pass through the Rafah border crossing at reduced levels. Later on 20 November, 40 aid trucks carrying medical and water desalination supplies are expected to enter Gaza.
  • Earlier on 20 November, a diplomatic delegation from Egypt, Jordan, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the Palestinian Authority and Saudi Arabia arrived in China for talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. The talks centred on IDF operations in Gaza. Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister called for an immediate ceasefire, while Yi called for international action to prevent conflict spillover. These statements reflect various well-established positions within the international community vis-à-vis the Israel-Hamas war and do not represent a significant shift in foreign policy by any party. Talks are likely to continue in the coming days; the diplomatic delegation will meet with representatives from France, Russia, the UK and the US, likely in an effort to increase pressure on the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to adopt legally binding resolutions that implement an immediate ceasefire and condemn the IDF’s actions in Gaza. While there is a realistic possibility that this diplomatic tour will increase international pressure on UNSC members, the US is unlikely to vote in favour of such resolutions.
  • On 20 November, reports emerged that the Israeli NGO Haqel filed a petition with the Israeli High Court calling for enhanced security for a number of Palestinians in the West Bank. The petition comes amid an alleged uptick in harassment and displacement operations by the Israeli security forces and settlers. The petition concerns 26 Palestinian individuals from five villages in the West Bank’s Area C who have reportedly been the victim of settler violence, including threats, physical assaults and attacks against infrastructure. Since 7 October, the UN has reported that over 1,000 individuals from 15 communities in the West Bank have been displaced, underscoring the elevated ethno-religious tensions and attacks against Palestinian communities.
  • Yemen: Ship seized by Houthis reflects elevated security risks, likely to elevate regional tensions.On 19 November, the spokesperson of the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels confirmed they seized a cargo vessel in the Red Sea, claiming it was owned by Israel. Against the backdrop of the Israel-Hamas war, the Houthis have gradually increased their activities against Israel in the past month, including missiles and drones targeting Israel. The seizure follows an earlier threat by the group on 14 November, that they will target Israeli ships in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The seized ship is reportedly co-owned by an Israeli businessman and a British company and is operated by a Japanese company under the Bahamas flag, none of the crew are Israeli or Japanese nationals. The seizure reflects the growing security risks for shipping vessels crossing the Red Sea, affecting international trade, due to the spillover of the Israel-Hamas war. Regional tensions are likely to remain elevated in the coming weeks with a realistic possibility of elevated naval presence by regional countries. (Source: Sibylline)

 

23 Nov 23. IDF arrests Al Shifa hospital director. Israeli forces have arrested the director of Al Shifa hospital, according to a senior doctor at the facility. Dr Muhammad Abu Salmiya and several other “senior doctors” were detained by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), said Khalid Abu Samra, a chief of department at the hospital. Mr Salmiya has been frequently quoted by international media about the conditions inside Al-Shifa, a major focus of the Israeli ground offensive. The IDF is yet to comment on reports of the arrests. The Israeli army raided the hospital last week. It has alleged that Hamas fighters used a tunnel complex beneath the facility in Gaza City to hold hostages taken from Israel and stage attacks. It released CCTV footage on Monday which it said showed hostages seized on October 7 being taken into Al Shifa by Hamas terrorists. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

23 Nov 23. A senior Israeli military intelligence officer dismissed a detailed warning predicting Hamas’s raid of October 7, calling it an “imaginary scenario”, said two people familiar with the discussions. Sentries on Israel’s border with Gaza, many of them female soldiers who watch and analyse a constant feed of video and other data gathered near the electronic fence surrounding the enclave, sent a detailed report weeks before the attack to the highest-ranking intelligence officer in the southern command, both people said. The report was sent using a secure communications system and contained specific warnings, including that Hamas was training to blow up border posts at several locations, enter Israeli territory and take over kibbutzim, the person with direct knowledge of the contents of the warning said. Israel’s failure to prevent the attack, which the government says killed more than 1,200 people, is now seen as its largest intelligence failure since Egypt and Syria launched a surprise assault in 1973 on Yom Kippur, Judaism’s holiest day. The lower-ranking soldiers also warned their analysis of several videos showed Hamas was rehearsing taking hostages, and that they felt an attack was imminent, the person said. The memo was triggered by the sighting of a high-ranking Hamas military commander overseeing the training, who was identified by the sentries against a database of faces and identities maintained by Unit 8200, a part of the Israeli intelligence corps. “This is an imaginary scenario,” the high-ranking intelligence officer replied, according to a description of the communications shared with the Financial Times. No action was taken, the person said. KAN, Israel’s public broadcaster, reported late on Thursday details of a similar warning sent by low-ranking soldiers to their seniors. KAN added that the warning included the possibility of an aircraft being downed, and of Hamas raising its flags over Israeli territory. A second person familiar with the issue said the failure to take the report seriously had become an issue of discussion, verging on disciplinary action, within the intelligence community. This person had been told a similar description of the communications. In response to a query from the FT, the Israel Defense Forces said its “commanders and soldiers were exclusively focused strictly” on their mission to defeat Hamas. “Following the war, a thorough investigation will be conducted to clarify all details,” the IDF said. The two people familiar with the communications told the FT that discussions within the intelligence community about the failure to act on the memo echoed those after the intelligence failures preceding the 1973 war. Both said the warnings were dismissed not just because they came from lower-ranking soldiers, but because they ran up against the Israeli government’s confidence that it had contained Hamas through a punishing blockade, by bombing its military capabilities, and using aid and money as a mean to placate the Palestinian militant group. An attack of that nature by Hamas would immediately trigger war with the Jewish state, which the Israeli intelligence community was convinced the militant group was seeking to avoid. (Source: FT.com)

 

21 Nov 23. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Visit to RAFAEL: “Provides Us the Nation’s Iron Dome.” Today (Tuesday), November 21, 2023, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited a RAFAEL Facility in northern Israel.

The Prime Minister received briefings from RAFAEL’s Chairman, Dr. Yuval Steinitz, and CEO, Brigadier General (Ret.) Yoav Har-Even, on RAFAEL’s activities during the ongoing war, including Iron Dome, David’s Sling, TROPHY APS, and more.

Additionally, the two presented to the Prime Minister the robust activity taking place across the company’s facilities, in collaboration with the IDF and all security forces, since the outbreak of the war on October 7.

PM Netanyahu also toured the production lines at the facility and met with RAFAEL’s workers who operate 24/7 since the beginning of the conflict. The Prime Minister expressed gratitude for their devoted work, providing the security establishment with all necessary means for ongoing combat.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated: “I am here at RAFAEL, which essentially provides us the nation’s Iron Dome. Here, they manufacture the interceptors of Iron Dome that intercept missiles and rockets, produce many other things for both defensive and offensive operations. I want to thank the scientists, engineers, production workers, and everyone contributing to this unique effort.”

RAFAEL’s Chairman, Dr. Yuval Steinitz, said: “We are pleased to host Prime Minister Netanyahu, even in this difficult and challenging period. Prime Minister, there are thousands of dedicated workers here, some of whom you’ve met, working night and day to produce more Iron Dome interceptors, David’s Sling, additional TROPHY Active Protection Systems and developing new means and capabilities for the air, ground, sea, and intelligence forces aiding and already operating in the ongoing conflict.”

RAFAEL’s CEO & President, Brigadier General (Ret.) Yoav Har-Even, stated:

“RAFAEL is fully engaged in the war effort, and we are proud to see our systems working shoulder to shoulder with the security forces, saving lives. Alongside hundreds of workers drafted for emergency reservist’s enlistment and hundreds more relocated from their homes, RAFAEL’s employees work around the clock to provide the required means—those familiar and those not yet revealed.”

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company

 

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