NEWS IN BRIEF – MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

Military And Security Developments

Jan 26.

26 Jan 25. Israel is considering sending Soviet and Russian-made weapons captured in Lebanon to Ukraine, with signs transfers may be under way. Israel reportedly met with Ukrainian diplomats on Tuesday to discuss a weapons transfer. Since then, US military cargo planes have been tracked flying from Israel to an airbase in eastern Poland.

Jan 24.

• Iraq: Shia commemoration will drive supply chain, travel disruption, elevate risk of sectarian violence. On 22 January, a specialised security committee announced a three-phase plan to secure the capital Baghdad for the commemoration of the death of Imam Musa al-Kazim. The pilgrimage is set to culminate at Al-Kazimiyya Mosque in the Kadhimiya neighbourhood on 26 January. A heightened security posture, including specialised units such as traffic police and civil defence forces, will highly likely emerge in proximity to the area. Localised traffic disruption is likely, driving limited supply chain disruption. Small-scale clashes between attendees and the security forces (as well as arbitrary detentions) are a realistic possibility due to stringent crowd control measures, elevating the risk of domestic unrest. As a Shia commemoration, the pilgrimage will likely drive sectarian tensions within Baghdad, elevating the risk of terrorist incidents, including suicide bombing. We assess that there is a possibility of knock-on security incidents emanating from panic, including large stampedes. Most streets in the capital will likely be closed, driving further operational disruption to businesses and NGOs.
• Syria: Armed conflict in northern Syria will likely expand in scope over coming weeks. On 23 January, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) attacked positions of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) in the villages of Al-Hoshriya and Al-Atshana near Dayr Hafir (all Aleppo governorate). The attack signals an attempt by the Kurdish forces to recapture the strategic city of Manbij (Aleppo governorate). The move also likely aims to alleviate the mounting pressure on the SDF forces repelling the SNA attacks on the nearby Tishrin Dam. Any potential collapse on this particular front will allow the SNA to cross the Euphrates, threatening key Kurdish cities. The recent military developments in the last few days signal that the SDF-SNA fronts will likely expand in the coming weeks, sustaining significant instability in northern Syria. Furthermore, we assess that any protracted conflict between both groups elevates the risks of a Turkish ground operation against the SDF (whereby the former attempts to establish a buffer zone along the whole Syrian border) in Q1 2025.

Jan 23.

• On 20 January, far-right extremist settlers attacked Palestinian villages in northern West Bank amid a broad rise in settler violence. On 18 January, a Palestinian sole perpetrator seriously injured one individual in a stabbing attack in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district).
• On 21 January, a Moroccan national injured five people in a stabbing attack in Nahalat Binyamin Street, Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district).
• On 21 January, the IDF embarked on a major counter-terrorism operation in Jenin (Jenin governorate) named ‘Operation Iron Wall’.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OVERALL FORECAST

• The Israel-Hamas ceasefire continues to hold; further hostage and prisoner releases will likely trigger demonstrations on 25 January. Despite efforts to increase aid deliveries into Gaza, humanitarian conditions are unlikely to improve significantly in the long term.
• IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzl Halevi announced he would resign from his position, effective from 6 March, and called for an external inquiry into the 7 October 2023 attacks.
• Efforts by the police to repel Israeli settler attacks in the West Bank triggered protests in Jerusalem, highlighting increasing unrest risks in Israel.
• US President Donald Trump removed all sanctions targeting Israeli settlers in the West Bank, moderating compliance concerns but elevating the risk of clashes.
• On 22 January, US President Donald Trump re-designated the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organisation (FTO), threatening humanitarian operations in Yemen and driving conflict escalation risks.
• Israel’s President Isaac Herzog will address the United Nations on International Holocaust Remembrance Day (IHRD), increasing protest risks amid broader targeted violence concerns.
• Yemen-US: Terrorist designation will raise energy, food security risks, drive supply chain disruption. On 22 January, US President Donald Trump re-designated Yemen’s Iranian-backed Houthis as a foreign terrorist organisation (FTO). The designation imposes harsher economic penalties. It will also likely implicate individuals and businesses perceived to be helping the Houthis, including several aid organisations. This will likely increase humanitarian risks in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen, elevating energy, food and water security risks. As a result, there is a realistic possibility that the Houthis will resume attacks in the Red Sea, particularly against US-affiliated vessels, sustaining supply chain disruption risks and elevating operational and financial risks facing businesses. Furthermore, the new US designation likely signals a willingness to increase pressure on the Houthis, indicating a possible increase in kinetic activity against Houthi targets in the coming weeks. These will exacerbate existing operational risks for NGOs and significantly elevate bystander security risks due to possible coalition airstrikes on Houthi infrastructure (including ports) in the coming month.

Jan 22.

• Libya: Threats to shut down oil fields point to elevated energy security, socio-economic health risks. On 21 January, local protesters in the Oil Crescent Region (eastern Libya, mostly al-Wahat district) issued an ultimatum to the National Oil Corporation (NOC) threatening to shut down oil fields and ports in the area if their demands for equitable resource distribution continue to be ignored. Protesters denounced the lack of adequate public services and demanded the relocation of the headquarters of five major oil companies to the region. It is likely that the Benghazi-based Government of National Stability (GNS) will advance negotiations with the protesters in the coming days. The Oil Crescent Region accounts for approximately 60% of Libya’s oil output. As such, unsuccessful negotiations will highly likely elevate energy security and socio-economic health risks in Libya, as oil exports comprise nearly 90% of state revenue. There is a realistic possibility that the GNS will seek mediation through General Khalifa Haftar, who wields influence over local communities in the region, moderating the risk of negotiations failing.
• Iraq: Legislative amendments will drive domestic unrest, increase human rights risks. On 21 January, Iraq’s parliament approved amendments to the 1959 Personal Status Law, lowering the legal minimum age for marriage from 18 to 15 years old, removing divorce and inheritance rights from women and granting Islamic courts greater authority over family matters. The amendments underscore deteriorating women’s rights in Iraq, effectively legalising early child marriage. General public discontent with the amendments will elevate the likelihood of protests organised by women’s rights organisations in the coming days in the capital Baghdad. Additional protests are likely in large urban centres in al-Qadisiyah, Basra, Dhi Qar, Kirkuk and Najaf governorates. These are likely to elevate travel disruption risks and to prompt a heightened security posture around protest locations. Risks of arbitrary stop-and-search operations will be particularly elevated in major cities. Sporadic clashes between protesters and the security forces remain a realistic possibility, driving bystander security risks in the coming days.

Jan 21.

• Israel-Palestinian Territories: Far-right extremist violence will likely elevate attack risks in West Bank. On 20 January, approximately 40 Israeli far-right extremist settlers attacked the Palestinian villages of Al-Funduq and Jinsafut (both Qalqilya governorate). The settlers set fire to buildings and vehicles in Al-Funduq before vandalising property and throwing stones in Jinsafut where they also clashed with the Israeli security forces. Near Ramat Gilad (Qalqilya), two settlers pepper-sprayed a border police officer who responded by opening fire, seriously injuring both. These incidents come amid the Israel-Hamas ceasefire in Gaza and the release of dozens of Palestinian prisoners as part of the deal. Tensions and radicalisation among Israeli settlers and Palestinians in the West Bank will likely intensify in the coming days. Risks of further settler attacks on Palestinian villages (particularly in the northern West Bank) remain elevated. We assess that risks of attacks by Palestinian militants and sole perpetrators will likely increase in the coming days, particularly near checkpoints, Israeli population centres, key highways and transport hubs.
• Syria: New campaign underscores heightened bystander, security risks in major governorates. On 20 January, the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led government launched a large-scale security campaign in Al-Ghantu village to the north of Homs governorate. The campaign targets narcotics and weapons dealers and affiliates of the former Assad government. HTS forces arrested dozens of suspects, conducted stop-and-search operations and imposed a curfew in the village. The development comes days after similar operations in other villages in rural parts of Homs governorate, including Akrad Al-Dasiniya, Jaburin and Qaniyyah Al-Assi. We assess that the scope of HTS security operations will likely expand in the coming weeks as the new government seeks to consolidate its control while dismantling the local intricate drug networks. This will sustain a high risk of reprisal attacks by affiliates of the former government and organised crime groups against HTS patrols, elevating bystander and security risks in Homs and other major governorates

Jan 20.

• On 19 January, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted additional airstrikes in Gaza following a delay in the enforcement of the ceasefire.
• On 18 January, a Palestinian sole perpetrator seriously injured one individual in a stabbing attack in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district).
• On 19 January, the IDF deployed additional forces to reinforce the Central Command, which is responsible for the West Bank.
• On 19 January the Iranian-backed Houthis announced the cessation of attacks on maritime vessels in the Red Sea, except those affiliated with Israel.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OVERALL FORECAST

• Following several delays, the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement came into effect on 19 January, decreasing short-term armed conflict risks.
• Despite efforts to increase aid deliveries into Gaza, humanitarian conditions are unlikely to improve significantly in the long term.
• The Otzmah Yehudit party left Israel’s coalition government, increasing medium-to-long-term government stability risks.
• Despite the Israel-Hamas ceasefire, we assess there is an elevated risk of organised terror attacks in the West Bank and sole-perpetrator attacks in Israel.
• On 19 January, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted additional airstrikes in Gaza following a delay in the enforcement of the ceasefire. The strikes took place after the pre-agreed ceasefire enforcement time of 0830hrs (local time), allegedly due to a significant delay in Hamas’ submission of the list of abductees to be released that day. Once this was submitted, the ceasefire entered into force at 1115hrs. The Gazan authorities claim that IDF airstrikes after 0830hrs killed at least eight people. Also on 19 January, IDF troops withdraw from areas in northern Gaza, including Beit Hanoun and Jabalia, as well as from areas in southern Gaza, particularly within Rafah. The delayed start of the ceasefire and the IDF strikes in Gaza reflect the fragility of the agreement, particularly given the lack of official enforcement mechanisms. This will sustain the risk of sporadic attacks by the IDF in Gaza in the coming days in response to perceived breaches, elevating the risk of a resumption of hostilities.
• On 18 January, a Palestinian sole perpetrator seriously injured one individual in a stabbing attack in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). The perpetrator was a resident of Tulkarm (Tulkarm governorate, West Bank) who entered Israel illegally, before then attacking civilians outside a café at the intersection of Levontin and Mikveh Israel streets in Tel Aviv. He was subsequently shot and killed. The incident underscores the persistently high security risks across Israel despite the Israel-Hamas ceasefire due to radicalisation campaigns within Palestinian society and attempts to disrupt public celebrations related to the agreement in Israel.
• On 19 January, the IDF deployed additional forces to bolster the Central Command, which is responsible for the West Bank. The decision comes amid the planned release of over 1,900 Palestinian prisoners over the coming six weeks as part of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire deal. The IDF announced that this deployment will enable both defensive and offensive operations in the West Bank. These include the establishment of additional checkpoints along traffic routes and the launch of counter-terrorism operations in Palestinian villages to disrupt militant activity and to prevent domestic unrest. Increased IDF activity in the West Bank will likely increase travel disruption risks in the coming days, as well as radicalisation risks among the local Palestinian population. This will in turn elevate the risk of opportunistic attacks by sole perpetrators against the Israeli security forces, particularly near checkpoints, driving bystander security risks. Opportunistic attacks are likely to include car-ramming and stabbing attempts, though small-arms fire also remains a realistic possibility.
• On 19 January the Iranian-backed Houthis announced the cessation of attacks on vessels in the Red Sea, except those affiliated with Israel. However, during previous periods in which only Israeli-affiliated ships were targeted, the Houthis targeted the ships of companies with very tenuous connections to Israel, such as having an Israeli national on their board of directors. The Houthis have also previously misidentified and targeted maritime vessels without any connection to Israel. As such, while the frequency of Houthi attacks in the Red Sea is likely to be reduced amid the Israel-Hamas ceasefire, general security risks in the Red Sea will remain elevated. Any break in the fragile ceasefire will increase (significantly) the risk of the Houthis resuming, and possibly ramping up, their attacks in the Red Sea. US-led coalition strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen will also elevate the risk of the Houthis resuming their attacks; in this event, the group would likely target naval vessels, increasing security risks for other proximate maritime assets.

Developments

• Following several delays, the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement came into effect on 19 January, decreasing short-term armed conflict risks. The agreement established a 42-day ceasefire in Gaza in exchange for Hamas releasing 33 Israeli hostages; Israel will also release over 1,900 Palestinian prisoners from detention facilities and will withdraw the IDF from major population centres in Gaza. The release of the first three Hamas hostages triggered large-scale rallies in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv (both Israel). In the coming weeks, further hostage releases will likely trigger similar demonstrations in major cities, elevating the risk of sporadic temporary operational and supply chain disruption, particularly in Tel Aviv. Also on 19 January, Israel’s release of 90 Palestinian prisoners triggered rallies in Beitunia (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate, West Bank). Similar demonstrations in the West Bank are highly likely following prisoner releases; any such gatherings will possibly also trigger further Israeli settler attacks against Palestinian civilians and population centres. In Israel, demonstrations opposing prisoner releases will also likely emerge in the coming weeks, particularly in the Jerusalem area, moderately increasing localised unrest risks.
• Despite efforts to increase aid deliveries into Gaza, humanitarian conditions are unlikely to improve significantly in the long term. On 20 January, the UN confirmed that 630 aid trucks had entered Gaza on 19 January as the Israel-Hamas ceasefire came into force. The agreement includes provisions to increase aid deliveries as part of broader efforts to improve humanitarian conditions, food security and energy security in Gaza. This marks a significant increase from the daily average of 51 truck deliveries recorded by the UN since 1 January. Despite these efforts, on 25 January, legislation restricting the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East’s (UNRWA) operations in Israel will come into force (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 31 October 2024). The bill will almost certainly restrict UNRWA’s operational capacity within Gaza in the coming weeks, undermining aid delivery efforts and limiting prospects for significant improvements in food and energy security. Additionally, there is an elevated risk that increased aid deliveries to Gaza will prompt an uptick in attempts by far-right protesters to disrupt convoys, driving bystander risks for logistics firms and NGOs. This concern likely explains why the IDF declared closed military zones around the Kerem Shalom and Yad Mordechai crossings until 24 January and the Nitzana crossing until 26 January. More broadly, the likely resumption of IDF operations in Gaza in the coming months will likely trigger critical disruption to NGO operations, sustaining broader humanitarian concerns.
• The Otzmah Yehudit party left Israel’s coalition government, increasing medium-to-long-term government stability risks. On 19 January, former National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir announced his party’s withdrawal from the coalition due to its opposition to the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement. The party’s withdrawal reduces the coalition’s majority from 68 to 62 seats in the 120-seat Knesset, elevating the risk of legislative deadlock and policy stasis in the coming months. Despite the resignation, Ben Gvir stated that the party would rejoin the coalition if combat operations resumed in Gaza following the conclusion of the first ceasefire phase, moderating short-term government stability risks. However, amid broader coalition tensions, there is a realistic possibility that the government will be unable to adopt budget legislation before 31 March; failure to do so will automatically trigger a general election and substantially increase government stability risks. Efforts to moderate governmental stability will likely include policy concessions to parties remaining within the coalition, particularly regarding ultra-Orthodox conscription, Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the resumption of IDF operations in Gaza. We assess that such concessions would increase the risk of protests and unrest in Israel in the coming weeks, while also driving broader ethno-religious tensions in the West Bank and exacerbating regional tensions.

Despite the Israel-Hamas ceasefire, we assess there is an elevated risk of organised terror attacks in the West Bank and sole-perpetrator attacks in Israel. In anticipation of a rise in unrest and attempted attacks following the release of 1,900 Palestinian prisoners, the IDF will likely elevate operations across the West Bank, particularly focusing on the northern West Bank. This will raise the risk of radicalisation among the Palestinian population, elevating the likelihood of attacks by sole perpetrators and militant organisations. As such, there is a realistic possibility that Hamas will try to facilitate attacks in the West Bank despite the ceasefire in Gaza, compounding the risk of attacks across the West Bank, particularly in the northern West Bank. Attack risks are also likely to extend to Israeli cities outside the West Bank, particularly Tel Aviv. Any such incidents are most likely to take the form of stabbing and car-ramming attempts. However, shootings and other more complex attacks remain possible. Targets are likely to comprise transit hubs (including those along major roadways), as well as ideological targets such as religious centres and IDF military sites, particularly relatively more accessible targets (such as checkpoints).

• Lebanon: Arrest of US citizens highlights sustained risks facing foreign nationals in southern Beirut. On 17 January, local media reported that Lebanese Hizballah (LH) detained two US citizens dining in the Dahieh suburb of the capital Beirut on 14 January. LH claimed they were arrested on suspicion of spying. LH operatives subsequently passed the two individuals over to Lebanon’s military intelligence for questioning. The incident highlights the sustained elevated security and arbitrary detention risks facing foreign nationals in the capital (particularly its southern suburbs), with Beirut’s Dahieh suburb remaining an LH stronghold. The incident also highlights LH’s continued enforcement of its security protocols in the capital (and likely across Lebanon more broadly), despite its weakened military and political status following its latest war with Israel. As such, the arrest of the two US citizens highlights the risks currently facing foreign nationals. There is also a realistic possibility of gradually rising tensions between LH and the official Lebanese security forces in the coming months; however, we assess that armed conflict between the two entities remains unlikely.
• Syria: Heightened tensions are unlikely to prompt clashes between Damascus, Kurds in coming days. On 19 January, Syria’s defence minister, Murhaf Abu Qasra, rejected proposals by the Syrian Democratic Forces’ (SDF) commander, Mazloum Abdi, for the SDF to retain its military bloc within the integrated Syrian armed forces. Abu Qasra also accused the SDF of prolonging disarmament talks, with Abdi later confirming the SDF has not yet decided whether to hand over its weapons to Damascus. The statements underscore the rising tensions between the Hay’at Tahrir al-sham (HTS)-led government and the SDF amid the negotiations. However, we assess that direct clashes between HTS and the SDF are unlikely in the coming days. HTS is likely to leverage the military advances made by its Turkish-backed ally, the Syrian National Army (SNA), against the SDF to pressure the latter into disarmament, increasing the risk of further armed conflict in northern Syria. We assess that the likelihood of such a deal will increase in the event of a rapid collapse of the SDF’s forces along the Tishreen Dam front or a direct Turkish ground operation against the Kurdish groups. (Source: Sibylline)

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-