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Military And Security Developments
Dec 23.
KEY POINTS
- The torching of a mosque in the West Bank by unnamed groups will drive the risk of ethno-religious clashes and vandalism against religious sites/tombs across the West Bank in January 2025.
- Heightened tensions between villagers and Israeli troops in southern Syria will elevate the risk of sporadic clashes in Daraa and Quneitra governorates (both Syria) in the coming weeks as Israel continues to carry out incursions beyond the buffer zone.
- Gaza Strip: Despite signs of a significant deterioration of Hamas’ capabilities in northern Gaza, the threat of sporadic aerial attacks against southern Israel persists. Between 19 and 22 December, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued its clearing operations in Beit Hanoun, Beit Lahia and Jabalia refugee camp (all northern Gaza), where clashes with residual Palestinian armed groups persisted (albeit at a lower intensity). Similarly, the rate of daily mortar attacks by Palestinian militias targeting the Netzarim Corridor (central Gaza) has also partially decreased. Notably, Hamas claimed multiple stabbings and a suicide vest attack against IDF soldiers in Jabalia; the IDF refuted these claims, adding that sporadic attacks by Hamas fighters were repelled without casualties. Hamas also conducted a drone attack targeting an IDF site in southern Israel on 19 December, though the drone was intercepted. Both the increased use of ‘cold’ weapons (i.e. not firearms) in northern Gaza and the lack of rocket launches signal a significant deterioration of Hamas’ capabilities. However, the risk of aerial attacks against southern and central Israel will persist.
- West Bank: The torching of a mosque will sustain the elevated risk of ethno-religious violence. On 20 December, an unnamed group vandalised and set fire to a mosque in Marda (Salfit governorate). The Israeli police and Shin Bet launched an (ongoing) investigation into the incident while Palestinian media claimed that a group of settlers was behind the act. The risk of ethno-religious violence, clashes and vandalism against religious sites/tombs will almost certainly persist across the West Bank in January 2025. On 19 December, the IDF conducted an airstrike killing an al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades (AAMB) commander, Tariq al-Dosh, and other AAMB members in Tulkarm (Tulkarm governorate). The IDF later claimed that al-Dosh played a pivotal role in receiving Iranian funding through Lebanon to conduct attacks in the West Bank. Meanwhile, clashes between Palestinian armed groups and Palestinian Authority (PA) forces in Jenin (Jenin governorate) have persisted amid the ongoing PA security operation. On 21 December, Palestinian fighters took control of a UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) health centre in Jenin during a PA raid, underscoring the significant physical security risks facing NGOs operating in the area. On the same day, the IDF thwarted an infiltration attempt by 20 individuals who were trying to cross into Israel from the West Bank in the Beit She’an Valley (Northern district). The IDF killed one infiltrator while the others fled back to the West Bank.
- Israel-Lebanon: The seizure of sites/camps affiliated with Palestinian militias in southern Lebanon by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will drive the risk of sporadic clashes. Between 19 and 22 December, the LAF continued to seize control of additional areas in the Beqaa Valley (Beqaa governorate), including sites and camps affiliated with the Palestinian Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and Fatah al-Intifada groups. These groups have a presence in Syria and likely used the Beqaa Valley as a key hub to supply their camps in Lebanon. With the fall of the al-Assad government in Syria and the withdrawal of Lebanese Hizballah (LH) from southern Lebanon, the capabilities of these Palestinian groups have significantly diminished, though sporadic clashes with the LAF in the area remain a realistic possibility in Q1 2025. Simultaneously, the IDF has continued to carry out demolition operations in southern Lebanon, destroying the remaining military and dual-use infrastructure operated by LH, while also seizing weapons depots and rocket launchers. Local media reported ongoing large-scale demolition operations in several villages in southern Lebanon, including Bani Haiyyan, Kfar Kila (both Nabatieh governorate) and An-Naqoura (South governorate).
- Israel-Syria: Heightened tensions between villagers and the IDF in southern Syria will elevate the risk of sporadic clashes. On 20 December, the IDF opened fire on local demonstrators near the village of Ma’ariya (Daraa governorate) who were denouncing Israel’s presence in the area. The IDF stated that it shot one protester in the legs after assessing that the individual posed a threat. No further details were disclosed by local Syrian media or the IDF, though the incident will likely elevate the risk of sporadic clashes between local villagers and the IDF in the coming weeks. This risk will likely be exacerbated by the presence of local elements affiliated with jihadist factions calling for retaliation against Israel. Meanwhile, between 19 and 22 December, the IDF continued to conduct operations in Daraa and Quneitra governorates beyond the buffer zone, seizing weapons caches and co-ordinating with local Druze clans. We assess that the IDF will likely continue to operate in these two governorates through January 2025, at least. Despite these incursions, the new government in Damascus is unlikely to seek to engage in direct clashes with Israel in the coming months.
- Israel-Yemen: Further IDF retaliatory strikes against Yemen are likely following persistent Houthi attacks. On 21 December, a missile launched by the Iran-backed and Yemen-based Houthis struck a public garden in a residential area of Jaffa, southern Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), lightly injuring 16 civilians. The IDF launched two Arrow missile interceptors and several shorter range interceptors, though these all missed the Houthi missile. This is the second such missile to have penetrated Israel’s air defences in 48 hours. These two incidents highlight the sustained security risks across Israel stemming from Houthi attacks and possible future Israeli air defence failures. As such, the IDF will likely conduct further retaliatory strikes against Yemen similar to the large-scale strikes conducted on 19 December (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 19 December 2024). Any new strikes will likely target Houthi military camps/headquarters in western Yemen as well as ports and energy infrastructure, further exacerbating security and energy risks across Yemen in January 2025.
- Red Sea: US friendly fire has underscored the persistent risk of misidentification in the Red Sea. On 21 December, the US military’s Central Command (CENTCOM) stated that two US Navy pilots were shot down over the Red Sea in an apparent friendly fire incident. CENTCOM added that the guided-missile cruiser USS Gettysburg mistakenly hit a two-seater F/A-18 jet; both pilots were later recovered alive after ejecting from the aircraft. While no further details were disclosed, the incident underscores the persistent risk of misidentification in the Red Sea amid continued Houthi aerial and naval attacks (as well as US-led coalition strikes against the Yemen-based group). Misfire and collateral damage risks also remain elevated for all commercial naval vessels passing through the Bab el-Mandeb strait, sustaining the physical security and bystander risks in the waters around Yemen.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- On 21 December, local media reported that Hamas provided proof of life for several hostages. While there has been no official confirmation, current negotiations have focused on a multi-phased ceasefire, with Israel pushing for a prolonged ceasefire rather than a complete long-standing deal. The first phase of the deal is likely to include the release of children, female Israeli soldiers and elderly and sick hostages in exchange for approximately 250 Palestinian prisoners. Local reports also claim that Israel requested the release of 34 hostages in the first phase, 11 of whom Hamas considers to be soldiers. While several sticking points remain, these developments indicate positive advances in ceasefire negotiations, increasing the likelihood of an agreement being reached in the coming weeks (see FORECAST below).
- On 22 December, thousands of Zionist individuals gathered at the First Station site in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) in support of a hostage deal with Hamas. The event was peaceful; it included speakers, prayers and songs. It highlighted the support for a deal that exists among elements of the religious Zionist population in Israel. This comes despite various Members of the Knesset (MKs) associated with the Zionist population (such as Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir) being opposed to a ceasefire in Gaza. This show of support is likely to place further pressure on the Israeli government to reach a ceasefire in the coming weeks.
- The US has lifted its bounty for Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) leader, signalling cautious optimism regarding HTS’ consolidation of power in Syria. On 20 December, the US confirmed it removed the USD 10 m bounty for Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani). The US claims this is due to Sharaa’s commitment to ensuring that terror groups in Syria will pose no threat to the US or its regional partners, though it did not disclose any binding agreement on the matter. The US also clarified that it supports a Syrian-led political process that results in inclusive and representative government. Further US support for the group and its leader is likely to be conditional on the group’s treatment of minorities in Syria (see Sibylline Special Report – 19 December 2024).
FORECAST
We assess that a ceasefire agreement is increasingly likely in the coming weeks, though sticking points are likely to delay negotiations slightly.
Three key sticking points remain:
- The ceasefire for which Israel is pushing is time-limited, rather than a full long-term ceasefire
- The presence of Israeli troops in Gaza (in particular the Philadelphi Corridor) and the question of who is to manage the border crossing on the Palestinian side
- The number and identity of Israeli hostages released during each phase, particularly the first phase, as well as the number and identity of Palestinian prisoners whom Israel releases in return
According to indications in recent days, the second and third points remain the most crucial (there is growing progress regarding the second). As such, there is a realistic possibility of an agreement being reached in the coming two weeks. US President-elect Donald Trump’s inauguration on 20 January 2025 is likely to act as an unofficial deadline; the likelihood of reaching an agreement will increase as this date approaches.
Fresh Israeli strikes against Yemen are highly likely to exacerbate food and energy security risks in Houthi-controlled territories. Houthi ballistic and drone attacks targeting southern and central Israel are highly likely to continue, especially in light of the recent Israeli air defence failures. As such, the IDF will likely conduct further large-scale airstrikes against western Yemen in the coming weeks, primarily targeting Houthi commanders, facilities and dual-use infrastructure. The most prominent targets are likely to be situated in the capital Sanaa, sustaining the significantly elevated security and bystander risks in the city, particularly near power plants and governmental facilities. Other likely targets include all Houthi-run Red Sea ports such as al-Hudaydah, as-Salif and the Ras Isa oil terminal (all al-Hudaydah governorate); these locations were previously targeted by the IDF on 19 December. Any new strikes against al-Hudaydah port in particular will further elevate food security and operational disruption risks for NGOs, as it remains a key hub for international food shipments and humanitarian aid.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
- A successful terror attack by LH and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting LH and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- Israel re-launches widespread, high-intensity military operations in Gaza
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
- An IDF-targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)
- An LH strike causes a mass casualty event in Israel
- An IDF strike causes a mass casualty event in Lebanon
- An IDF strike kills civilians in Lebanon
(Source: Sibylline)
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