www.exensor.com
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
Military And Security Developments
Dec 19.
KEY POINTS
* Sustained and intense clashes between Palestinian militant groups and Palestinian Authority (PA) forces in Jenin (Jenin governorate) will likely increase the risk of attacks against PA government and military facilities across the West Bank.
* While the prospects for a phased ceasefire agreement between Israel and Gaza-based militant groups is increasing, clearing operations by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in Gaza and sporadic rocket fire against locations in southern (and possibly central) Israel will continue in the interim.
* Gaza Strip: Despite continued IDF clearing operations, the risk of sporadic rocket fire persists. Between 16 and 18 December, the IDF continued clearing operations in Beit Lahia, Gaza City and Jabalia refugee camp (all northern Gaza) and Rafah City (southern Gaza), triggering sporadic clashes with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) cells. Particularly intense clashes were prompted by the IDF’s attempts to bulldoze streets around Kamal Adwan Hospital in Beit Lahia to enable its forces to reposition. Notably, on 18 December the IDF issued evacuation orders for residents of al-Bureij (central Gaza) following a rocket attack originating from the area. Similar clearing operations are likely in the coming 48 hours.
* West Bank: An attack against civilians entering Jospeh’s tomb has underscored the significant bystander risks near Jewish religious sites in the West Bank. On 18 December, Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fighters shot at a bus carrying Israeli civilians that entered Joseph’s Tomb in Nablus (Nablus governorate), slightly injuring the driver. The IDF later announced that it detained 19 Israelis for entering the area without prior co-ordination. Meanwhile, in Jenin, clashes between Palestinian militias and the PA security forces persisted amid ongoing large-scale PA operations to re-establish a presence in the city’s refugee camp. The operation is likely to continue over the coming two weeks, sustaining bystander and attack risks in the city. Retaliatory strikes by PIJ and other Palestinian militias against the PA in other West Bank cities are increasingly likely, elevating bystander risks around PA offices and security facilities.
* Israel-Lebanon: A partial decrease in the rate of IDF activity in southern Lebanon signals the active implementation of the ceasefire agreement. On 16 December, the IDF announced that the 98th Division had completed its mission in southern Lebanon and would be redeployed to the Gaza Strip, indicating a gradual decrease in the IDF’s local operational strength, which is consistent with the ceasefire agreement. Meanwhile, during clearing operations on 17-18 December, the IDF’s 91st Division seized multiple Lebanese Hizballah (LH) weapons depots, including stores of mobile rocket launchers, anti-tank guided missiles, rockets and IEDs in southern Lebanon. On 16 and 17 December, special combat engineering units also continued the systemic demolition of LH tunnel networks and infrastructure in southern Lebanon, particularly in Bani Haiyyan, Kfar Kila (both Nabatiyeh governorate) and Naqoura (South governorate).
* Israel-Syria: IDF incursions into the buffer zone will drive the possibility of clashes with rogue jihadist elements in southern Syria. Between 16 and 18 December, the IDF conducted operations along the border of the 1974 buffer zone, specifically in the villages of Abdin and Maariyah (both Daraa governorate). The IDF is also increasing its footprint within the buffer zone itself, destroying former Syrian Armed Forces (SAF) infrastructure in Kwdana and Saidah (both Quneitra governorate). Notably, the IDF reached an agreement with local clans in the aforementioned areas (likely from the Druze population). As part of the deal, residents will gather weapons left by the SAF. Local Syrian media also claimed that IDF airstrikes targeted SAF radar systems near Deir ez-Zor city (Deir ez-Zor governorate) in eastern Syria. While it is unlikely that Druze clans will seek to clash with the IDF, further Israeli incursions into Syria will possibly drive the risk of clashes with rogue jihadist elements affiliated with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Meanwhile, on 17 December, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that the IDF would remain on the Syrian side of Mount Hermon until Israel reaches another security arrangement with Damascus. Given that this strategic location allows for observation into both southern Syria and Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley, we assess that the IDF will likely seek to remain in the area during Q1 2025.
* Israel-Yemen: IDF airstrikes against key Houthi ports on the Red Sea will significantly increase existing energy and food security risks in western Yemen. Earlier on 19 December, the IDF announced it had partially intercepted a ballistic missile launched from Yemen by the Houthis. However, the warhead crashed into an empty school building in Ramat Gan (Tel Aviv district), with no injuries reported. Shortly afterwards, the IDF conducted a series of retaliatory airstrikes targeting energy infrastructure in the capital Sanaa and the ports of al-Hudaydah, As-Salif and Ras Isa oil terminal (all al-Hudaydah governorate). The three ports are key logistical and energy hubs for the Houthis on the Red Sea; as such, the strikes are highly likely to exacerbate existing energy security risks across Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen (including Sanaa). Striking al-Hudaydah port will also elevate food security and operational disruption risks for NGOs, as it has been a key hub for international food shipments and humanitarian aid.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
* Human Rights Watch (HRW) has accused Israel of perpetrating genocide in Gaza, highlighting significant humanitarian and corporate governance concerns. On 19 December, the US-based NGO published a report stating that Israel has intentionally restricted access to clean water in Gaza since October 2023, resulting in thousands of deaths; it underscores that this amounts to an act of genocide. This comes after Amnesty International also published a report on 5 December which characterised Israel’s military operations in Gaza as genocidal. Although Israel has rejected both NGOs’ claims, the reports highlight sustained humanitarian concerns regarding conditions in Gaza, particularly relating to widespread food and water insecurity. As IDF operations continue in Gaza, humanitarian conditions are highly unlikely to improve substantially, sustaining socio-economic challenges, particularly in northern governorates. In the coming months, Israel will almost certainly continue facing allegations of genocide and war crimes linked to operations in Gaza, sustaining elevated reputational risks for firms with operations in Israel, particularly those with links to the Israeli government and/or security forces. Such outfits will also face elevated risks of targeted protests, staff activism and divestment from firms with strong ESG requirements, driving longer-term corporate governance risks.
* Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu travelled to the Mount Hermon area, driving regional tensions and sanctions-exposure risks. On 17 November, Netanyahu was granted a temporary delay to his ongoing corruption trial to visit the Mount Hermon area, where the IDF has established positions in the past two weeks (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 16 December 2024). During the visit, Netanyahu stated that the IDF would maintain these positions until an alternative security arrangement was reached with Damascus. The statement will likely compound concerns that Israel intends to establish permanent positions on Syria’s side of the Golan Heights demilitarised buffer zone, driving tensions with Syria’s HTS-led transitional government. However, sustained clashes between the IDF and government forces remain unlikely. Also on 17 December, the spokesperson for the UN’s Secretary General stated that the IDF’s presence in the buffer zone violates the 1974 Disengagement Agreement. In combination with the Israeli government’s plans to double the Israeli population in the Golan Heights in the coming years, international tensions relating to the territory’s status will likely continue to rise, driving the risk of sanctions targeting Israeli entities that facilitate civilian and military infrastructure expansion in the area.
* Despite escalating disputes within Israel’s coalition government, government stability risks are unlikely to increase critically in the coming weeks. On 16 December, Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir and his Otzma Yehudit party voted against the government-backed 2025 Budget Bill during its first reading in the Knesset. Although the bill passed with a two-vote margin, the rejection highlights increasing tensions within the coalition government, particularly relating to Ben Gvir’s ongoing efforts to dismiss the Attorney General. In the coming months, increasing coalition disunity will likely undermine efforts to pass government-backed legislation, driving risks of policy stagnation. However, since Gideon Sa’ar’s New Hope party joined the coalition in September, the government has operated with a larger 68-seat majority. As such, while tensions within the government will possibly increase policy risks, we assess that the threats to government stability are unlikely to increase critically in the coming weeks.
* A lawsuit calling for the US to restrict arms exports to Israel will increase legal exposure and supply chain disruption risks, particularly for defence and technology firms. On 17 November, five Palestinian-US citizens filed a civil lawsuit against US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, alleging that continued arms exports to Israel have violated US laws prohibiting the provision of military aid to states engaging in human rights violations. The suit alleges there is credible evidence of IDF units committing gross human rights violations during operations in Gaza and that continued exports represent a violation of the 1997 Leahy Law. If successful, the lawsuit would result in an injunction ordering the State Department to enforce the Leahy Law, possibly disrupting access to military aid for certain IDF units. Such an injunction would also set a precedent for other legal challenges vis-à-vis Israeli access to military aid. Consequently, defence and technology firms exporting goods to Israel would face elevated compliance concerns and supply chain disruption risks. However, the court will almost certainly take several months to consider the lawsuit, moderating the risk of immediate operational disruption. Even so, developments in the case will possibly trigger an uptick in pro-Palestine demonstrations and unrest, driving transport and operational disruption risks in protest hotspots such as New York City (New York) and Washington DC.
* An incendiary attack against a synagogue in Quebec province (Canada) highlights the elevated risks of targeted violence, particularly during the upcoming Hannukah period. At approximately 0300hrs (local time) on 18 December, unidentified perpetrators detonated an incendiary device at a synagogue in Montreal (Quebec). The device triggered a fire at the Congregation Beth Tikvah modern Orthodox synagogue in the Dollard-des-Ormeaux suburb, resulting in damage to the building but no injuries. This marks the second attack targeting the synagogue since Hamas’ 7 October 2023 attack against Israel (unidentified perpetrators threw a Molotov cocktail at the building in November 2023). Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau characterised the incident as an antisemitic hate crime, highlighting the elevated risks of targeted violence and attacks facing Jewish individuals and communities in Canada. More broadly, the risk of attacks targeting synagogues will increase in the coming weeks due to celebrations associated with the Hannukah period (25 December – 2 January), driving elevated security and bystander risks. This risk will be particularly acute for Orthodox congregations holding services in areas with elevated ethno-religious tensions linked to the Israel-Hamas war, such as Australia, Canada, France, South Africa, the UK and the US. Jewish individuals will also face elevated risks of harassment and targeted violence during this time, particularly those wearing religious symbols and participating in religious services.
- Israel-Yemen: Airstrikes on key infrastructure drive energy security risks, supply chain disruption. Earlier on 19 December, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) claimed to have intercepted a missile launched from Yemen toward its territory. This followed a series of Israeli airstrikes overnight on key energy infrastructure in As-Salif and Ras Isa (both Al Hudaydah governorate), likely in response to the Houthis firing a ballistic missile toward Israel on 16 December. The strikes will almost certainly threaten energy security in Yemen, elevating existing power supply challenges and driving operational risks for NGOs and their personnel. They will also likely disrupt humanitarian aid deliveries and increase food insecurity in the short term. Further ballistic missile launches toward major population centres in Israel including Haifa (Haifa district), Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) are likely, elevating security and business operational risks. We assess that attacks on commercial shipping vessels in the Red Sea will likely escalate in the coming weeks, driving significant global supply chain risks and threatening broader conflict escalation.
Dec 18.
- Jordan-Syria: Reopening of crossing signals partial restoration of governance in southern Syria. Earlier on 18 December, the Jaber-Nasib border crossing between Syria and Jordan resumed operations after being shut by the Jordanian authorities amid the collapse of Syria’s former al-Assad government. While the resumption of the flow of goods and freight traffic is confirmed, it is still not clear whether the cross-border movement of people is permitted. Notably, the new Syrian authorities have cancelled all fees and stamps previously required at the crossing in a likely bid to facilitate the entry of goods and to support the ailing economy. We assess that the resumption of bilateral trade signals a partial restoration of governance and security in the border region of Daraa governorate (Syria) by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). However, given HTS’ inability to secure the border fully, the risk of cross-border smuggling remains elevated, increasing the likelihood that Jordan will again close the crossing at short notice should the authorities identify any uptick in these illicit operations.
Dec 16.
KEY POINTS
- Despite increasing prospects for an Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement in the coming weeks, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are likely to expand ground operations in central Gaza, driving rocket strikes.
- The passage of a bill designed to double the population of the Golan Heights will likely increase ethno-religious and diplomatic tensions, driving the risk of sanctions.
- The increasing frequency of attempted Iran-backed Houthi strikes on Israel will increase the likelihood of retaliatory Israeli strikes on Houthi-controlled parts of Yemen in the coming weeks.
- Gaza Strip: There was a moderate uptick in rocket fire from central Gaza, highlighting sustained security concerns amid possible militant reconstitution efforts. On 13 December, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) militants fired two rockets towards Ashkelon (Southern district). The IDF later destroyed the rocket launchers, which it claimed were positioned approximately 50 metres from humanitarian aid warehouses in central Gaza. Subsequently, on 14 December, the IDF intercepted two further rockets fired from central Gaza, highlighting possible militant efforts to reconstitute forces in and around the Deir al Balah area. In response, the IDF conducted numerous airstrikes targeting locations in central Gaza, including municipality buildings in Deir al Balah and Nuseirat. On 15 December, the IDF issued evacuation orders for residents in the al Qarara and Wadi al Salqa areas south of Deir al Balah, indicating a possible expansion of ground operations into these areas in the coming days. Such operations will likely trigger additional instances of rocket fire targeting southern Israel as militants attempt to clear weapons caches before their seizure by IDF ground forces. However, rocket attacks will likely remain sporadic, moderating security and bystander risks in southern Israel.
- West Bank: Crackdown on Islamist groups in Jenin underscores Palestinian concerns over developments in Syria, elevating bystander security risks. Since 14 December, clashes between Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces and militants in the Jenin (Jenin governorate) have killed at least three individuals. This comes amid PA operations to re-establish its presence in Jenin’s refugee camp, parts of which remain under the control of militants associated with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). The operations also likely reflect increased PA concerns that the recent success of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in toppling the Assad regime in Syria will inspire local militant groups to attempt a similar uprising targeting the PA. The US has reportedly requested that the Israeli government approve the delivery of ammunition, bulletproof vests, radios, armoured cars and other equipment to the Palestinian security forces, underscoring international concern over the PA’s ability to govern and secure the West Bank. Clashes between PA security forces and local militants will almost certainly continue as PA operations proceed in the coming weeks, driving localised bystander and collateral risks, particularly in the Jenin area. In the event of a larger-scale security breakdown in the West Bank, militants will also likely increase targeting of PA municipal buildings, IDF outposts and Israeli settlements, driving the risk of further escalation and exacerbating ethno-religious tensions.
- Israel-Lebanon: IDF strikes on southern Lebanon reflect sustained pressure on the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire agreement, though imminent conflict resumption remains unlikely. On 16 December, Lebanon’s Ministry of Public Health announced that an IDF drone strike earlier that day injured three people in Sidon district (South governorate). This followed further IDF drone strikes in southern Lebanon on 14 December which the IDF claimed hit ready-to-launch rocket launchers targeting Israel. While continued Israeli strikes targeting southern Lebanon will sustain pressure on the ceasefire agreement and possibly elevate risks of conflict escalation, the strikes themselves are unlikely to trigger a resumption of the Israel-Hizballah war. Rather, operations to ensure the ceasefire holds will likely continue in southern Lebanon, including the progressive withdrawals of IDF personnel and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) militants from south of the Litani River.
- Israel-Syria: IDF strikes on military assets underscore escalating regional tensions, drive diplomatic risks. On 14 December, the IDF struck former Syrian Armed Forces weapons depots in Daraa, Hama, Homs and Suwayda governorates. Subsequently, the leader of Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) Abu Mohammad al-Julani claimed that IDF airstrikes had crossed several red lines. On 15 December, additional strikes were conducted on military facilities near Tartus (Tartus governorate), further escalating tensions. Simultaneously, Israel has positioned more troops in the demilitarised buffer zone on the border between the Golan Heights (Northern district) and Quneitra governorate in Syria, prompting criticism from regional actors such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, likely driving increased diplomatic isolation and weakening shared security initiatives. Israel’s ongoing military strategy in Syria will likely undermine diplomatic relations with the incoming Syrian leadership. It also threatens to further destabilise Syria at a sensitive time, particularly with displaced Syrians returning to the country, exacerbating bystander risks to civilians, elevating reliance on informal shelters and driving human rights risks. In the event Israel continues to strike Syria, this will likely delay the country’s timeframe for conflict recovery while exacerbating security risks across the region over the coming months.
- Israel-Yemen: Ballistic missile interception underscores elevated security risks in central Israel, with an Israeli response in the coming weeks a realistic possibility. Earlier on 16 December, sirens sounded across central Israel as the IDF successfully intercepted a ballistic missile targeting Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) from Yemen. The launch was almost certainly conducted by the Iran-backed Houthis, who have attacked Israel repeatedly since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023. Israel claims the missile was shot down before crossing the country’s borders, while local media reports shrapnel from the interception fell in the West Bank. At the time of writing, no injuries have been reported, however, falling shrapnel from the intercepted missile will drive bystander risks to those on the ground. The temporary suspension of flights to and from Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV) will drive moderate transport disruption and supply chain risks while increasing strain on other local airports. Local media have also reported that Israeli officials are considering conducting another significant military operation against Yemen in the coming weeks, increasing risks of direct strikes targeting Houthi-controlled territory (see: FORECAST).
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has delayed further testimony in his ongoing corruption trial, possibly indicating progress in ceasefire negotiations with Hamas. On 16 December, the judge in Netanyahu’s ongoing corruption trial agreed to cancel court proceedings on 17 December due to ‘special circumstances’. Court proceedings will resume on 18 December. The cancellation comes amid increasing reports of Israel and Hamas approaching a ceasefire and hostage release deal. On 16 December, local media reported that Defence Minister Israel Katz had briefed the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee and stated that an agreement is becoming increasingly likely. There is a realistic possibility that Netanyahu’s absence from court will facilitate a Security Cabinet meeting to approve a formal ceasefire proposal or framework for an agreement with Hamas. In the coming days, efforts to facilitate further progress in negotiations will likely continue, though tensions relating to the number of hostage releases and the length of the ceasefire period will possibly delay a formal agreement being reached in the coming week.
- Anti-government protest activity continued at pace, though attendance will possibly increase in the coming week due to controversial government policy initiatives. On 14 December, thousands of protesters gathered in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) for weekly demonstrations calling on the government to secure hostage releases through ceasefire negotiations. Demonstrations remained broadly peaceful and did not cause major disruption. However, ongoing efforts from coalition members such as National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir to dismiss the Attorney General and Justice Minister Yariv Levin in pursuit of judicial reform efforts will possibly trigger short-term upticks in rally attendance and frequency. Additionally, in the event that delays to Netanyahu’s ongoing testimony in his corruption trial are not related to progress in ceasefire negotiations, protests will possibly emerge in locations such as Caesarea (Haifa district), Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv, elevating risks of temporary operational disruption. Regardless, in the longer term protest attendance will likely continue moderately decreasing.
- The Israeli government’s efforts to increase the population of the Golan Heights will likely exacerbate bilateral and regional tensions. On 15 December, the Israeli cabinet unanimously approved a NIS 40 m (USD 11 m) plan to double the Israeli population in the Golan Heights from approximately 50,000 to 100,000. The funds will primarily be invested in education and energy infrastructure to increase communities’ ability to absorb new residents. Although the Golan Heights form part of Syria, Israel has controlled the territory since 1967 and the territory’s status is a source of long-standing regional tension. Efforts to increase the Israeli population in the Golan Heights underscore long-term efforts by the government to bolster and legitimise its territorial claims therein. The move also likely reflects longer-term water security concerns, with Israel partially seeking international recognition of its claims to the Golan Heights to secure water rights for the Jordan River and the Sea of Galilee. The plan has triggered substantial regional criticism, with Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the UAE condemning the bill’s adoption. Efforts to increase the Israeli population in the area will likely further exacerbate bilateral and regional tensions in the coming weeks (see: FORECAST).
- The UK and Japan downgraded travel warnings for Israel, highlighting a stabilising risk environment. On 13 December, the UK and Japan downgraded security risk assessments regarding travel to Israel and the West Bank. The move reflects the stabilising travel risk environment in Israel as the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire continues to hold. Despite the rating downgrade, however, tourism-related travel and spending are unlikely to reach pre-October 2023 levels in the short- to medium-term, sustaining socio-economic risks, particularly in the West Bank.
- The closure of the Israeli embassy in Ireland highlights substantially elevated bilateral tensions. On 15 December, Israel’s Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar announced the closure of the Israeli embassy in Ireland due to ‘extreme anti-Israeli policies’. The move comes after Ireland’s cabinet voted on 11 December to join South Africa’s case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). South Africa alleges that IDF operations in Gaza have resulted in genocide and crimes against humanity, violating Israel’s obligations under the 1948 Genocide Convention. The closure highlights substantially elevated diplomatic tensions between Israel and Ireland, which will likely persist throughout the Israel-Hamas war. The move will likely restrict access to consular services for Israeli nationals in Ireland, though there is a realistic possibility that Israel will establish a Consulate General in Belfast (Northern Ireland, UK) if demand for consular services is particularly elevated. Although Ireland has not announced the closure of its embassy in Tel Aviv, sustained diplomatic tensions will possibly trigger a recall of the Irish ambassador to Israel in the coming weeks.
- Israel-Syria: Efforts to double Israeli population in Golan Heights will increase regional tensions. On 15 December, Israel’s cabinet approved a USD 11 m plan to double the Israeli population in Golan Heights (Northern district) from roughly 50,000 to 100,000 residents. The funds will be allocated to education and energy infrastructure. Although the Golan Heights form part of Syria, Israel has controlled the territory since 1967; international recognition of Israel’s sovereignty claims is limited. The plan comes amid substantially elevated bilateral tensions after Israeli troops took control of the Golan Height’s demilitarised buffer zone in Quneitra governorate (Syria) on 8 December. The move will likely further exacerbate bilateral tensions between Israel and Syria’s transition government while also sustaining broader regional tensions. We assess that international partners including the EU and UK will possibly sanction members of the Israeli government in response, further driving global diplomatic stasis and increasing compliance concerns. While Israel seeks to increase the population proportionally between Jewish and Druze residents, the general population increase will possibly drive ethno-religious tensions and risks of inter-communal violence in the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
A CNIM Group Company
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-