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Military And Security Developments
Dec 13.
- Syria: Al-Hawl escape attempt elevates humanitarian concerns, terrorism risks. On 12 December, Kurdish Asayish forces arrested the family members of Islamic State (IS) operatives who attempted to escape Al-Hawl refugee camp (Al-Hasakah governorate). The forces later imposed a security cordon around the camp. Kurdish-led forces guarding IS prisons and camps are facing increased pressure due to ongoing fights against the Turkey-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). This led to a reduction in forces guarding IS facilities across Syria. Attempts by IS fighters and families to escape will raise risks of forceful arrests and more stringent enforcement of security measures around camps, elevating humanitarian concerns and bystander risks. Furthermore, any weakening of security around detention camps will elevate the risks of successful escapes driving risks of terrorism. We assess that attacks by IS members on detention centres also remain a realistic possibility, sustaining elevated bystander and security risks around these locations in the coming weeks.
- Syria: Attempts to seize strategic dam will elevate environmental risks. On 12 December, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced they had repelled an attack by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) on the Tishrin Dam on the Euphrates River. Syrian media also confirmed that heavy weapons and drones were used in the attack, citing local fears of inflicting significant damage to the strategic dam. Despite the US-brokered ceasefire on the Manbij front (Aleppo governorate) in which the SNA secured control of the city, the Turkish-backed group will likely continue attempts to seize the dam and its bridge, which connects Manbij to Raqqa governorate. This will likely elevate major security and environmental risks along the Euphrates as any serious damage to the dam will almost certainly result in significant flooding in population centres along the river. However, we assess there is a realistic possibility that the ceasefire agreement in Manbij will be replicated on other fronts between the SNA and SDF, including the area around the dam.
Dec 12.
KEY POINTS
- The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) claims to have destroyed 70-80% of military infrastructure and weapons associated with Syria’s former Assad government.
- A shooting attack in the West Bank killed a child, elevating the risk of Israeli settler violence in the coming days.
- The IDF is likely to reduce the threshold for triggering sirens, resulting in an uptick in sirens and false alarms in the coming days.
- Gaza Strip: The IDF struck militants attempting to seize humanitarian aid; the move reflects persistently elevated security risks in the vicinity of humanitarian aid hubs and routes. On 11 December the IDF conducted targeted airstrikes against two gathering points in Rafah (southern Gaza); it claimed that it aimed to strike armed militants planning to capture aid convoys. Palestinian sources claim the strikes killed 12 Palestinians. The incident reflects persistently elevated security and bystander risks stemming from militant operations and IDF counter-terrorism activities along routes used for aid deliveries in Gaza.
- West Bank: Shooting incidents against Israelis in the West Bank underscore elevated security risks over the coming days. Earlier on 12 December, a Palestinian gunman killed a child and injured three other individuals in a small arms attack against a civilian bus close to the Tunnel Barrier near al-Khader (Bethlehem governorate). The bus was travelling along route 291 from Beitar Illit (Bethlehem) to Jerusalem (Jerusalem governorate). The perpetrator, a resident of Beit Awwa (Hebron governorate), surrendered himself to the Israeli security forces following an overnight pursuit. Furthermore, on 11 December, gunmen opened fire on three Israelis visiting Joseph’s tomb in Nablus (Nablus governorate) without authorisation from the IDF, lightly injuring them. The Israeli police later held the three for questioning as they breached a military checkpoint. According to local news, the three individuals are members of the ultra-Orthodox Shuvu Bonim cult. The incidents will likely elevate the risk of further ethno-religious tensions, domestic unrest and attacks by both Palestinians and Israeli groups in the West Bank in the coming days (see FORECAST).
- Israel-Lebanon: The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and UN Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) entered al-Khiyam (Nabatieh governorate) following the IDF’s withdrawal, reflecting steady progress in the ceasefire’s implementation. On 11 December, the LAF and UNIFIL confirmed they entered al-Khiyam, approximately 3.5 miles (5.6km) from the Israel-Lebanon border. The forces are backfilling the IDF’s 7th armoured division, which was earlier operating in the village, from which it later withdrew. The event reflects the gradual implementation of the ceasefire terms, highlighting the growing stability of the deal, despite continued sporadic IDF strikes in southern Lebanon. The IDF continues to operate in southern Lebanon and is likely to withdraw its troops from the area slowly throughout December (and January 2025).
- Israel-Syria: IDF operations against the remnants of strategic weapons in Syria are ongoing; the IDF estimates it has destroyed 70-80% of these weapons. In recent days, the IDF has continued to strike fighter jets, military research centres, naval vessels, tanks and weapon depots across Syria operated by the former Assad government. The IDF also confiscated weapons, including tanks, during its ground operations in and near the Israel-Syria buffer zone. These operations are likely to continue in the coming days, though advances deep into Syria are likely to remain limited.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) announced that it would attend ceasefire talks, indicating possible progress in negotiations. On 11 December, a PIJ spokesperson confirmed that the group had sent a delegation to Egypt to engage in ongoing ceasefire and hostage-release negotiations with Israel. PIJ is one of the most active militant groups in Gaza and closely co-operates with Hamas. PIJ militants participated in the 7 October 2023 attacks; the group also holds several hostages. The inclusion of PIJ in negotiations possibly indicates progress vis-à-vis establishing a list of hostages for release in the initial phases of an agreement. In the coming days, indirect negotiations between Israel, Hamas and allied militant groups will likely continue; there is a realistic possibility of an agreement being reached in the coming weeks.
- In Gaza, a US-based NGO dismissed dozens of staff due to allegations of links to militant groups, highlighting sustained compliance and labour flexibility concerns. On 12 December, World Central Kitchen (WCK) announced it had dismissed 62 Palestinian staff members after Israel alleged the individuals were directly affiliated with Gaza-based militant groups. Israel targeted (and killed) a WCK employee in an airstrike on 30 November after determining he had participated in the 7 October 2023 attacks; WCK has indicated it was unaware of his participation. The dismissal highlights substantial compliance concerns for NGOs and firms hiring local staff in Gaza as deteriorating governance conditions continue to impede screening and due diligence efforts. In the coming weeks, the IDF is highly likely to continue targeting militants, including those employed by NGOs, sustaining the risk of strikes targeting NGO vehicles, convoys and offices. Such strikes will sustain significant threats to life for NGO staff and increase collateral risks. More broadly, concerns over the possible hiring of individuals associated with militant groups will elevate regulatory framework concerns for NGOs and increase the risk of funding restrictions, particularly from the US.
- Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s testimony in his ongoing corruption trial triggered protests in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), sustaining moderate disruption risks. On 10 December, Netanyahu began giving testimony in the Tel Aviv Jaffa District Court; Netanyahu faces allegations of fraud, breach of trust and bribery in three cases related to his relationship with media entity owners. Approximately 100 protesters supporting Netanyahu gathered outside the court, with the police implementing a security cordon to separate counter-demonstrators who also gathered in the area. Although the demonstrations remained peaceful and did not critically disrupt movement through central Tel Aviv, localised demonstrations will likely continue as the trial proceeds. Developments in Netanyahu’s testimony (particularly delays to court proceedings) will likely trigger larger-scale demonstrations, increasing the risk of operational and travel disruption. Additionally, Netanyahu will likely continue making numerous inflammatory comments regarding Israeli media entities throughout his testimony, possibly motivating supporters to harass journalists and high-profile anti-corruption activists. Although widespread targeted violence remains unlikely amid increasing polarisation, media entities and staff will face elevated risks of targeted harassment and vandalism, increasing security and bystander risks.
- The UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution calling for a ceasefire in Gaza, highlighting sustained reputational pressure for Israel-linked firms. On 12 December, the UNGA adopted a resolution calling for an immediate, permanent and unconditional ceasefire in Gaza. In all, 158 member states voted for the resolution, while 159 also voted to adopt a resolution calling on Israel to respect the mandate of the UN agency for Palestinian refugees. Although UNGA resolutions are non-binding, the adoptions highlight sustained international pressure on Israel to establish a ceasefire and improve humanitarian conditions in Gaza. As IDF ground operations continue, reputational risks for firms with links to the Israeli government will remain elevated, particularly for those in the defence and technology industries. Additionally, there is a realistic possibility that Algeria will propose a similarly worded resolution to the UN Security Council in the coming weeks, which would be legally binding if passed. However, the US is highly likely to veto such a resolution, moderating Israel’s legal obligations vis-à-vis a ceasefire in Gaza.
- France criticised the IDF’s establishment of a buffer zone in Syria, increasing pressure on, but likely not fundamentally undermining, the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire. On 11 December, France’s foreign ministry called on Israel to withdraw from positions in the buffer zone in Quneitra governorate (Syria). The statement highlights elevated bilateral tensions between France and Israel; in recent months, Paris has increasingly called on the IDF to moderate operations in Gaza. In addition, French President Emmanuel Macron has repeatedly called for a cessation of weapons exports to Israel (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 14 October 2024). Although further action from Paris remains unlikely, there is a realistic possibility of increasing bilateral tensions undermining the stability of the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire. The ceasefire established a monitoring mechanism co-led by France to assess potential violations. Increasing tensions between Israel and France will possibly trigger additional diplomatic disputes regarding the IDF’s presence in southern Lebanon, though they are unlikely to undermine the agreement fundamentally in the coming weeks.
- A failed IED attack targeting a Jewish community centre in South Africa has underscored the sustained risk of violence. On 10 December, the authorities in Cape Town (Western Cape province, South Africa) confirmed that unidentified individuals had thrown an IED at a Jewish community centre in the Gardens area on 6 December. Although the device did not detonate, the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation is looking into the incident, indicating a possible connection to organised criminal or terrorist activity. The incident has underscored the substantial risks of attacks and violence facing South Africa’s Jewish and Israeli communities amid elevated ethno-religious tensions linked to the Israel-Hamas war. In the coming months, individuals and installations associated with the Jewish and Israeli communities will face elevated risks of targeted protests, harassment and vandalism, which will in turn raise security and bystander risks. Such events will likely become increasingly common during the Hanukkah period (25 December – 2 January), increasing security and bystander risks, particularly for Jewish individuals in Cape Town and Johannesburg (Gauteng province).
- Palestinian Territories: Shooting on bus elevates ethno-religious tensions, Israeli settler violence risk. Earlier on 12 December, a Palestinian gunman killed a child and injured three individuals in a small arms attack on a civilian bus close to the Tunnel Barrier near Al-Khader (Bethlehem governorate). The bus was travelling on bus route 291 from Beitar Illit (Bethlehem governorate) to Jerusalem (Jerusalem governorate). The perpetrator, a resident of Beit Awwa (Hebron governorate), surrendered himself to the Israeli security forces following an overnight pursuit. The incident reflects sustained attack risks posed by radicalised individuals and militants. In the coming days, security and bystander risks will remain elevated across the West Bank, particularly on highways and routes near checkpoints and Israeli settlements and transport hubs. There is a realistic possibility that the IDF will commence short counterterrorism operations in the Hebron governorate in the coming days, elevating travel disruption risk. We assess there is a realistic possibility of a spike in Israeli settler violence against Palestinian villages in the southern West Bank in retaliation, further elevating ethno-religious tensions and security risks in the area.
Dec 11.
- Syria: Capture of Deir ez-Zor reflects loss of SDF influence, new government’s consolidation of power. On 11 December, local reports indicated that HTS-led forces of the transitional government captured the city of Deir ez-Zor (Deir ez-Zor governorate) after the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) withdrew from the city. Additionally, on 11 December, the SDF confirmed a US-mediated ceasefire between the group and the Turkey-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) in Manbij (Aleppo governorate), wherein the SDF withdrew from the city. The events come after Arab groups within the SDF defected to the HTS-led transitional government on 10 December. These developments signal a weakening of the SDF’s influence and control in eastern Syria. However, we assess there is a realistic possibility that the recent withdrawals are aimed at consolidating forces so as to bolster eastern SDF-controlled areas, particularly along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River. HTS-led forces are likely to continue their advances in an effort to capture Al-Hasakah (Al-Hasakah governorate) and Raqqa (Raqqa governorate), elevating the risk of armed conflict along the Euphrates River and across eastern Syria in the coming days.
Dec 10.
- Israel: Trial of prime minister will further elevate risks of domestic unrest. Earlier on 10 December, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu arrived at the Tel Aviv District Court to testify in his trial over alleged corruption charges. Several groups of protesters surrounded the court including relatives of hostages. While the court is unlikely to issue a sentence today, developments in court proceedings and Netanyahu’s testimony will likely increase participation in hostage release rallies and anti-government protests in the days up to and including the weekly protest on 14 December. This will highly likely further elevate the risks of domestic unrest along with operational and travel disruption risks in Haifa (Haifa district), Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) throughout the week. In Tel Aviv in particular, likely gatherings in Democracy Square, Hostages Square and along Begin Road on 14 December will be the main trigger for mobility disruption. We assess that attempts to block key thoroughfares (such as the Ayalon Highway) remain a realistic possibility, elevating risks of clashes with the security forces and arrests and driving bystander security risks.
Dec 09.
KEY POINTS
- Israel Defense Forces (IDF) deployed ground troops into the Israel-Syria buffer zone and increased its strikes on military targets in Syria following the fall of Assad’s rule, elevating regional tensions.
- The Palestinian Authority (PA)’s security forces launched counter-terrorism operations in Jenin (Jenin governorate), clashing with local Palestinian militants and elevating security risks in the northern West Bank.
- IDF continue to strike Lebanese Hizballah (LH) operatives returning to their positions in southern Lebanon and targeting military infrastructure in the area; however, the ceasefire holds.
- Gaza Strip: Palestinian militant groups continue to resist ongoing IDF operations across the strip, sustaining regular offensive operations. On 8 December, Hamas operatives targeted an IDF tank in Jabalia (northern Gaza) with a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) but likely caused limited to no damage. On the same day, other Palestinian militants also launched rocket and IED attacks against IDF troops in the Netzarim Corridor and Deir al-Balah (both central Gaza). On 6 December, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) militants attacked an IDF bulldozer in eastern Rafah city (Rafah governorate) with a rocket. With a ceasefire unlikely in the coming week, persistent IDF security operations will drive severe security risks around Jabalia, the Netzarim corridor and Rafah city over the coming days.
- West Bank: The Palestinian Authority (PA) special operation in Jenin underscores efforts to shift the balance of power in the city, elevating security risks. Earlier on 9 December, heavily equipped PA security forces launched counter-terrorism and arrest operations in Jenin (Jenin governorate) targeting PIJ’s Jenin Brigades. The move comes after members of the brigades stole and paraded two PA vehicles on 5 December. Subsequently, later on 5 December, the PA security forces began increasing their troop presence in Jenin (including closed entry and exit points) and took control of the city’s hospitals. Armed clashes are ongoing with Palestinian militants also employing vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) and other IEDs against the PA forces. Security and bystander risks will remain elevated around Jenin in the coming days; PA operations will possibly trigger domestic unrest in other Palestinian towns across Jenin governorate.
- Israel-Yemen: An undetected drone hit a residential building in central Israel, underscoring persistent security risks. Earlier on 9 December, a drone launched from Yemen, likely by the Iranian-backed Houthis, hit a high-rise residential building in Yavne (Central district). The strike caused material damage but no injuries or deaths. The drone did not trigger any sirens and the IDF is investigating the failure. On 8 December the IDF intercepted a missile from Yemen before reaching Israeli territory. The incidents highlight the persistent security and bystander risks across Israel tied to persistent militant efforts to hit Israeli targets. An Israeli retaliation against Houthi targets in Yemen following the incident is unlikely.
- Israel-Lebanon: IDF operations continue in southern Lebanon, destroying weapon depots and military infrastructure and clashing with militants. The IDF’s Division 98 continues to operate in southern Lebanon to locate and destroy LH weapon depots and military infrastructure. On 7 December, the IDF conducted airstrikes against LH operatives in Deir Siryan (Nabatieh governorate). Additionally, on 6 December, IDF troops conducted clearing operations in Al-Khiyam (Nabatieh governorate). The incidents reflect continued IDF efforts to clear military infrastructure in southern Lebanon before the end of the 60-day ceasefire implementation period. Similarly, militants have sustained efforts to return to their positions in southern Lebanon and to retrieve weapons from these areas. IDF strikes against operatives and infrastructure will likely continue, driving elevated security risks in southern Lebanon. However, we assess the ceasefire is unlikely to break in the coming days.
- Israel-Syria: IDF strikes against weapon depots, surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs), alleged chemical weapon factories and other military targets in Syria will likely continue. Over the past few days, the IDF launched a campaign of systematic airstrikes against military targets previously belonging to the Syrian Armed Forces (SAF). These include, among others, weapon depots in Mayadin (Deir ez-Zor governorate) and the Mezzeh Military Airport outside the capital Damascus as well as the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC). Additionally, on 8 December, the US performed airstrikes against more than 75 targets in central Syria. The strike by both Israel and the US underscores elevated concerns that advanced military equipment will be obtained by extremists and jihadist militant groups in Syria and neighbouring states, further destabilising regional security. Further strikes are likely in the coming days, sustaining high-security risks near SAF-affiliated sites as well as border areas.
- Israel-Syria: The deployment of IDF ground forces into the Israel-Syria border buffer zone will raise the risk of such forces being targeted by armed groups. Over the weekend, the IDF deployed ground forces under the 210 ‘Bashan’ Regional Division (including tanks) into the Israel-Syria buffer zone. Additionally, on 7 December, the IDF helped repel an attack on UN forces by unidentified gunmen positioned near Hader (Quneitra governorate). The deployment of IDF troops into the buffer zone following the collapse of former Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s rule is likely aimed at preventing militant groups from bolstering their presence along the Israel border and thereby augmenting Israel’s border security. However, there is a realistic possibility that such an Israeli presence within Syrian territory will attract sporadic attacks on its forces, elevating security risks along Israel-Syria border areas as well as within the buffer zone.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- On 8 December, a spokesperson for Qatar’s foreign ministry stated it would possibly resume mediating Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations, increasing prospects for an agreement. Qatar previously announced it would not continue facilitating negotiations due to a lack of progress in recent months (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 11 November 2024). The resumption of mediation will likely facilitate further negotiations. Local media sources also report that Hamas has begun contacting factions and militant groups in Gaza to receive updates on the condition of hostages in their custody. This possibly indicates the negotiations have progressed to the extent that Hamas is preparing a list of living hostages for possible release under an agreement. Although negotiations remain highly fragile, there is a realistic possibility of further progress leading to an agreement in the coming weeks (see: FORECAST).
- In Israel, anti-government protest activity continued at pace, resulting in several arrests in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). On 7 December, thousands of protesters gathered in major cities and called for the government to secure hostage releases through ceasefire negotiations, most significantly in Haifa (Haifa district), Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). In Tel Aviv, protesters gathered in numerous locations including Democracy Square, Hostages Square and along Begin Road, disrupting cross-city movement. Though demonstrations remained broadly peaceful, protesters also attempted to block the Ayalon Highway, resulting in eight arrests. Protest attendance notably increased after Hamas released a video of an Israeli hostage on 7 December. Despite a general decrease in protest attendance in recent weeks, the continued dissemination of hostage videos will likely sustain anti-government protests in major population centres in the coming weeks. Additionally, on 10 December, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will begin testifying in his ongoing corruption trial in Tel Aviv. Developments in court proceedings, particularly motions delaying testimony, will likely bolster participation in the weekly hostage release rallies on 14 December, elevating risks of operational and travel disruption in major cities.
- An uptick in arrests of individuals accused of spying on Israel for Iran highlights increasing espionage risks. On 6 December, the Shin Bet announced the arrests of two residents of a Druze village in Northern district on charges of spying for Iran. The individuals allegedly participated in surveillance of IDF positions and equipment for Iran, highlighting sustained Iranian intelligence gathering efforts vis-à-vis Israel’s force posture, particularly in Northern and Haifa districts. On 8 December, the Shin Bet announced the arrest of another individual on espionage charges. The individual allegedly vandalised numerous buildings and vehicles in the Haifa area in exchange for cryptocurrency payments. Given the untraceable nature of cryptocurrency, the arrest highlights increasing risks of undetected espionage within Israel, increasing risks to firms with connections to the Israeli government (particularly those in the technology and defence industries).
- An arson attack targeting a synagogue in Australia underscores sustained risks of targeted violence, driving security and bystander risks. On 6 December, three unidentified individuals conducted an arson attack on the Adass Israel Synagogue in Melbourne (Victoria state), causing extensive damage. The Australian police later characterised the attack as an antisemitic terror incident, highlighting increasing risks of targeted violence amid significantly elevated ethno-religious tensions linked to the Israel-Hamas war. The attack marks a substantial escalation in antisemitic violence amid a sustained uptick in incidents of harassment and vandalism targeting Australia’s Jewish community. Earlier on 9 December, the Australian Federal Police announced the formation of an antisemitism taskforce; this will likely include increased funding for patrols outside synagogues, Jewish community centres and religious schools, moderating risks of successful attacks. Even so, Jewish and Israeli individuals will likely continue facing elevated risks of harassment and attacks in the coming months, particularly as IDF operations in Gaza continue.
- Syria: Security vacuum will almost certainly exacerbate risks near military facilities. On 8 December, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted several airstrikes against former Syrian Armed Forces (SAF) sites in numerous locations across Syria. The targets included a weapons depot in Mayadin (Deir ez Zor governorate) and the Mezzeh Military Airport outside the capital Damascus, as well as the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) and another security complex inside the city. On the same day, the US attacked more than 75 Islamic State (IS) targets in central Syria. We assess that Israel will almost certainly continue to conduct further strikes against former SAF arsenal and facilities, particularly those suspected to be tied to a chemical weapons programme. These strikes primarily aim to prevent jihadist elements within the Syrian opposition from capturing strategic weapons and sensitive intelligence amid the security vacuum triggered by the collapse of Assad’s rule. We assess these strikes will almost certainly augment the already high security and bystander risks near military facilities across Syria in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)
08 Dec 24. President-elect Donald Trump said Saturday that the U.S. military should stay out of the fast-escalating conflict in Syria, where a dramatic rebel offensive reached the capital and threatened the rule of Syria’s Russian- and Iranian-allied president. “THIS IS NOT OUR FIGHT,” Trump declared on social media.
As world leaders watched the stunning rebel advance, with its potential to alter the balance of power in the Middle East, President Joe Biden’s national security adviser separately stressed that the Biden administration had no intention of intervening.
“The United States is not going to … militarily dive into the middle of a Syrian civil war,” Jake Sullivan told an audience in California.
Sullivan said the U.S. would keep acting as necessary to keep the Islamic State — a violently anti-Western extremist group not known to be involved in the offensive but with sleeper cells in Syria’s deserts — from exploiting openings presented by the fighting.
Insurgents’ stunning march across Syria appeared to reach its goal hours after both men spoke, with rebels entering Damascus after claiming many of the country’s other major cities within roughly 10 days. The head of a Syrian opposition war monitor said early Sunday that Assad left the country for an undisclosed location.
Trump’s comments on the dramatic rebel push were his first since Syrian rebels launched their advance late last month. They came while he was in Paris for the reopening of the Notre Dame cathedral.
In his post, Trump said Assad did not deserve U.S. support to stay in power.
Assad’s government has been propped up by the Russian and Iranian military, along with Hezbollah and other Iranian-allied militias, in a now 13-year-old war against opposition groups seeking his overthrow. The war, which began as a mostly peaceful uprising in 2011 against the Assad family’s rule, has killed a half-m people, fractured Syria and drawn in a more than a half-dozen foreign militaries and militias. The U.S. early on closed its embassy in Syria and imposed sanctions over the brutality of Assad’s conduct of the war. (Source: Defense News Early Bird/AP)
09 Dec 24. Israel has taken more Syrian territory and struck chemical weapons sites in reaction to the toppling of Bashar al-Assad’s regime by a group led by the Islamist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Defence minister Israel Katz on Monday said the country’s military was continuing to seize “high ground” inside Syria after tanks and infantry moved into a previously demilitarised buffer zone. The moves come as regional powers scramble to respond to the stunning 12-day offensive by HTS, once an affiliate of al-Qaeda, which led disparate rebel factions to overthrow the Assad dynasty on Sunday. Russia, a longstanding backer of the Assad regime that maintains naval and air bases in Syria, said it was “doing everything it can to get in touch” with the country’s new rulers. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said Moscow would need “a serious conversation” about its military presence in Syria, state newswire Ria Novosti reported on Monday. Countries opposed to the regime are also concerned that its fall could lead to further instability in the region. The US has carried out over dozens of strikes against Isis targets in Syria while Turkey-backed Syrian fighters have battled Kurdish forces in the north of the country. A wide swath of the Israel-Syria frontier had been governed by a 1974 armistice agreement, including a significant UN peacekeeping force to monitor the pact. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, visiting the border region on Sunday, said the agreement had “collapsed” after Syrian army units abandoned their positions, with Israeli forces taking them over “to ensure no hostile force embeds itself right next to the border of Israel”. (Source: FT.com)
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