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Military And Security Developments
Dec 08.
- Damascus falls. Earlier on 8 December, opposition forces led by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) rebel group took control of the capital Damascus. President Bashar al-Assad has reportedly left the country; Prime Minister Mohammed Ghazi al-Jalali has announced that the government will co-operate with rebel leadership within the capital to form a transitional council.
SIGNIFICANCE
* HTS-led rebels began a major offensive targeting government forces on 27 November. Rebels rapidly captured major cities including Aleppo (Aleppo governorate), Idlib (Idlib governorate), Hama (Hama governorate) and Homs (Homs governorate).
* In line with our previous assessment, the former Assad government’s battlefield reversals also prompted major rebellions in the southern Daraa and Suwayda governates. Meanwhile, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have also taken control of key positions in eastern Syria, including Deir ez Zor city (Deir ez Zor governorate) and the Abu Kamal crossing on the Iraq-Syia border. The SDF are also engaged in intensifying clashes with the Turkey-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) rebel coalition in Aleppo governorate.
* Assad previously relied on support from Russia, Iran and Iranian-backed militant groups to bolster aerial and ground forces. However, the war in Ukraine and the Israel-Hizbollah war have substantially restricted the capacity of Assad’s allies to intervene and support the Syrian Armed Forces.
* Despite the former government members’ claimed willingness to co-operate in forming a transitional council, the numerous rebel groups active across Syria represent an array of competing interests and goals; the current composition of the transitional government is currently unknown.
FORECAST
Security risks in Damascus, Latakia (Latakia governorate) and most major cities in Syria will almost certainly increase in the coming hours. The security vacuum created by the rapid surrender and defections within the former Assad government’s security apparatus (including the police) hours before the armed opposition forces entered Damascus will continue throughout major cities in the coming hours. While HTS will almost certainly deploy its personnel to protect key institutions, the opposition does not have the capacity to implement sufficient security measures on a large scale. This will possibly prompt HTS to co-ordinate with the Prime Minister to conduct joint patrols with some elements of the former interior ministry. We also assess that reprisal attacks by various armed groups against former government officials, media figures, and Baathist politicians are likely; this will exacerbate bystander and misidentification risks all over Syria in the coming days. These risks will be particularly high in Damascus, Latakia and Tartus (Assad’s government strongholds). Ethno-religious clashes between Sunni extremist groups (embedded within the opposition) and Alawite Shia Syrians will also remain a realistic possibility (especially in coastal cities).
Clashes between Turkey-backed militias and Kurdish forces will likely continue in the coming days, compounding elevated security risks across northern Syria. The Turkey-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) is highly likely to capitalise on the security vacuum and political uncertainty to continue its offensive against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northern Syria. The SNA will focus on capturing the key strategic city of Manbij (Aleppo Governorate) while also preparing for Kurdish counterattacks along the line of control, triggering new waves of civilian displacement towards safer regions in the east. Any increase in the scope of the clashes between both groups will likely trigger an uptick in Turkish airstrikes against the Kurdish militias in the SDF along the border. There is also a realistic possibility that the armed conflict in the north will increase the risks of direct Turkish military intervention in 2025.
Borders with Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon will likely continue to remain closed in the coming days, disrupting evacuation routes and supply chains and driving the risk of border clashes. The Iraqi security forces will almost certainly augment their posture around the Al-Qa’im border crossing with Syria; it will likely remain closed in the coming days, halting border movement for personnel and goods. The same measures will continue to be implemented in Jordan around the now-closed Jabir-Nasib border crossing and along the porous border adjacent to Syria’s Darra and Suwayd governorates which are hotspots for smugglers, driving the risk of border clashes. In Lebanon, the army will also continue to boost its presence in the border regions of Akkar, Baalbek-Hermel and Beqaa governorates in the coming weeks as there is a realistic possibility that jihadist elements within the Syrian opposition will attempt to bolster their presence in northern Lebanon, aided by the existing crime-terror nexus and smuggling networks. Border closures will result in at least temporary disruption to imports, driving the risk of shortages of essential goods (including fuel).
08 Dec 24. – Extract- The FT reported today that Syrian rebels seized Damascus on Sunday as President Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapsed in the face of the insurgents’ stunning offensive across the country. The rebels said in a statement that “the city of Damascus is free from the tyrant Bashar al-Assad” and that “Assad has fled” after various factions encircled the capital from the north and the south. The whereabouts of Assad were unclear, with reports that he had fled, as the rebel onslaught brought an ignominious end to a family dynasty that has ruled Syria for more than 50 years. Videos sent to the FT by a Damascus resident purportedly showed people inside the presidential palace, rummaging through rooms and smashing pictures of the Assad family. A man dressed in civilian clothing appeared on Syrian state TV on Sunday morning, declaring that the rebels had “liberated” Damascus, and released detainees from “regime prisons”. He called on fighters to “protect the properties of the free Syrian state”. The speaker was flanked by eight other men, also in civilian clothes. Several of the men had their arms around each others’ shoulders. “It’s something historical. No one has suffered as much as the Syrian people.” He added that rebel militants were posted outside banks and other public institutions to guard them. The downfall of the Assad regime would usher in a period of huge uncertainty for Syria, a nation shattered and fragmented after 13 years of civil war, and for the wider region. The country shares borders with Israel, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon. Rebel groups have clashed with each other in the past. The rebel offensive has been led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, an Islamist movement that was confined to Syria’s north-west province of Idlib before beginning its offensive 12 days ago. The group, which was once an affiliate of al-Qaeda, rocked the country by seizing Aleppo, Syria’s second city, within 48 hours and then marching southwards towards the capital. It has been working with Turkish-backed rebels who operate under the umbrella of the Syrian National Army, but Syria is home to myriad factions and the degree of co-ordination between them all is unclear. As rebels entered the palace, Syrian Prime Minister Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali said he was ready to work with any leadership chosen by the people and called for unity, saying “Syria is for all Syrians”. “I am in my home and I have not left,” he said in a video statement. “We are ready to co-operate and all the properties of the people and the institutions of the Syrian state must be preserved,” he said. “They belong to all Syrians.” Jalali said he last had contact with Assad on Saturday evening and has no idea where he is. In an interview with Saudi broadcaster Al Arabiya later on Sunday morning, Jalali said he has been in touch with HTS leader Jolani to discuss a transition. There was no official statement by the Syrian presidency, the military or state media about the Assad or the situation in the country. Al-Ekhbaria, one state-run TV channel, had been broadcasting pre-recorded footage of Syrian architecture set to light guitar music. (Source: FT.com)
Dec 06.
- Syria: Fall of Hama increases the likelihood of Syrian government collapse, heightening instability. On 5 December, Syrian opposition forces led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) captured the city of Hama (Hama governorate) and Hama Military Airport following several days of clashes with the Syrian Armed Forces (SAF). On 6 December, local opposition groups in Daraa governorate launched attacks on government and military facilities in the rural town of Inkhil (Daraa governorate), elevating the risk of copycat attacks in rural parts of northern and eastern Daraa governorate. Opposition forces are currently advancing southwards along the M5 highway towards the strategic city of Homs (Homs governorate), seizing additional towns in rural Hama. Should Homs fall to the opposition, critical roads and supply lines between the capital Damascus and key ports will be severed, including Latakia (Latakia governorate) and Tartus (Tartus governorate). Such a development would increase the likelihood that the Syrian government will collapse. We assess the likelihood of this scenario will grow further in the absence of sufficient support from Iran-backed groups in Iraq or direct intervention from Russia and Iran.
- Iran: Space rocket launch will likely undermine diplomatic efforts, elevate regional security risks. On 6 December, Iran claimed it successfully launched its Simorgh satellite-carrying rocket with its heaviest-ever payload into space. Iran claims the rocket carried an orbital propulsion system and several research units to orbit approximately 250 miles (400km) above Earth. The launch will likely reinforce international concerns about Iran’s prospective development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, elevating regional tensions. The launch will likely further undermine international efforts to negotiate with Iran on its nuclear program. If verified, the successful launch will elevate the risks of further sanctions on Iran and its space program. These will likely further target the aerospace, technology and finance sectors, including the sale of components to Iran, elevating compliance risks for businesses in these sectors. We assess these sanctions will likely further increase Iran’s reluctance to co-operate with the West and be transparent about its nuclear program, driving diplomatic tensions (particularly with the US) and, in turn, the likelihood of further sanctions.
Dec 05.
KEY POINTS
• Despite an increasing rate of armed clashes and strikes by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) against Lebanese Hizballah (LH), both sides are maintaining broadly subdued levels of armed conflict, underscoring their willingness to sustain the ceasefire.
• Pressure from US President-elected Donald Trump to reach an Israel-Hamas ceasefire deal will increase the likelihood of progress in negotiations in the coming weeks, though key challenges remain, moderating the prospects of an agreement in this timeframe.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF has confirmed the retrieval of a hostage’s body from an unspecified location amid continued operations in Jabalia (central Gaza). On 4 December, the IDF announced it retrieved a hostage’s body from Gaza in a military operation. Additionally, throughout the week, the IDF continued its large-scale operation in Jabalia. Since the beginning of its clearing operations in Jabalia in early October, the IDF claims to have killed and captured approximately 2,000 Palestinian fighters in the area; it also confirmed the loss of 30 IDF soldiers. The operation in Jabalia is likely to continue in the coming weeks, with Palestinian fighters in the area showing strong (though weakening) resistance. We assess that security risks in the area will remain severe.
• West Bank: Violent Israeli settler riots in Palestinian villages following the evacuation of illegal settlements highlight the evolution of ‘price tag’ attacks. On 4 December, at least ten masked Israeli settlers set fire to Palestinian cars and houses in Beit Furik (Nablus governorate) and attacked Palestinian residents fleeing the blazes. Following the attack, the rioters attempted to enter Rujeib (Nablus) but were stopped by the IDF. At the same time, at least 20 masked Israeli settlers rioted and set fire to cars and houses in Huwara (Nablus). The riots followed an evacuation of illegal Israeli settlements near Nablus by the IDF earlier that day, whereupon Israeli settlers threw stones, injuring two soldiers. Additionally, on the same day, the IDF reported that Israeli settlers attacked the military security co-ordinator responsible for the security of the Israeli Yitzhar settlement. The violent attacks highlight a change in settlers’ informal policy of ‘price tag’ attacks, in which they conduct attacks on Palestinian communities in response to Palestinian violence or terrorism. Now it appears that their justification for such attacks has expanded to include the evacuation of settlements and similar actions by the IDF. The IDF arrested eight individuals involved in the riots, though they were all released after a court hearing later on the same day. The increasing rate of settler violence reflects settlers’ growing confidence in their impunity when carrying out attacks against Palestinian communities and the Israeli security forces in the West Bank. These attacks are likely to continue, elevating security risks around Palestinian population centres. Furthermore, the growing violence is likely to increase radicalisation among the Palestinian community, elevating the risk of attacks against Israeli population centres and individuals, including along key roads and near transport hubs.
• Israel-Lebanon: The IDF has gradually increased its strikes against LH targets in southern Lebanon that it claims pose an immediate threat to its forces; nonetheless, the ceasefire continues to hold. On 4 December, the IDF conducted a drone strike against an LH rocket launcher in Majdal Zoun (South governorate, Lebanon). Additionally, and on the same day, the IDF struck weapons stockpiles in Aitaroun and Al-Khiyam (both Nabatieh governorate, Lebanon). Despite the strikes and sporadic clashes with LH operatives, armed conflict remains largely subdued, reflecting both sides’ broad commitment to the ceasefire. However, continued sporadic clashes and strikes will sustain elevated security risks in southern Lebanon in the coming days while elevating armed escalation risks.
*Lebanon-Syria: Army’s deployment signals possible security deterioration along shared border. On 4 December, several units of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) began deploying to the Lebanon-Syria border amid the escalating conflict in Syria. The LAF also deployed multiple rocket launchers along Lebanon’s northern border with Syria in Akkar and Baalbek-Hermel governorates (Lebanon). It has increased the frequency of army patrols and bolstered security at checkpoints. While the Syrian opposition offensive is advancing towards Hama (Hama governorate, Syria), the regions bordering Lebanon are still under the control of the Syrian Armed Forces (SAF), sustaining an elevated but stable security risk environment. However, there is a realistic possibility that the security environment in this region will significantly deteriorate in the coming weeks if the opposition captures Hama and advances towards Homs (Homs governorate, Syria). In such a scenario, we assess that Jihadist elements within the Syrian opposition will likely capitalise on the situation and conduct cross-border operations aided by the existing crime-terror nexus and smuggling networks, significantly augmenting security, terror and organised crime risks.
Dec 04.
* Syria – Key points
In the coming days, the Hay’at Tahrir al-sham (HTS)-led opposition will likely use its current momentum to consolidate control of south-eastern Aleppo and northern Hama governorates. Such efforts, particularly in Aleppo city, will elevate tensions with Kurdish forces, sustaining the risk of clashes between the two groups. The regrouping of the Syrian Armed Forces (SAF) and Iranian proxies and the establishment of a new defensive line to protect Hama city (Hama) will likely reduce the rate of opposition advances along the Hama front in the coming days. The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) will likely continue operating in north-eastern Aleppo in a bid to capture more Kurdish-held regions, triggering wider clashes with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). These clashes will elevate the likelihood of direct Turkish incursions against Kurdish positions in northern Syria, further destabilising the region. Russian and SAF airstrikes are highly likely to increase in frequency and scope; they will mainly target Aleppo and Idlib governorates, triggering major waves of displacement in northern Syria. The HTS-led offensive will possibly prompt local opposition groups in Daraa and Suwayda governorates to attack governmental and SAF posts, as well as the offices of Iran-backed groups, increasing bystander risks near these facilities.
Context
On 27 November, Idlib-based opposition armed groups led by HTS launched the largest offensive against the SAF and Iran-backed militias in north-western Syria since 2020. Despite initially aiming only to pre-empt and deter a suspected SAF attack against its stronghold in Idlib, the opposition managed to advance rapidly, capturing tens of villages in eastern areas of Aleppo within 48 hours. On 29 November, the opposition entered Aleppo city (the most populous city in Syria) following overnight clashes in which many SAF brigades either fled or surrendered. Simultaneously, the opposition launched a southwards offensive in which it consolidated control of Idlib, capturing tens of towns. As of 4 December, HTS and its allies have consolidated their control of key towns in the rural eastern and south-eastern areas of Aleppo governorate, cutting provincial highways and government supply lines. On the western front, the HTS-led opposition has continued to attack northern areas of Hama, where the SAF has regrouped and established a defensive line to protect the strategic Hama city.
Meanwhile, the Turkish-backed SNA (a separate opposition faction in northern Syria, which is currently allied with HTS) launched an operation on 30 November to capture Kurdish-held towns in northern regions of Aleppo. This triggered heavy clashes with the Kurdish-led SDF, which withdrew from several towns, including Tel Rifaat. At the time of writing, the SNA is still operating in north-eastern areas of Aleppo and targeting further Kurdish-held territories.
Forecast
The HTS-led offensive will likely continue across multiple fronts in Aleppo and Hama in the coming days, though at a relatively lower pace than last week
In the coming days, the HTS-led opposition will likely use its current momentum to expand its control of eastern and south-eastern parts of Aleppo, particularly around the captured town of As-Safira. The opposition will continue clearing SAF pockets in Aleppo city and attempt to secure Kurdish neighbourhoods and districts that are under the control of the Kurdish-led SDF. Disputes with the SDF will likely be resolved via withdrawal agreements rather than force; this would be consistent with recent arrangements between HTS and the SDF over control of Aleppo International Airport (ALP), initially seized by the SDF and then handed over to HTS. However, the risk of clashes between both groups remains significantly elevated, sustaining the risk of conflict within Aleppo and surrounding areas.
We also assess that the opposition will continue to advance into Aleppo’s southern desert regions around the captured town of Khanasir, expanding its footprint and cutting off key provincial highways and SAF supply lines. This would likely disrupt the movement of civilians travelling from Aleppo towards safer regions in eastern and central Syria. Furthermore, additional SAF troop withdrawals and defections in south-eastern Aleppo remain a realistic possibility, and would facilitate further rapid opposition gains on this particular front.
However, this rapid pace is unlikely to be replicated on other fronts. While HTS and allied militias will likely divert more forces from southern Idlib to support the front in Hama in the coming days, the SAF and pro-government militias will highly likely continue to regroup in the area, resisting opposition offensives with the support of Russian airstrikes. This new defensive line will likely hinder the rapid rate of territorial gains made by the opposition in recent days. However, the SAF’s limited capacity to respond to the new tactics and HTS’ extensive use of locally made Shahin drones will elevate the likelihood of government defences collapsing in this strategic governorate.
Any counter-offensive operation by the SAF and its allies will almost certainly initially focus on the Hama front as a top priority in a bid to restore mobility along provincial thoroughfares, as well as to open the road to Aleppo and reconnect captured regions with the capital Damasus. However, given the strategic and logistical limitations of the SAF, any such operation is unlikely to be effective without major support from Iran-backed groups and Russia.
Clashes between the Turkish-backed SNA and Kurdish forces will likely increase, further destabilising northern Syria
SNA operations in Tell Rifaat, Al-Bab and other Kurdish-held areas in northern and north-eastern Aleppo will continue to drive further armed clashes with the Kurdish-led SDF. In the likely event that the SNA tries to move eastwards towards the strategic town of Manbij (Aleppo), these clashes will almost certainly increase in scope and frequency. Such a move would trigger waves of civilian displacement as people attempt to reach safer areas within the Kurdish-controlled territories of eastern Syria, placing increased strain on humanitarian resources in these areas. Any major clashes will likely elevate the risk of a spike in the number of direct Turkish airstrikes targeting SDF strongholds in northern Syria. Furthermore, a protracted conflict between the SNA and Kurdish forces would create greater opportunities for major Turkish interventions into northern and eastern Syria in 2025, including ground operations to push back Kurdish units from the border, further exacerbating security risks and instability.
Russian and SAF airstrikes will highly likely increase in frequency and scope; they will likely mainly target Aleppo and Idlib, triggering further displacement in north-western Syria
Russian and SAF fighter jets will highly likely increase the rate and scope of airstrikes targeting opposition strongholds in Idlib (including Idlib city). Airstrikes are also likely to continue targeting further HTS positions in Aleppo (including Aleppo city centre) and other recently captured areas, such as the towns of Saraqib and Maarat al-Numan (both Idlib), and possibly also the opposition frontline in Hama. Such strikes would substantially elevate collateral risks for residents and damage key infrastructure, prompting thousands of people to relocate to safer regions in Raqqa governorate and possibly southwards to Homs governorate and Damascus. Major displacement will possibly create bottlenecks along provincial highways, compounding existing mobility disruption in north-western and central Syria triggered by HTS cutting off the M5 highway connecting Aleppo to Damascus.
Several Iran-backed Iraqi groups will likely support the SAF counter-offensive in the coming weeks, triggering broader ethno-religious clashes in Syria
In the coming weeks, it is likely that Iran-backed Shia militias in Iraq will mobilise to support the SAF due to the risk of the latter collapsing. Other Syria-based Iranian proxies will help to bolster the SAF’s defensive line (particularly to the south of Aleppo). An increased presence of Iraqi Shia militias will possibly deepen existing sectarian rifts and tensions across the country, triggering a wider Sunni-Shia conflict in Syria. This will also increase the risk of radicalisation campaigns by Sunni jihadist groups that are already fighting alongside HTS and which enjoy a significant presence in Idlib and north-western Syria.
A refocus by Iranian proxies on Syria will likely moderately reduce hostilities against Israel in the short term
Iran’s refocusing of its proxy resources to assist the SAF and other pro-government militias will likely draw from Tehran’s resources that are dedicated to combating Israel in the coming weeks, partially reducing physical risks in Israel stemming from drone and missile strikes. However, in the longer term, an expanded presence of Iranian proxies in Syria is likely to elevate regional tensions and cross-border hostilities along Israel’s northern border. There is also an increased likelihood of an uptick in Israeli strikes against Syria in the coming weeks; such strikes would likely aim to prevent Iranian weapons transfers and to disrupt supply lines. Israeli strikes against sensitive locations that are captured by Syrian opposition (including jihadist) forces are also increasingly likely. Such locations include research centres operated by the Syrian weapons industry (CERS), some of which are allegedly involved in the development of chemical weapons. Israel would also almost certainly look to prevent such materials from falling into the hands of extremist jihadist elements.
The HTS-led offensive will possibly prompt other opposition groups in southern Syria to mobilise, increasing the risk of the Syrian government collapsing
We assess there is a realistic possibility that the offensive will prompt several local opposition groups in Daraa and Suwayda governorates to attack government and SAF posts, as well as the offices of Iran-backed groups, increasing bystander risks near these facilities. In such a scenario, the Syrian security forces would almost certainly implement wide stop-and-search operations, exacerbating local tensions and increasing the risk of domestic unrest. Any governorate instability in these particular governorates would elevate security risks along Syria’s border with Jordan, possibly prompting the Jordanian authorities to close the Nasib border crossing if the security environment deteriorates; this would disrupt supply chains and overland evacuation routes.
Dec 02.
KEY POINTS
• The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) prevented an Iranian flight from landing in Syria, reflecting the persistently elevated security risks near airports and along the Syria-Lebanon border.
• A ceasefire between Israel and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) continues to hold despite sporadic armed clashes, though an LH attack against the Mount Dov area (Northern district, Israel) points to the risk of snowballing escalation.
• Gaza Strip: Persistent IDF clearing operations in Gaza will sustain elevated security risks. On 2 December, satellite imagery revealed that the IDF has continued to expand the Netzarim Corridor to almost seven square miles (18 sq km). Clearing operations have also continued in Jabalia (northern Gaza), likely in a bid to create a stable area from which to operate a humanitarian aid hub in the coming months. These advances are consistent with our previous analysis and reflect a policy that favours the expansion of military control in Gaza over efforts to establish non-Israeli civil administration, sustaining the risk of armed conflict.
• West Bank: A targeted airstrike on a militant squad and a small arms attack on an Israeli bus point to the elevated security risks in the north and central West Bank (Palestinian Territories), as well as a possible uptick in hostilities in the coming weeks. On 29 November, a Palestinian gunman armed with an M16 assault rifle injured at least nine individuals in an attack on an Israeli civilian bus at the Gitai Avisar Junction near the Arial Israeli settlement (Salfit governorate). Hamas’ military wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, took responsibility for the shooting. On 1 December, the IDF killed four individuals in a targeted airstrike on a militant squad south of Jenin (Jenin governorate). The strike in Jenin follows weeks of surveillance of the squad, as well as a foiled Iranian attempt to smuggle advanced weapons into the area last week (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 28 November 2024). Combined with the shooting near Arial (Salfit governorate), the incident reflects a possible uptick in militant activities in the West Bank; it also underscores the sustained security risks gripping the northern West Bank governorates of Jenin and Nablus in the coming weeks. The likelihood of Palestinian militant attacks near Israeli population centres, along key roads and in the vicinity of security force positions and/or transport hubs will also remain elevated in the coming weeks, sustaining bystander security risks across the West Bank.
• Israel-Iran-Syria: On 2 December, an IDF spokesperson warned Iran against taking advantage of the growing insecurity in Syria to perform weapons transfers. The warning also follows an incident on 1 December in which the IDF compelled an Iranian plane (a Mahan Air flight) to revert its course, preventing it from landing in Syria. The IDF claims the plane was being used to deliver weapons to LH through Syria. According to local reports, IDF fighter jets circled the plane and threatened to shoot it down. The incident reflects increased IDF activity aimed at intercepting and preventing weapons smuggling through Syria. This will sustain elevated security risks for Iranian airlines, and also for personnel and assets in the vicinity of airports in Lebanon and Syria (as well as border crossings between Syria and Lebanon) in the coming weeks.
• Israel-Lebanon: While the ceasefire continues to hold (despite sporadic clashes and IDF operations), the Mount Dov strike underscores that a significant threat remains. In the past few days, IDF troops repeatedly clashed with LH fighters in southern Lebanon, particularly in al-Khiyam (Nabatieh governorate), Tayr Harfa and Shamaa (both South governorate). Additionally, on 2 December, IDF airstrikes killed one individual in Marjayoun and one member of Lebanon’s state security services in Nabatieh (both Nabatieh), according to Lebanese officials. During this period, the IDF also conducted airstrikes against vehicles near LH military infrastructure in the Beqaa Valley (Baalbek-Hermel and Beqaa governorates), as well as those close to the Lebanon-Syria border; it also conducted reconnaissance drone missions above Beirut. In response to what LH has called repeated Israeli ceasefire violations, LH confirmed earlier on 2 December that it launched an attack on an Israeli army position within Israel’s Mount Dov area (Northern). The armed clashes and airstrikes reflect the fragility of the ceasefire, though these remain localised low-level events. There is a realistic possibility the IDF will feel compelled to respond to the Mount Dov strike, increasing the risk of future strikes snowballing and the ceasefire breaking down. Regardless, if the ceasefire holds, attacks against IDF positions in Lebanon and any launches by LH into Israel, particularly if they affect civilians, will continue to act as triggers for a ceasefire breakdown.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• The UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has suspended aid deliveries through a crossing in southern Gaza, highlighting critical humanitarian concerns. On 1 December, the UNRWA announced the suspension of aid deliveries via the Kerem Shalom crossing (southern Gaza) due to intensifying looting and violence targeting convoys. The Kerem Shalom crossing is the UNRWA’s primary aid delivery route; the suspension will almost certainly disrupt aid delivery and distribution efforts within Gaza, especially amid widespread looting associated with organised criminal and militant group activity. As the UN’s Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has also assessed that the roads connecting the Kissufim border crossing (central Gaza) to major thoroughfares now faces heightened risks due to ‘a breakdown in civil order’, there is a realistic possibility that the UNRWA will suspend deliveries through this facility in the coming weeks. This would almost certainly restrict the availability of aid (including food, medical supplies and shelter) in Gaza, further exacerbating humanitarian concerns, particularly during the winter months (November to February). Additionally, on 30 November, the World Central Kitchen (WCK) announced it was pausing operations in Gaza after an IDF airstrike killed a WCK staff member whom the IDF claimed participated in the 7 October 2023 attacks. Amid deteriorating humanitarian conditions, further operational suspensions by NGOs will likely further restrict the availability of aid in Gaza, driving the risk of looting for aid convoys and storage facilities, while also increasing threats to NGO staff.
• The Home Front Command (HFC) has eased restrictions on public gatherings in northern Israel, underscoring the stabilising risk environment as the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire continues to hold. On 30 November, the HFC lifted all restrictions on gatherings and school activities for the majority of locations in northern Israel and eased restrictions on the size of gatherings in locations in the immediate vicinity of the Israel-Lebanon border. These changes reflect the decreasing risks of operational disruption and labour flexibility concerns for firms with operations in northern Israel. Despite these announcements, concerns over the durability of the ceasefire will likely moderate participation at major gatherings, in turn diluting the operational risks facing businesses in Haifa and Northern. There is also a realistic possibility of the HFC re-assessing restrictions on gathering sizes due to concerns over possible ceasefire violations in the coming weeks, sustaining the longer-term risks pertaining to operational disruption.
• In Israel, a moderate uptick in anti-government protest activity has underscored the sustained risks of operational disruption. On 30 November, thousands of demonstrators calling for the government to secure hostage releases from Hamas gathered in major urban centres across Israel. The largest demonstrations occurred in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Haifa (Haifa), though they remained broadly peaceful. Smaller-scale demonstrations also took place in Caesarea (Haifa), Carmei Gat and Sderot (both Southern district). In Northern and Haifa districts, demonstrators also gathered at key intersections, including the Amiad junction (Highways 85 and 90), the Goma junction (Highway 90) and the Horeb junction (Highway 85), highlighting the proliferation of such events after the Home Front Command relaxed its limitations on public gatherings. Although Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu convened the security cabinet for renewed discussions on securing hostage releases on 1 December, negotiations with Hamas remain fragile and are unlikely to progress substantially in the coming days. As such, the risk of protest activity will remain elevated in major cities and near key highway intersections in the coming weeks.
• Israeli Housing and Construction Minister Yitzchak Goldknopf re-iterated his support for settlement construction in Gaza, driving diplomatic tensions. On 28 November, Goldknopf toured the Gaza border area with members of the Nachala Settlement Movement and re-iterated calls for the establishment of settlements in Gaza. There is also a realistic possibility that the visit will embolden pro-settlement activists, who will possibly attempt to breach the Israel-Gaza border, increasing the risk of clashes with IDF personnel in the Gaza Envelope. Following the highly publicised remarks, there is now a realistic possibility of the US moving to sanction the Nachala Settlement Movement and its leadership in the coming weeks. Sanctions targeting expansionist settlers and associated organisations will increase compliance concerns and sanctions-exposure risks for firms with operations in Israel, particularly those processing financial transfers to entities associated with the settler movement.
FORECAST
Developments in Syria are likely to divert Iranian proxies’ attention, reducing the likelihood of attacks against Israel. Since Syrian opposition forces headed by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched offensive operations on 27 November, Iran-backed Iraqi militants have become increasingly active in north-western Syria. Iran is likely to divert more proxy forces, particularly from Iraq, and to increase its efforts to support the Syrian government in the coming days. This re-focusing is likely to impact Iran-backed militia activities vis-à-vis their targeting of Israel in the coming days, reducing physical risks stemming from drone and missile strikes across Israel (albeit slightly), particularly northern Israel. However, in the longer term, an Iranian proxy presence in Syria is likely to elevate regional tensions and cross-border hostilities with Israel. As such, this will elevate security risks across Israel’s north-eastern regions and (to a lesser extent) its central regions in the coming months. Additionally, in the coming weeks, there is an increased likelihood of Israeli strikes against Syria aimed at preventing Iranian weapons transfers, as well as strikes against sensitive locations that are captured by Syrian opposition forces. Such locations include research centres operated by the Syrian weapons industry (CERS), some of which are alleged to have been involved in the development of chemical weapons. Syrian air defence systems and air bases are also possible targets.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
• A successful terror attack by LH and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
• High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
• Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
• Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting LH and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
• Israel re-launches widespread, high-intensity military operations in Gaza
• An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
• US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
• Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
• An IDF-targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)
• An LH strike causes a mass casualty event in Israel
• An IDF strike causes a mass casualty event in Lebanon
• An IDF strike kills civilians in Lebanon
* Yemen-US: Houthi attacks sustain global supply chain risks, elevate conflict escalation risks. On 1 December, US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed that Iran-backed Houthis attacked a convoy of US-flagged merchant vessels being escorted by the US Navy in the Gulf of Aden between 30 November and 1 December. The US Navy intercepted several Houthi-launched ordinance; no injuries or damage were reported. The Houthis have frequently attacked Western-affiliated ships since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war. These attacks will likely continue over the coming months, sustaining significant disruption to key shipping routes in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, elevating operational and financial risks for businesses and straining global supply chains. There is a realistic possibility the US and its coalition partners will respond to the attack in the coming days with airstrikes on Houthi infrastructure in Yemen. We assess that strikes will drive bystander security risks in proximity to military assets and elevate risks of conflict escalation in the coming months.
* Syria: Clashes between opposition and Kurdish forces will augment instability in northern Syria. On 1 December, the Syrian opposition forces led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) continued to consolidate their newly held territories in Aleppo governorate north-western Syria. This included attempts to enter neighbourhoods in Aleppo city (Aleppo governorate) controlled by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The SDF will likely withdraw from these locations through agreements with HTS rather than by force, reducing immediate physical security risks for Kurdish residents. However, on the same day, clashes erupted between the Kurdish forces and the Turkish-backed opposition militia the Syrian National Army (SNA) in multiple locations across northern Aleppo, particularly around Tell Rifaat. These clashes will possibly increase in scope in the coming days as the SNA will seek to expand its areas of control, further seizing strategic towns further east towards Minbaj (Aleppo governorate). We assess that these clashes will elevate the risks of direct Turkish airstrikes targeting SDF locations in the coming weeks, further compounding security risks and instability across northern Syria. (Source: Sibylline)
03 Dec 24. Russia fires hypersonic missile in Mediterranean Sea. Naval drill comes as Syrian rebels threaten Putin’s military presence in the region. Russian forces test fired an advanced nuclear-capable hypersonic cruise missile during navy and air force drills in the eastern Mediterranean Sea on Tuesday. Photographs released by the Russian defence ministry show a Zircon launching from the decks of the Admiral Gorshkov, a frigate commissioned in 2018 and designed to attack land, surface and underwater targets.
“On Dec 3, during an exercise to test the combined activities of Russian navy and air force troop groups, precision sea-based missiles were launched in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea,” Russia’s defence ministry said in a statement.
The Kremlin claims that the Zirkon missile has a top speed of Mach 9 (6,000mph), which analysts have said would make it essentially invulnerable to even the best Western missile defence systems.
According to Russian state media, Putin has said the weapon has “no analogues in any country in the world”. (Source: Daily Telegraph)
03 Dec 24. A new IISS report “Navigating Troubled Waters: The Houthis’ Campaign in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden” suggests that the Houthi arsenal is continuing to increase and that Red Sea trade flows are down, despite Western pressure and its military response.
The report shows that, despite ongoing international military operations (Operation Prosperity Guardian, Operation Poseidon Archer and EUNAVFOR Aspides) joint military efforts have not succeeded in significantly reducing the overall number of Houthi attacks, while strikes from the international community have only temporarily degraded their capabilities.
“Navigating Troubled Waters: The Houthis’ Campaign in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden” also examines the evolution of Houthi strategy at sea over the twelve months since the start of the campaign, in particular with regard to targeting criteria, geographic scope and weapons systems used.
With a large number of merchant ships transiting through the Red Sea, the report also looks at the economic impact of the crisis as well as the impact on global supply lines, which is found to have had more limited consequences than was first anticipated.
The International Response
In a change of approach from October 2023, in the wake of the Hamas-led attacks on Israel, the Houthis began launching missile attacks and uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) against various targets in Israel – in addition to their role as a conflict party in Yemen’s internationalized civil war.
Neither attacks under Operations Poseidon Archer nor the Israeli Air Force have seriously impacted on their capabilities to either launch attacks or to smuggle weapons from Iran and other countries. This is a result of both the lack of ground forces within the international missions but also because of Yemen’s rugged geography that gives tactical advantages to the Houthis in concealing their positions.
Although civilian lives at sea have been saved, the defensive actions of Operation Prosperity Guardian and EUNAVFOR Aspides, have failed to sufficiently reassure the international shipping industry to return to the Red Sea in the numbers seen before November 2023. As a result, the participating nations need to maintain significant naval assets in the region.
This, however, comes as a serious burden particularly for the EU and its member states whose navies are already overstretched. In addition, the high cost of depleting expensive weapons systems to defend against the cheaply manufactured Houthi missiles and UAVs raises the question of how long the current mission can be sustained.
The Houthis’ arsenal
The Houthis’ arsenal consists primarily of Iranian-designed ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as locally manufactured UAVs and uninhabited surface vessels, while they continue to improve range and accuracy.
Despite a United Nations Security Council arms embargo since 2015, the group manages to smuggle weapons and their components into Yemen, where Houthi control of the Red Sea ports of Hudaydah and Salif remains important as does maritime smuggling using traditional dhows.
Moreover, the Houthis have been able to improve their reputation in the region. They have positioned themselves as the de facto government of much of Yemen and have also strengthened their position within the network of Iran’s allies. However, it remains to be seen how this might change and whether Tehran will be able to maintain its significant degree of influence in Yemen. The Houthis have also demonstrated their ambition to conduct their own foreign policy beyond the region through diplomatic contacts with Russia and China, which hints at the possibility of a more independent – but hardly more pro-Western – position in the future.
The economic impact of the crisis
The impact in global supply lines has been more limited than first anticipated. In the last twelve months, since November 2023, the number of transits of merchant ships through the Red Sea has decreased by roughly 50%.
Many of the larger Western shipping lines have decided to divert their vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, which had only a marginal impact in global supply lines and inflationary pressure. Red Sea countries, such as Egypt, rely heavily on the revenue from Suez transits and have felt the effects. Ports in Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Sudan have also been hit, yet most states in the region have remained passive with regard to the crisis.
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