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Military And Security Developments
Nov 23.
23 Nov 24. The Israeli military and Hizbollah are locked in fierce fighting around a strategically positioned 12th century crusader castle in one of Israel’s northernmost advances into Lebanon since launching its ground invasion in September. Hizbollah militants and Israeli troops have clashed repeatedly in recent days in Chamaa, a hill village some 5km from Lebanon’s southern border with Israel. The village is famed for the ruins of a crusader citadel and an important religious shrine. UN peacekeeping force Unifil said that four Italian peacekeepers were admitted to hospital on Friday after two rockets — which Unifil said were “likely launched” by Hizbollah or affiliates — hit its base in Chamaa for the third time this week. The attack came “amid heavy shelling and ground skirmishes” in the area, Unifil said. The fighting marks some of the deepest known advances of Israeli forces into Lebanon since they launched their ground invasion, in what had been described by Israeli officials as “limited, localised, targeted raids”. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu admitted to parliament this week that there had been a “certain expansion” of the ground campaign, hinting that troops are now ranging beyond the so-called “first belt” of Lebanese villages closer to the border. The stated goal of the offensive had been to “clear” the area of Hizbollah bunkers, weapons caches, and fighters that Israel says posed a risk to its northern communities. Hizbollah began firing rockets from Lebanon into Israel after Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack from Gaza. The Israeli military has declined to comment on the combat in Chamaa and refuses to divulge the exact locations of Israel Defense Forces advances into southern Lebanon. For its part, Hizbollah said it has targeted Israeli Merkava tanks and soldiers in the area multiple times. Israeli media reported on Wednesday that an Israeli civilian and one IDF soldier were killed at Chamaa’s citadel after being ambushed by Hizbollah militants. Two other Israeli officers were injured in the incident. (Source: FT.com)
Nov 21.
KEY POINTS
• The uptick in cross-border hostilities between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) is likely to continue, sustaining elevated bystander risks across Lebanon and northern Israel.
• The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant to Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, elevating domestic unrest and sanction risks.
• Gaza Strip: Clearing operations in the north continue to degrade Hamas capabilities in Jabalia (North Gaza governorate) and nearby strongholds. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced on 19 November that it has killed over 1300 Palestinian militia fighters since restarting the ongoing clearing operations in Jabalia in October. It also estimates that between 100-200 fighters remain in the area. The figures underscore the significant deterioration of Hamas’s military presence in Jabalia, its historical stronghold in northern Gaza. Also, on 19 November, the IDF arrested dozens of Palestinian fighters attempting to relocate south of Gaza City via the established evacuation route. Meanwhile, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the National Resistance Brigades continued their mortar attacks against the IDF along the Netzarim Corridor in northern Gaza. Palestinian militants also conducted limited attacks near the Bureij refugee camp, Deir al Balah city (both Deir al-Balah governorate) and the Philadelphia Corridor (Rafah governorate).
• Israel-Lebanon: IDF continues advancing in southern Lebanon amid broad airstrikes, including against the capital Beirut, underscoring persistently high-security risks nationwide. As of 21 November, intense fighting between the IDF’s 7th Armoured Brigade and 35th Paratroopers Brigade and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) is ongoing in Khiam (Nabatieh governorate), after IDF advances were halted by LH projectile strikes on IDF positions around the town. Intense fighting has also been reported around Al Wazzani (Nabatieh), Jibbain and Tayr Harfa (both South governorate). This follows operations on 19 November near the strategic towns of Maroun Al Ras (Nabatieh) and Aalma ech Chaab (South) from which LH cells had launched mortar and rocket strikes on IDF units. Also on 19 November, Hezbollah fired a rocket barrage towards the IDF 36th Division operating in Chama (South), hitting a UNIFIL site; no injuries among the UN peacekeepers were reported. Meanwhile, the IDF conducted hundreds of airstrikes against LH infrastructure in various towns across Nabatiyeh and South governorates, including the commander of LH’s medium-range rocket array in Mazraat Kfar Jouz (Nabatieh). While the majority of IDF airstrikes against Beirut targeted the southern suburbs (including in the al Chiyah, Burj al Barajneh and Haret Hreik areas) on 18 November, IDF killed five people in a strike on a building in the Zuqaq al Balat neighbourhood in northern Beirut. The airstrikes underscore the significant security and bystander risks in Beirut that are not only limited to the city’s southern suburbs.
• Israel-Lebanon: Cross-border shelling continues, driving injuries and sustaining bystander risks in population centres near IDF bases and along the border. On 18 November LH claimed it targeted the IDF Golani Brigade administrative headquarters north of Acre (North) in addition to launching one-way attack drones targeting Golani Brigade training camps at the Regavim base (Haifa district). Later on 18 November, shrapnel from an intercepted Lebanese surface-to-surface missile injured several people in Ramat Gan (Tel Aviv district). On 19 and 20 November, LH also claimed numerous cross-border rocket and drone attacks attacking IDF bases including those in Ayelet HaShahar (North), Netanya (Central) and Sheikh Danun (North). Sustained LH rocket attacks will likely undermine steps taken by Israel to return displaced residents to the north in addition to sustaining bystander risks in population centres near IDF bases.
• Israel-West Bank: IDF counterterrorism operation in Jenin will possibly prompt retaliatory attacks in the West Bank. Between 19 and 20 November, the IDF launched a counterterrorism operation across at least 13 locations across Jenin governorate, prompting intense small-arms and IED attacks from Palestinian militants. During the operation, the IDF killed several fighters, including a prominent Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) member in Qabatiya village, and destroyed IED manufacturing facilities. In retaliation, we assess that an uptick in attacks against the IDF and settlers in the West Bank is a realistic possibility in the coming days, sustaining the significantly high security and bystander risks around settlements and checkpoints.
• Yemen: Houthi attack on Turkish vessel is unlikely to prompt a military response from Ankara. On 20 November, Turkey’s foreign ministry condemned the attacks by the Iranian-backed Houthis on a Turkish cargo ship in the Red Sea on 17 and 18 November. While no injuries or damage were reported the attack is notable as the first against a Turkish maritime asset by the Houthis; however, we assess that it was highly likely a result of misidentification, underscoring the sustained risks of attack against all commercial vessels in the waters around Yemen. The attack is highly unlikely to prompt a Turkish military response against the Houthis as Ankara remains staunchly opposed to Western military intervention in Yemen. Alternatively, Turkey will likely undertake initiatives to prevent similar incidents in the coming months, possibly involving maritime patrols in the Red Sea.
• Israel-Syria: Israeli airstrikes against LH’s supply lines in Syria will sustain elevated security and bystander risks in government-controlled territories. Over the monitoring period, the IDF has continued its airstrikes in Syria’s Al-Qusayr (Homs governorate) and destroyed 15 bridges along the Syria-Lebanon border as it attempts to disrupt the movement of supplies to LH. Additionally, Syrian state media claimed that recent IDF strikes in Palmyra (Homs) killed 36 people and injured 50 others. Opposition media claimed that the strikes targeted an ammunition depot, a site near the Syrian Military Intelligence Branch, and a position tied to the Iranian-backed Afghani group Fatemiyoun. Israeli airstrikes in Syria will likely continue into 2025, sustaining significant bystander risks in the government-controlled territories, particularly near government buildings, military bases and locations tied to the Iranian-backed armed groups.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• Plans to distribute aid via third parties elevate risks of military governance in Gaza, though unlikely to be fully operational in the coming month. On 20 November, Israel’s former defence minister, Yoav Gallant, publicly criticised discussions within Israel’s government to allow private US companies to distribute aid in Gaza under IDF security. The plans, not fully finalised, outline the possibility of establishing a hub in northern Gaza, likely Jabalia, secured by the IDF or optionally by private security contractors co-ordinating with the IDF. The plan would likely cement the role of the IDF as the main security provider in the area, as private contractors are unlikely to have full responsibility and capacity over the long term. Discussions on new methods to distribute humanitarian aid in Gaza have peaked following an increase in the looting of aid trucks by armed militants in the past weeks. However, to completely secure an area such as Jabalia to serve as a hub, the IDF will likely need at least a month, possibly three months, to complete clearing operations. As such the plans are unlikely to improve humanitarian conditions in Gaza in the coming weeks and security risks for NGO staff are likely to remain elevated.
• Resumption of Tzav 9 operations will elevate bystander risks along the Israel-Gaza border and disrupt humanitarian aid operations. On 20 November, the Israeli protest group Tzav 9 announced it would resume its blockade of humanitarian aid entering Gaza. The announcement comes after a five-month hiatus and sanctions on the group and its founders by the EU and the US. In response, Israeli pro-aid organisation ‘Standing Together’ announced counter-protests against Tzav 9. The announcement will elevate bystander security risks in border crossings into Gaza, with clashes between protesters, counter-protesters and security forces remaining likely, as well as acts of vandalism against humanitarian aid tracks, elevating security risks for NGO staff and particularly truck drivers.
• The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for Israeli officials, elevating domestic unrest risks. On 21 November, the ICC issued arrest warrants for Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant for crimes against humanity and war crimes. The announcement is likely to elevate risks of domestic unrest in the form of anti-Israel demonstrations across the region and countries around the globe, elevating bystander security risks. Furthermore, the decision will likely elevate civilian pressure on companies, organisations and states to sanction and boycott Israel, elevating reputational and compliance risks in the coming month (see Forecast).
FORECAST
ICC arrest warrants will elevate diplomatic tensions, business operation risks and domestic unrest targeting Israel-affiliated entities in the coming month. Israel is not a member of the ICC founding document, the Rome Statute, and Israel can still appeal against the warrants as outside the ICC’s jurisdiction. However, in a previous decision in 2021, the court ruled that its jurisdiction extends to the Palestinian Territories, including East Jerusalem, Gaza and the West Bank. However, enforcement of the ICC’s warrant remains the sole decision of each of ICC’s 123 member states when either Netanyahu or Gallant step onto their sovereign territory. Member states have often opted not to enforce ICC arrest warrants against national leaders. However political leaders, such as the EU foreign policy chief Josef Borrell, have already called to respect and implement the warrant, raising concerns about possible diplomatic tensions with Israel in the coming months. There is a growing risk that the ICC’s ruling will prompt countries to increase sanctions on Israel and Israeli officials in the coming months, elevating compliance risks for companies affiliated with Israeli entities, particularly in the West Bank. Furthermore, the ICC decision will likely vindicate anti-Israel groups and increase anti-Israel sentiment among the global general public. This will elevate risks of increased pressure by activists on organisations, companies and states to divest from Israel, elevating reputational and financial risks for entities affiliated with Israel. Furthermore, in the coming month, there will be elevated risks of pro-Palestinian protests, particularly in university campuses across Europe and the US, as well as in big cities in the Middle East and North Africa region, elevating bystander security risks.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
• A successful terror attack by LH and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
• High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
• Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
• Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting LH and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
• Israel re-launches widespread, high-intensity military operations in Gaza
• An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
• US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
• Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
• An IDF-targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)
• An LH strike causes a mass casualty event in Israel
• An IDF strike causes a mass casualty event in Lebanon
• An IDF strike kills civilians in Lebanon
• Turkey-Yemen: Houthi attack on Turkish vessel is unlikely to prompt significant response. On 20 November, Turkey’s Foreign Ministry denounced attacks by the Iran-backed Houthis on a Turkish-owned cargo ship in the Red Sea on 17 and 18 November and reported no injuries or damage. This marks the first time the Houthis have targeted a Turkish-owned vessel since they launched their campaign in November 2023. In the coming days, Turkey will likely undertake initiatives to prevent similar occurrences, possibly involving maritime patrols in the Red Sea, driving the threat of vessel misidentification and collateral risks. Turkey is highly unlikely to initiate a military response in Yemen as it staunchly opposes Western military intervention in the country. However, security risks in Yemen due to Western strikes will remain elevated. Attacks against Western and Israeli-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea will likely continue throughout the winter months, driving significant disruption to key Red Sea and Gulf of Aden shipping routes. We assess that this will exacerbate global supply chain costs and elevate operational and financial risks for businesses.
Nov 20.
• Israel: Arrest warrants against draft evaders will highly likely trigger reactionary protests. On 19 November, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) issued 1,126 arrest warrants to ultra-Orthodox men who did not respond to draft orders over recent months. While the IDF military police is unlikely to conduct arrests in the coming days, the noticed individuals will receive a final call for recruitment; if they don’t respond they will be designated as draft evaders, providing grounds for arrest by law enforcement. The move marks an escalation in the IDF’s efforts to recruit ultra-orthodox men, likely reflecting increasing pressure on the security forces’ capacity. Reactionary anti-conscript protests are highly likely in the coming weeks in ultra-Orthodox population centres, particularly Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv district), Beit Shemesh (Jerusalem district) and in neighbourhoods inside Jerusalem such as Geula, Kikar HaShabbat and Mea Shearim. These protests will likely target IDF recruitment centres and block Highways 1 and 4, increasing risks of supply chain and travel disruption. We also assess that clashes with the police are highly likely during these events, increasing bystander and collateral damage risks.
Nov 19.
• Israel-Lebanon: US ceasefire proposal is unlikely to signal immediate conflict resolution. Earlier on 19 November, US envoy Amos Hochstein arrived in Lebanon to discuss a prospective ceasefire between Lebanese Hizballah (LH) and Israel at the capital Beirut following LH’s provisional agreement to the US proposal. The discussions come as Israel intensifies its air campaign against LH targets in and around Beirut, including a strike which killed five people near the Lebanese government headquarters in central Beirut on 18 November. LH continues to fire missiles into northern and central Israel. As both sides continue to escalate, there is unlikely to be an immediate resolution to the conflict. Israel will likely continue to pursue its objectives to remove LH military infrastructure near the Lebanon-Israel border. US influence on Israel to accept an agreement will likely be limited during the ongoing presidential transitionary period, undermining efforts to resolve the conflict in the coming month. As such, we assess that a heightened rate of cross-border strikes will likely persist, increasing strains on Lebanese healthcare infrastructure and driving bystander risks throughout both states.
Nov 18
KEY POINTS
• The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have continued to advance towards the ‘second village line’ and conducted further airstrikes in the Lebanese capital Beirut; efforts to secure a ceasefire between Israel and Hizballah are unlikely to succeed in the coming month.
• The issuance of 7,000 conscription notices to ultra-Orthodox men in the coming weeks will drive anti-conscription protests by the ultra-Orthodox community, particularly in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv districts.
• Gaza Strip: Ongoing operations underscore threats to critical infrastructure, driving energy and security risks. On 16 November, an Israeli airstrike targeting Hamas operatives at the UN-operated Abu Assi school in the Al-Shati refugee camp (Gaza City governorate) killed 10 people and wounded at least 20 others. Earlier on 18 November, Israeli strikes across Gaza killed at least 20 people including four who were killed in informal shelters in Al-Mawasi (Rafah governorate), an IDF-designated humanitarian zone, driving further risks of displacement within Gaza. The strikes underscore IDF’s willingness to conduct strikes across the entirety of Gaza in pursuit of militants, elevating threats to critical civilian infrastructure including schools, housing and medical facilities elevating threats to NGOs.
• Israel-Lebanon: The IDF continued to advance in southern Lebanon and conducted numerous strikes in the capital Beirut, sustaining substantial security and bystander risks. Since 14 November, IDF efforts to move towards the ‘second village line’, have triggered intense clashes with Lebanese Hizballah (LH) militants. On 15 November, IDF personnel advanced into Chama (South governorate), a village approximately 3 miles (5km) from the Israel-Lebanon border, highlighting the increasing range of IDF ground operations, which will likely continue over the coming weeks. During the reporting period, the IDF also conducted further airstrikes in Beirut, primarily targeting weapons manufacturing and storage facilities in the Dahieh area. On 17 November, an IDF strike in the Ras al Nabaa area of central Beirut killed LH’s head of media operations as part of ongoing efforts to eliminate high-ranking members of LH’s leadership structure. In the coming weeks, the IDF will likely sustain frequent airstrikes in southern Beirut, driving substantial security and bystander risks in the Burj al Barajneh, Ghobeiry and Haret Hreik municipalities. Although strikes will likely remain largely concentrated in these areas, opportunistic targeting of high-ranking LH members will raise the prospect of sporadic strikes against locations across Beirut, increasing threats to proximate staff and assets.
• Israel-Lebanon: Cross-border shelling continues, driving injuries and sustaining bystander risks. On 16 November, an LH rocket barrage on Haifa (Haifa district), injured five civilians and caused significant damage to Avot Ubanim synagogue complex in the Carmel quarter. Subsequently, earlier on 18 November, interceptions of a 30-rocket barrage against IDF troops stationed in Kiryat Shmona (Northern district) resulted in minor shrapnel injury to one woman. In response, the IDF will likely increase the frequency of its strikes, prompting further LH retaliation. Heightened bystander risks will therefore persist across northern Israel and southern Lebanon, including within population centres, as well as possibly in Beirut and eastern governorates such as Baalbek-Hermel governorate. Sustained LH rocket attacks will likely undermine steps taken by Israel to restore freedom of movement and return displaced residents to the north, evidenced by the IDF’s removal of roadblocks on 17 November.
• Israel-West Bank: Arson attack on Palestinian village underscores persistent intercommunal violence. On 16 November, dozens of Israeli settlers set fire to several buildings and a vehicle in Beit Furik (Nablus governorate) and clashed with residents over the alleged assault of an Israeli civilian and livestock theft. Earlier on 18 November, the IDF prevented a Palestinian car-ramming attack in At-Tuwani (Hebron governorate) and apprehended the suspect. These events are consistent with the heightened level of tensions between settlers and Palestinians in the West Bank, with frequent attacks by settlers and militants likely to continue. Bystander security risks in proximity to Palestinian population centres and West Bank settlements will remain elevated.
• Yemen: Iran-backed Houthi attacks on commercial vessels sustain security risks in the Red Sea. On 17 November, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) agency said an unnamed vessel reported a missile hit near their ship while navigating the Red Sea west of Mokha (Taiz governorate, Yemen). On 18 November, the UKMTO said the same vessel reported a similar incident south-east of Aden (Aden governorate). While these likely Houthi attacks were unsuccessful, they underscore persistent hostilities toward commercial shipping in the Red Sea, sustaining security risks to personnel and driving threats to business operations. Moreover, following the US decision on 17 November to allow Ukraine to strike targets within Russia, there is an increased likelihood of Russia providing the Houthis with P-800 Yakhont (Oniks) anti-ship cruise missiles. This will likely augment the Houthis’ capability to precisely strike Western and Israeli-affiliated vessels, increasing the risk of significant damage to ships and harm to crew and passengers. In response greater numbers of ships will likely choose to avoid the Red Sea, prolonging travel times, increasing costs and disrupting supply chains.
• Israel-Syria: Continued IDF strikes on Syria’s capital Damascus highlight elevated bystander security and escalation risks. On 15 November, Israel struck a military housing complex in Damascus’ Mezzeh district, which hosts several embassies, security headquarters, and UN offices. This followed Israeli strikes on 14 November that targeted two residential buildings in Mezzeh district and Qudsaya (Rif Dimashq governorate). The strikes likely underscore the IDF’s willingness to pursue Iranian proxies and officials across Syria, including in Damascus and near diplomatic missions. This trend will likely persist at least through the coming weeks, increasing bystander risks and driving the threat of armed escalation. Israel will likely target strategic infrastructure including Damascus International Airport (DAM) and Aleppo International Airport (ALP), compounding bystander risks and threatening aviation security.
• Israel-Iraq-Jordan: Interceptor misfire following a drone attack from Iraq highlights elevated security and bystander risks in southern Israel and Jordan. Since 14 November, the Iran-backed Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) has continued to fire numerous unmanned aerial vehicles towards locations throughout Israel, particularly via the Red Sea. On 16 November, the IDF intercepted two IRI-launched drones over the Red Sea, before the ordinance entered Israeli airspace. As drones have proved harder for the IDF to intercept with existing air defences, continued drone launches towards Israel are highly likely to sustain elevated security and bystander risks, particularly in the Southern district and in locations along the Israel-Jordan and Israel-Syria borders. Additionally, on 17 November, the IRI launched a drone targeting Eilat (Southern district). Although the IDF successfully intercepted the drone before impact, at least one Israeli interceptor missile misfired and landed in the Aqaba area (Aqaba governorate, Jordan). Although the interceptor’s impact did not result in substantial material damage or any reported injuries, continued drone interceptions in the Eilat area will sustain risks of further misfires impacting locations in southern Jordan, moderately increasing incidental and collateral risks.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• Unidentified perpetrators looted an aid convoy in southern Gaza, highlighting persistent risks of disruption to aid distribution efforts and threats to NGO staff. On 16 November, unidentified individuals looted a convoy of 109 aid trucks in southern Gaza, resulting in the loss of 98 vehicles’ cargo and numerous staff injuries. The convoy carried food aid from UN agencies including UNRWA and the World Food Program and entered Gaza via the Kerem Shalom border crossing. The convoy was highly likely attacked by either militants or organised criminal groups. These groups are highly active in southern Gaza and routinely loot aid travelling along the Salah al Dinn road for sale on the black market at inflated prices. Despite the opening of the Kissufim border crossing on 14 November to facilitate additional aid deliveries, widespread looting and attacks on convoys will almost certainly continue disrupting aid distribution efforts and sustaining threats to NGO staff, particularly drivers. Humanitarian conditions are highly unlikely to improve in the coming weeks, sustaining widespread food insecurity and broader threats to life throughout Gaza.
• In Israel, anti-government protest activity continued at pace, with demonstrators firing flares at Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s private residence, highlighting moderately elevated collateral risks. On 16 November, thousands of anti-government protesters attended hostage release rallies in cities throughout Israel. The largest demonstrations took place in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), moderately restricting movement through these cities. Although demonstrations remained broadly peaceful, police detained three individuals for firing flares in the immediate vicinity of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s private residence in Caesarea (Haifa), one of which malfunctioned and landed in the garden. While this incident likely does not indicate increasing militancy among anti-government protesters, the use of pyrotechnics during rallies will elevate collateral and bystander risks, particularly in crowded protest hotspots. In the coming weeks, security forces will likely adopt an elevated posture in the Caesarea and Jerusalem areas during anti-government rallies, disrupting transport along Highway 2 and through the Rehavia area, respectively.
• Amid increasing pressure on the IDF’s capacity, the Defence Minister confirmed the issuance of 7,000 conscription notices to ultra-Orthodox men in the coming weeks, increasing risks of anti-conscription unrest. The announcement, on 15 November, comes after Israeli Army Radio released data indicating that the IDF staffing levels are 17% below requirements, highlighting increasing pressure on security force capacity. On 17 November, the IDF hosted a conference regarding the development of a new reservist brigade for ultra-Orthodox conscripts, the Hasmonean Brigade, highlighting continued efforts to accommodate ultra-Orthodox religious practices during mandatory military service. Despite these overtures, however, efforts to conscript ultra-Orthodox men are highly likely to trigger anti-conscription protests in ultra-Orthodox population centres in Israel, particularly in the Central, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv districts. On 17 November, dozens of anti-conscription protesters blocked Highway 4 near Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv district), highlighting risks of travel disruption amid increasing protest activity. In the coming weeks, the frequency and scale of anti-conscription protests will likely increase, with demonstrations likely targeting IDF recruitment centres and major thoroughfares, increasing risks of travel and supply chain disruption, particularly along Highways 1 and 4. Demonstrators will likely clash with police attempting to disperse protests, increasing localise bystander and collateral risks.
• Israel’s President Isaac Herzog will not attend the COP29 conference due to security concerns, highlighting increased risks of protests and unrest targeting high-profile events involving Israeli delegations. On 16 November, Herzog’s office announced he would not attend the UN climate conference on 22 November as planned after a revised security assessment. The announcement comes after a football match in the Netherlands between the Israeli team Maccabi Tel Aviv and the Dutch club Ajax triggered a series of attacks on Israeli fans and several days of pro-Palestine protest activity and unrest in the capital Amsterdam. The re-assessment highlights elevated security concerns regarding events involving high-profile Israeli individuals, delegations and teams. In the coming weeks, such events will face substantially elevated risks of targeted protests and possible unrest, increasing risks of disruption and localised travel delays. Risks of targeted violence for Israeli and Jewish individuals will also remain elevated, possibly increasing threats to staff, particularly in states with lower security and police force capacity.
• A Palestinian NGO has petitioned a court in the UK to halt the export of fighter jet components to Israel, highlighting elevated compliance concerns for technology and defence firms. On 18 November, hearings began at the High Court regarding a petition filed by the al-Haq NGO against the Department for Business and Trade. NGO aims to halt the UK’s export of parts for F-35 fighter jets to Israel and argues that the parts will possibly be used in operations that violate international humanitarian law (IHL). Although the UK government submitted documents to the court indicating there is a ‘clear risk’ of the F-35 components being used to commit ‘serious violations’ of IHL, the UK’s Minister of Defence John Healey has indicated that the government will continue authorising exports to prevent disruption to the global F-35 programme. Although the case is unlikely to proceed to a full hearing until 2025, further developments will possibly trigger an uptick in pro-Palestine protest activity in the UK, particularly in the capital London. Further legal challenges to weapons exports are also likely in the coming months, increasing compliance concerns and risks of supply chain disruption for defence and technology firms, particularly those with links to the Israeli government. There is a realistic possibility the UK government will suspend export licenses for certain classes of weapons and weapons components, to moderate risks of further legal challenges, likely increasing diplomatic tensions with Israel and further undermining supply chain continuity for affected firms.
Nov. 15.
• US-Israel: Settler violence will likely draw increased scrutiny from the US, raising bilateral tensions. On 14 November, nearly 90 Democratic lawmakers urged President Joe Biden to sanction members of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government over alleged anti-Palestine violence in the West Bank (Palestinian Territories). The lawmakers expressed concern over a rise in settler violence, settlement expansion and measures adopted to ‘weaken the Palestinian Authority’. They argue that imposing sanctions would send a broader message that the US will be strict on addressing humanitarian issues. Biden retains the authority to impose sanctions under an existing executive order. Increasing pressure on Biden will possibly incite him to take a more assertive stance in urging Israel to limit settlement expansion, particularly as his term ends on 20 January 2025. Any imposed sanctions will likely draw criticism from Republican lawmakers and increase bilateral tensions with Israel. In the near term, the incoming Trump administration will likely continue the US’ longstanding position of supporting a two-state solution. However, we assess that Trump is unlikely to pressure Israeli officials to moderate support for settlement expansion and legalisation.
• Israel: New draft orders to ultra-Orthodox men will raise domestic unrest, government instability risks. Earlier on 15 November, the newly appointed defence minister, Israel Katz, approved 7,000 draft orders to be sent gradually to ultra-Orthodox men; the first 1,000 are scheduled to be sent on 17 November. The approval has drawn condemnation from ultra-Orthodox parties, which had previously assumed that former defence minister Yoav Gallant was the main obstacle to ultra-Orthodox draft exemptions. These parties now accuse the ruling Likud party and its leader, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, of orchestrating a personal attack on the ultra-Orthodox community. The decision will likely elevate risks of policy stasis and government instability in the coming week. Additionally, it will elevate risks of domestic unrest among the ultra-Orthodox population, particularly in cities with large ultra-Orthodox populations such as Beit Shemesh (Jerusalem district), Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv district) and Jerusalem (Jerusalem district). We assess that demonstrations are highly likely to cause travel disruption around these locations, including on nearby highways such as Highway 4. Risks of violent unrest and clashes with the police will be elevated near IDF recruitment bases.
• Canada: Domestic unrest, extremism threat will remain heightened amid ongoing Israel-Hamas war. On 14 November, the police in Vancouver (British Columbia province) arrested an individual allegedly connected to the Samidoun Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network, which is a designated terrorist group. The arrest was made as part of an ongoing hate crimes investigation. On 15 October, the Canadian government designated Samidoun as a terrorist entity in a joint action with the US. This followed a Samidoun-organised protest in Vancouver on 7 October (the first anniversary of Hamas’ 2023 attack on Israel) in which demonstrators burnt Canadian flags. The investigation, and wider action surrounding Samidoun, underscores the federal government’s ongoing efforts to intercept terrorist financing; this effort will likely stay closely aligned with the US in the long term. Nevertheless, we assess that the threat of extremism and terror-related activities will remain heightened across North America amid the ongoing Israel-Hamas war and escalating tensions with Iran. The US’ increasing defence posture in the Middle East and support to Israel will likely have a knock-on effect in motivating extremist sentiment in Canada in the near term. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Nov 24. Netanyahu says Israel’s October attack hit a component in Iran nuclear programme. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on Monday that Israel’s air attack on Iran last month hit an element of Tehran’s nuclear programme while degrading its defence and missile production capabilities.
“It’s not a secret,” Netanyahu said in a speech in parliament. “There is a specific component in their nuclear programme that was hit in this attack,”
He did not identify the component, but added that Iran’s path to a nuclear weapon had not been blocked.
On Oct. 26, Israeli fighter jets carried out three waves of attacks on Iranian military targets, a few weeks after Iran had fired a barrage of about 200 ballistic missiles against Israel.
This followed a previous exchange of direct attacks in April.
Netanyahu, in his speech, offered a few more details on what Israel had targeted.
Israel’s April strike, he said, was narrower, taking out one of four Russian-supplied S-300 surface-to-air missile defence batteries around Tehran, the Iranian capital. (Source: Google/Reuters)
18 Nov 24. Israeli Airstrike in Central Beirut Kills Hezbollah’s Media Relations Chief. A Hezbollah graphic confirming the death of top spokesman Mohammad Afif in an IDF strike in Beirut. (Hezbollah)
An Israeli airstrike on Sunday killed Mohammad Afif, Hezbollah’s media relations chief, in the Ras al-Naba’a neighborhood of central Beirut. The attack also reportedly killed three others and caused significant damage to neighboring buildings.
Afif, a key figure in Hezbollah, had served as the group’s public spokesperson and previously led its television network, Al Manar. His prominence increased after the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in September. Lebanese security officials and a Hezbollah representative confirmed his death in the strike, which targeted offices shared with the Syrian Ba’ath Party.
As of press time, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has not released a statement regarding the strike, although the operation aligns with their broader efforts to weaken Hezbollah’s operational capabilities. The group has been heavily involved in cross-border attacks on Israel, including recent rocket barrages targeting northern Israeli cities.
The airstrike comes as Israel ramps up military operations in Lebanon, with over 50 Hezbollah targets hit in the past week. Earlier Sunday, Hezbollah launched rockets into northern Israel, injuring civilians and damaging property. In response, the IDF carried out extensive strikes on Hezbollah infrastructure, including weapons caches and command centers in southern Lebanon.
The Editor Staff at SOFX comprises a diverse, global team of dedicated staff writers and skilled freelancers. Together, they form the backbone of our reporting and content creation. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
15 Nov 24. Cuashub.com said today that CENTCOM forces repel drone attack in the Middle East. U.S. forces stationed in the Middle East faced a series of coordinated attacks over the weekend, prompting retaliatory strikes against Iran-backed militias, according to announcements by the Pentagon and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).
On Monday, U.S. Navy destroyers USS Stockdale and USS Spruance were targeted by Iran-backed Houthi rebels while transiting the Bab al-Mandeb strait, a critical maritime corridor connecting the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The Pentagon reported that the attack involved a sophisticated arsenal including “at least eight attack drones, five anti-ship ballistic missiles and three anti-ship cruise missiles,” all of which were successfully intercepted and neutralised.
“The vessels were not damaged, no personnel were hurt,” confirmed Pentagon spokesman Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder during a press briefing.
CENTCOM also noted that, over the weekend, U.S. forces launched strikes on Houthi storage sites containing “a variety of advanced conventional weapons.”
On Sunday, Iran-backed militants targeted Mission Support Site Green Village in Syria using a combination of drone and rocket attacks.
“No troops were injured in those attacks,” Maj. Gen. Ryder stated. CENTCOM responded by targeting nine sites associated with Iranian-aligned groups in Syria, reinforcing the U.S. stance on defending its forces, according to Ryder.
“Central Command took appropriate action again to protect our forces and send a clear message that attacks against our forces won’t be tolerated,” said Ryder.
The specific groups responsible for the attacks and targeted in the response were not disclosed by CENTCOM.
Currently, approximately 900 American troops remain in Syria as part of the ongoing international coalition effort against ISIS, a mission set to gradually scale down over the next two years.
Maj. Gen. Ryder also noted that the recent strikes come amid an increase in Houthi attacks on commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea, a situation that has escalated following the outbreak of Israel’s conflict in Gaza. In response, the U.S. launched an international coalition late last year to safeguard shipping lanes, though many companies have opted to reroute to avoid potential threats.
https://cuashub.com/en/content/centcom-forces-repel-drone-attack-in-the-middle-east/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
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