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Military And Security Developments
Nov 14.
KEY POINTS
- The Israel Defense Forces (IDF), began advancing ground operations further into southern Lebanon, elevating risks of intensifying armed conflict with Lebanese Hizballah (LH) militants.
- US President-elect Donald Trump’s nominees for high-ranking government positions likely highlight a hawkish policy towards Iran.
- Gaza Strip: The high number of IDF casualties during operations in Jabalia (North Gaza governorate) reflects the extent of militant reconstitution in the area. Over the past six weeks, the IDF has suffered 24 casualties in operations in Jabalia, a relatively high number compared to its previous focused raids in Gaza. During these operations, the IDF has continued to uncover weapons stashes and rocket launchers positioned towards Israeli population centres in the Gaza Envelope. The IDF previously conducted raids on Jabalia in December 2023 and in May and June, with the intensity of clashes underlining the extent of militant reconstitution efforts in previously cleared areas. There is a realistic possibility that this will prompt the IDF to intensify its use of force during raids on previously cleared areas, possibly increasing the frequency of its use of air support in these locations, significantly elevating bystander risks.
- Israel-Lebanon: The IDF has expanded ground operations in southern Lebanon toward the ‘second village line’ areas not immediately in the proximity of the Israel-Lebanon border. Earlier on 14 November, the IDF confirmed Brigade 188 is operating in new areas amid a wider IDF advance towards the ‘second village line’ over the last few days. The move signals that the IDF is close to completing its initial goal of clearing LH Redwan Force positions and military infrastructure on the border and is consistent with our previous assessment. However, LH militants have likely fortified the second line in anticipation of IDF operations. This will elevate the risks of intensified armed clashes between IDF troops and LH militants in the coming weeks, during which there is an increased likelihood IDF soldiers will be kidnapped, dead or alive. Such incidents will likely result in the escalation of IDF operations in Lebanon and prolonged armed conflict.
- Israel-West Bank: Israeli settlers attacked IDF troops during an evacuation of an illegal outpost, reflecting increasing tensions and risks of settler violence. On 12 November, a group of 50 Israeli settlers attacked IDF soldiers evacuating an illegal outpost near Giv’at Asaf (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate) with stones, moderately injuring one soldier. The incident reflects growing clashes between Israeli settlers and IDF troops in the West Bank. These underscore the growing confidence of right-wing movements in the West Bank and the increasing likelihood of settler violence, driving attack risks (particularly against Palestinian communities).
- US-Yemen: Iran-backed Houthi attacks on US Navy ships reflect Houthi resilience in response to US operations, sustaining elevated tensions and security risks in the Red Sea. On 12 November, the Houthis launched a large attack on two US Navy destroyers while they crossed the Bab-el-Mandeb strait. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed the navy intercepted eight one-way attack uncrewed aerial systems (OWA UAS), five anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), and four anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) without damage to US personnel or assets. The scope of the attack highlights the resilience and willingness of the Houthis to keep engaging in hostilities targeting maritime routes in the Red Sea despite US operations targeting their military infrastructure. In the coming days, the US will likely retaliate against the Houthis, elevating bystander security risks in Houthi-controlled parts of Yemen. These will elevate the risks of a short-term spike in hostilities in the Red Sea and Yemen, intensifying risks to commercial shipping.
- US-Syria: Stikes against Iran-backed militants reflect elevated tensions and risks of gradual armed escalation. The US military conducted strikes against Iran-backed militias in Syria on 11 and 12 November, targeting command centres, weapon storages, logistics facilities and communication checkpoints in Deir ez-Zor governorate. The US CENTCOM confirmed that the strikes were a response to several attacks against US forces in Syria on 10 November, including against troops in the al-Omar Oil Field and Conoco Gas Field military bases (both Deir ez-Zor governorate). The incidents underscore an increase in attacks on US forces and elevated tensions driving risks of gradual armed escalation. Security and bystander security risks near US and Iran-backed militant positions in Syria will remain elevated in the coming month; however, significant escalation remains unlikely.
- Israel-Syria: IDF airstrikes on roads on the Syria-Lebanon border in Homs governorate reflect elevated bystander security risks and likely prolonged travel disruption in the area. The strikes, confirmed on 13 November, underline Iran’s continued efforts to transfer weapons to LH through Syria, despite sustained Israeli efforts to disrupt this movement. This will drive continued Israeli strikes in Syria, sustaining elevated bystander security and travel disruption risks in border areas and around major transit nodes, including Damascus International Airport (DAM).
- Israel-Syria: An IDF strike on a Syrian residential building in the capital Damascus highlights elevated bystander security and escalation risks. Earlier on 14 November, the IDF killed four people in strikes on two residential buildings, one in the Mezzeh municipality in Damascus and one in Qudsaya (Rif Dimashq governorate). While embassies, UN offices and security headquarters are located in Mezzeh, the municipality has been previously targeted in IDF strikes. The strike comes amid Ali Larijani’s visit to Damascus. Larijani is a member of Iran’s Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution. However, there are no indications that Larijani was the target. The strikes highlight the elevated bystander security risks across Syria, including in Damascus and within areas frequented by diplomats. IDF efforts to target Iranian proxies and officials in the region will likely remain significant in the coming weeks, elevating risks of snowballing armed escalation.
- Israel-Iraq: The interception of a drone launched by Iranian proxies in Iraq underscores sustained elevated risks across Israel. On 13 November, the IDF Navy intercepted a drone in Israel’s southernmost city Eilat (Southern district); responsibility was claimed by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI). Footage from the interception indicates the drone was flying very low, close to the water level, highlighting militant use of evasive manoeuvres to avoid detection. The IRI claimed responsibility for at least another two drone attacks on Israel on 12 November, targeting central and northern Israel. However, these were likely intercepted before reaching Israeli territory. In the past month, there has been an uptick in drone attacks on Israel by the IRI, with the latest incident highlighting the elevated security threat such attacks pose across all of Israel. Any attack that causes significant material damage or injuries to civilians will elevate risks of Israeli response against IRI targets in Iraq, elevating bystander security risks near militant locations.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- The US announced it will not restrict Israeli access to US weapons shipments despite critical humanitarian conditions in Gaza. On 12 November, the US State Department announced that it would not restrict deliveries, despite acknowledging that Israel had not improved humanitarian conditions within Gaza in line with recommendations from US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 17 October 2024). The State Department stated that Israel had made ‘some steps’ to improving conditions in Gaza and is not in violation of US law prohibiting weapons deliveries to states restricting humanitarian aid deliveries. In contrast, a coalition of eight global NGOs including the Norwegian Refugee Council, Oxfam and Save the Children, published an assessment on 12 November indicating that Israel had failed to entirely fulfil any of the 12 criteria outlined by the US as necessary to improve living conditions. Despite the opening of the Kissufim border crossing on 12 November, humanitarian conditions are unlikely to improve in the coming weeks due to ongoing IDF ground operations, clashes with militants and critical disruption to aid delivery and distribution.
- Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) published a video of an Israeli hostage, increasing risks of protest activity in major cities over the coming days. On 13 November, the militant group released footage of Alexander Troufanov, who was abducted from Kibbutz Nir Oz (Southern district) during the 7 October attacks. The footage was undated but was likely recorded within the past six weeks. Subsequently, dozens of protesters calling for the government to secure hostage releases gathered in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district), restricting movement through Paris Square and the surrounding area. The release of the footage will likely trigger an uptick in anti-government protest activity on 16 November during weekly rallies in major cities, including Haifa (Haifa district), Jerusalem and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). Although protests will likely remain broadly peaceful, demonstrators will likely temporarily block major roads in proximity to protest hotspots, increasing risks of travel disruption and localised altercations with the police.
- The IDF announced it will issue 7,000 draft orders to ultra-Orthodox men by 17 November, increasing risks of anti-conscription protests and unrest. The IDF announced it would issue these orders on 12 November; they were approved by former defence minister Yoav Gallant shortly before his dismissal on 5 October. Ultra-Orthodox men are highly unlikely to respond to the notices; less than 10% of ultra-Orthodox men have responded to conscription orders issued since August (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 11 July 2024). Rather, the notices will likely trigger a substantial uptick in anti-conscription protests, increasing risks of unrest in ultra-Orthodox population centres such as Beit Shemesh (Jerusalem district) Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv district), and other areas of Jerusalem. Demonstrators will highly likely clash with the police and engage in acts of unrest, increasing bystander and incidental risks. Demonstrators will also highly likely temporarily block key thoroughfares (particularly Highway 4) and public transport systems, increasing risks of localised travel delays and supply chain disruption. There is also a realistic possibility of clashes with pro-conscription counter-demonstrators, further increasing bystander risks.
- On 12 November, US President-elect Donald Trump nominated Mike Huckabee as Ambassador to Israel, highlighting his administration’s possible support for Israeli settlement expansion in the West Bank. Huckabee has frequently indicated his support for settlement expansion in the West Bank and laid bricks during the construction of a housing complex in the Efrat settlement (Bethlehem governorate) in 2018. This nomination will likely bolster perceptions within Israel of US support for settlement expansion and possible annexation. On 11 November, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich stated that Trump’s victory in the US presidential election presents an ‘important opportunity’ for Israel to annex the West Bank with US support. We assess that the Trump administration is unlikely to support full-scale annexation, as this would likely trigger a significant escalation of violence in the region, increase threats to regional stability and substantially undermine US efforts to facilitate an Israel-Saudi Arabia normalisation agreement. However, perceptions of US support will likely embolden Israeli settlers in the West Bank to expand settlements and construct outposts, increasing ethno-religious tensions and risks of clashes with Palestinians.
- In the Netherlands, pro-Palestine protests and rioting have continued in the capital Amsterdam, highlighting elevated unrest risks amid sustained ethno-religious tensions. On 11 November, pro-Palestine protests in Amsterdam became violent, resulting in riot-like behaviour in the New-West district. Participants targeted a tram car and stationary vehicles with arson attacks and threw projectiles including rocks and fireworks at passing cars and police in the 40-45 Square area. Participants also chanted antisemitic slogans and clashed with the police, resulting in several arrests. Peaceful protests also emerged in Dam Square in central Amsterdam on 13 November, highlighting sustained risks of protest activity in the city. The protests occurred despite a ban on pro-Palestine demonstrations in the city following a series of attacks targeting Israeli football fans following a match in Amsterdam on 7 November (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 11 November 2024). The ongoing Israel-Hamas war will highly likely continue exacerbating ethno-religious tensions in Europe, triggering pro-Palestine protest activity and possible unrest, particularly during high-profile public events involving Israeli teams, individuals or supporters. On 11 November, UEFA announced it will move the 28 November Maccabi Tel Aviv-Besiktas football match from Istanbul (Istanbul province, Turkey) to Debrecen (Hajdú-Bihar county, Hungary) and will hold the match without spectators to moderate risks of similar post-match violence. Risks of targeted violence will remain elevated in the coming weeks, increasing threats to staff and elevating risks of localised travel and operational disruption in major cities throughout Europe.
- Iranian Air Force representatives attended the Chinese International Aviation & Aerospace Exhibition, highlighting increasing efforts to bolster defence co-operation and trade. On 12 November, the commander of the Artesh Air Force attended the exhibition in Zhuhai (Guangdong province), discussing potential areas for co-operation with high-ranking Chinese military figures. The visit highlights increasing Iranian interest in advanced Chinese military technology, particularly fighter jets. Over the coming months, Iran will likely continue diplomatic efforts to develop trade relations with China to increase access to military technology facilitating the modernisation of its air force. Iran will also highly likely continue developing relations with China to access advanced missile production technology (such as solid fuel mixers) to restore production capabilities following Israeli strikes on key facilities on 26 October (see Sibylline Alert – 26 October 2024).
Nov 13.
- Israel-US: Sanction risks remain elevated despite decision to continue weapon shipments. On 12 November, a US State Department spokesperson announced that the Biden administration will not withhold weapon shipments to Israel. The announcement came at the expiration of the administration’s 30-day deadline for Israel to improve humanitarian conditions in Gaza. The administration listed several actions by the Israeli government to facilitate aid in Gaza including re-opening of crossings, waiving certain customs and expanding humanitarian zones. Regardless, the actions are unlikely to significantly improve humanitarian conditions in the strip. Moreover, a multitude of aid organisations criticised the decision, claiming Israel partially complied with only four out of 19 demands. There is a realistic possibility that the Biden administration will seek to counteract this criticism by increasing sanctions on Israeli right-wing activists, including government officials, particularly under the assumption that the Trump administration will cancel them when entering office. We assess that these will elevate diplomatic tensions between Israel and the US as well as compliance and reputational risks for businesses working with Israeli West Bank entities for at least the remainder of 2024.
- Israel: Evolving tactics point to heightened disruption risks stemming from Hamas-affiliated groups. On 12 November, the cyber security firm Check Point revealed that the Hamas-affiliated group ‘Wirte’ targeted Israel-based organisations (including hospitals and government municipalities) during at least two disruptive campaigns in February and October. The campaigns started with phishing emails impersonating a legitimate Israeli security company to trick Wirte’s targets into downloading malicious files. The users were then redirected to a legitimate website that can only be accessed from within Israel; this executed a new variant of the ‘SameCoin’ wiper malware, which subsequently disrupted the compromised networks, identifying and deleting the targeted systems’ files. Wirte and other Hamas-linked groups have primarily conducted espionage operations against Israeli entities since the onset of the Israel-Hamas war; they now appear to be leveraging their cyber capabilities to supplement kinetic action. We assess this will heighten the operational risks facing Israel-based organisations as the war persists.
Nov 11
KEY POINTS
- Preparations by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to re-open the Kissufim border crossing to facilitate aid deliveries into central Gaza are unlikely to improve humanitarian conditions significantly.
- Qatar announced it would not continue mediating Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations, which likely reflects increasing pressure from the US to reach an agreement. Even so, a ceasefire remains unlikely in the short term.
- Gaza Strip: The IDF will likely increase its clearing operations in Rafah in the coming weeks, while the re-opening of the Kissufim border crossing will elevate the risk of militant attacks. On 8 November, the IDF announced it is preparing to re-open the Kissufim border crossing to facilitate aid deliveries into central Gaza. The IDF also announced it had started to bolster security around the crossing, which closed in 2005. Gaza-based militants will likely attempt to attack the crossing to disrupt IDF works and security operations in the coming weeks, increasing threats to NGO staff moving through the crossing, particularly drivers and convoy staff. Increased militant activity will also likely include a moderate uptick in cross-border rocket fire targeting Israeli population centres in the Gaza envelope, elevating bystander risks. Also in central Gaza, the IDF continues to fortify and expand the Netzarim Corridor, building infrastructure and military positions and increasing the corridor’s area to 21.6 square miles (56 sq km). In the past few days, the IDF has slightly intensified its clearing operations in the Rafah area (southern Gaza); this is highly likely to reflect preliminary efforts to construct a similar fortified corridor in the Philadelphi Corridor area. The IDF will likely continue increasing operations in the area in the coming weeks, elevating the risk of clashes with militants. As such, localised bystander risks will likely increase, as will risks of cross-border rocket launches as militants attempt to clear weapon caches before the IDF reaches them.
- Israel-Lebanon: IDF restrictions on sailing south of Haifa (Haifa district) underscore the elevated threat of militant activity. On 11 November, the IDF banned the sailing of small maritime vessels less than 78.7 feet (24m) in length along the coastline between Atlit and Haifa (both Haifa) between 0200hrs and 1200hrs (local time). The closure possibly reflects the IDF’s intelligence assessment that Lebanon-based militants intend to infiltrate northern Israel via the sea; it possibly also forms part of the IDF’s efforts to test maritime infiltration detection capabilities. The ban highlights the IDF’s increasing concerns regarding maritime incursions into Israeli waters, as well as possible militant infiltration. In the coming weeks, the IDF will likely continue bolstering its maritime security posture in northern Israel, which will possibly lead to further closures. This posture will increase the risk of vessel misidentification, possibly delaying or disrupting maritime travel and supply chain continuity. Northern Israel’s coastal areas and ports will remain likely targets for militant infiltration and attacks, sustaining elevated security risks in the vicinity of these areas.
- Israel-Lebanon: Cross-border hostilities continue to intensify, sustaining elevated bystander risks. In the past few days, Lebanese Hizballah (LH) has continued to launch an increasing number of rockets towards locations in northern Israel. On 11 November, LH launched three barrages containing over 140 rockets towards locations in Northern and Haifa districts; shrapnel from interceptions over Karmiel (Northern) and Haifa lightly injured six civilians, highlighting the sustained incidental risks in northern Israel. In Lebanon, the IDF has continued to conduct strikes in the capital Beirut and in areas to its north. On 9 November, the IDF conducted strikes against LH weapon production sites in Beirut’s Dahieh suburb, highlighting the elevated bystander and collateral risks despite previously issued evacuation orders for five affected buildings. On 10 November, the Lebanese health ministry also reported that the IDF conducted a strike to the north of Beirut in Alamat (Mount Lebanon governorate), killing 23 individuals. These incidents reflect a continued uptick in cross-border hostilities that is driving security and bystander risks in northern Israel and across Lebanon. The IDF will also likely increase the frequency of its strikes in locations to the north of Beirut in the coming weeks, increasing security risks therein.
- Israel-Yemen: Shrapnel from the interception of a Houthi-fired missile triggered small fires in central Israel, highlighting the sustained hazards risks associated with cross-border missile launches. On 11 November, the Iran-backed, Yemen-based Houthis launched a ballistic missile towards Israel, triggering sirens near Jerusalem (Jerusalem district). Although the IDF intercepted the missile, shrapnel from the interceptor landed in Beit Shemesh (Jerusalem), causing light material damage and triggering several small fires. The incident highlights the sustained risk of Houthi missiles and drones targeting Israel, including Central and Jerusalem districts. These risks will likely remain elevated in the coming weeks, despite US-led strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen.
- Yemen-US: The Houthis claimed to have shot down a US drone, triggering US airstrikes on Houthi targets while also highlighting the sustained threats to vessels in the Red Sea. On 10 November, the US carried out a series of airstrikes against Yemen targeting Houthi weapons storage facilities in at least three locations. The strikes came after the Houthis claimed on 8 November that they had shot down a US MQ-9 ‘Reaper’ drone operating over al-Jawf province (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 8 November 2024). Despite these continued US strikes on Houthi territory, the incident indicates that the Houthis likely retain the capacity to conduct strikes on vessels in the Red Sea, sustaining threats to international shipping lanes. In the coming months, the risk of indiscriminate Houthi attacks and ordinance misfire will sustain elevated risks for non-military maritime vessels, particularly those traversing the Bab al-Mandab Strait. In turn, the possibility of further US airstrikes against Houthi-controlled territory will sustain elevated bystander risks, particularly near militant facilities and dual-use infrastructure.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Despite efforts to facilitate additional aid deliveries into Gaza, humanitarian conditions are highly unlikely to improve. On 8 November, Israel’s defence ministry announced plans to open an additional border crossing in the Kissufim area (Southern district) to facilitate aid deliveries into central Gaza. Subsequently, on 11 November, the IDF announced the expansion of the humanitarian zone in southern Gaza. These announcements highlight efforts to improve humanitarian conditions in Gaza, particularly after the US announced it would move to restrict Israeli access to military aid if conditions did not improve by 15 November (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 17 October 2024). However, these measures are unlikely to improve conditions by this deadline. Efforts to bolster cross-border aid deliveries are unlikely to improve conditions in Gaza due to a lack of effective aid distribution mechanisms. Looting of aid supplies, attacks on convoys and continued clashes between the IDF and Gaza-based militants are highly likely to continue disrupting aid supply chains throughout Gaza, sustaining widespread food insecurity. Additionally, as the IDF has conducted airstrikes on locations within the designated humanitarian zone throughout the Israel-Hamas war, the zone’s expansion is unlikely to improve security conditions significantly for civilians or NGO staff within this area in the coming weeks.
- Qatar announced that it would not continue mediating Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations, highlighting the sustained threats to a possible agreement. On 9 November, Qatar’s foreign ministry announced that it would no longer facilitate negotiations and that due to a lack of progress in recent weeks, Hamas’ political office in the country ‘no longer serves its purpose’. The announcement comes after numerous media sources reported that the US had recently requested that Qatar expel Hamas from its territory due to the group’s continued rejection of ceasefire proposals. However, Qatar’s statement does not indicate a timeline for possibly expelling Hamas’ political leadership and Hamas officials have denied receiving such as request. The announcement highlights the increasing pressure on Israel and Hamas to reach a ceasefire agreement, despite significant sticking points; we assess that an agreement remains unlikely in the short term (see: FORECAST).
- In the Netherlands, the police arrested over 60 individuals for attacking Israeli fans after a football match, highlighting the risk of targeted violence amid sustained ethno-religious tensions. On 7 November, at least ten Israelis were attacked in the capital Amsterdam following a football match between the Dutch club Ajax and the Israeli Maccabi Tel Aviv football club. Footage of the incidents indicates that numerous Maccabi Tel Aviv fans were chased down, harassed and assaulted by groups of individuals. Many of the assailants carried Palestinian flags or chanted phrases associated with the pro-Palestine protest movement. Dutch and Israeli politicians have condemned the violence and characterised the incidents as antisemitic. Subsequently, Israel’s National Security Council (NSC) advised Israelis not to attend the Maccabi Tel Aviv basketball match in Bologna (Italy) on 8 November or a football match in Paris (France) on 14 November. The NSC also warned of the elevated risk of violence targeting Israeli and Jewish individuals in Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK; it has imposed a ban on IDF personnel travelling to the Netherlands until further notice. The incident highlights sustained ethno-religious tensions linked to the Israel-Hamas war, particularly in Western Europe. In the coming weeks, the risk of targeted violence will remain elevated for individuals associated with Israel and the Jewish community, underscoring the latent threats to staff, particularly during high-profile public events involving Israeli teams, individuals or supporters. Such events will also trigger an uptick in pro-Palestine protest activity, increasing operational and localised travel disruption risks while also possibly disrupting event-management processes.
FORECAST
Despite increasing pressure from the US, a ceasefire and hostage-release agreement between Israel and Hamas remains unlikely. Qatar’s announcement that it would cease mediation efforts likely reflects increased pressure from the US to advance negotiations after months of deadlock. The Biden administration has likely requested that Qatar increase pressure on Hamas to make concessions in order to achieve a ceasefire and hostage-release agreement before the inauguration of President-elect Donald Trump. However, we continue to assess that a ceasefire agreement remains unlikely in the short term. Hamas is highly unlikely to deviate from its maximalist position, particularly regarding a complete IDF withdrawal from Gaza during any ceasefire period. More broadly, following the death of Yahya Sinwar on 15 October, the current leadership of Hamas’ Political Bureau remains unclear, as the group has not announced a successor. Hamas will likely continue operating under collective leadership in the coming months; this will undermine its ability to engage productively in negotiations due to possible factionalism and committee disunity. Additionally, IDF ground operations continue to disrupt (critically) communication between Hamas’ Political Bureau and its Gaza-based leadership. As such, Hamas’ delegates are unlikely to be able to commit credibly to securing hostage releases in the short term, undermining the viability of further negotiations.
In the coming months, there is a realistic possibility that Qatar will begin expelling members of Hamas’ political leadership, though a whole-scale expulsion remains unlikely. Qatar is unlikely to engage in a broad expulsion before the inauguration of US President-elect Donald Trump in January 2025 due to uncertainty over US policy in the medium term. Even so, in the event of such an expulsion, Hamas would likely begin moving the Political Bureau’s leadership to Iraq, where it established a media office in June. aasAlthough Turkey previously expressed an interest in hosting Hamas’ political offices, this remains unlikely in light of Turkey’s NATO membership. Despite local media reports indicating that Hamas will move to establish a formal presence in Algeria or Iran, we assess this remains unlikely in the short term. Regardless of Hamas’ preference, the relocation of Hamas’ Political Bureau will likely increase the risk of anti-Hamas demonstrations (as well as security and bystander risks) in whichever country or entity eventually hosts the bureau. Hosting Hamas’ political leadership will also possibly increase tensions with the US, particularly if ceasefire negotiations continue to stall. In such a scenario, there is also a realistic possibility of the US expanding sanctions on individuals and entities linked to Hamas’ leadership depending on their location, increasing compliance concerns and sanctions-exposure risks therein.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
- A successful terror attack by LH and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting LH and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- Israel re-launches widespread, high-intensity military operations in Gaza
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
- An IDF-targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)
- An LH strike causes a mass casualty event in Israel
- An IDF strike causes a mass casualty event in Lebanon
Nov 08.
- Yemen-US: Drone downing underscores shifting Houthi priorities, drives bystander risks. Earlier on 8 November, the Iran-backed Houthi militia reportedly shot down a US MQ-9 ‘Reaper’ drone over Yemen’s Al-Jawf province. This is the latest in over ten incidents of US drone downing by the Houthis this year. It comes amid a gradual decrease of attacks on vessels in the Red Sea in the past two months, signalling a likely redirection of resources toward Israeli and US military assets due to sustained US-Coalition strikes in Yemen, depleting Houthi weapons caches. The US will likely respond to the attack over the coming days with further airstrikes on Houthi infrastructure, driving bystander risks for individuals in proximity to military assets. We assess that further Houthi attacks on US and Israeli military and civilian infrastructure are likely, including in Israeli territory, driving the risk of retaliatory attacks and conflict escalation. There remains a sustained risk of indiscriminate attacks on Western commercial shipping vessels in the Red Sea, particularly in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. (Source: Sibylline)
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