Sponsored by Bertin Exensor
www.exensor.com
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Military And Security Developments
Nov 07.
KEY POINTS
- The dismissal of Yoav Gallant as defence minister will increase domestic unrest risks across Israel, though a general strike remains unlikely.
- The re-election of Donald Trump as the US president will likely elevate regional tensions, increasing US pressure on both Israel and Iran.
- Gaza Strip: The expansion of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations in northern Gaza to Beit Lahiya on 6 November will likely elevate the risk of cross-border rocket strikes. The move comes as part of the IDF’s efforts over the last month to root out militants and to clear military infrastructure in northern Gaza, underlining the persistent challenges stemming from the repeated return of militants to previously cleared areas. There is a realistic possibility that the IDF will prevent residents from returning to newly cleared areas in the medium term; it will possibly install security mechanisms to monitor militants’ return and reconstitution efforts. Additionally, such operations will likely prompt militants in Beit Lahiya to exhaust their rocket arsenal before the city is captured by the IDF. This will elevate the risk of cross-border rocket launches targeting Israeli population centres in the coming week, particularly those in the Gaza Envelope.
- Israel-West Bank: On 5 November, the IDF launched a large-scale counter-terrorism operation in the northern West Bank focusing on Jenin, Tubas and Tulkarm governorates; this has likely elevated the broader risk of attacks. Additionally, on 6 November, a Palestinian man drove his car into a bus station near the Israeli settlement of Shiloh (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate), lightly injuring two civilians. Civilians shot and killed the perpetrator after he got out of the car holding a knife. The incident follows a series of instances of Israeli settler violence against Palestinian populations in the area earlier this week (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 4 November 2024), highlighting the elevated risk of attacks in areas that have undergone a spike in ethno-religious tensions. As such, IDF operations in the northern West Bank will likely elevate the risk of attacks in the area in the coming week, particularly near IDF positions and transport hubs.
- Israel-Lebanon: The withdrawal of at least two IDF brigades from southern Lebanon on 5 November is unlikely to reflect a winding down of operations. Rather, the move likely signals preparations to prolong operations as the IDF takes steps to ensure that units are properly refreshed; this will possibly allow them to extend further into southern Lebanon in the coming days.
- Israel-Lebanon: Damage to airports in both Israel and Lebanon highlights the current bystander and collateral damage risks. On 6 November, Lebanese Hizballah (LH) launched two barrages of rockets targeting central Israel. One rocket hit an area within Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV), causing light material damage to the parking area. The incident caused a temporary delay in the airport’s flight operations. Following the incident (and on the same day), the IDF conducted airstrikes in the southern suburbs of Beirut (Lebanon). Several strikes impacted the area near Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY), where shrapnel caused light damage to buildings in the airport compound but did not impact operations or the terminal area. The IDF likely targeted Fatah-110 missiles, which were used in the earlier barrage against central Israel (several of which were located close to BEY). The incidents highlight the sustained security risks across Israel and in Beirut driven by the current retaliatory strike cycle. They also highlight the elevated risks facing flight operations in Israel and Lebanon; these risks will drive travel disruption and possibly undermine the efficacy of businesses’ rapid evacuation protocols.
- Israel-Lebanon: A targeted IDF strike that injured Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) soldiers and UN peacekeepers highlights the elevated risks facing overland movement across Lebanon. Earlier on 7 November, the LAF claimed that an IDF strike targeted a car that was passing the Awali checkpoint in Sidon (South governorate), killing its three Lebanese passengers. According to the LAF, the strike also injured three LAF troops and four peacekeepers of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The strike highlights the IDF’s willingness to hit targets regardless of their proximity to international assets, elevating the bystander security risks along roads across Lebanon, particularly in southern Lebanon. We assess these risks are likely to increase in the immediate aftermath of any uptick in LH cross-border rocket launches, particularly those targeting central Israel.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Allegations that the IDF is attempting to displace civilians from northern Gaza permanently highlight the critical humanitarian conditions therein, particularly in the Jabalia area. During a press briefing on 5 November, IDF Brigadier General Itzik Cohen stated that ‘there is no intention of allowing the residents of the northern Gaza Strip to return to their homes’ and that aid deliveries into northern Gaza are unlikely to increase given the reduced civilian population therein. On 7 November, the IDF announced that Cohen’s statements had been broadly misinterpreted and referred to specific evacuation orders in the Jabalia area. Regardless of Cohen’s intended sentiment, these statements highlight the critical threats to life as the IDF continues to expand operations in northern Gaza, particularly in the Gaza City area. In the coming weeks, the IDF will almost certainly continue issuing evacuation orders for locations throughout northern Gaza, sustaining critical threats to life for individuals (including NGO staff) who continue to operate in affected areas. More broadly, claims that Israel is attempting to displace civilians forcibly from northern Gaza will likely sustain pro-Palestine protest activity worldwide, particularly in Europe, the Middle East and North America.
- Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed Defence Minister Yoav Gallant on 5 November, triggering protests and likely exacerbating anti-government sentiment. Tensions between Gallant and Netanyahu have increased in recent months due to stalling ceasefire negotiations and disputes over conscripting ultra-Orthodox men into the IDF. Netanyahu replaced Gallant with Israel Katz, a Likud party member without substantial military experience, who previously served as Israel’s foreign minister. The leader of the New Hope party, Gideon Sa’ar, will now serve as foreign minister. The announcement triggered anti-government protests in numerous urban centres, including Haifa (Haifa district), Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) on 5 and 6 November, with demonstrators blocking several key thoroughfares and lighting numerous bonfires (see Sibylline Alert – 6 November 2024). The police used batons, water canons and skunk water (strong-smelling liquid) to disperse protesters, highlighting the elevated bystander and collateral risks in protest hotspots. In the coming days, protest activity will likely continue at pace, increasing operational disruption risks (see FORECAST).
- LH leader Naim Qassem reiterated his opposition to a ceasefire without an IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon, highlighting the continued sticking points within negotiations. On 6 November, Qassem indicated that LH would not consider a ceasefire based on political considerations, but rather on the status on ‘the battlefield’; this indicates that LH is unlikely to agree a ceasefire without an IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Even so, Qassem did not explicitly link conditions for resolving the Israel-Hizballah war to the establishment of a ceasefire in Gaza, highlighting a gradual shift in LH’s objectives. Despite this increasing decoupling, we assess that a diplomatic resolution to the Israel-Hizballah war remains highly unlikely in the coming weeks as the IDF indicates a persistent commitment to ground operations.
Nov. 06.
- On 5 November, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant. The announcement triggered anti-government protests in numerous urban centres, including Haifa (Haifa district), Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). Following the news, two NGOs filed petitions to the High Court of Justice calling for Gallant’s dismissal to be reversed.
SIGNIFICANCE
- Gallant served as defence minister from 2022 to 2024, holding the portfolio throughout the ongoing Israel-Hamas and Israel-Hizballah wars. In recent months, tensions between Gallant and Netanyahu have increased due to stalling ceasefire negotiations and disputes over conscripting ultra-Orthodox men into the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).
- Netanyahu previously dismissed Gallant in March 2023 following the latter’s criticism of the government’s judicial reform efforts. In response, the Histadrut labour federation called a general strike on 27 March 2023, triggering significant public and private sector disruption. Netanyahu subsequently reinstated Gallant (see Sibylline Alert – 27 March 2023).
- Netanyahu replaced Gallant with Israel Katz, a Likud party member who previously served as Israel’s foreign affairs minister, a portfolio that will in turn be filled by the leader of the New Hope party, Gideon Sa’ar.
FORECAST
Large protests are likely to continue throughout Israel in the coming days, elevating bystander security risks. While Tel Aviv will likely be the main protest hotspot, large protests are also likely in Haifa and Jerusalem, particularly outside the Knesset and Netanyahu’s residence. Protests will significantly elevate travel disruption risks, including along key routes such as Highway 20 (Ayalon), Highway 1 and Highway 4. There is a realistic possibility that protesters will target road junctions, including those near Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV), driving traffic congestion. In the coming days, protests in urban hotspots, particularly Tel Aviv, are likely to intensify both in terms of scale and the accompanying risk of violence, especially after nightfall and during the weekend.
While acts of vandalism remain unlikely, there is a realistic possibility of clashes between protesters and the police. The latter are likely to use forceful measures to disperse protesters, elevating security risks for both bystanders and proximate assets. The police are likely to use water cannon and mounted personnel; the use of tear gas and stun grenades is also a realistic possibility, particularly near roadblocks. The likely use of a ‘skunk truck’ (which shoots strong-smelling liquid that can linger for days afterwards) against protesters will also elevate continuity and operational risks for proximate businesses.
There is a realistic possibility that a general strike will elevate business continuity and operational risks. In the coming days, there is a realistic possibility of large strikes affecting both the private and public sectors. Currently, most major committees are controlled by members of Likud (the ruling party), which is likely to challenge any efforts to organise a general strike by the Histadrut national trade union (though such a strike remains possible). Strikes by other trade unions are also possible, as are private initiatives by sympathetic businesses. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility of employees shortening their workdays to join protests. We assess this will elevate business continuity and operational disruption risks in the coming days. An uptick in cross-border rocket launches and attacks following Gallant’s dismissal is a realistic possibility, elevating security risks across Israel. Israel’s adversaries will likely perceive the loss of an experienced defence minister during the current multi-front conflict as a prime opportunity. Netanyahu’s likely increased role in defence issues will exacerbate this perception given the reportedly challenging working relations between Netanyahu and Israel’s security agencies – the IDF, Mossad and Shin Bet – in recent months. This will elevate the likelihood of an increase in cross-border rocket and drone launches by militants, particularly Iranian proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility of an increase in efforts by militants in the West Bank to conduct attacks, exacerbating insecurity across Israel.
- Israel-Palestinian Territories: Trump victory will likely embolden settlement expansion in West Bank. On 6 November, Israeli settlers in the West Bank welcomed the victory of President-elect Donald Trump. During Trump’s first term as president (2017-2021), he moved the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and recognised Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, key Israeli nationalist goals. Additionally, the Israeli settler movement has been investing in strengthening its relationship with key figures among US Republicans in recent months. With Israel’s right-wing coalition government and settler movement likely to pursue policies advancing settlement approval and construction, the Trump administration is unlikely to expand sanctions on Israeli settlers in the West Bank substantially. This is highly likely to exacerbate ethno-religious tensions in the Palestinian Territories, increasing the risk of settler attacks and intercommunal violence. Amid the increasing risk of violence, we assess that domestic unrest in Palestinian population centres will also likely increase, particularly those close to expanding settlements.
- Evolving tactics will elevate security risks posed by Iranian state-sponsored groups. On 5 November, international news outlets reported that the Iranian state-sponsored group ‘Cotton Sandstorm’ shifted its tactics following the onset of the Israel-Hamas war and recent regional escalations in the Middle East. Cotton Sandstorm impersonated a legitimate information technology (IT) company to infiltrate and exfiltrate data from IP cameras, underscoring an expansion of its targeted assets. The group also attacked organisations and election systems in France and Sweden, highlighting a widening of their target pool away beyond solely Israeli or US targets. Additionally, the same fake IT company was used to provide other Middle Eastern cyber threat groups with resources and infrastructure, suggesting that Iranian state-sponsored actors may increase co-operation with other groups in future. Iranian-nexus groups continue to develop their tactics to conduct espionage and disruptive operations. As a result, we assess that this trend will elevate security risks to global entities in the medium term.
Nov 05.
KEY POINTS
- The Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) failure to intercept a Lebanese Hizballah (LH) rocket that injured 19 civilians in central Israel highlights the sustained security risks across Israel.
- Iran’s increasingly belligerent rhetoric regarding retaliation against Israel has elevated the likelihood of IDF strikes against Iranian proxies, particularly those in Iraq.
- Gaza Strip: Sirens in Israeli population centres across the Gaza envelope underscore the sustained threat of rocket attacks. On 2 November, two rockets from Gaza triggered sirens in Sderot (Southern district). The incident reflects the sustained threat of rocket attacks from Gaza (despite the low frequency of such launches in recent months), particularly for population centres within the Gaza envelope.
- Israel-West Bank: The destruction of vehicles in a Palestinian town underscores elevated ethno-religious tensions and bystander risks. The Israeli police have opened an investigation into an arson attack against 15 cars in al-Brieh (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate) on 3 November. The attack was likely conducted by Israeli settlers given nearby graffiti reading ‘On Judea and Samaria — war’. According to local media, several of the cars belonged to Palestinian Authority (PA) officials; one car belonged to a Jordanian medical delegation. Additionally, on 4 November, Israeli settlers attempted to burn down an olive grove in the village of Burqa (Ramallah and al-Bireh), resulting in clashes with Palestinians. The incidents reflect a continued uptick in settler violence in the West Bank, as well as elevated ethno-religious tensions. This trend will continue driving the risk of attacks facing Israeli settlements and Palestinian communities in the West Bank, compounding bystander security risks near population centres in the coming weeks.
- Israel-Lebanon: An IDF commando raid deep inside Lebanon underscores the extent of Israeli operations, as well as the elevated threats to coastal cities. On 1 November, personnel of the IDF Navy’s Shayetet 13 commando unit raided a home in Batroun (North governorate, Lebanon), located approximately 26 miles (42km) north of the capital Beirut. The unit extracted a civilian ship’s captain allegedly involved in LH naval operations for questioning in Israel. The operation underscores the possible scope of IDF operations throughout Lebanon, as well as the sustained elevated bystander security risks throughout the country, particularly in coastal cities. Furthermore, the operation signals the IDF’s interest in LH naval operations, which will possibly elevate the security and operational risks facing shipping in Lebanese and Israeli waters due to LH and Israeli operations. Furthermore, possible LH naval operations will elevate the threat of attacks for Israeli coastal cities, particularly in northern Israel, as well as the risk of sabotage operations facing Israeli maritime interests, including for commercial ships en route to Israeli ports.
- Israel-Lebanon: An LH rocket injured 19 civilians in central Israel, highlighting the risks stemming from interception failures, even in areas covered by air defences. In the early hours of 2 November, LH launched three rockets at central Israel, triggering sirens in proximate population centres. One rocket directly struck a residential building in Tira (Central district) and injured 19 individuals. The IDF confirmed that attempted interceptions failed and that investigations are ongoing. The incident reflects the sustained risks from LH rocket strikes facing central Israel despite only sporadic targeting of this area and the extensive coverage by Israeli air defences. The interception failure also underscores the particularly elevated risks facing those areas that are targeted more frequently, particularly large population centres in northern Israel such as Haifa (Haifa district) and Nahariya (Northern district).
- US-region: The deployment of additional military assets to the region signals a continued commitment to safeguarding against Iranian aggression. On 1 November, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin announced the deployment of additional bombers, including B-52 bombers, and navy warships to the region. The deployment comes amid an escalation in belligerent Iranian rhetoric regarding possible future retaliation against Israel. These forces will also fill the gap left by the departure of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group in mid-November until the arrival of another strike group, likely the USS Harry S. Truman strike group. The deployment signals the US’ continued commitment to supporting Israel’s defence against Iran and maintaining a heightened regional presence.
- Israel: Tensions over subsidies to ultra-Orthodox families will increase government stability risks. Earlier on 5 November, the Israeli government coalition lost its majority on a controversial bill that would subsidise children’s daycare of ultra-orthodox persons who have avoided military conscription (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 31 October 2024). In the past few days, an increasing number of coalition members have announced their opposition to the bill. These announcements elevate risks for government stability and policy stasis, with ultra-Orthodox parties likely to withhold their votes from other government-backed legislation. However, the government is unlikely to fall and there is a realistic possibility of a last-minute agreement that secures the bill’s passage, possibly in the coming week. If the bill fails, this will likely elevate risks of domestic unrest by ultra-orthodox populations which will raise traffic disruption risks, particularly in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district). By contrast, there is a realistic possibility that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will offer an alternative approach, bypassing ultra-Orthodox conscription requirements, prompting backlash from secular demographics. We assess that associated protests will likely be concentrated in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district).
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- The World Health Organization (WHO) partially resumed its polio vaccination campaign in northern Gaza, though the risk of an outbreak remains elevated. On 3 November, the WHO confirmed it would begin administering oral vaccines from health centres in the Gaza City area (northern Gaza). Following the detection of a polio case in Gaza in August, the WHO launched a two-phase campaign to address the significant risk of an imminent outbreak; however, the second phase in northern Gaza was suspended on 23 October due to intense clashes and critical threats to staff safety (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 24 October 2024). Although Israel and Hamas agreed on a localised humanitarian pause to facilitate the vaccine campaign, on 3 November an explosion at a vaccination clinic in Sheikh Radwan (Gaza City area) injured at least three minors. Both the IDF and Hamas have denied responsibility for the explosion. This incident highlights the significant security and bystander threats to civilians and NGO staff in northern Gaza, including those in medical centres during agreed humanitarian pauses. Continued clashes will also likely restrict civilians’ access to vaccination services and sustain the risk of a polio outbreak, further exacerbating humanitarian and public health concerns.
- On 1 November, the Israeli cabinet approved a proposal for the 2025 budget, possibly undermining investor confidence. The proposal includes approximately USD 10.5 bn in tax increases and spending cuts to moderate the increasing deficit (currently 8.5% of GDP). These measures include increases in National Insurance contributions and value-added tax (VAT), as well as substantial spending cuts to ministries providing health, education and welfare services. The budget will now move to the Knesset, where it will be voted on in the coming weeks. The austerity package will likely moderately increase investor concerns in the coming weeks, though further changes and adjustments to the proposal are highly likely. Negotiations over tax increases, coalition funds and spending cuts will almost certainly trigger disputes within the coalition government, elevating risks of broader policy stasis and legislative deadlock in the coming months. While the government will likely pass the budget before the March deadline, there is a realistic possibility that coalition disunity will undermine prospects for unanimous support, elevating the threats to government stability in the medium term.
- Although Israel renewed a sanctions waiver for financial institutions facilitating Palestinian financial transfers for 30 days, longer-term threats to stability remain elevated in the West Bank. On 1 November, the Israeli finance ministry renewed the indemnification allowing Israeli financial institutions to process transfers linked to Palestinian entities in the West Bank without violating existing sanctions. In previous years, the indemnification was generally renewed on a 12-month basis. However, throughout 2024, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has progressively decreased the length of the indemnification. These measures likely reflect Smotrich’s efforts to gain government concessions on settlement expansion and regularisation in the West Bank; the latest 30-day renewal likely points to efforts to gauge the extent of US opposition to such measures following the 5 November presidential election. Further stop-gap renewals and temporary expirations of the waiver will sustain sanctions-exposure risks for firms facilitating transactions involving entities in the Palestinian Territories. These measures, paired with possible settlement expansion, are highly likely to increase ethno-religious tensions in the West Bank, as well as the risk of unrest, particularly in northern governorates.
- In Israel, anti-government protest activity has moderately increased, elevating the risk of temporary operational disruption in major urban centres as ceasefire negotiations continue to stall. On 2 November, hundreds of demonstrators gathered for protests calling on the government to secure hostage releases through ceasefire negotiations. The largest demonstrations occurred in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), where gatherings restricted movement between Habima Square and Hostages Square, as well as along Begin Street. Smaller-scale demonstrations also took place in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district), Kiryat Gat and Sderot (both Southern district). In the coming weeks, ceasefire negotiations are highly unlikely to progress meaningfully, particularly as the IDF continues to dismantle Hamas’ remaining governance structures in Gaza. As such, protest activity will likely continue at pace in the coming weeks, elevating the risk of temporary movement and operational disruption. However, demonstrations are unlikely to grow to include more than 2,000 participants per gathering due to outstanding Home Front Command guidelines on gathering sizes, moderating the risk of unrest.
- A UK-based bank’s alleged divestment from an Israeli defence firm highlights increasing reputational and security risks for Israeli-linked firms. On 31 October, the pro-Palestine activist group Palestine Action (PA) claimed that the multi-national bank Barclays had divested from the Israeli defence company Elbit Systems as a result of PA activism. PA has repeatedly vandalised high street branches of Barclays over the past year. Although neither Barclays nor Elbit have commented on the allegations, the PA’s claim highlights the substantial reputational and site-security risks facing firms with links to Israeli entities, particularly defence and government-linked entities. In the coming weeks, PA claims of Barclay’s divestment will likely incentivise further disruptive protests against Israeli-linked firms, including those with tangential or perceived links. Risks of PA action will be most acute in the UK, where the group is most disruptive, though offshoot chapters and similar groups operate throughout Europe and North America, increasing the risks for staff and assets in these regions.
FORECAST
Iran’s increasingly belligerent rhetoric and threats of retaliation against Israel will elevate bystander security risks across the region in the coming weeks, particularly in Iraq. Iranian retaliation against Israel remains a realistic possibility in the coming weeks following the US election. Such retaliation will likely involve an increase in the rate of attacks against Israel by Iranian proxies, including the Iran-backed Houthis and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI). It is possible that such attacks will be co-ordinated to overwhelm Israeli air defences. The prospects for such an attack will elevate the likelihood of Israel conducting pre-emptive strikes against Iranian proxies in the region, particularly IRI, which has gradually escalated its attacks against Israel over the past month. These will elevate bystander security risks in areas near militant positions in Iraq in the coming weeks. However, Israeli strikes in Iraq will likely elevate regional tensions and the risk of attacks against US personnel in the region due to US support for Israel. As such, the US will likely press Israel to limit its operations to those designed either to disrupt an imminent attack or to retaliate following confirmed strikes. However, there is also a realistic possibility that Israel will respond to increasing hostility from IRI with sporadic strikes against IRI targets across Iraq that are neither retaliatory nor necessarily pre-emptive in nature. Such an expansion in the accepted operational sphere of the IDF will likely require US approval, which Israel would be more likely to receive under a Trump presidency, underlining the risk of regional escalation if the former president Donald Trump is elected on 5 November.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
- A successful terror attack by LH and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting LH and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- Israel re-launches widespread, high-intensity military operations in Gaza
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
- An IDF-targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)
- An LH strike causes a mass casualty event in Israel
- An IDF strike causes a mass casualty event in Lebanon
- An IDF strike kills civilians in Lebanon
(Source: Sibylline)
03 Nov 24. Israeli Naval Commandos Capture Operative in Northern Lebanon. Israeli naval commandos captured Imad Amhaz, whom the Israeli Defense Forces claim holds a senior position in Hezbollah’s naval operations, in a rare and deep incursion into northern Lebanon. The Friday attack was carried out by members of the Shayetet 13 force. It took place on the coast in Batroun, around 140 kilometers (87 miles) north of Israel’s maritime border. Israeli officials said Amhaz was brought back to Israel and is being interrogated by Unit 504, an intelligence unit focused on human intelligence. Lebanese authorities condemned the raid as a violation of national sovereignty. Security forces in Lebanon have started an investigation, collecting statements from eyewitnesses who saw an armed force storming Amhaz’s rented chalet and taking him away by boat. Caretaker Public Works Minister Ali Hamieh said Lebanon plans to file a complaint with the United Nations Security Council, demanding accountability for what they described as an “unjustified attack” on Lebanese soil. Amhaz’s family has denied any links to Hezbollah, stating that he is a civilian boat captain studying at a local maritime institute. His father called on Lebanese and international agencies to intervene, asserting that his son has no ties to political or militant groups. Hezbollah-affiliated media criticized the raid, accusing Israel of aggression without providing further details. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
03 Nov 24. IDF Kills More Hezbollah Commanders in Retaliatory Strikes in Lebanon. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) carried out targeted strikes against Hezbollah commanders in southern Lebanon over the weekend. Among those killed was Jaafar Khader Faour, a key figure in Hezbollah’s Nasser Brigade rocket unit. The IDF stated Faour was responsible for numerous attacks on northern Israel since October 2023. The IDF also reported killing Farouk Amin Al-Asi, the Hezbollah commander for the Khiam area, and Yousef Ahmed Noun, a commander in Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force. Both men were reportedly involved in recent rocket and anti-tank attacks on Israeli towns, including Metula in the Galilee region. These strikes came after a Hezbollah attack on Metula killed an Israeli farmer and four foreign workers on Thursday, followed by another strike near Haifa that left two people dead. In response, the IDF has increased operations along the Lebanon border, targeting Hezbollah’s positions, locating weaponry, and dismantling militant cells with support from the Israeli Air Force. In Gaza, the IDF continued operations in areas like Jabaliya and Rafah, where dozens of militants were killed in air and ground strikes aimed at dismantling terror networks and locating weapons. IDF units are engaged in similar operations in southern Lebanon, focusing on Hezbollah targets and infrastructure. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
A CNIM Group Company
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-