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Military And Security Developments
Nov 01.
01 Nov 24. Statement From Pentagon Press Secretary Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder on Middle East Force Posture Updates
Pentagon Press Secretary Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder provided the following statement:
In keeping with our commitments to the protection of U.S. citizens and forces in the Middle East, the defense of Israel, and de-escalation through deterrence and diplomacy, the Secretary of Defense ordered the deployment of additional ballistic missile defense destroyers, fighter squadron and tanker aircraft, and several U.S. Air Force B-52 long-range strike bombers to the region. These forces will begin to arrive in coming months as the USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN Carrier Strike Group prepares to depart.
These deployments build on the recent decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system to Israel as well as DoD’s sustained Amphibious Ready Group Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU) posture in the Eastern Mediterranean. These movements demonstrate the flexible nature of U.S. global defense posture and U.S. capability to deploy world-wide on short notice to meet evolving national security threats.
Secretary Austin continues to make clear that should Iran, its partners, or its proxies use this moment to target American personnel or interests in the region, the United States will take every measure necessary to defend our people.
(Source: U.S. DoD)
Oct 31.
KEY POINTS
• Despite reports of progress in ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) such an agreement remains unlikely in the short term.
• Israel’s legislation against the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) will likely undermine humanitarian conditions in Gaza and increase diplomatic tensions.
• Gaza Strip: Accidental destruction of a five-story building underscores severe misfire and bystander security risks. On 29 October, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck and destroyed a five-story building in Beit Lahia (North Gaza governorate). The Hamas-run Gazan Health Ministry claims the strike killed at least 93 individuals. The IDF claims the area was evacuated but has acknowledged possible civilian casualties and is investigating the incident. Media reports citing unidentified IDF sources claim that the IDF was targeting a Hamas operative on the roof of the building and that the strike did not intend to collapse the building. The incident reflects the severe risks of misfire driving bystander risks surrounding active IDF operations.
• Israel-West Bank: Settler shooting of personnel from the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas’ calls for intensified attacks on Israeli settlers will drive intercommunal violence. On 29 October, alleged Israeli settlers from the Havat Gilad settlement (Nablus governorate) shot and moderately injured two PA security personnel. On the same day, Hamas in the West Bank issued a call for the Palestinian population to increase their resistance to growing violence from Israeli settlers. The incident reflects increasing ethno-religious tensions in the West Bank, elevating risks of attacks by both Israeli settlers and Palestinian militants.
• Israel-Lebanon: An uptick in LH cross-border strikes targeting northern Israel and civilian casualties highlights elevated security risks in open areas outside of cities. On 29 October, an LH drone hit a pedestrian bridge near the train station in Nahariya (Northern district); the strike caused material damage to the bridge and a nearby train carriage. Earlier on 31 October, shrapnel from LH rockets killed two civilians and lightly injured one in an agricultural area near Gilam Junction, east of Kiryat Ata (Haifa district). Earlier that day, LH rockets killed five agricultural workers and critically injured one near Metula (Northern district). The incidents underscore elevated exposure to rocket fire in open and agricultural areas outside Israeli population centres since these areas are often not covered by the Iron Dome air defence system.
• Israel-Lebanon: Intensive strikes in Baalbek (Baalbek-Hermel governorate) following evacuation orders underscores intensifying IDF operations. On 30 October, the IDF ordered Lebanese residents of Ain Bourday, Baalbek and Duris (all Baalbek-Hermel governorate) to evacuate their homes. In the following hours, the IDF launched an intense airstrike campaign targeting LH infrastructure in the area, which killed at least 20 individuals. The strikes, deep in Lebanese territory, underscore an expansion in the scope and scale of IDF operations across the country, elevating security risks (including in eastern Lebanon). The latest air strikes and evacuation orders will likely increase the flow of displaced populations into urban centres, compounding threats to population health, including from infectious disease outbreaks; they will also drive clashes with local Lebanese security forces.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• On 29 October, the Knesset passed two bills severely restricting the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)’s operations in Israel, increasing socio-economic health concerns in the Palestinian Territories. The first bill prevents UNRWA from operating in Israeli territory; Israel has stated it will also implement the legislation in East Jerusalem and other areas in the West Bank under its administration. A complimentary bill also bans Israeli officials from communicating with UNRWA; this will prevent Israeli authorities from co-ordinating the movement of UNRWA personnel and aid supplies from Israel into Gaza and the West Bank. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office stated that Israel will work with ‘international partners’ to ensure aid reaches communities currently reliant on UNRWA services. However, it did not specify which aid agencies it would work with. The bills have drawn significant criticism from numerous international partners, including the EU, UK and US, increasing regional and diplomatic tensions. The legislation will take effect on 26 January 2025, significantly increasing threats to food security and socio-economic health in the Palestinian Territories (see FORECAST).
• The Israeli government adopted legislation incentivising the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, highlighting elevated ethno-religious tensions in the West Bank and Jerusalem areas. On 29 October, the Knesset passed an amendment to the ‘Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel’ which bans the opening of new consulates in Jerusalem to provide services to Palestinians. The bill includes clauses calling for the government to encourage the establishment of embassies in the city, highlighting continued government efforts to gain recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital from international parties. Although the bill is unlikely to restrict access to existing consular services for Palestinians, there is a realistic possibility of the Israeli government advancing additional legislation that restricts Palestinians’ access to services (whether diplomatic or humanitarian) in the coming months. Such efforts will likely increase regulatory framework risks for firms with operations in the West Bank, particularly NGOs serving Palestinian communities. Continued restrictions to public and diplomatic services will likely increase ethno-religious tensions in the Jerusalem area, increasing risks of protests and unrest (particularly in the East Jerusalem area).
• In Israel, legislative disputes over subsidies for ultra-Orthodox families highlight sustained tensions over conscription reform, elevating risks of protests and unrest. On 28 October, United Torah Judaism announced the submission of a bill allowing the government to subsidise daycare costs for ultra-Orthodox children based on their mothers’ employment status. The bill would effectively nullify orders by the Attorney General to stop issuing daycare subsidies for the children of ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students who have defied conscription notices (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 12 August 2024). The bill highlights increasing legislative disputes over government efforts to enforce conscription notices. In the coming weeks, legislative efforts to enforce and reform conscription practices will likely further exacerbate tensions with the ultra-Orthodox communities, increasing risks of protest activity. On 31 October, dozens of ultra-Orthodox demonstrators gathered outside the Tel HaShomer base (Tel Aviv district) to protest the conscription of ultra-Orthodox men into the IDF. Protesters blocked traffic moving along roads near the base, highlighting increasing risks of disruption to overland movement and supply chain continuity as anti-conscription protests remobilise.
• Despite rumours of an Israeli-proposed 60-day ceasefire in southern Lebanon, prospects for an agreement in the short term remain low. On 30 October, international media began circulating a document purporting to be a leaked Israeli ceasefire proposal to LH. The proposal includes terms establishing a 60-day ceasefire, the withdrawal of LH from south of the Litani River, a heavy deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces to the Israel-Lebanon border and international enforcement mechanisms to prevent LH from re-arming in future. Although the US has stated that the document does not ‘reflect the current state of negotiations’, international pressure to reach a ceasefire agreement remains high. Even so, we assess that neither Israel nor LH will agree to these terms in the short term; the IDF aims to complete ground operations in southern Lebanon and LH will almost certainly oppose clauses affording the IDF freedom of movement.
• LH appointed Naim Qassem as its leader, indicating a continuation of LH’s political and military goals, particularly regarding a ceasefire agreement with Israel. On 29 October, LH’s Shura Council announced that Qassem would succeed Hassan Nasrallah as the group’s secretary general. Qassem is a founding member of LH and served as Nasrallah’s deputy secretary-general for over 30 years. Although Qassem is a less charismatic and popular figure than Nasrallah, his long tenure within LH’s Shura council and lack of competitors will likely consolidate support for him within LH’s leadership. In a speech on 30 October, Qassem stated that LH would accept a ceasefire with Israel under ‘acceptable terms’ but that no such deal has been presented; this position is largely contiguous with statements made by Nasrallah over the past year. As such, Qassem’s leadership is unlikely to increase prospects for a ceasefire agreement in the short term.
• The Spanish government expanded its commitments to boycotting Israeli defence exports, highlighting increasing risks of operational disruption in the defence and weapons sectors. On 29 October, Spain’s Interior Ministry announced it had cancelled a contract to buy ammunition from an Israeli firm. The ministry cited Spain’s prior commitments to not selling weapons to Israel and stated that this would now extend to procuring weapons and ammunition from Israeli firms. Israeli firms will also be excluded from any outstanding tenders with the Spanish police and security forces. The announcement highlights increasing regulatory risks for Israeli firms with operations in Europe, particularly in the security, armaments and technology industries. As the Israel-Hamas and Israel-Hizballah wars continue, Israeli firms will face elevated risks of public-sector bodies cancelling procurement contracts, particularly in states where there is significant public pressure to boycott Israeli exports and entities. Firms with links to Israel, particularly the Israeli government, will also likely face elevated regulatory scrutiny; however, they are unlikely to face unilateral divestment from public sector entities in the short term.
• Israel-Lebanon: Increased range of IDF operations, evacuation orders will drive socio-economic risks. On 30 October, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed at least 19 people in airstrikes in Baalbek (Baalbek-Hermel governorate). This came after the IDF issued an evacuation order for the city several hours before. The latest wave of airstrikes underscores an intensification of Israel’s operations in Lebanon, particularly in the Beqaa Valley, driving further internal displacement. This comes amid growing signals of possible progress in ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Lebanese Hizballah (LH). As such, there is a realistic possibility that the IDF will intensify its military operations across Lebanon in the coming weeks, pushing to achieve its war objectives before a ceasefire is agreed. The IDF is unlikely to push its ground operations much further to the north, with only a remote chance that operations will push north of the Litani River. However, we assess that an expansion of its airstrike campaign (including in eastern Lebanon) is likely. This will further elevate security risks across Lebanon, likely driving population displacement and increasing socio-economic risks.
Oct 29.
• Israel-Palestinian Territories: UNRWA ban drives critical food security, public health risks in Gaza. On 28 October, the Knesset passed a law banning the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) from operating within Israel’s sovereign territory, including in East Jerusalem. A second law was also passed, stating that Israel would sever all ties and communication with UNRWA. The legislation will prevent the organisation from providing education, health and civil services to hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in East Jerusalem. Furthermore, the organisation’s operations in Gaza will likely be severely impacted as it relies heavily on co-ordination with the Israeli authorities. These will elevate humanitarian concerns, public health and food and water security risks for Palestinian civilians (particularly in Gaza) in the coming weeks. We assess that the decision will likely further elevate diplomatic tensions between Israel and the international community (including the US), elevating risks of sanctions as well as reputational risks for businesses affiliated with Israel over the coming months.
Oct 28.
KEY POINTS
• The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strike against Iranian military infrastructure has elevated regional tensions, though imminent Iranian retaliation is unlikely; Tehran’s initial response is likely to be conducted via increased proxy action.
• Egypt’s offer regarding an incremental ceasefire in Gaza is unlikely to be accepted, though it underscores renewed efforts in negotiations.
• Gaza Strip: On 24 October, several Jewish Israeli individuals attempted to breach the Israel-Gaza border near the Erez crossing (Southern district). The individuals did not successfully enter Gaza and were later detained by the Israeli security forces. The incursion followed increasingly inflammatory rhetoric from pro-settlement figures within Israel calling for the re-establishment of settlements within Gaza (see POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS). In the coming weeks, continued efforts to corral political support for settlement re-establishment in Gaza will possibly trigger further border incursion efforts, elevating the risk of localised clashes with the Israeli security forces. Such clashes will moderately elevate the risk of disruption impacting cross-border movement, particularly for humanitarian aid convoys, consequently increasing security risks for NGO staff during transit.
• Israel-West Bank: The IDF arrested 11 wanted individuals amid persistent counter-terrorism operations in the West Bank. On 27 October, the IDF conducted operations in Nablus governorate, as well as in Beit Ummar (Hebron governorate) and Salfit (Salfit governorate, all West Bank). It uncovered weapons stashes and money that it suspects is being used to finance terror activities. Further operations are likely in the coming days, elevating travel disruption risks and ethno-religious tensions. Clashes between the IDF and Palestinian militants, particularly in northern Gaza, remain possible, elevating bystander risks.
• Israel-Lebanon: Over the weekend, LH continued to intensify cross-border rocket launches against northern Israel. On 25 October, an LH rocket barrage killed two civilians and injured seven others in Majd al-Krum (Northern district). On 27 October, LH launched over 75 rockets in a single barrage, triggering sirens in the Upper Galilee region (Northern). Later on the same day, a drone directly struck a defence industry factory in Acre (Northern); shrapnel injured two civilians. These cross-border rocket and drone attacks continue to focus primarily on northern Israel; the range of such attacks remains largely within 25 miles (40km) of the Israel-Lebanon border. However, the recent incidents highlight the elevated security risks facing civilians within this strike range, particularly in population centres close to military bases or defence sector factories.
• Iran-Israel: The IDF strike against Iranian military infrastructure has sustained the risk of armed conflict and elevated regional tensions. In the early hours of 26 October, Israel carried out a retaliatory strike against Iran for the latter’s 1 October missile attack against Israel. The IDF struck Iran in three waves; fighter jets and unmanned drones hit approximately 20 targets across Iran (though mainly in the west of the country, as well as Khuzestan and Tehran provinces). Israel focused its strike on missile and drone manufacturing capabilities, as well as Iran’s air defence and early detection assets. Official Iranian reports claim the strike killed five individuals, though unofficial and unconfirmed reports claim there were at least 20 casualties. The strike has elevated regional tensions and the risk of armed conflict. However, immediate direct retaliation by Iran against Israel is unlikely (see FORECAST).
• Israel-Syria: Retaliation by Syria is unlikely following Israel’s strike on Syrian air defences shortly before its strike on Iran. On 26 October, Israel struck several radar and surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems in as-Suwayda, Daraa, Homs and Rif Dimashq governorates (all Syria). The IDF conducted the strikes shortly before its attack on Iran, likely in an effort to reduce the risks facing its air force, as well as to augment its freedom of movement in the region. It is unlikely that Syria will respond to the Israeli strike militarily, though sustained regional tensions will drive the continued flow of arms and Iranian and Iran-aligned personnel through Syria.
• Iran-Israel: Israeli strikes will sustain regional tensions; imminent Iranian retaliation is unlikely. On 26 October, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched three waves of strikes against Iran involving fighter jets and drones; the strikes targeted 20 locations (see Sibylline Alert – 26 October 2024). Satellite footage shows damage to Iran’s Parchin and Khojir military complexes (both Tehran province). These sites house key missile-production infrastructure. Furthermore, Israel struck all four of Iran’s S-300 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, including the unit at Imam Khomeini International Airport (IKA) near the capital Tehran. Israel struck other air defence sites that protect critical energy infrastructure, as well as missile and drone positions and facilities in western and south-western Iran. Despite the damage, we assess that Iran is unlikely to retaliate directly against Israel in the coming days. However, currently elevated regional tensions will be sustained. Iran’s regional proxies will likely increase the frequency of their missile and drone attacks against Israel in the coming weeks, maintaining the current security and bystander risks facing major urban centres in Israel (as well as areas in the vicinity of energy infrastructure and ports). (Source: Sibylline)
28 Oct 24. Israeli Strike in Iran Should Mark End of Tit-For-Tat Between Two Nations. On Friday, Israel conducted a precision strike against military targets in Iran. The strike was a response to an Oct. 1 attack where Iran launched about 200 ballistic missiles into Israel. While most of the missiles from that attack against Israel were destroyed before reaching their target, some did impact and cause minimal damage.
During a call this weekend with Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III reaffirmed the American ironclad commitment to Israel’s security and support for its right to defend itself. He said Iran should not respond to Israel’s strikes but should instead consider this the end of the two-nation exchange.
“We believe that this should be the end of this tit-for-tat,” said Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh during a meeting today with reporters. “We don’t think that Iran should or needs to respond. On Oct. 1, Iran launched the 200 ballistic missiles that were targeting civilian population centers. Israel’s response was targeted at military targets. We see this as a way to off-ramp.”
Since the terrorist group Hamas attacked Israel Oct. 7, 2023, and during the ongoing Israeli response to that attack, the U.S. has continued to emphasize that it remains well-postured to defend its forces, facilities and partners in the region and remains determined to prevent any actor from exploiting tensions or expanding conflict in the region.
“The secretary also discussed the opportunities that now exist to use diplomacy to dial down tensions in the region, including a hostage release and cease-fire deal in Gaza and an agreement in Lebanon that allows civilians on both sides of the blue line to return safely to their homes,” Singh said.
North Korean Soldiers Train in Russia
The Russians have suffered some 500,000 casualties since their illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Now, said Singh, the Russians have turned to North Korea to get assistance in their ongoing war in Ukraine.
“We have seen reports from over the weekend indicating that soldiers have started arriving in western Russia,” Singh said. “We believe that the DPRK has sent around 10,000 soldiers in total to train in eastern Russia that will probably augment Russian forces near Ukraine over the next several weeks.”
Some of those soldiers have already moved closer to Ukraine, and Singh said defense officials are concerned Russia intends to use those soldiers either in combat or to support combat operations against Ukrainian forces in Russia’s Kursk Oblast.
“Should DPRK soldiers be used on the battlefield, this would mark a further escalation and highlights President Putin’s increasing desperation as Russia has suffered extraordinary casualties on the battlefield,” Singh said. ” an indication that Putin may be in more trouble than people realize.”
Later this week, Austin will host South Korean Minister of National Defense Kim Yong-hyun at the Pentagon for the 56th U.S./Republic of Korea Security Consultative Meeting, Singh said.
The recent deployment of North Korean troops to Russia will likely be a topic of discussion at the meeting, Singh said. (Source: U.S. DoD)
25 Oct 24. Readout of 35th U.S.-Egypt Military Cooperation Committee.
Pentagon Spokesperson Tom Crosson provided the following readout:
The United States and Egypt held the 35th annual U.S.-Egypt Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) in Washington, D.C. on Oct. 23-24, 2024. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for the Middle East Daniel B. Shapiro, and Egypt Assistant Minister of Defense for Foreign Relations Major General Walaa Bibers, co-chaired the event for the United States and Egypt, respectively.
Building on last year’s strategic forum in Cairo, the MCC reinforced the strong U.S.-Egypt defense partnership through discussions on enhancing security cooperation, shared regional concerns, and building on critical security assistance programs. The delegations exchanged perspectives on regional security challenges, including the conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, and Sudan, Houthi threats to the free flow of global commerce in the Red Sea, and the destabilizing activities by Iran and Iran-backed terrorist groups. Both sides agreed on the importance of enhancing regional security integration and deepening U.S.-Egyptian military cooperation.
DASD Shapiro expressed appreciation for Egypt’s ongoing efforts to facilitate Gaza hostage release and ceasefire talks, as well as Egypt’s role in deescalating regional tensions. He reiterated that the United States seeks a diplomatic resolution along the Israel-Lebanon border that would allow civilians on both sides to return safely to their homes, the release of all hostages held by Hamas, and increased delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in need. DASD Shapiro and Major General Bibers reaffirmed the enduring U.S. and Egyptian commitment to the bilateral strategic relationship and preserving regional stability. (Source: U.S. DoD)
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