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Military And Security Developments
Oct 26.
26 Oct 24. Sibylline reported that at approximately 0230hrs (local time) on 26 October, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) began conducting a series of strikes inside Iran. Footage circulating on social media indicates that several explosions occurred near the capital Tehran, including in the vicinity of Imam Khomeini International Airport (TEH). At the time of writing, the Iranian authorities have not commented on the strikes; they have not mentioned the possible material damage to targeted locations or any resultant casualties. Local media sources in Syria also reported on strikes targeting Damascus and Homs governorates (both Syria); IDF aircraft also reportedly flew at low altitudes over Iraq.
SIGNIFICANCE
- The strikes come amid significantly elevated regional tensions due to the ongoing Middle East crisis. On 1 October, Iran launched over 180 ballistic missiles towards Israel, causing minor damage to three air bases (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 3 October 2024).
- Following a period of elevated tensions, Iran fired over 300 missiles and drones towards Israel on 13-14 April. In response, Israel allegedly conducted airstrikes against Isfahan (Isfahan province, Iran) and Tabriz (East Azerbaijan province, Iran) on 19 April. Iran did not ascribe blame for these strikes, moderately reducing regional tensions (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 22 April 2024).
- At the time of writing, the target(s) of the latest airstrikes remain unclear. However, the IDF claims that its attacks primarily targeted military infrastructure.
FORECAST
There is a realistic possibility that Israel will launch additional strikes on Iranian targets in the coming hours, sustaining security and bystander risks nationwide. In the coming hours, there is a realistic possibility that further airstrikes will target Iranian military infrastructure, particularly Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) assets. Nearby civilian population centres will face substantially elevated security and collateral risks due to strike debris and possible secondary explosions. While unlikely overall, it is possible that the IDF will also target communications and data centres associated with the IRGC and Iranian security forces, many of which are located in residential areas. Any such strike would significantly elevate the threat to nearby assets and civilians, particularly in densely populated areas. To limit any media coverage of potential strike-related damage to IRGC locations, the authorities will likely restrict movement to and from targeted locations in the coming days, disrupting travel and supply chain continuity, particularly in Tehran.
Iran is unlikely to retaliate with direct strikes against Israel in the coming days, though regional tensions will remain substantially elevated. An immediate Iranian strike against Israel remains highly unlikely at the time of writing. In the coming hours, the Iranian authorities will begin to assess possible damage to targeted locations, particularly military positions. In the event of critical damage to military or IRGC infrastructure, personnel casualties, damage to dual-use infrastructure and/or civilian casualties, a direct Iranian response will become more likely in the coming weeks. The risk of further clashes between Israel and Iran will almost certainly further exacerbate regional tensions and increase the risk of armed conflict, undermining regional stability.
Iran’s numerous regional proxies will likely escalate their attacks against Israel in the coming days, increasing pressure on Israeli air defence systems and elevating security and bystander risks. Iran-backed groups such as Lebanese Hizballah (LH), the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) and the Yemen-based Houthis will likely launch missile and drone attacks against Israel in the coming days. Although rocket and drone attacks will likely continue primarily targeting locations in northern Israel, particularly Haifa (Haifa district), sporadic attacks targeting cities in central Israel, particularly Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), will remain highly likely. Intensified rocket attacks and drone incursions will increase pressure on air defence systems, increasing the likelihood of successful strikes and driving elevated security and bystander risks throughout Israel. Even in the event of successful interceptions, shrapnel from munitions and interceptors will also elevate the collateral risks facing staff and assets. (Source: Sibylline)
The Daily Telegraph reported that Israel’s attack on Iran is ‘an escalation’, warns Hamas.
Hamas has condemned Israel’s attack on Iran as an “escalation”, calling it a violation of Iran’s sovereignty and a threat to regional security.
“We strongly condemn the Zionist regime’s aggression against Iran which targeted military sites in several provinces,” Hamas said on Saturday.
“This is a clear violation of Iran’s sovereignty and an escalation aimed at undermining regional security and the security of its people,” the terrorist organisation added.
Israel hit multiple military targets across Iran in the early hours of Saturday in a long-awaited retaliation for missile barrage from Iran at the start of the month. The terror group blamed Israel and the US for any fallout of the strikes, which targeted at least three Iranian provinces.
“We hold the occupying regime, backed by the US, fully responsible for the consequences of this aggression,” Hamas said.
26 October 2024 9:28am
9:28AM
Israel’s worked in ‘close coordination’ with US, according to source
Israel conducted a “calculated” attack on Iran’s military sites in “close coordination” with the United States, a source familiar with the issue told The Telegraph.
“The attack was extensive but designed in such a way that it showed the Israeli public that Iran was hit hard, but at the same time giving Iran a chance to chose not to respond,” said the source, reported by Jotam Confino in Tel-Aviv.
“Israel was encouraged about the UK’s reaction, which reaffirmed Israel’s right to defend itself.,” the source added. “Israel is looking to wrap up the war in Gaza and bring the hostages home”
9:14AM
Russia gave Iran heads up hours before Israeli strikes began
Sky News Arabia, quoting an unnamed source, said that Russia warned Iran ahead of the impending Israeli airstrikes this morning.
The report said that the intelligence was provided hours before Israel announced the waves of strikes on Iranian military targets.
9:13AM
US vows to defend Israel after largest ever direct attack on Iran
The US has vowed to defend Israel after it launched a direct attack on Iran in a double wave of airstrikes across the country.
Lloyd Austin, the US defence secretary, told his Israeli counterpart Yoav Gallant that the US would defend Israel from “threats from Iran and Iran-based terrorist organisations” and that it was determined to prevent escalation in the Middle East.
Mr Austin “reaffirmed” the US’ “ironclad commitment… to Israel’s security and self-defence”.
Israel hit multiple military targets across Iran in the early hours of Saturday in a long-awaited retaliation for missile barrage from Iran at the start of the month.
A senior official in US President Joe Biden’s administration said that Israel’s retaliatory strike on Iran was “targeted and proportional with a low risk of civilian harm”. (Source: Daily Telegraph)
Oct 25.
- Israel-Palestinian Territories: Border breach highlights growing far-right settler movement. Late on 24 October, several Israeli right-wing activists attempting to enter the Gaza Strip breached the barrier at the Erez Crossing. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) apprehended the group and turned them over to the Israeli police, leading to six arrests. Further crossing attempts are likely, elevating risks of sporadic clashes between activists and the security forces, possibly elevating far-right domestic unrest near Gaza borders and crossings. The incident reflects a growing far-right settler movement, backed by rhetoric of far-right Israeli politicians. Far-right activists will likely continue increasing their activities also in the West Bank, elevating ethno-religious tensions and risks of violent clashes with local Palestinian populations. As a result, risks of radicalisation, increased Palestinian militant activity and attacks in the West Bank will likely grow over the coming months, driving elevated security risks. We assess that continued supportive rhetoric by Israeli politicians will also increase the likelihood of international sanctions on far-right entities (and possibly Israeli officials) in the coming months. This will elevate diplomatic tensions and reputational risks.
Oct 24.
KEY POINTS
• The intensification of cross-border strikes by both the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) will likely continue in the coming days, elevating bystander risks.
• Israel’s national day of mourning for the 7 October 2023 attack (on 27 October) will elevate attack and security risks across Israel in the coming days.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF’s 162nd Division has expanded clearing operations in Jabalia (North Gaza governorate); the IDF claims to have arrested more than 200 militants in Jabalia since 6 October, likely undermining the Palestinian militant presence in the area. While Gazan militants remain active in the area, the evacuation of 20,000 civilians along IDF-designated routes in recent days (which militants often attempt to disrupt) likely reflects a weakening of Gazan militant presence and activities in the area. However, even on IDF-designated safe routes, security risks in the area will likely remain high in the coming days, including for NGO staff.
• Israel-West Bank: Clashes between Jewish pilgrims and the Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces highlight elevated ethno-religious tensions. On the night of 21 October, dozens of Israeli Jewish pilgrims entered Joseph’s Tomb on the outskirts of Nablus (Nablus governorate) without co-ordinating with the IDF. Local media reports claim members of the PA security forces clashed with the pilgrims, forcefully evicting them from the area with the assistance of the IDF, who turned them over to Israeli police for illegally entering the West Bank’s Area. The incident reflects elevated ethno-religious tensions and risks of localised violent clashes between Israeli and Palestinian populations in the West Bank, particularly during religious holidays. These will likely elevate radicalisation and attack risks throughout the West Bank near Palestinian and Israeli population centres, religious sites and positions held by the security forces in the coming weeks.
• Israel-Lebanon: During this monitoring period LH has increased the frequency and scope of its cross-border hostilities, including towards central Israel. LH rockets triggered sirens in central Israel, including in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), on 22 and 23 October. Interceptor debris in Herzliya (Tel Aviv) caused light material damage; a rocket also struck in Qalqilya governorate (West Bank) lightly injured one Palestinian. Additionally, between 23 and 24 October, LH increased the intensity and frequency of its rocket launches towards Nahariya (Northern district, Israel) injuring an unspecified number of civilians. It is possible that LH is targeting the IDF’s Shraga Camp, south of Nahariya, which serves as the command centre for the Golani brigade and the Egoz unit. Recorded cases of civilian injuries and material damage reflect persistently elevated bystander security risks across Israel, including by interceptor debris. These risks will likely gradually increase in the coming week in line with LH’s escalation in hostilities, including in central Israel; LH will likely increase the frequency of its rocket barrages in the region.
• Israel-Lebanon: Following the increase in LH rocket launches, the IDF intensified its airstrikes in the capital Beirut. On 23 October, the IDF struck and destroyed six buildings in Beirut’s Dahieh suburb and continued its intensified strikes in the area throughout the night. The IDF also targeted the offices of LH-affiliated broadcaster, Al-Mayadeen. These strikes were likely a response to LH rockets targeting central Israel and injuring civilians in northern Israel in the past few days. A gradual uptick in IDF strikes is likely in the coming days, sustaining elevated bystander security risks in Beirut and Lebanon more broadly (see Forecast).
• Israel-Lebanon: An IDF strike allegedly killed three Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) personnel facilitating medical evacuations in Yatar (Nabatieh governorate, Lebanon) highlighting bystander security risks near conflict zones. Yatar is approximately 2.8 miles (4.6km) north of the Israel-Lebanon border. The IDF confirmed it is investigating the incident, claiming it targeted a building controlled by LH operatives and is checking whether its strike accidentally hit the nearby LAF soldiers. Additionally, the IDF stated it does not deliberately target LAF personnel. In the past week, there have been growing reports of incidents in which the IDF harmed civilians and other non-involved parties near conflict zones in southern Lebanon. These reflect severe bystander security risks in southern Lebanon, particularly near IDF combat operations close to the Israel-Lebanon border.
• Israel-Syria: Deadly IDF air strikes reflect active Israeli operations against pro-Iran proxies in Syria, underlining expanding regional bystander security and conflict spillover risks. Earlier on 24 October, reports from Syrian local media claimed Israel conducted two airstrikes in the capital Damascus and Al-Qusayr (Homs governorate). The first strike killed one unidentified person and injured three others, while the second, targeting a vehicle near a Syrian government checkpoint, killed one Syrian Army soldier and injured four others. The incidents reflect active efforts by Israel to disrupt weapon transfers to LH through Syria and the continued targeting of pro-Iran proxies in Syria. It is unlikely that the killing of the Syrian Army soldier will prompt retaliation by the Syrian government against Israel. However, the incident highlights the elevated collateral damage risks to personnel and assets active in Syria’s border areas.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• The World Health Organization (WHO) has suspended its polio vaccination campaign in northern Gaza, highlighting deteriorating humanitarian conditions and increasing public health risks. On 23 October, the WHO announced the indefinite postponement of the second phase of its vaccination campaign in northern Gaza due to a lack of humanitarian pauses, intense IDF airstrikes and escalating violence. Following the detection of a polio case in Gaza on 23 August, the WHO launched a two-phase campaign to address the significant risk of an imminent outbreak (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 29 August 2024). Although the first phase was completed in September, the oral polio vaccine requires two doses administered within six weeks to be fully effective. As such, disruption to the second phase will critically undermine efforts to immunise the 120,000 minors resident in northern Gaza. Partial immunisation is unlikely to prevent the spread of polio, elevating the risks of an outbreak in northern Gaza. As intensified IDF operations continue in the Jabalia area, humanitarian conditions are highly likely to continue deteriorating, highlighting critical threats to civilians and NGO employees, particularly those engaged in efforts to deliver aid to active conflict zones.
• Israel will send a delegation to ceasefire negotiations in the coming days, however, Hamas has not confirmed its attendance, undermining prospects for successful mediation. Earlier on 24 October, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken announced that Israeli negotiators would travel to Qatar in the coming days to meet with US representatives to revive ceasefire negotiations. Qatar’s Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed Al Thani stated that Hamas representatives had recently ‘re-engaged’ with the Qatari authorities, though their participation in further negotiations remains unconfirmed. More broadly, the current leadership of Hamas’ Political Bureau remains unclear following the death of Yahya Sinwar on 15 October. Since 21 October, regional media sources stated that Hamas will not appoint a successor until the bureau’s next elections in March. As such, a committee will likely continue to run Hamas’ political operations, increasing risks of stalling ceasefire negotiations due to possible factionalism and committee disunity. As such, a ceasefire agreement remains highly unlikely in the short term, particularly as IDF operations continue at pace in northern Gaza.
• The United Nations has stated that the Israel-Hizballah war will likely trigger significant economic contraction in Lebanon, highlighting substantial socio-economic health concerns. On 24 October, France began hosting a humanitarian conference in the capital Paris which aims to raise over USD 540m in humanitarian aid for Lebanon. The conference follows the release of a rapid assessment, conducted by the UN Development Program, on the economic impact of the Israel-Hizballah war. The assessment indicates that, compared to a no-war scenario, Lebanon’s GDP will likely decline by 9.2% by the end of 2024, decreasing trade activity by 21% and undermining GDP growth until at least 2026. This indicates that the economic fallout from the conflict will be greater than the 2006 Israel-Hizballah war; it follows five years of economic contraction in Lebanon. The assessment highlights significant, long-term socio-economic health concerns which will likely be most acute in southern Lebanon, where intense IDF airstrikes have resulted in widespread damage to infrastructure. In the coming month, economic contraction and restricted trade activity will likely increase food security risks, increasing risks of common and opportunistic crime targeting retail outlets. Similarly, tensions linked to socio-economic conditions will possibly trigger an increase in ethno-religious tensions, increasing risks of intercommunal violence.
• The Israeli government has not extended the indemnification allowing Israeli banks to process transactions to Palestinian banks, highlighting increasing threats to economic stability in the West Bank. On 22 October, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen called on Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich to renew the indemnification that allows Israeli financial institutions to process transfers linked to Palestinian entities in the West Bank without violating existing sanctions. This waiver also partially facilitates fiscal transfers to the Palestinian Authority (PA). Smotrich last renewed the waiver on 30 June, which will expire on 30 October. Failure to renew the waiver would significantly restrict financial flows into the West Bank, undermining the PA’s stability, increasing socio-economic health concerns and elevating risks of domestic unrest. Smotrich previously leveraged delays to renewing the waiver to gain policy concessions regarding settlement expansion and outpost regularisation (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 1 July 2024). Smotrich will likely attempt to gain similar concessions in the coming days, possibly emboldening Israeli settlers to further expand settlements in the West Bank. This will increase ethno-religious tensions and elevate the risks of further US sanctions.
• Israel’s National Security Council (NSC) advised Israelis to leave several areas of Sri Lanka due risks of an attack on a Jewish cultural centre, highlighting sustained risks of ethno-religious violence. On 23 October, the NSC advised Israelis to immediately leave the Arugam Bay area (Eastern province) and the cities of Ahangame, Galle, Hikkaduwa and Weligama (all Southern province) due to safety concerns. The US embassy in Sri Lanka also issued a security alert indicating that it received credible information about a potential attack targeting popular tourist locations in Arugam Bay (see Sibylline Alert – 23 October 2024). The Sri Lankan police subsequently adopted an elevated posture around the Chabad House in Arugam Bay, indicating this was possibly the target. The warnings highlight elevated risks of violence targeting installations associated with the Jewish and Israeli communities worldwide, including religious, cultural and community centres. In the coming days, the Sri Lankan security forces will likely maintain an elevated posture around the Israeli embassy in the capital Colombo and locations associated with the Jewish community nationwide, moderating risks of successful attacks. However, localised security and bystander risks will remain elevated.
• Israel: High fiscal deficit, low growth amid ongoing wars will increase socio-economic health risks. On 22 October, the IMF published its updated growth and fiscal deficit forecast for Israel, slashing its estimates by almost half. Real GDP growth for Israel is projected at 0.7% and 2.7% for 2024 and 2025, respectively (as compared to the IMF’s previous projection in April of 1.6% and 5.4%). Similarly, the IMF forecasts that Israel’s financial deficit will be 9% of GDP in 2024, which is contrary to the 7% forecast by Israel’s finance ministry. This difference amounts to approximately USD 10.4 bn. The IMF’s estimates reflect growing concerns about the economic cost of Israel’s current wars and the ability of the Israeli government to pass all necessary budget cuts to restrain the financial deficit. We assess these challenges will likely continue to impact (and worsen) Israel’s socio-economic health, possibly decreasing investor confidence and the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country in the coming year.
Oct 23.
• Israel: Increased activity of Iranian spy rings highlights elevated bystander security risks. On 22 October, seven residents of East Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) were arrested by the Israeli police for allegedly spying on behalf of Iran and plotting to assassinate a nuclear scientist and a mayor of a large city in Israel. This marks the fifth publicised case of Iranian espionage operations in Israel since September. On 21 October, Israeli prosecutors announced the indictment of seven Jewish Israeli citizens from northern Israel who the authorities arrested in September for spying on military positions and Israeli officials over a two-year period. Iranian efforts to spy and possibly assassinate key figures will likely increase in the coming weeks, driving associated crossfire and bystander security risks. The main targets of such efforts will likely be Israeli officials and figures with key positions in Israel’s military or military industry complex, reducing physical risks incurred by the direct targeting of Western executives and staff. However, we assess that Iranian spy activities heighten the risks of industrial espionage, particularly within Israel’s tech and security sectors.
Oct 22.
• Germany: Foiled attack on Israeli embassy underscores elevated terrorist threat. On 20 October, the German authorities apprehended a Libyan asylum seeker who had concrete plans to attack the Israeli embassy in the capital Berlin. The authorities had rejected the 28-year-old man’s asylum claim but were unable to deport him, which will likely re-ignite calls for stricter immigration and asylum laws. According to media reports, the man had planned his attack for 21 October, which was foiled due to a tip by foreign intelligence services. This has renewed the debate concerning increasing powers for German intelligence services. Unlike other services, German intelligence is unable to access phone data directly due to privacy restrictions. Currently, there is a cross-party consensus to amend these powers but, due to disagreements pertaining to the scale of the changes, such changes will unlikely materialise in the near future. In the meantime, Germany will remain partially reliant on foreign services to neutralise the elevated terrorist threat. We assess that Jewish and Israeli institutions as well as ‘soft’ targets remain likely objectives for terrorist attacks in the run-up to the festive period.
• Lebanon: Forced evictions highlight risk of increasing intra-city violence, elevate humanitarian risks. On 21 October, Lebanese security force personnel clashed with displaced residents while enforcing a judicial order to evict them from an informal shelter in the Hamra area of the capital Beirut. Residents blocked adjacent roads for several hours, set fire to tyres and threw stones at the authorities. The incident underscores the risk of increasing violent domestic unrest due to the growing displacement of communities in Lebanon and within the city amid Israeli military operations in the country. The incident will likely drive further intra-city displacement, increasing eviction notices and exacerbating tensions between the authorities and residents. Further evictions will likely increase the risk of harm to bystanders in the proximity of informal shelters from sporadic clashes with the security forces. We assess that such evictions will also drive humanitarian risks for displaced residents. Clashes along ethno-religious lines are a realistic possibility, elevating the risk of sustained intercommunal violence, particularly amid increasing socio-economic concerns.
Oct 21.
KEY POINTS
• The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has targeted Lebanese Hizballah (LH)-associated financial institutions, elevating and extending socio-economic and security risks in Lebanon beyond strictly military targets.
• Hamas’ vacant leadership position and the lack of a successor have elevated factionalism risks; the prospect of successful ceasefire negotiations remains low.
• Gaza Strip: Nothing significant to report
• Israel-West Bank: The arrest of an individual planning to carry out terror attacks during hostage-release protests in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) highlights the currently elevated radicalisation and attack risks. On 18 October, local media reported the indictment of an individual from East Jerusalem who was planning to conduct attacks against Israeli civilians. According to the reports, the individual was arrested on 19 September. They were planning to carry out various acts, including planting explosives on trains in Tel Aviv and conducting an attack during hostage-release protests in the city. They planned to collaborate with militants associated with Hamas in the West Bank. The arrest highlights the growing risks of radicalisation and attacks targeting large population centres and crowded events in Israel.
• Israel-Lebanon: An LH drone strike against the Israeli prime minister’s residence highlights that the targeting of Israeli officials will possibly increase. On 19 October, three drones launched by LH crossed into Israel, two of which were intercepted (they triggered sirens around military facilities in Glilot), while the third struck the residence of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Caesarea (Haifa district), causing light material damage. No sirens were triggered in Caesarea. The PM and his family were not present in the house at the time of the attack. Notably, the IDF Home Front Command app did not register the sirens in Glilot. The IDF claimed this was because the sirens are confined to military facilities. However, the app would have previously registered this activity. The strike in Caesarea underscores the sustained elevated strike risks across Israel. Furthermore, the decision to target Netanyahu indicates a possible shift in targeting patterns, as well as the elevated collateral risks around government officials and symbols.
• Israel-Lebanon: IDF strikes targeting financial institutions supporting LH in Beirut underscore the elevated risks near all assets affiliated with LH. On 20 October, the IDF struck multiple targets across Lebanon, including in the capital Beirut’s Dahieh neighbourhood. It targeted financial institutions that it claims are financing LH, including assets of the al-Qard al-Hasan association. Prior to the strikes, the IDF warned civilians to stay away from and evacuate areas near facilities that are used to finance LH activities. The strikes highlight the risk of the IDF targeting non-military assets affiliated with LH. Such organisations are embedded throughout Lebanese society; many of them support non-LH activity, underlining the broader threats to the Lebanese population. Further strikes against LH-affiliated assets remain likely in the coming week, elevating bystander risks across Lebanon, including in Beirut.
• Israel-Lebanon: A strike against a Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) military vehicle underscores the severe security risks across southern Lebanon. On 20 October, the IDF killed three LAF soldiers in an airstrike against a military vehicle travelling along the road between Ain Ebel and Hanine (Nabatiyeh governorate). The IDF confirmed the strike; it also stated that the IDF is not targeting LAF soldiers, and that this incident was a case of mistaken identity (the LAF soldiers were allegedly in an unmarked vehicle travelling towards an area where IDF soldiers were operating). The incident highlights the severe security risks in southern Lebanon for third parties, including NGOs, particularly in areas where the IDF is actively operating.
• Israel-US: All the parts for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system have arrived in Israel; the system will likely be operational in the coming week. On 21 October, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin confirmed that the THAAD system arrived in Israel and is ‘in place’. It is unclear if the system is already fully operational. However, given the system’s fast delivery, we assess it is likely to be prioritised and operational within the coming week. The weapon will bolster Israel’s air defences, particularly against ballistic missile attacks from Iran. Its deployment underscores ongoing preparations for an Iranian response to an Israeli attack against Iran in the coming days or weeks.
• Israel-Jordan: A border breach by armed individuals highlights the current attack risks; the incident will likely lead to an increased security posture. On 18 October, two armed individuals dressed in Jordanian army uniforms breached the border between Israel and Jordan south of the Dead Sea near Neot HaKikar (Southern district, Israel). IDF personnel killed the two individuals in a small arms engagement. Jordan confirmed the individuals were not members of its armed forces. It was later confirmed that the perpetrators were members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. In the coming days, a heightened security posture is likely along large sections of both sides of the Israel-Jordan border. This augmented posture is especially likely at land crossings, elevating the risk of increased stop-and-search operations. This will cause delays and travel disruption, posing knock-on operational risks to supply chains. We assess that the threat of further attacks at the border will remain elevated as the Israel-Hamas and Israel-Hizballah wars continue, sustaining elevated risks of weapons smuggling and organised crime in the Israel-Jordan border area.
• Israel-Egypt: The attempted smuggling of weapons using drones signifies the elevated security risks in border areas. On 19 October, the IDF shot down a drone carrying eight handguns and ammunition. The drone crossed from Egypt into Israel, underlining the collateral risks associated with arms smuggling and policing efforts. Following the incident, the security forces on both sides of the border are likely to heighten their posture. The Egyptian security forces are likely to increase their stop-and-search operations in north and central Sinai in the coming days, elevating travel disruption and knock-on business operation risks.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• Hamas has not selected a successor to Yahya Sinwar, further delaying ceasefire negotiations. Following Sinwar’s death on 16 October, Hamas has not yet formally named his successor as the group’s leader in Gaza or chairperson of the Political Bureau (see FORECAST). Delays to the succession process, partially driven by internal competition and disruption to communications with Hamas’ leadership in Gaza, are highly likely to continue disrupting efforts to revive ceasefire negotiations. On 20 October, the head of Israel’s Shin Bet reportedly met with Egypt’s newly appointed intelligence chief, Hassan Rashad, in Cairo (Egypt), indicating continued Israeli engagement with negotiation efforts amid sustained domestic pressure to secure hostage releases. However, since Sinwar’s death, numerous high-profile Hamas figures have stated that they are unwilling to accept a ceasefire without a total Israeli withdrawal from Gaza; continued maximalism vis-à-vis negotiations will likely continue undermining prospects for a deal in the coming weeks.
• Despite continued efforts to improve diplomatic engagement between Israel and LH, a ceasefire agreement remains highly unlikely. On 18 October, Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Ghalibaf stated in an interview with French media that Iran was willing to participate in negotiations to implement UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701 (which aims to create a military buffer zone in southern Lebanon). However, on 21 October, US envoy Amos Hochstein also stated that ‘further mechanisms’ would be needed to implement UNSCR 1701 fully, highlighting increasing international scepticism over the resolution’s ability to stabilise the risk environment along the Israel-Lebanon border. Sustained concerns over what mechanisms will enforce any such buffer zone in southern Lebanon will likely continue undermining prospects for a ceasefire or the cessation of IDF ground operations. Despite these concerns, efforts to improve diplomatic engagement continue throughout the region; Hochstein arrived in Lebanon for further talks with Lebanese officials, while US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken will visit Israel on 22 October. These visits are unlikely to result in significant diplomatic progress vis-à-vis the Israel-Hizballah war.
• Disputes over displaced populations’ use of informal shelters triggered localised clashes in Beirut (Lebanon), highlighting the risk of proliferating violence. On 21 October, displaced residents in Beirut clashed with security force personnel near an informal shelter in the Hamra area. The clashes broke out after security force personnel attempted to enforce a judicial order to evacuate residents. Subsequently, residents blocked adjacent roads for several hours, set tyres on fire and engaged in altercations with the police. Amid the increasing strain on public services and restricted access to emergency services, further localised clashes are highly likely, particularly in the event of additional eviction notices. Clashes along ethno-religious lines are also possible, increasing the risk of longer-term tensions and sustained intercommunal violence, particularly amid increasing socio-economic health concerns.
• A reported US intelligence leak underlines the elevated likelihood of a direct Israeli strike against Iran in the coming days and weeks, sustaining elevated regional tensions. On 19 October, pro-Iran accounts on the Telegram messaging app began circulating material they claimed was highly classified US intelligence detailing Israel’s military preparations for a potential strike on Iran. The documents reportedly assess that Israel will likely respond to Iran’s 1 October missile attack by employing air-launched ballistic missiles (see Sibylline Alert – Iran-Israel – 21 October 2024). The documents do not include an assessment of which locations Israel will likely target, though they reportedly indicate that Israel does not plan to employ its alleged nuclear capabilities in any such attack. While neither the US nor Israel have commented on the documents, they are credible, though there is also a remote chance that they are part of a highly complex disinformation campaign. Despite the alleged leak, Israel is unlikely to alter its plans to strike Iran in the coming days, sustaining the risk of broader regional escalation in the coming weeks.
EVENT
On 19 October, pro-Iran accounts on the Telegram messaging app began circulating material purporting to be two highly classified US intelligence documents detailing Israel’s military preparations for a potential strike on Iran. The documents reportedly detail an assessment of how Israel will respond to Iran’s missile attack on 1 October (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 2 October 2024) but do not indicate which locations Israel plans to target.
SIGNIFICANCE
• Although unconfirmed by the US or Israel, the documents appear credible. That said, there is a remote chance that the documents are part of a highly complex disinformation campaign.
• The documents allegedly include analysis of satellite imagery indicating that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are preparing to directly strike Iran using air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBM) and have begun preparations for a direct Iranian retaliation.
• The documents also refer to Israel’s alleged nuclear weapons programme, indicating that Israel is not preparing to employ its nuclear arsenal to attack Iran, moderating risks of an escalation into nuclear-driven warfare.
• The documents highlight ongoing US surveillance of Israeli military operations, though this is unlikely to impact US-Israel relations. The US deployed a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to Israel on 21 October, underscoring strong military co-operation and ongoing efforts to mitigate further Iranian attacks.
FORECAST
The documents support our previous assessment that a direct Israeli strike on Iran is highly likely in the coming days or weeks, sustaining significant regional escalation. Reports of the document’s alleged content indicate that Israel plans to employ air-launched ballistic missiles to strike locations within Iranian territory, broadly in line with previous assessments. While documents do not include reference to which targets IDF will likely select in such an attack, we assess that Israel will likely primarily target Iranian military infrastructure, such as surface-to-air batteries, ballistic missile locations and manufacturing facilities, early detection systems and/or data centres. Strikes targeting military infrastructure close to nuclear development facilities, such as those in Isfahan (Isfahan province) are also highly likely. Increasing international pressure to avoid critically disrupting Iran’s oil production and export facilities reduces the risks of these locations being targeted by Israel, moderating risks of oil price volatility in the coming weeks. However, such a strike remains a realistic possibility. We continue to assess that Israel is unlikely to strike Iranian nuclear facilities or civilian population centres to avoid triggering an uncontrolled and direct escalation.
Despite the likely authenticity of the documents, Israel is unlikely to substantially alter its plans for striking Iran. Iran is likely already aware of the preparations highlighted in the documents and likely already in the process of hardening defences around suspected targets. However, Iran’s relatively inefficient air defences are highly unlikely to eliminate risks of successful strikes. Strikes critically disrupting military, oil export or nuclear development capabilities will elevate risks of a retaliatory Iranian attack on Israeli territory, driving risks of regional escalation. However, the US’ THAAD system deployment, in conjunction with Israel’s multi-layered air defences, will moderate the risks of critically successful Iranian strikes on military and civilian infrastructure, partially decreasing direct security threats to individuals and assets within Israel.
• Israel-Jordan: Border breach highlights attack risks; heightened security posture is likely, On 18 October, two armed individuals dressed in Jordanian army uniforms breached the border between Israel and Jordan south of the Dead Sea near Neot HaKikar (Southern district, Israel). Personnel from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed the two individuals in a small arms engagement. Jordan confirmed the individuals were not members of its armed forces. It was later confirmed that the perpetrators were members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. In the coming days, a heightened security posture is likely along large sections of both sides of the Israel-Jordan border. This augmented posture is especially likely at land crossings, elevating the risk of increased stop-and-search operations. This will cause delays and travel disruption, posing knock-on operational risks to supply chains. We assess that the threat of further attacks at the border will remain elevated as the Israel-Hamas and Israel-Hizballah wars continue, sustaining elevated risks of weapons smuggling and organised crime in the Israel-Jordan border area. (Source: Sibylline)
22 Oct 24. Israel said it had killed Hashem Safieddine, heir apparent to assassinated Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, in an air strike in Lebanon earlier this month. In a statement on X, the Israel Defense Forces on Tuesday stated Safieddine, who was expected to succeed Nasrallah, was “eliminated” in an air strike on the Lebanese militant group’s “main intelligence HQ” in the southern Beirut suburb of Dahiyeh. The IDF added another Hizbollah commander, Ali Hussein Hazima, had also been killed in the strike. There was no immediate response from Hizbollah. The claim came hours after US secretary of state Antony Blinken and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held inconclusive talks in Jerusalem as the Joe Biden administration attempts to end the war in Gaza and secure the release of Israeli hostages following the killing of Hamas’s leader Yahya Sinwar. Ahead of the meeting, the US state department said there was “an opportunity to move the ball forward” on ceasefire negotiations. But diplomats say there is little momentum for renewed talks as Netanyahu’s far-right government continues its offensive in Gaza and intensifies its assault against Hizbollah in Lebanon. A few hours before Blinken’s arrival, Hizbollah fired several barrages of rockets and missiles across northern and central Israel, including at Tel Aviv and Haifa. The Lebanese militant group said it targeted the Glilot intelligence base just north of Tel Aviv and a naval base in Haifa. The Israeli military said the Iran-backed group fired at least 80 projectiles into Israel throughout the day, killing one Israeli soldier and seriously wounding three others in the north after a rocket detonated. (Source: FT.com)
22 Oct 24. Leaked Documents Expose Top-Secret Israeli Drone. Leaked intelligence documents have revealed that Israel possesses a highly classified long-range unmanned surveillance drone capable of covert operations across the Middle East.
The documents, which surfaced on Telegram on October 15 and 16, detail Israeli preparations for potential military strikes against Iran and point to the existence of a secretive drone program previously undisclosed to the public.
According to the leaked files, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted covert drone operations between October 15 and 16, utilizing these advanced Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for long-range, stealth surveillance. The U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) confirmed the intelligence, observing ground personnel and equipment preparing UAVs at Ramon Airbase in southern Israel.
“The Israeli Air Force continued covert UAV operations from 15 through 16 October,” the documents note, adding that imagery analysis shows that Israel’s drones are capable of conducting sustained intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions over Iran and broader regional targets.
This information sheds new light on Israel’s intelligence capabilities, providing insight into a highly secretive aspect of its military apparatus. The long-range drones allow Israel to maintain a discreet presence over sensitive areas, particularly in Iran, where tensions have remained high due to Tehran’s nuclear program and support for militant groups in the region.
A source familiar with the leaked documents confirmed their authenticity, while U.S. officials are currently investigating the leak of the sensitive information. The revelations come at a time of heightened tensions between Israel and Iran, with both nations engaged in a complex, covert confrontation across multiple domains, including cyber warfare and clandestine military operations.
The leaked documents have also sparked concerns about Israel’s potential plans for military action. Israeli officials have long warned that they will take necessary steps to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, a point reiterated in recent months as negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program faltered.
In addition to the surveillance flights over Iran, the documents also highlight Israel’s broader intelligence-gathering capabilities across the Middle East. The undisclosed drone program offers Israel a significant advantage in monitoring its adversaries, with the drones providing real-time intelligence on military developments across the region. (Source: UAS VISION/Defence Blog)
22 Oct 24. Blinken heads to Israel to revive Gaza ceasefire talks after Sinwar death.
• Summary
• Blinken will visit Israel, Jordan and Doha
• Talks on how to end Gaza war, post-war planning, aid
• Gaza ceasefire ahead of US election elusive, analyst says
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken arrives in Israel on Tuesday, the first stop of a wider Middle East tour aimed at reviving Gaza ceasefire talks and discussing the enclave’s future following the death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, but any breakthrough ahead of the looming U.S. election looks elusive.
The top U.S. diplomat’s latest trip – his eleventh to the region since Palestinian Hamas militants attacked southern Israel on Oct. 7 triggering the Gaza war – comes as the Israeli military has intensified its campaign in the Palestinian enclave as well as in Lebanon against Iran-aligned Hezbollah militia.
Blinken’s planned week-long trip, which will include a stop in Jordan on Wednesday and Doha, also comes as the region braces for Israel’s response to Iran’s Oct. 1 ballistic missile attack on Israel. The retaliation could disrupt oil markets and risks igniting a full-blown war between the arch-enemies.
On Gaza, Blinken will focus discussions on how to end the war, plans for the enclave after the fighting ends and how to improve humanitarian assistance, said a senior State Department official, speaking on condition of anonymity. (Source: Reuters)
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