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Military And Security Developments
Oct 07.
07 Oct 24 Israel’s army chief said on Sunday that Israeli forces had defeated the military wing of Hamas.
Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said that after a year of fighting since the October 7 attack, the Palestinian terror group had been demolished, even as troops in northern Gaza continue to operate against what the military said were Hamas attempts to rebuild.
“A year has passed, and we have defeated the military wing of Hamas… We have dealt a severe blow to Hezbollah, which has lost all of its senior leadership. We are not stopping,” Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said as he addressed troops ahead of the first anniversary of the October 7 massacre.
Lt Gen Halevi’s remarks reiterate those made in September by Yoav Gallant, Israel’s defence minister, who said Hamas “no longer exists” as an organised military force.
Lt Gen Halevi also said Sunday that Israel was fighting a lengthy war and vowed to destroy those who attack Israel, in both Gaza and Lebanon.
“This is a long war, measured not only by capabilities but also by willpower and perseverance over time,” Lt Gen Halevi said. “This is a war for our right to be a free people in our land”. (Source: Daily Telegraph)
Oct 04.
Key points
- Israel is most likely to launch an attack against Iranian oil and (possibly) military facilities; Iran is likely to attempt to moderate its response to mitigate against the risk of rapid and uncontrolled escalation (though misfire risks will persist).
- A more substantial Israeli strike will elevate the risk of a greater Iranian response, in which Tehran attempts to co-ordinate its attack with its proxies so as to increase the effectiveness of this retaliation, substantially increasing security risks within Israel and driving tit-for-tat hostilities.
- There is a low-level (but realistic possibility) scenario in which Israel targets Iranian nuclear facilities. If these strikes are successful, the likelihood of a far greater Iranian response and regular and repeated direct strikes between Iran and Israel will increase.
Context
In the past week, Israel has assassinated the leader of Lebanese Hizballah (LH), Hassan Nasrallah, and launched ground operations into southern Lebanon. In response, Iran launched 181 ballistic missiles against Israel on 1 October. These developments have raised regional tensions to their highest level since Hamas’ attack against Israel on 7 October 2023. While Israel has stated that the Iranian strike has not compromised its operational military capabilities, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed to retaliate against Iran. In addition, White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated that there would be severe consequences for the strike, marking a notable shift from April, when the US warned against escalation. As such, it is highly likely that Israel will retaliate kinetically against Iran in the coming days or weeks. In the current climate, this threatens to escalate the ongoing Middle East crisis substantially. This Situation Update Brief assesses the impact of the most likely scenarios involving Israeli retaliation.
Forecast
Scenario 1: A limited Israeli response targets military infrastructure, prompting no direct Iranian response (12%)
Israel conducts limited kinetic and/or cyber attacks against military infrastructure either in Iran or against its proxies. These attacks are similar in scope to Israel’s strikes against Iran in April; they likely remain limited to surface-to-air batteries, early detection systems and/or data centres. They likely target positions close to nuclear facilities, such as those around Isfahan (Isfahan province). They showcase capability but do not prompt Iran to respond. Regardless, continued Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations in southern Lebanon drive Iran to sustain elevated rates of weapons transfers to LH. This prompts Israel to increase its strikes to disrupt said transfers and to target Iranian-linked weapons caches and communications positions, particularly in Syria, including locations such as Damascus International Airport (DAM) and crossings along the Syria-Iraq and Syria-Lebanon borders. While this scenario essentially maintains the current conflict dynamic, there is an elevated risk of miscalculation and/or misfire driving further regional escalation in the long term.
Scenario 2: A limited Israeli response against military infrastructure prompts a limited Iranian response (14%)
Israel strikes military bases and infrastructure in Iran, including air defences, rocket launchers, weapons manufacturing plants and high-ranking security force personnel. However, these strikes remain limited in scope. Iran announces that it intends to retaliate but seeks to limit its response to avoid further escalation. As such, Iran likely signals its intended target pre-emptively and employs substantially fewer munitions compared to previous attacks, reducing the risk of significant damage. Possible targets include Israeli off-shore gas rigs, military airbases and/or Israeli defence companies/factories. Such a response likely causes low-level and managed tit-for-tat escalation that possibly evolves into an attritional war, in which there are elevated risks of miscalculation and snowballing escalation. In this scenario, spillover risks and the likelihood of Iranian proxies targeting US and allied forces stationed in the region are elevated (moderately).
Scenario 3: An Israeli strike against Iranian oil facilities – and possibly limited military targets – prompts a limited Iranian response (29% – most likely)
The strike primarily targets Iranian oil facilities, including refineries, oil ports in the Persian Gulf and possibly even oil fields deep in Iranian territory. This possibly extends to limited military positions such as Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) bases, air defence systems and missile launch pads. Any such strike disrupts operations at oil facilities, increasing domestic energy security risks. Furthermore, any strike that targets Iran’s coastal oil facilities increases the risk of oil spills and ecological hazard risks across the Persian Gulf, impacting various Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. The strike highly likely impacts the global oil market, prompting price hikes for various oil products, as well as temporarily disrupting the regional oil supply chain. Iran likely conducts a limited retaliatory strike against Israeli gas infrastructure, offshore rigs and possibly even power stations. Nevertheless, Iran’s response is smaller in scale compared to its 1 October attack and similar in scope to that outlined in Scenario 2. However, if Israel targets key oil facilities in Abadan (Khuzestan province), Bandar Abbas (Hormozgan province) and Kharg Island (Bushehr province, all Iran), a broader and more intense Iranian reaction is likely.
Scenario 4: Broad Israeli retaliation against military and/or key infrastructure prompts Iran to escalate (27%)
While a substantial and broad Israeli response likely causes similar disruption to Iran’s oil sector as that outlined in Scenario 3, it also significantly elevates the risk of considerable Iranian retaliation. Iran likely mobilises its proxies in the region, particularly those in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, which increase their attacks against Israel significantly. Such co-ordination possibly increases the effectiveness of strikes against Israeli airbases and airport runways, including at Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV), while driving the risk of strikes across Israel more broadly. There is a realistic possibility that Iranian proxies target US forces so as to disrupt their (almost certain) interception attempts. The escalation risks prompting further Israeli retaliation against Iran, as well as US strikes against Iranian proxies across the region, driving a gradual expansion of the conflict in which the risk of miscalculation leading to a regional war is elevated. The Houthis likely escalate their strikes against commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea substantially; they possibly expand the range of their strikes in the Indian Ocean, exacerbating disruption to global supply chains.
Scenario 5: Israel causes minimal damage to Iranian nuclear facilities, prompting escalation (11%)
Israel likely targets nuclear development and research facilities, such as those in Isfahan, or uranium mines in Saghand (Yazd province). While such strikes fail to cause significant damage and the sites remain operational, Iran likely launches direct strikes against key Israeli military sites, port infrastructure and energy substations (likely in co-ordination with its regional proxies, similar to Scenario 4). In this scenario, the US and Israel’s regional allies likely assist with identifying and intercepting ordnance targeting Israel, though broader assistance remains unlikely. However, increased US support drives the risk of a rise in attacks by Iranian proxies against US facilities and subsequent US retaliation. Beyond increasing support for established and nascent proxies throughout the region, Iran also highly likely increases its financial and military support for LH substantially to deter further strikes against nuclear facilities, sustaining and prolonging the Israel-Hizballah war. In the long term, Iran also likely increases its defences around nuclear sites to prevent further attacks, while also increasing stockpiles of enriched uranium.
Scenario 6: Israel destroys an Iranian nuclear facility; escalation leads to a state of war (7%)
In our final scenario, Israel successfully undermines Iran’s nuclear capabilities; Iran highly likely retaliates with a sustained military campaign that directly targets Israel with missiles and drones. Attacks targeting key Israeli military bases, infrastructure and possibly adjacent civilian population centres likely trigger further Israeli strikes against Iranian territory, initiating a state of war and exacerbating the risks highlighted in Scenario 4. The US highly likely supports Israel by sharing intelligence and intercepting missiles and drones. In the event of substantial military or civilian casualties, there is a realistic possibility that the US employs naval and air force assets stationed in the region to conduct pre-emptive strikes against Iranian missile launch sites. In response, Iranian proxies likely recommence sustained attacks on US military positions and assets in Iraq and Syria, triggering the US to strike proxy strongholds, assets and personnel. Direct (albeit sporadic) Iranian strikes against US assets in the region are possible.
The broader impact of regional escalation on neighbouring states not involved in hostilities
While several neighbouring governments are likely determined not to be drawn directly into hostilities, worsening escalation will expose them to mounting spillover risks. As the rate of missiles exchanged between Iran, its proxies and Israel increases, interceptions, misfires and malfunctions will elevate the risk of sporadic collateral damage (particularly in border regions), as well as travel disruption. Increasing regional hostilities will likely drive mounting anti-Israel and (by extension) anti-West sentiment, raising the threat of protests targeting Israeli and Western embassies. This risk is highest in Iraq, Jordan and Turkey. However, government measures regarding demonstrations in Egypt and various Gulf countries such as Oman will limit their scale and disruptive impact, while complete protest bans in states such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE will mitigate against this risk significantly. Escalating conflict will also drive regional radicalisation risks, elevating the threat posed by terror cells and/or sole perpetrators, particularly against Israeli nationals and assets. However, the risk of attacks against Western nationals will also rise in line with conflict escalation.
- Iran-Israel: Regional escalation will increase security, disruption risks from cyber threat actors. On 1 October, Israel vowed to deliver a strong response to Iran following the launch of 181 ballistic missiles against Israel. There is a realistic possibility that Israel’s response to the attack will include disruptive cyber operations against Iranian critical national infrastructure (CNI). These will likely target oil and (possibly) military facilities, temporarily disrupting and/or halting operations, while falling short of provoking further escalation or retaliation from Iran. Additionally, both pro-Iran and pro-Israel hacktivist groups have significantly increased politically-motivated information-theft and disruptive cyber campaigns since the onset of the Israel-Hamas war in 2023, targeting entities based in and affiliated with both countries. In December 2023, the pro-Israel group ‘Predatory Sparrow’ compromised around 70% of Iran’s gas stations, forcing Iranians to resort to manual operations. As tensions between Iran and Israel continue to escalate, we assess that security and disruption risks stemming from pro-Iran and pro-Israel hacktivist groups are likely to elevate in the short-to-medium term.
- Israel-Palestinian Territories: Airstrike elevates risk of domestic unrest, militant reprisal. Late on 3 October, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed at least 18 people in an airstrike in Tulkarm (Tulkarm governorate, Palestinian Territories). The strike targeted a senior Hamas commander allegedly involved in planning an imminent terror attack on Israel. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas has called for demonstrations later on 4 October, driving bystander risks, particularly in the northern West Bank and Hebron (Hebron governorate). The strike will likely elevate risks of radicalisation among the Palestinian population, driving risks of sole-perpetrator attacks against Israeli entities. Palestinian militant activity will likely increase in the coming days, especially in the context of the 7 October anniversary of the start of the Israel-Hamas war. This will further elevate the risks of attacks in Israeli population centres including Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). In light of these risks, we assess that there is a realistic possibility of the IDF further augmenting its operations in the West Bank in the coming days, driving bystander security risks.
Oct 03.
- US-Israel: President’s push for proportional response underscores intent to avert regional escalation. On 2 October, President Joe Biden stated that he would not support an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear sites and urged Israel to act ‘proportionally’. The statement comes after Iran launched approximately 180 missiles against Israel on 1 October. Biden stated that he will be in communication with Israel regarding its response. While the US will not pressure Israel into avoiding any form of retaliation, Biden will almost certainly attempt to moderate Israel’s response in order to stem the threat of regional escalation. However, recent tensions with Israeli Prime Minister Bejamin Netanyahu, as well as Biden’s position as an outgoing president, will likely undermine his administration’s leverage during such talks. The US will likely impose additional sanctions on Iran in the coming days. During this period, it remains likely that the US will help Israel to facilitate increased strikes on Iranian proxies across the Middle East, specifically through intelligence sharing. We assess that the US will also likely use its augmented presence in the region to bolster Israel’s defence capabilities (though it remains unlikely that Congress will reconvene to pass a supplementary military aid bill for Israel).
Oct 02.
Key points
- Israel is highly likely to launch some form of retaliatory strike against Iran; we assess that it will likely strike military assets, though there is a lower-level possibility of a strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. Oil infrastructure is among the more likely targets of an Israeli strike; such action will likely trigger disruption to global oil markets and elevate energy security risks in the Persian Gulf region.
- Israel will also likely increase the intensity of its operations against Lebanese Hizballah (LH) and other Iranian proxies, driving security risks across the region.
- The US is highly likely to provide intelligence and will possibly support Israel in strikes on Iranian proxies in Syria and possibly Iraq, elevating the risk of retaliatory attacks on US assets in the region.
Context
On 1 October, Iran launched 181 ballistic missiles at several areas across Israel. The strike came after Israel launched a ground offensive into southern Lebanon on 30 September. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed the attack was in response to Israel’s assassination of Hamas’ political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran (Iran) on 31 July and Lebanese Hizballah (LH)’s leader Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut (Lebanon) on 27 September. Iran also claimed the attack targeted three military airbases: Nevatim, Hatzerim (both Southern district, Israel) and Tel Nof (Central district, Israel). However, while the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported minor material damage, it confirmed that military assets at these sites are intact. The IDF added that most of the Iranian missiles were intercepted by air defence systems and with the help of a US-led coalition. The Iranian attack resulted in one death near Jericho (Jericho governorate, West Bank) and two injuries in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district, Israel) due to falling shrapnel. Media footage showed multiple interceptions above Jerusalem (Jerusalem district, Israel), Tel Aviv and southern Israel.
Forecast
Israel is highly likely to retaliate with a direct strike against Iran, significantly elevating regional tensions
A direct Israeli strike will likely target Iranian army and IRGC military infrastructure. Likely targets include high-level assets such as military bases, missile launch pads, airports and air defence systems, elevating significant bystander risks in nearby urban centres. Israel will also likely target key infrastructure, particularly prominent oil refineries, ports (and possibly even oil fields). Any such strike is likely to impact global oil markets, elevating energy security risks in the Persian Gulf region.
Notably, there is a realistic possibility that Israel will target Iran’s nuclear infrastructure in one or multiple locations across the country. This scenario is highly likely to trigger significant risks of regional escalation between Iran and Israel as it will exacerbate a cycle of mutual retaliation, possibly accelerating the snowballing of hostilities into uncontrolled escalation (further reporting will be provided to assess the likely fallout of such action). There is also a realistic possibility that Israel will seek to assassinate IRGC commanders inside Iran, though such a scenario would likely come as part of a larger strike against the aforementioned targets. Israel will likely increase the intensity and scope of airstrikes against LH while also continuing its current ground operations in southern Lebanon, compounding security risks across Lebanon. Airstrikes will likely expand to other regions in Baalbek-Hermel, Beqaa, Nabatieh and South governorates (all Lebanon) to target broader LH military infrastructure, expanding collateral damage risks for communities near such assets. This will strain local healthcare and public infrastructure and raise the likelihood of residents in the south fleeing towards the capital Beirut and northern governorates, driving congestion and travel disruption along major highways. The IDF will also likely conduct further airstrikes against border crossings between Lebanon and Syria to cut off supply lines to other Iran-backed proxies in Syria and Iraq. Such strikes will likely trigger significant physical security threats to Lebanese refugees en route to Syria and will further complicate efforts by aid organisations to move staff and equipment into Lebanon.
- US-Middle East region: US participation in Israeli defence increases risk of armed conflict. On 1 October, President Joe Biden announced that US forces helped Israel shoot down incoming missiles from an Iranian attack. Biden stated that he directed US naval forces to defend Israel while also crediting extensive bilateral planning. Republican leaders in Congress have called on Biden to adopt more stringent measures to hinder Iran’s military and its proxies. Republican leadership also alleged that Biden’s policy decisions emboldened Iran to attack Israel. While Biden will possibly use executive authority to impose stricter sanctions in the short term, we assess it is unlikely that Congress will return early from recess to pass a supplemental aid bill for Israel. Biden’s broader foreign policy towards the region is unlikely to substantially change; his focus will likely remain on protecting US personnel and assets. As such, the US will almost certainly maintain an augmented defence posture in the region but refrain from taking direct action against Iran. Still, it remains likely that the US will help Israel to facilitate increased strikes on Iranian proxies, specifically through intelligence sharing.
- Israel-Palestinian territories: Terror attack highlights persistent security risks in urban centres. On 1 October, two armed men killed seven people and injured at least 16 in a shooting and stabbing attack in Jaffa (Tel Aviv district). The perpetrators initially attacked civilians on a light rail train before disembarking and attacking pedestrians on Jerusalem Boulevard. The security forces killed the attackers. The authorities then identified the perpetrators as Palestinians from Hebron (Hebron governorate). The incident highlights the persistent risk of terror attacks as well as elevated security risks inside Israel’s urban centres. These risks are unlikely to decrease in the coming months. We also assess that the attack will highly likely trigger reactionary anti-Israel protests in Hebron, augmenting existing risks of ethno-religious tensions and clashes with settlers. These risks will be particularly high after Friday prayers on 4 October outside major mosques in the city. Militants will likely attempt further attacks within major Israeli cities throughout the coming month, particularly around the 7 October anniversary of the Israel-Hamas war and upcoming Jewish religious holidays
- Denmark-Sweden: Incidents at Israeli embassies were possibly caused by Iran, driving attack risks. Earlier on 2 October at approximately 0320hrs (local time), two explosions occurred near the Israeli embassy in Denmark, in the capital Copenhagen. The Swedish police also confirmed that shots were fired near the Israeli embassy in Sweden, in the capital Stockholm, on 1 October. In the past few months, multiple incidents have taken place near the Israeli embassy in Stockholm, including the discovery of an undetonated grenade and a shooting. Both the Swedish intelligence services (SÄPO) and its Israeli counterpart, Mossad, have attributed these incidents to Iran, which has reportedly commissioned local organised crime groups (OCGs) to conduct such attacks. Danish OCGs have also been linked to Iran. We assess that it is a realistic-to-likely possibility that the two incidents are a continuation of this trend. The incidents are almost certainly linked to Israel’s (ground) operations in Lebanon and Iranian retaliation. We assess that Jewish and Israeli targets will highly likely face elevated attack risks in Denmark and Sweden in the coming weeks, possibly driven by Iranian proxies.
- Israel-Palestinian territories: Terror attack highlights persistent security risks in urban centres. On 1 October, two armed men killed seven people and injured at least 16 in a shooting and stabbing attack in Jaffa (Tel Aviv district). The perpetrators initially attacked civilians on a light rail train before disembarking and attacking pedestrians on Jerusalem Boulevard. The security forces killed the attackers. The authorities then identified the perpetrators as Palestinians from Hebron (Hebron governorate). The incident highlights the persistent risk of terror attacks as well as elevated security risks inside Israel’s urban centres. These risks are unlikely to decrease in the coming months. We also assess that the attack will highly likely trigger reactionary anti-Israel protests in Hebron, augmenting existing risks of ethno-religious tensions and clashes with settlers. These risks will be particularly high after Friday prayers on 4 October outside major mosques in the city. Militants will likely attempt further attacks within major Israeli cities throughout the coming month, particularly around the 7 October anniversary of the Israel-Hamas war and upcoming Jewish religious holidays
Oct 01.
At 1930hrs (local time) on 1 October, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that Iran had launched missiles towards Israel. The launch has triggered sirens across Israel, while flights to and from Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV, Israel) have been grounded. Local media reports indicate that Iran has fired over 140 ballistic missiles towards Israel. However, there is a realistic possibility that Iran has also launched hyper-sonic missiles. Video footage indicates that the IDF intercepted a significant number of missiles, including in the airspace above Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). However, the missiles’ targets remain unclear at the time of writing.
SIGNIFICANCE
- At approximately 1655hrs, the IDF announced that the US had warned that Iran was preparing cruise and ballistic missiles for an ‘imminent’ and direct attack.
- The strike comes hours after the IDF launched a ground operation into southern Lebanon against Lebanese Hizballah (LH, see Sibylline Alert – 1 October 2024); it also follows previous threats made by Iran that it would retaliate for the assassination of Hamas’ political chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran (Iran) in July (see Sibylline Alert – 31 July 2024).
- After the IDF struck a building at the Iranian embassy compound in Damascus (Syria) in April, Iran launched hundreds of drones and missiles towards Israel. However, the IDF and its allies intercepted the majority of munitions before they entered Israeli airspace (see Sibylline Alert – 14 April 2024). While the current strike appears similar in scale, it is likely to be viewed as a more significant move than the April strike given the current tensions and the ordnance involved.
FORECAST
There is a realistic possibility of further strikes in the coming hours, either by Iran or its numerous regional proxies, including the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), the Yemen-based Houthis and LH. Further direct or co-ordinated strikes will likely target locations near major population centres, such as Jerusalem and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). While adherence to Home Front Command guidelines will mitigate against critical threats to life, target misidentification, interceptor shrapnel and the possible use of unguided munitions will sustain substantial security risks in civilian population centres, particularly near military bases.
In the coming hours, regional flight operations will likely remain significantly disrupted; access to commercially available evacuation routes will be restricted. Flights to and from Ben Gurion International Airport will likely remain suspended in the coming hours, while regional airspace closures and flight diversions are also possible. These measures will almost certainly increase travel delays and restrict access to commercially available evacuation routes. Disruption to GPS services is also likely to impact overland movement and short-term supply chain continuity.
In the coming days, Israel will almost certainly respond to the attack. The nature and scale of Israel’s retaliation will likely depend on the extent of the damage to infrastructure, as well as the casualty count and whether the IDF determines that Iran targeted civilian population centres. The US is also highly likely to maintain an elevated posture in the region. It will possibly help to facilitate increased strikes on Iranian proxies. However, we assess that the US’ participation in a direct strike on Iran remains unlikely at present.
- Israel-Lebanon: IDF ground operation will exacerbate security risks, strain emergency services. Late on 30 September, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched cross-border ground raids against Lebanese Hizballah (LH) forces and infrastructure in southern Lebanon. The operation involves soldiers from the 98th Paratroopers Division supported by air and artillery forces. Limited ground operations will likely continue in the coming days as the IDF seeks to clear LH assets from the border region and limit its capacity to attack northern Israel. We assess these efforts will involve frequent airstrikes against Lebanon, including the capital Beirut. This will further elevate the risk of serious harm facing individuals on the ground, while also straining local healthcare infrastructure and the emergency services significantly. Ground operations will likely exacerbate the displacement of southern residents towards Beirut, driving congestion along major highways and elevating travel disruption and supply chain risks. This will likely also affect the flow of goods and services towards the south, threatening food security and limiting access for aid workers and NGOs.
- US-Middle East region: Increased troop presence will raise regional tensions, risk of armed conflict. On 30 September, Department of Defense (DoD) officials stated that the US will deploy several thousand additional troops to the Middle East to bolster regional security and support the defence of Israel. The deployment will augment the 40,000 troops already in the region and include multiple fighter squadrons to increase the US’ air defence capacity substantially. The decision comes amid increasing concerns that the ongoing Israel-Hizballah war will prompt Iran to retaliate. At the time of writing, Washington DC is currently preparing for a scenario involving the evacuation of US citizens from Lebanon. Such an operation will become more likely if the war intensifies in the coming days. Additionally, the US’ strengthened defence posture underscores a willingness to defend US personnel and assets in the region against Iran and its proxies. However, we assess that the US is unlikely to take any direct action against Iran; potential strikes will likely hit targets in regions with existing and heightened military contestation, including Iraq, Syria and Yem
- Global: Spear phishing campaign will elevate security risks from Iranian state-sponsored groups. On 27 September, the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) reported that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is targeting journalists, diplomats, activists and lobbyists with links to affairs in Iran and the Middle East in an ongoing spear phishing campaign. The campaign starts with spear-phishing emails to trick victims into clicking a link disguised as an invitation to an official event. The actors built rapport with victims prior to sending the phishing emails, underscoring the highly targeted and premeditated nature of this operation. The link redirects victims to a malicious email login page, allowing the actors to steal victims’ credentials. We assess that the actors likely seek to steal sensitive information while possibly propagating influence operations; the campaign has also targeted individuals associated with US political. Iranian state-sponsored actors routinely target individuals linked to Iran or the Middle East to collect strategic information, sustaining elevated phishing and espionage risks in the long term
Sept 30.
EVENT
Late on 30 September, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched localised ground operations targeting Lebanese Hizballah (LH) infrastructure in southern Lebanon. The IDF claims the operation will mainly focus on villages adjacent to the border; it has also called on Lebanese civilians not to operate vehicles in areas south of the Litani River, approximately 18 miles (29km) from the Israel-Lebanon border.
SIGNIFICANCE
- This is the first Israeli ground operation inside Lebanese territory since the 2006 Israel-LH war, marking a significant escalation in cross-border hostilities.
- At the time of writing, there is no clear information concerning which villages the IDF has targeted or the size of the forces participating in the operation. However, the IDF said that the 98th Division led the operation overnight, likely indicating that initial phases include targeted and pinpoint raids by commando forces.
- The operation comes amid a persistent uptick of heavy IDF airstrikes systemically targeting LH infrastructure and high-ranking commanders, including the killing of LH leader Hassan Nasrallah.
FORECAST
The IDF ground operation will likely trigger a significant uptick in LH rocket attacks targeting northern and central Israel in the coming days. LH rocket attacks targeting Israeli troops stationed in Metula (Northern district) and a barrage targeting Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) earlier on 1 October highlight the likely beginning of a broader LH retaliation campaign in the coming days. This will likely involve increased rocket and drone attacks in northern and central Israel, primarily targeting military bases in Atlit (Haifa district), Mount Meron, Safed and Ramat David (all Northern district). LH retaliation will also likely target facilities in the Golan Heights such as Naffakh (Northern district), elevating security risks for proximate communities. LH attacks will also likely target civilian and dual-use infrastructure, including ports and power stations in these districts within Haifa (Haifa district) and Tel Aviv, increasing operational and supply chain disruption risks. Strikes on residential areas are also a realistic possibility, significantly elevating physical security threats to local staff and assets.
In Lebanon, direct clashes between IDF and LH personnel are highly likely to remain limited within villages adjacent to the Israel-Lebanon border in the coming days. It is currently highly unlikely that the Lebanese armed forces will intervene in support of LH, as reflected by the withdrawal of some forces from border positions ahead of the ground operation. More broadly, the IDF will almost certainly continue its intensified airstrike campaign, with airstrikes likely targeting the capital Beirut (particularly the Dahieh suburb), and the Baalbek-Hermel, Beqaa, Nabatiieh and South governorates. Strikes near Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY) targeting LH weapons caches are also likely, further disrupting evacuation efforts. There is also a realistic possibility of LH attempting to conduct small-scale incursions targeting Israel’s upper Galilee region (Northern), increasing risks of clashes and kidnapping attempts in proximate Israeli communities.
Direct Iranian involvement will remain a realistic possibility, though Iran will likely primarily leverage its proxies to provide logistical and military support to LH. Iran will likely co-ordinate an increase in the intensity and frequency of proxy attacks on central and southern Israel. Iranian proxies such as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), Syrian-based militants and Yemen-based Houthis will likely employ drones as well as ballistic and cruise missiles against southern and central Israel, increasing pressure on Israeli air defence systems. Proxy attacks will likely primarily target military bases, ports and infrastructure, increasing bystander and incidental risks. Although Israeli air defences will likely intercept the majority of projectiles, security and bystander risks in urban centres near military bases, ports and power stations will remain substantially elevated. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that Iran-backed groups will increase their logistical support (in terms of personnel and weaponry) to LH across the Syria-Lebanon border. This will significantly elevate the likelihood of new Israeli airstrikes targeting border crossings in the coming days to cut supply lines.
The IDF ground operation will highly likely trigger further internal displacement in Lebanon, increasing strains on public services and possibly increasing ethno-religious tensions. In the coming days, thoroughfares extending from southern Lebanon to Beirut and the northern governorates will likely be highly congested as civilians increasingly evacuate at-risk regions; this will trigger bottlenecks and significant mobility disruptions. Further internal displacement will substantially increase demands for public and emergency services, compounding pressure on outdated infrastructure and increasing shortages. Possible altercations around aid distribution centres and healthcare facilities will elevate bystander risks for civilians and NGO staff, though widespread unrest remains unlikely. In the coming weeks, there is a realistic possibility of elevated ethno-religious tensions triggering inter-communal clashes between displaced and receiving communities, particularly in Beirut, increasing security and bystander risks.
KEY POINTS
- The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed Lebanese Hizballah (LH) leader Hassan Nasrallah in a strike in Beirut and further escalated its military campaign; ground operations remain likely in the coming days.
- An IDF strike in Yemen following the Iran-backed Houthis’ targeting of Israel reflects a growing engagement policy and an elevated risk of retaliation against Iranian proxies throughout the region.
- Gaza Strip: The IDF has continued to operate in Rafah (southern Gaza); it has expanded its infrastructure in the Netzarim Corridor (central Gaza). The IDF will likely continue to limit its activity in Gaza to fortifying its positions and conducting targeted raids as the main military focus shifts towards Israel’s northern border.
- West Bank: LH rockets targeting the West Bank underscore the elevated security risks therein, particularly in Palestinian villages. On 28 September, LH launched five rockets towards central Israel and the West Bank, with shrapnel from an interception falling in the Palestinian town Huwara (Nablus governorate) and causing light material damage to a residential house. The rockets triggered sirens across Israeli population centres within Jerusalem, Nablus and Ramallah and al-Bireh governorates, such as Beit Aryeh-Ofarim (Ramallah and al-Bireh) and Ma’ale Adumim (Jerusalem). However, local reports indicate that Palestinian population centres do not have siren systems, underscoring elevated risks for individuals in the vicinity of such locations. Security risks in the West Bank emanating from LH rockets remain low but are likely to increase to moderate in the event of further escalation in the Israel-LH conflict.
- Israel-Yemen: An IDF strike against the Iran-backed Houthis’ energy infrastructure underlines a shift in retaliation strategy, elevating the risk of regional escalation. On 29 September, the IDF conducted airstrikes targeting a fuel terminal at Hudaydah Port and several power stations around al Hudaydah city (al Hudaydah governorate). According to the Houthi-run health ministry, the strike killed four individuals and injured at least 29 others while causing power cuts in most parts of the port city. The strike follows Houthi missile launches against targets in central Israel, including Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV), on 26 and 28 September. The IDF intercepted the missiles before they entered Israeli airspace on both days, though sirens in central Israel were activated regardless due to the risk of falling shrapnel. The Israeli strike is likely to exacerbate the impact of fuel shortages and energy security risks in Hudaydah and the wider Houthi territory in the coming days.
- Israel-Yemen: The incident reflects a shift in Israel’s retaliation pattern, and points to a much lower threshold. Israel previously struck Yemen in July in response to a strike that killed one person in Tel Aviv. This will elevate the risk of further Israeli strikes in Syria and Yemen in response to militias launching ordnances at Israel in the coming days. While the threat is greater in parts of Syria along the border with Iraq, strikes against militants in Iraq remain a realistic possibility (though any such attacks would likely remain concentrated in border areas).
- Israel-Lebanon: The assassination of LH’s leader in Beirut (Lebanon) underscores the possibility of conflict expansion and the growing scope of the security risks in Lebanon more widely. On 27 September, Israel conducted a high-capacity airstrike targeting Hassan Nasrallah in LH’s underground headquarters in the Dahieh suburb of Beirut. The strike used about 80 heavy payload bombs and flattened at least six residential buildings. On 28 September the IDF (and later LH) confirmed that the strike killed Nasrallah, alongside at least 20 other senior commanders. These include Ali Karki, the commander of LH’s Southern Front, and Abbas Nilforoushan, an Iranian brigadier general from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
- Israel continued to conduct strikes against Beirut and southern Lebanon throughout the weekend, targeting LH senior commanders as well as weapon manufacturing capabilities, depots and launchers, including the advanced P-800 Oniks (Yakhont). On 29 September, Israel conducted its first airstrike in Beirut outside Dahieh, killing three senior leaders of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in the Kola neighbourhood in central Beirut. The strike reflects Israel’s willingness to expand its attacks across Beirut and also to target non-LH militants, indicating the growing security risks in Lebanon’s capital.
- On 28 September, the IDF reportedly hacked into Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY)’s flight control system and warned an approaching Iranian plane against landing at the airport. This follows previous warnings from the IDF that it would not allow weapons to be transferred to LH through the airport and that it would be forced to target transport carrying such cargo in the future. The communication prompted the plane to return to Iran. The incident and warning reflect the increased threats facing the airport and its surroundings, as well as throughout Lebanon’s border areas more generally due to IDF operations targeting weapons shipments. Furthermore, it has further elevated the challenges facing expats and staff attempting to evacuate from Lebanon due to increasing flight and sea travel disruption.
- Israel-Lebanon: LH has continued to fire numerous short-, medium- and long-range missiles towards northern and central Israel, highlighting the sustained threats to staff and assets, particularly those in proximity to military bases. Since 26 September, LH and allied militants in Lebanon have continued to launch rockets towards Israel on a frequent basis, mainly targeting IDF positions and bases such as the Northern Command in Safed (Northern district). On 26 September, LH also launched a third round of rockets towards the Rafael Advanced Defense Systems’ facility near Haifa (Haifa district), highlighting the sustained threats to assets and individuals in close proximity to military bases and defence contractor installations. On 29 September there was a substantial uptick in LH rocket fire targeting locations in central Israel; LH fired three barrages of long-range missiles towards Israeli settlements in the West Bank, triggering sirens in the West Bank and Jerusalem areas. While the IDF intercepted the majority of ordnances, at least one missile hit an open area in the West Bank and caused a fire that resulted in localised power outages. On the same day, LH launched a surface-to-surface missile towards Central and Tel Aviv districts, hitting an open space near Tel Aviv. Although these attacks did not result in any significant material damage or casualties, the increasing frequency, intensity and range of rocket fire towards central and northern Israel highlights the growing threats to staff and assets in major population centres. Increasing rocket fire will also elevate the risk of direct strikes facing civilian population centres and infrastructure, exacerbating operational disruption and the risks pertaining to uncontrolled escalation along the Israel-Lebanon border.
- Red Sea: On 26 September, the Houthis launched 23 ballistic and cruise missiles against three US destroyers near the Bab al Mandeb Strait. The timing of the launches (in conjunction with the Houthi strike on Israel on 26 September) indicates they were possibly part of a penetration test. They also highlight the elevated risks facing shipping and US forces in the area.
- Jordan: A Grad rocket launched from southern Lebanon fell within Jordanian territory, highlighting the current spillover risks. The rocket was launched on 29 September and fell in an uninhabited area in al-Muwaqqar (Amman governorate), around 99 miles (160km) from the Lebanese border. While the launch was likely a misfire, there is a realistic possibility that it was an intentional attempt to hit Amman Civil Airport (ADJ) which is also used by US forces in Jordan and is located around 14 miles (22km) from the impact site. This comes amid suggestions by Iranian proxies that they will possibly target the assets of any country deemed to support Israel (see Forecast). Regardless, the incident reflects growing spillover and security risks in neighbouring countries due to the escalation in hostilities and rate of cross-border fire. These will likely remain elevated in the coming weeks, possibly increasing further in the event of additional escalation.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- The UN agency for Palestinian refugees (UNRWA) confirmed that it had employed Hamas’ leader in Lebanon, increasing the likelihood of further funding restrictions. On 30 September, UNRWA confirmed that it had employed Fateh Sherif as the principal of a UNRWA-run school in the el-Buss refugee camp (South governorate). UNRWA placed Sherif on administrative leave in March following an inquiry into his potential links to Hamas. The announcement will increase the likelihood of donor states such as the UK and Germany once again restricting funding for UNRWA due to the connections of staff members to Hamas (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 29 January 2024). As UNRWA operates without strategic financial reserves, funding restrictions will likely undermine its capacity to provide humanitarian services in the coming months, particularly in Gaza. This will increase socio-economic and unrest risks within Palestinian refugee camps across Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories and Syria in the coming months. Growing financial pressure will also likely further limit UNRWA’s operational capacity in Gaza, sustaining significant food security and public health concerns therein.
- The New Hope party has joined the Israeli coalition government, moderating threats to government stability in the short term. On 29 September, New Hope leader Gideon Sa’ar announced his party would join the governing coalition, increasing the coalition’s majority from 64 to 68 seats. The increase in the coalition majority will likely partially moderate the influence of hard-right coalition parties such as Otzmah Yehudit and Religious Zionism. There is a realistic possibility that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will leverage the increased majority to adopt policy measures opposed by hard-right coalition members, such as reforms to conscription legislation, and advance ceasefire negotiations with Hamas (though an agreement remains highly unlikely in the short term). The increased majority will moderate threats to government stability in the short term, though long-standing tensions within the government will sustain the risk of coalition reformation in the coming months. Sa’ar will also serve as a minister without portfolio within the cabinet, highlighting Netanyahu’s efforts to co-opt potential political rivals before the 2026 general election.
- Moody’s Ratings downgraded Israel’s credit rating for the second time in 2024, underscoring increasing investor anxiety linked to possible regional escalation. On 27 September, Moody’s cut Israel’s credit rating from A2 to Baa1, while maintaining a negative economic outlook. The credit rating agency cited concerns over conflict intensification and fears that Israel will not be able to engage in a rapid economic recovery amid broader military campaigns in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories. The downgrading highlights increasing anxiety over Israel’s economic stability amid rising government spending and stagnant economic activity; it will likely further undermine investor confidence. While substantial capital flight remains unlikely in the short term, continued ratings cuts and broader fiscal pressures will likely moderately undermine socio-economic conditions in Q3 and Q4.
- Continued airstrikes against Lebanon have triggered substantial internal displacement, increasing strains on public and emergency services. On 29 September, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees reported that intensifying IDF airstrikes against Lebanon have displaced approximately 120,000 individuals since 23 September. Roughly 30,000 civilians have also moved into Syria from Lebanon, increasing the strain on humanitarian services in border regions. In the coming days, further internal and external displacement is highly likely; this will increase demands for public and emergency services. Rising demands for medical services and food aid will compound the pressure on already-strained humanitarian resources, increasing shortages and delaying access. Altercations around aid distribution centres and healthcare facilities will elevate bystander risks for civilians and NGO staff, though widespread unrest remains unlikely. In the coming weeks, there is also a realistic possibility of increasing displacement compounding ethno-religious tensions within communities in Lebanon and Syria that receive displaced people.
- Following the assassination of LH leader Hassan Nasrallah, several states declared periods of mourning, highlighting the elevated risk of operational disruption. Lebanon, Iraq and Syria have declared three days of national mourning (29/30 September to 1/2 October), while Iran declared a five-day mourning period (29 September to 3 October). Access to public sector services will be restricted during these periods. In the coming days, commemorative events coinciding with Nasrallah’s funeral will likely trigger numerous private sector business closures throughout the region, disrupting operational and supply chain continuity. Although LH has not confirmed plans for Nasrallah’s funeral at the time of writing, the event will almost certainly take place in Lebanon (likely in the Dahiya area of the capital Beirut), attracting tens of thousands of attendees. The funeral and related events will increase the risk of major operational and travel disruption; there is also a realistic possibility that the IDF will target high-ranking LH members attending funeral events, increasing bystander risks.
- Nasrallah’s death has triggered an uptick in protest activity throughout the region, highlighting the elevated risks of unrest and possible hostility to foreign investment. Demonstrations following Nasrallah’s death have occurred throughout Iran (including Tehran), Beirut and Sidan (both Lebanon), Ramallah (West Bank, Palestinian Territories) and Sanaa (Yemen), increasing localised operational and travel disruption risks. Demonstrations in Amman (Jordan) and Rabat (Morocco) on 29 September primarily targeted the Israeli embassies in both cities, though they remained broadly peaceful. On 29 September, thousands of protesters gathered in Baghdad (Iraq) and marched along the 14th July Bridge, likely with the aim to protest outside the nearby US embassy, though the Iraqi security forces dispersed the participants. In Karachi (Pakistan), hundreds of pro-LH protesters gathered near the US consulate and clashed with the police, who used tear gas, resulting in over 20 arrests and multiple injuries. In the coming days, further protests are highly likely in cities throughout the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia regions, particularly in states maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel and in cities with significant Shia populations. Demonstrations will likely target entities linked to Israel and the US, including embassies, consulates, military bases and high-profile businesses, highlighting the elevated hostility to foreign investment and increasing the risk of staff becoming exposed to unrest and potential acts of vandalism.
- Israel-Yemen: Airstrikes on key infrastructure will drive energy security risks, drive retaliatory attacks. On 29 September, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted airstrikes on several energy infrastructure targets in the port city of Al Hudaydah (al Hudaydah governorate). The strikes followed two recent missile attacks from the Iran-backed Houthis targeting central Israel on 26 and 28 September. The militants notably targeted Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV) during Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s return from the US. The IDF airstrikes will highly likely undermine energy security in Yemen, exacerbating existing power supply challenges and elevating operational concerns for NGOs and their in-country personnel. The Houthis will likely retaliate by attempting further strikes on population centres in Israel, elevating security and business operations risks in major cities including Haifa (Haifa district), Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). We assess that there will likely be an escalation in attacks on commercial shipping vessels in the Red Sea, driving significant disruption to shipping routes and elevating global supply chain risks.
- Pakistan: Escalation of Israel-Hamas war will drive protests, security risks outside US consulates. On 29 September, thousands of people participated in rallies and protests in Karachi (Sindh province) and the capital Islamabad to protest Israel’s killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. In Karachi, 3,000 people attended a rally organised by the Wahdat-e-Muslimeen (MWM) party; protesters clashed with the police as they attempted to march towards the US consulate. The police used tear gas and batons to stop the protesters who breached barricades to reach areas beyond agreed boundaries. In retaliation, the protesters resorted to pelting stones at the police. At least seven police officers were injured and 20 people were arrested during the clashes. The demonstrations follow earlier sporadic protests outside the US embassy in Islamabad and the US consulate in Karachi against Israel’s killing of civilians in Gaza and US military aid to Israel. Given the recent escalation in the Middle East and the widespread pro-Palestine sentiment in the country, activism-related domestic unrest risks related to the war will likely remain elevated in the coming weeks. We assess that there is a realistic possibility of further protests outside US consulates in major cities, which will drive security risks. (Source: Sibylline)
03 Oct 24. Israel strikes heart of Beirut, killing six.
Explosions heard across Beirut after Israel strikes city heart.
- Israel strikes central Beirut early on Thursday
- Six killed, seven wounded in Israeli air strike
- Houthis say they strike Tel Aviv with drones
- Israeli forces suffer deadliest day on Lebanese front in a year
Israel bombed central Beirut early on Thursday, killing at least six people, after its forces suffered their deadliest day on the Lebanese front in a year of clashes with Iran-backed Hezbollah.
Israel said it conducted a precise air strike on Beirut. Reuters witnesses reported hearing a massive blast, and a security source said it targeted a building in the central district of Bachoura near parliament, the closest an Israeli strike has come to the centre of Lebanon’s capital.
At least six people were killed and seven wounded, Lebanese health officials said. A photo circulating on Lebanese WhatsApp groups, which Reuters could not immediately verify, showed a heavily damaged building with its first floor on fire.
Three missiles also hit the southern suburb of Dahiyeh, where Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah was killed last week, and loud blasts were heard, Lebanese security officials said. The southern suburbs came under more than a dozen Israeli strikes on Wednesday.
The Israel Defense Forces urged residents of Lebanese villages who have evacuated their homes not to return until further notice. “IDF raids are continuing,” spokesperson Avichay Adraee said on X on Thursday.
Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi militant group said it launched drone strikes on Israel’s financial capital, Tel Aviv.
“The operation achieved its goals successfully by the arrival of the drones without being detected or shot down by the enemy,” said Yahya Saree, the group’s military spokesperson.
A day after Iran fired more than 180 missiles into Israel, Israel said on Wednesday eight soldiers were killed in ground combat in south Lebanon as its forces thrust into its northern neighbour.
The Israeli military said regular infantry and armoured units joined ground operations in Lebanon on Wednesday as Iran’s missile attack and Israel’s promise of retaliation fanned concern of a wider conflict in the oil-producing Middle East.
Hezbollah said its fighters engaged Israeli forces inside Lebanon. The movement reported ground clashes for the first time since Israeli forces pushed over the border on Monday. Hezbollah said it had destroyed three Israeli Merkava tanks with rockets near the border town of Maroun El Ras.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in a condolence video, said: “We are at the height of a difficult war against Iran’s Axis of Evil, which wants to destroy us.
“This will not happen because we will stand together and with God’s help, we will win together.”
G7, CHINA CALL FOR DIPLOMACY
Lebanon’s health ministry said Israeli air raids killed at least 46 people in south and central regions in the past 24 hours.
Iran said on Wednesday its missile volley – its biggest ever assault on Israel – was over, barring further provocation, but Israel and the United States promised to hit back hard.
U.S. President Joe Biden said he would not support any Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear sites in response to its ballistic missile attack and urged Israel to act “proportionally” against its regional arch-foe.
Biden joined a call with other leaders of the Group of Seven major powers to coordinate a response, including new sanctions against Tehran, the White House said.
China called on the United Nations Security Council to take “urgent actions” to de-escalate the situation in the Middle East.
“The Security Council bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,” China’s permanent representative to the U.N., Fu Cong, said during a Security Council briefing on Wednesday, Xinhua news said.
Fu said all parties “must return to the track of political and diplomatic solutions”.
Western nations have drafted contingency plans to evacuate citizens from Lebanon after Tuesday’s dramatic escalation, but none have launched a large-scale military evacuation yet, though some are chartering aircraft as Beirut airport stays open.
1.2m LEBANESE DISPLACED
Hezbollah said it repelled Israeli forces near several border towns and fired rockets at military posts in Israel.
The paramilitary group’s media chief Mohammad Afif said those battles were only the “first round” and that Hezbollah had enough fighters, weapons and ammunition to push back Israel.
Israel’s addition of infantry and armoured troops from the 36th Division, including the Golani Brigade, the 188th Armoured Brigade and 6th Infantry Brigade, suggested that the operation might expand beyond limited commando raids.
The military has said its incursion is largely aimed at destroying tunnels and other infrastructure on the border and there were no plans for a wider operation targeting Beirut to the north or major cities in the south.
Nevertheless, it issued new evacuation orders for about two dozen towns along the southern border, telling residents to head north of the Awali River, which flows east to west some 60 km (40 miles) north of the Israeli frontier.
More than 1,900 people have been killed and over 9,000 wounded in Lebanon in almost a year of cross-border fighting, with most of the deaths occurring in the past two weeks, according to Lebanese government statistics.
Caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati said about 1.2 m Lebanese had been displaced by Israeli attacks.
Malika Joumaa, from Sudan, took shelter in Saint Joseph’s church in Beirut after being forced from her house near Sidon in coastal south Lebanon with her husband and two children.
“It’s good that the church offered its help,” she said. “We were going to stay in the streets; where would we have gone?”
Iran described Tuesday’s missile assault as a response to Israeli killings of militant leaders, including Nasrallah, attacks in Lebanon against the group and Israel’s war against Iran-backed Palestinian Hamas militants in Gaza. There were no casualties from the missile onslaught in Israel, but one person was killed in the Israeli-occupied West Bank. (Source: Reuters)
01 Oct 24. U.S. Assets in Mediterranean Again Helped Defend Israel Against Iranian Missiles. Iran attacked Israel earlier today with a barrage of approximately 200 ballistic missiles. While most of those missiles were destroyed before reaching their target, some did impact and cause minimal damage, said the Pentagon press secretary during a briefing today.
“We condemn these reckless attacks by Iran, and we call on Iran to halt any further attacks, including from its proxy forces,” said Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder. “During the attack, the U.S. military coordinated closely with the Israeli Defense Forces to help defend Israel.”
Today’s attack was nearly twice the scope of a similar attack April 13 and 14, said Ryder. And like in April, the U.S. again assisted in defending Israel.
Two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, the USS Cole and USS Bulkeley, both deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean, fired a dozen interceptors at incoming Iranian ballistic missiles as part of defending Israel. At this time, Ryder said, it is unknown if those interceptors took down any of the missiles.
Ryder also said initial assessments are that all the missiles fired were actually launched from Iran, not from proxy states, and Iran did indeed plan to cause a significant amount of harm in Israel.
“You don’t launch that many missiles at a target without the intent of hitting something,” Ryder said. “Just like the last time, their intent is to cause destruction. And so, fortunately … Israel has very significant air defense capabilities, and the U.S., of course, played a role in helping on that front as well.”
Initial indications, Ryder said, are that there was minimal damage on the ground and Israel was able to defend itself against the Iranian attack successfully.
Ryder also said, no U.S. personnel were injured or harmed during the Iranian missile attack.
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III communicated with Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant at least twice today, both before the attack and during the attack, Ryder said.
“He reaffirmed the United States ironclad commitment to the defense of Israel and underscored that the U.S. remains well-postured throughout the Middle East region to protect U.S. forces and defend Israel in the face of threats from Iran and Iran-backed terrorist organizations,” Ryder said. (Source: U.S. DoD)
02 Oct 24. Iran says it has finished its missile attack on Israel
- Summary
- Iran describes its operation as defensive
- US promises ‘severe consequences’ for Iran
- Israel renews bombing of Beirut suburbs
- France mobilises military in Middle East
Iran said on Wednesday its missile attack on Israel, its biggest military assault on the Jewish state, was over, barring further provocation, while Israel and the United States promised to retaliate against Tehran as fears of a wider war intensified.
Despite calls for a ceasefire from the United Nations, the United States and the European Union, fighting between Israel and Hezbollah continued on Wednesday.
Israel renewed its bombardment of Beirut’s southern suburbs, a stronghold of the Iran-backed armed Hezbollah group, with at least a dozen airstrikes against what it said were targets belonging the group.
Large plumes of smoke were seen rising from parts of the suburbs. Israel issued new evacuation orders for the area, which has largely emptied after days of heavy strikes.
Hezbollah said it confronted Israeli forces infiltrating the Lebanese town of Adaisseh early on Wednesday and forced them to retreat.
Iran described Tuesday’s assault on Israel as defensive and solely aimed at its military facilities. Iran’s state news agency said three Israeli military bases had been targeted.
Tehran said its assault was a response to Israeli killings of militant leaders and aggression in Lebanon against Hezbollah and in Gaza.
“Our action is concluded unless the Israeli regime decides to invite further retaliation. In that scenario, our response will be stronger and more powerful,” Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said in a post on X early on Wednesday.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed to hit back. “Iran made a big mistake tonight – and it will pay for it,” he said at the outset of an emergency political security cabinet meeting late on Tuesday, according to a statement.
Washington said it would work with longtime ally Israel to ensure Iran faced “severe consequences” for Tuesday’s attack, which Israel said involved more than 180 ballistic missiles.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin spoke to Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant late on Tuesday and said Washington was “well-postured” to defend its interests in the Middle East, the Pentagon said in a statement.
“The minister and I expressed mutual appreciation for the coordinated defense of Israel against nearly 200 ballistic missiles launched by Iran and committed to remain in close contact,” Austin said separately in a post on X.
U.S. Navy warships fired about a dozen interceptors against Iranian missiles headed toward Israel, the Pentagon said. Britain said its forces played a part “in attempts to prevent further escalation in the Middle East”, without elaborating.
The Pentagon said Tuesday’s airstrikes by Iran were about twice the size of April’s assault by Iran on Israel.
“THE RESPONSE WILL BE PAINFUL”
Israel activated air defences against Iran’s bombardment on Tuesday and most missiles were intercepted “by Israel and a defensive coalition led by the United States,” Israeli Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari said in a video on X, adding: “Iran’s attack is a severe and dangerous escalation.”
Iran’s forces on Tuesday used hypersonic Fattah missiles for the first time, and 90% of its missiles successfully hit their targets in Israel, the Revolutionary Guards said.
In a statement on state media, the general staff of Iran’s armed forces said any Israeli response would be met with “vast destruction” of the latter’s infrastructure.
It also said it would target the regional assets of any Israeli ally that got involved.
Fears that Iran and the U.S. could be drawn into a regional war have risen with Israel’s growing assault on Lebanon in the past two weeks, including the start of a ground operation there on Monday, while its conflict in the Gaza Strip is a year old.
U.S. President Joe Biden expressed full U.S. support for Israel and described Iran’s attack as “ineffective.” Vice President Kamala Harris, the Democratic presidential candidate, backed Biden’s stance and said the United States would not hesitate to defend its interests against Iran.
“We will act. Iran will soon feel the consequences of their actions. The response will be painful,” Israel’s U.N. Ambassador Danny Danon told reporters.
The White House similarly promised “severe consequences” for Iran and spokesman Jake Sullivan told a Washington briefing the United States would “work with Israel to make that the case.”
Sullivan did not specify what those consequences might be.
In a statement, French President Emmanuel Macron said he strongly condemns Iran’s new attacks on Israel, adding that in a sign of its commitment to Israel’s security France mobilised its military resources in the Middle East on Wednesday.
The United Nations Security Council scheduled a meeting about the Middle East conflict for Wednesday, and the European Union called for an immediate ceasefire.
Nearly 1,900 people have been killed and more than 9,000 wounded in Lebanon in almost a year of cross-border fighting, most in the past two weeks, Lebanese government statistics showed on Tuesday. (Source: Reuters)
01 Oct 24. Israeli forces have carried out raids in Lebanon for months, military says. Israeli forces have been carrying out raids into southern Lebanon for months, uncovering Hezbollah tunnels and weapon caches under homes and uncovering invasion plans by the group, Israeli military spokesman Daniel Hagari said on Tuesday.
Hagari said the details were being declassified, hours after Israel announced a ground operation against the Iran-backed Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.
Dozens of such operations had uncovered detailed plans by Hezbollah to enter Israel and carry out an attack similar to the one led by the Palestinian militant group Hamas in southern Israel on Oct. 7 last year.
“Our soldiers entered Hezbollah’s underground infrastructure; exposed Hezbollah’s hidden weapons caches and seized and destroyed the weapons including advanced, Iranian-made weapons,” Hagari said.
The findings and evidence discovered under homes in villages in southern Lebanon during the raids will be presented to the international community, Hagari said.
Hagari showed videos filmed on troops’ body-cameras from what he said were Hezbollah tunnels under three Lebanese villages that lie across the border from three Israeli towns. The forces also found maps marking Israeli communities and army posts, he said.
“The operations that we de-classified tonight are only a small number of dozens of operations that we will reveal going forward, including the destruction of Hezbollah’s strategic assets and capabilities,” he said.
Hagari said that the ground raids would continue until tens of thousands of uprooted Israelis living near the border are able to return safely to their homes, but that the military’s aim was to complete them as fast as they can.
“We’re not going to Beirut. We’re not going to the cities in southern Lebanon. We are focusing on the area of those villages next to our border,” said Hagari. (Source: Reuters)
03 Oct 24. The anniversary of the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack will likely act as a significant global flashpoint for pro-Palestine demonstrations.
- This threat will likely be particularly acute across Europe, the Middle East, North Africa and North America. Demonstrations are also likely in parts of Asia and Africa, though these will likely be smaller in scale and largely peaceful due to broad alignment between popular opinion and the stance of domestic governments. However, there will be some exceptions in cases of existing domestic tensions.
- In many states, Israeli and Western embassies will likely be key targets for protests, prompting governments to augment security around such facilities. This will disrupt access to consular services and raise the risk of clashes, driving bystander risks.
- Businesses engaged with Israel, particularly those working with the Israeli government in strategic sectors, will likely encounter heightened risks from activist groups. Facilities in Europe and North America are at risk of being directly targeted by protesters; online campaigns will likely escalate and risks of hacktivism will likely increase.
- The symbolic significance of the anniversary will likely elevate the risk of attacks against Jewish and Israeli institutions, particularly by sole perpetrators. Recent developments in the conflict will likely compound the risk of radicalisation among vulnerable groups.
Context
To mark the anniversary of the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack, Israeli and Jewish communities around the world will likely mark the day with vigils and commemorative services. As these attacks also prompted the Israel-Hamas war and a significant intensification of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s military operations in Gaza, numerous communities will also likely mark the anniversary by calling for de-escalation, particularly Muslims, human rights activists and students. The initial launch of operations into Gaza (Palestinian Territories) and their expansion into Rafah (Rafah governorate) acted as sparks for major protests internationally, particularly throughout the region, the US and other Western countries.
While the rate of protests has declined in recent months, developments in the past weeks will likely exacerbate anti-Israel sentiment, threatening to compound public interest in pro-Palestine demonstrations. Israel’s 27 September assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, secretary-general of Lebanese Hizballah (LH), in an airstrike targeting Lebanon (specifically the capital Beirut) has raised concerns over further escalation on the Israel-Lebanon border. These concerns include the launch of a possible Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operation into southern Lebanon. This will compound perceptions of Israel as an aggressor in the conflict, inflaming condemnation and increasing the risk of radicalisation among communities which feel that international governments are not doing enough to constrain Israel. (Source: Sibylline)
02 Oct 24. RAF Typhoons and Voyager used in defence of Israel from Iranian attack. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) confirmed the role of the aircraft, however added “due to the nature of this attack, they did not engage any targets”.
In a statement, the MOD said the aircraft “played an important part in wider deterrence and efforts to prevent further escalation”.
The MOD’s confirmation comes after the Defence Secretary John Healey said British forces “played their part” and the Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer said he stood with Israel following an attack on the country by Iran.
Speaking to BFBS Forces News, Mr Healey said RAF personnel attached to the Typhoon jets based in Cyprus had been working 19-hour days in order to keep the aircraft in the air.
Mr Healey said he visited some of the RAF personnel who underlined “they know their job”.
“They do their job day to day, but they are also ready to scramble at very short notice to put in, as some did, 19 hours a day to get planes in the air and to be ready to respond to the changing circumstances,” he said.
Mr Healey earlier condemned Iran’s attack on Israel and thanked personnel involved in the operation for their “courage and professionalism”.
RAF Typhoons previously came to the aid of Israel’s defence in April after Iran launched a drone and cruise missile barrage at the country, with the British fighter jets shooting down a number of drones.
The Israeli military said most of the missiles fired on Tuesday night were intercepted – some by US Navy destroyers – with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warning Iran will face grave “consequences” for the attack.
Sir Keir said he was “deeply concerned that the region is on the brink” and again urged British nationals in Lebanon to leave amid escalating violence in the Middle East.
Britons fleeing Lebanon were set to board a UK Government-chartered flight to safety yesterday.
Last month, around 700 British troops were sent to Cyprus in case an emergency evacuation of Lebanon is required as fighting between Israel and Hezbollah continues to escalate.
Any more details relating to an evacuation or NEO (Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation) have yet to be announced.
Mr Healey spoke to BFBS Forces News as he met British troops in Cyprus preparing for the possibility of evacuating British citizens from Lebanon.
“We are ready to go if needed,” he told BFBS Forces News. “But for now, our advice to any Brits in Lebanon has not changed – it’s get out.
“And as a government, we are booking extra seats on the commercial flights that are leaving Beirut airport.
“Today is the first time we’ve got a specially chartered UK commercial flight available for those who want to leave and are ready to leave.”
It is believed Iran launched the strikes in retaliation for the killing of senior Hezbollah and Hamas leaders.
Sir Keir said Iran has “menaced the Middle East for far too long” and called on the country to “stop these attacks”.
This escalation in violence has arrived after Israel began a ground offensive in Lebanon, carrying out what it described as “limited, localised” operations. (Source: forces.net)
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