NEWS IN BRIEF – ISRAEL – HAMAS CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Sept 30.

• The first anniversary of Hamas’ 7 October 2023 attack against Israel is scheduled to include numerous memorial events across Israel, including a government-televised broadcast at 2110hrs (local time) and a ceremony organised by the families of hostages. The latter will begin in HaYarkon Park (Tel Aviv district) at 1910hrs. Around 40,000 tickets have been sold so far. In all, 251 people were kidnapped during the attack (of whom 97 remain in captivity).

SIGNIFICANCE

* The anniversary comes amid rising levels of domestic unrest. Protests demanding the release of hostages (as well as a ceasefire deal) have spiked in recent months; they have included calls for nationwide strike action.

* At the time of writing, we assess that both Lebanese Hizballah (LH) and Iran are preparing to launch retaliatory attacks against Israel for the assassinations of senior LH and Hamas members.

* In the past two months, Hamas operatives in the West Bank have shifted their strategy towards increasing their targeting of the civilian population, particularly with explosives.

*  FORECAST

Memorial ceremonies will reduce the likelihood of major unrest, though localised travel disruption and nationwide strikes remain possible. Participation in and observance of memorial ceremonies on 7 October will reduce the risk of acts of major domestic unrest across Israeli society on the day itself. However, limited outbreaks of spontaneous unrest remain a realistic possibility, particularly in Tel Aviv district and after the HaYarkon Park ceremony. The scale of the ceremony will also significantly elevate the risk of travel disruption in Tel Aviv and surrounding areas. Additionally, we assess that strikes and shortened business hours throughout Israel are likely on 7 October across both the public and private sectors, increasing disruption risks for operations and supply chains, while also limiting access to key services.

However, domestic unrest and national strikes are highly likely throughout the rest of October, particularly during the weekends before and after 7 October. Organisations advocating for a ceasefire deal will likely call for daily disruption throughout October, elevating domestic unrest and disruption risks for business operations (and travellers). Due to the memorial ceremonies on 7 October, significantly large protests are likely on 5 October and 12 October in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv. The realistic possibility of altercations between protesters, counter-protesters and the police (including the use of excessive dispersal tactics, such as water cannons) will elevate bystander security risks around these events. We assess that these risks will be particularly elevated when / if protesters attempt to block key thoroughfares, such as the Aylon Highway (Highway 20), as well as Highways 1 and 4.

The risk of unrest will likely persist throughout key holidays in October. These include Rosh HaShana (between the evenings of 2 and 4 October), Yom Kippur (between the evenings of 11 and 12 October), Sukkot (between the evenings of 16 and 23 October), Shemini Atzeret (between the evenings of 23 and 24 October) and the national memorial day for 7 October (27 October). Furthermore, we assess that Hamas is highly likely to publish at least one video of the hostages in October. Domestic unrest risks will rise significantly in the days following any such publication. However, major violent domestic unrest, including vandalism, remains unlikely.

Sept 29.

29 Sep 24. Statement From Pentagon Press Secretary Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder. Secretary Austin has been receiving updates from and providing guidance to his team throughout the weekend on the latest developments in the Middle East. He and DoD leaders remain focused on the protection of U.S. citizens and forces in the region, the defense of Israel, and the de-escalation of the situation through deterrence and diplomacy. Secretary Austin stressed that the United States is determined to prevent Iran and Iranian-backed partners and proxies from exploiting the situation or expanding the conflict. Secretary Austin made clear that should Iran, its partners, or its proxies use this moment to target American personnel or interests in the region, the United States will take every necessary measure to defend our people. The United States retains the capability to deploy forces on short notice. The Department of Defense continues to maintain a significant amount of capability in the region and to dynamically adjust our force posture based on the evolving security situation.  The Secretary has directed that the USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN Carrier Strike Group (CSG) remain in the USCENTCOM theater and that the USS Wasp Amphibious Ready Group / Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU) will continue to operate in the Eastern Mediterranean. This afloat posture is complemented by DoD’s elevated fighter and attack squadron presence, including F-22, F-15E, F-16, and A-10 aircraft, and we will further reinforce our defensive air-support capabilities in the coming days.  The Secretary has also increased the readiness of additional U.S. forces to deploy, elevating our preparedness to respond to various contingencies. And DoD maintains robust and integrated air-defense capabilities across the Middle East, ensuring the protection of U.S. forces operating in the region. (Source: U.S. DoD)

Sept 28.

28 Sept 24. Readout of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III’s Calls With Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant. Pentagon Press Secretary Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder provided the following readout: Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III spoke twice with Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant yesterday about events in Lebanon. The Secretary expressed full support for Israel’s right to defend itself and its people against Iranian backed terrorist groups. Secretary Austin stressed that the United States is determined to prevent Iran and Iranian-backed partners and proxies from exploiting the situation or expanding the conflict. The Secretary made it clear that the United States remains postured to protect U.S. forces and facilities in the region and committed to the defense of Israel. (Source: U.S. DoD)

28 Sept 24.  Israeli military says Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah is dead; militant group has not confirmed. The Shiite cleric was one of Israel’s archfoes for decades and led one of the most powerful militant groups in the region with backing from Iran. His death could sharply escalate the risks of a wider Middle East war nearly a year after Hamas’s deadly raid from Gaza touched off Israeli attacks that have claimed tens of thousands of lives. (Source: Washington Post)

Sept 27.

• On 27 September at approximately 1620hrs (local time), the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike against Beirut (Lebanon). It targeted the alleged headquarters of Lebanese Hizballah (LH). Local media reports indicate that the strike flattened at least six buildings in the Haret Hreik area.

SIGNIFICANCE

* Unconfirmed reports indicate that the strike also targeted LH Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, whose whereabouts remain unknown at the time of writing. The IDF subsequently announced that the target was located under civilian residential buildings, indicating a high likelihood of significant civilian casualties.

* The strike comes amid substantially elevated cross-border tensions, with both the IDF and LH having significantly increased the frequency, intensity and range of strikes since 20 September (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 23 September 2024).

* In the past week, the IDF has conducted several airstrikes against Beirut, killing multiple high-ranking LH commanders, including Ibrahim Aqil (see Sibylline Alert – 20 September 2024), Ibrahim Qubaisi and Abu Salah (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 26 September 2024).

FORECAST

LH is highly likely to retaliate forcefully in the coming 72 hours, significantly elevating security risks in northern Israel. A broad response involving a significantly increased rate and intensity of fire into northern Israel against civilian and military targets is likely. These will possibly include facilities such as Haifa port, off-shore gas rigs and electric power stations in northern Israel, including Israel’s largest power station in Hadera (Haifa district). Military targets will likely include key IDF bases, particularly those in Atlit (Haifa), Mount Meron, Safed and Ramat David (all Northern district), as well as facilities in the Golan Heights such as Naffakh (Northern). Such strikes will present severe indirect security risks for civilian populations living near these locations. In the coming 48 hours, there is also a realistic possibility of increased transit from northern Israel to southern areas, elevating congestion along key roads. While the Home Front Command has yet to change its guidelines, these are likely to be amended in the coming 48 hours. They will likely restrict activities in northern areas and further disrupt business operations.

In addition to an elevated intensity of strikes against northern Israel, LH is also likely to increase attacks against central Israel, including Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), raising the risk of major armed escalation. There is also a realistic possibility of strikes against Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV) around the time of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s return from the US. These will sustain elevated security and business operation risks in central Israel in the coming 72 hours. We assess that a series of strikes consistently targeting central Israel or regular high-intensity barrages targeting areas in the north will significantly elevate the risk of the IDF launching a ground operation into southern Lebanon.

In the coming week, Iranian proxies in the region are likely to increase their attacks against Israel, elevating security risks, including in Southern district. Iranian proxies, particularly the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) and the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen, have gradually increased their attacks against Israel in the past week. Following the latest attack against Beirut, they are likely to intensify their efforts to attack Israel. This will elevate security risks across Israel, particularly in Southern district and around major ports such as Ashdod, Ashkelon and Eilat. Attacks by Iranian proxies will also compound increasing security risks in central Israel, including in Tel Aviv.

• Israel: Houthi missile attack underscores elevated security risks in central Israel. On 26 September, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted a ballistic missile launched by the Iran-backed Houthis targeting central Israel. Despite the interception taking place outside of Israeli airspace, the missile triggered rocket sirens throughout the Gush Dan area due to the risk of shrapnel. The incident comes amid increasingly intense hostilities between Israel and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) and growing attempts by Iranian proxies to target Israel. These underscore elevated security risks for individuals across the country; though currently, these risks are relatively lower in the Central and Southern districts. Attacks by Iranian proxies targeting Israel will likely gradually grow in the coming days and weeks, particularly in the run-up to the 7 October anniversary. We assess that this will continue to gradually increase security and business operations risks in major cities including Haifa (Haifa district) Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district).

Sept 26.

27 Sept 24. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Remarks Following an Israeli Strike on Lebanese Hizbollah. September 27, 2024, Joint Base Andrews, after returning from the AUKUS Defence Ministers’ Meeting Communique in London:

I know that you’re seeing reports about a significant strike today in Beirut.

I spoke by phone earlier today to my counterpart in Israel Minister Gallant.

The United States was not involved in Israel’s operation. We had no advance warning. My call with Minister Gallant took place while Israel’s operation was already underway.

As you know this operation took place just a few hours ago and they’re still making assessments, so I don’t have any further information or specifics for you at this time. You’ve heard me say a number of times, an all-out war should be avoided.

Diplomacy continues to be the best way forward — and it’s the fastest way to let displaced Israeli and Lebanese citizens return to their homes on both sides of the border.

I’ll be talking with Minister Gallant again soon and I look to get an update from him when we have that conversation. Thank you. (Source: U.S. DoD)

Sept 26.

KEY POINTS

• The Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s deployment of two infantry reserve brigades to northern Israel underscores the risks of a ground operation into southern Lebanon; however, an imminent operation in the coming 72 hours remains unlikely.
• An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strike on Eilat port (Southern district, Israel) reflects increased attempts by Iranian proxies to target Israel, sustaining elevated security risks across the country.
• Gaza Strip: Amid the escalation in northern Israel, the IDF has reduced the tempo of its military operations in Gaza. Ongoing IDF operations are largely concentrated in Rafah (Rafah governorate, southern Gaza) and reflect a gradual shift to more targeted raids. Additionally, the IDF continues to expand its infrastructure in the Netzarim Corridor (central Gaza) possibly indicating an effort to entrench and maintain its positions for a prolonged period.
• West Bank: IDF operations continued at pace, with targeted raids on militant hot spots, sustaining elevated security risks and ethno-religious tensions. IDF operations are primarily concentrated in the northern West Bank, particularly Jenin and Nablus governorates and the Hebron governorate in the southern West Bank.
• Israel-Lebanon: An attempted Lebanese Hizballah (LH) missile strike on central Israel prompted the IDF to call up two reserve brigades for deployment in northern Israel, underlining the growing risk of conflict escalation. On 23 and 24 September the IDF conducted airstrikes in the Lebanese capital Beirut. The strike on 23 September was likely a failed assassination attempt on Ali Karaki (the head of LH’s southern front) while the strike on 24 September successfully killed Ibrahim Qubaisi, the head of LH’s rocket and missile array. The latter strike also killed several other senior commanders in the Dahieh neighbourhood (Beirut). Subsequently, on 25 September, LH launched a single missile towards central Israel, claiming to target Mossad’s headquarters. Israel’s David’s Sling medium to long-range air defence system intercepted the missile. Later on 25 September, the IDF announced it called two infantry reserve brigades, Brigade 228 and Brigade 6, for deployment in northern Israel. Both brigades have experience fighting either in Lebanon or across similar topography. Earlier on 26 September, the IDF performed an airstrike in the Dahieh neighbourhood of Beirut, reportedly targeting Abu Salah, the head of LH aerial forces.
• Israel-Lebanon: Over this period, the IDF continued its intensive airstrike campaign, focusing mainly on the Nabatieh and South governorates in southern Lebanon. The IDF also increased the frequency of attacks on the Lebanese governorates of Beqaa and Baalbek-Hermel. The main targets of the IDF strikes are LH rocket launchers, weapon depots and military infrastructure. On 25 September, an IDF spokesperson stated that the IDF struck LH’s intelligence headquarters array in 70 different areas.
• Israel-Lebanon: LH has also increased the tempo and range of its strikes, though these remain largely within Israel’s Haifa and Northern district and predominantly target IDF bases. However, many IDF bases are near Israeli population centres; as such, strikes pose significantly increasing collateral and security risks for civilians in northern Israel.
• Israel-Iraq: A recent unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) explosion in Eilat (Southern district, Israel) reflects a continued escalation of attacks by Iranian proxies, elevating risks of an Israeli response. On 25 September, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) launched two UAVs against Eilat (Southern district). The IDF navy successfully intercepted one UAV but the second hit Eilat port, causing material damage and lightly injuring two bystanders. AN IDF spokesperson stated that the IDF is following up on the ‘threat from Iraq’, collecting intelligence and will ‘do whatever it takes to deal with the matter’.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• At the UN, France and the US have proposed a ceasefire agreement for Israel and LH, underscoring increasing international pressure to de-escalate tensions. On 25 September, France and the US presented a draft proposal for a 21-day ceasefire in Lebanon to the UN Security Council (UNSC). Although the proposal has received broad endorsement from fellow UNSC members, no party has proposed a resolution that would enforce the ceasefire. Despite increasing diplomatic pressure to de-escalate ongoing military operations in Lebanon, we assess that neither LH nor Israel will likely agree to a ceasefire agreement over the coming days, substantially undermining efforts to diffuse cross-border tensions (see: FORECAST).
• Significant internal displacement in Lebanon has increased the strain on public and emergency services, highlighting elevated socio-economic health risks. On 25 September, the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that the recent intensification of IDF strikes in Lebanon has displaced at least 90,500 civilians. The majority of internally displaced peoples (IDPs) have travelled to the capital Beirut, increasing the strain on emergency and public services. Rising demand for medical services and food aid will compound pressure on already-strained humanitarian resources, increasing shortages and delays for local staff. Altercations around aid distribution centres and healthcare facilities will elevate bystander risks for both civilians and NGO staff, though widespread unrest remains unlikely. In the coming days, thousands of civilians will almost certainly continue evacuating southern Lebanon, exacerbating pressure on public services, sustaining significant congestion on highways and delaying overland movement nationwide.
• Amid significantly elevated tensions, commercial airlines have continued to suspend regional services while numerous states have called for foreign nationals to leave Lebanon. Since 23 September, several states, including the UK and Russia, have called for their citizens to immediately leave Lebanon amid concerns of an unmanaged escalation between the IDF and LH. However, numerous commercial airlines have suspended flights to Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY), including Air France, Emirates, Etihad, the Lufthansa Group and Turkish Airlines. Similarly, Air France, British Airways, the Lufthansa Group and Wizz Air have temporarily suspended services to Israel, substantially restricting travel to and from Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV). Amid significantly elevated regional tensions, further cancellations and suspensions are highly likely, further restricting the commercial availability of evacuation routes.
• Protest organisers have cancelled upcoming hostage release demonstrations in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district, Israel) highlighting increasing security concerns in central Israel. Earlier on 26 September, the Hostages and Missing Families Forum cancelled a 28 September demonstration calling for the government to secure hostage releases through ceasefire negotiations. The cancellation highlights increasing concerns over possible LH missile attacks targeting Tel Aviv and coinciding with protests, where large-scale attendance would restrict access to public shelters and increase risks to participants. Despite the cancellation, however, smaller-scale protests will likely take place in localities throughout Israel on 28 September, increasing localised travel and operational disruption risks. In the coming weeks, the scale and frequency of protest activity will likely increase, though it will remain highly dependent on security directives amid increasing tensions on the Israel-Lebanon border.
• Warnings from Israel’s National Security Council (NSC) for Israelis travelling abroad highlight significant risks of targeted violence in the coming weeks. On 25 September, the NSC issued several travel advisories for Israeli and Jewish individuals planning to travel abroad in October due to the upcoming anniversary of the Israel-Hamas war on 7 October and numerous subsequent Jewish holidays. The NSC stated that there will be a significantly elevated risk of various militant groups attempting to conduct violent attacks and possible kidnappings targeting Jewish and Israeli individuals, particularly in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia regions. In the coming weeks, elevated ethno-religious tensions linked to the Israel-Hamas war will likely trigger an uptick in attempted militant and sole-perpetrator attacks targeting facilities associated with Jewish and Israeli communities worldwide. Attacks targeting these locations, including religious facilities and community centres, will increase security and bystander risks, particularly in cities and neighbourhoods with substantial Jewish populations.
• Increasing tensions between Israel’s ultra-Orthodox Jewish community and the Israeli police will likely trigger violent protests amid increasing efforts to enforce conscription notices. On 23 September, the police violently clashed with ultra-Orthodox protesters during an anti-conscription demonstration in the Ramat Beit Shemesh Daled area (Jerusalem district). Footage of the rally shows police striking seated protesters with batons; the footage will likely trigger anti-police demonstrations in ultra-Orthodox population centres over the coming days, particularly in Beit Shemesh (Jerusalem district). Additionally, local media sources began reporting on 25 September that the IDF had begun warning ultra-Orthodox men that non-adherence to conscription orders could result in their arrest over the coming days. The reports highlight continued IDF efforts to enforce the 1,000 draft orders issued to ultra-Orthodox men since July (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 18 July 2024). In the coming weeks, efforts to enforce conscription orders will almost certainly trigger clashes with the police, particularly around attempts to arrest ultra-Orthodox individuals evading draft notices, increasing localised bystander risks. Broader anti-conscription protests are highly likely over the coming weeks, particularly in Beit Shemesh, Jerusalem (both Jerusalem district), Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv district) and Modi’in-Maccabin-Re’ut (Central district). Demonstrators will highly likely attempt to block key intersections on Highways 1 and 4, undermining supply chain continuity; clashes with the police will almost certainly drive elevated security and bystander risks.

FORECAST

Risks of an IDF ground operation into Lebanon remain elevated, however an imminent operation in the next 72 hours remains unlikely. The preparation and the full deployment of the two reserve brigades to northern Israel will likely take at least 72 hours. Israel will likely sustain its current rate of strikes against southern Lebanon, with sporadic, precise strikes against the capital Beirut targeting senior LH commanders. LH will likely slowly increase its targeting of central Israel, likely to set red lines in response to strikes in Beirut and to push back on Israel’s escalation. However, LH will likely continue to primarily focus on IDF positions in northern Israel; this will sustain high-security risks in proximate Israeli population centres. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s trip (26-28 October) to the UN General Assembly in New York City (US) will also likely delay any potential IDF ground operation as will efforts by international partners. However, ongoing bilateral hostilities will sustain elevated risks of miscalculation, misjudgement and misfire sustaining a realistic possibility of escalation into IDF ground operations in the medium term.

A ceasefire between Israel and Lebanese Hizballah remains highly unlikely in the coming days, moderating prospects for diplomatic de-escalation. Despite increased diplomatic pressure to accept a ceasefire agreement, neither LH nor Israel will likely agree to mutually acceptable ceasefire terms. Following reports of hundreds of civilian casualties in southern Lebanon and the IDF’s numerous strikes targeting high-ranking LH members in the capital Beirut, LH remains highly unlikely to agree to a ceasefire. On Israel’s part, Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Israel Katz have both released statements rejecting a potential ceasefire agreement. National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir has threatened to withdraw his Otzmah Yehudit party from the governing coalition if Netanyahu agrees to a ceasefire, underscoring significant opposition from within the cabinet, particularly among hard-right coalition members. Additionally, key opposition figures within Israel such as National Unity party leader Benny Gantz have called for a continuation of operations in Lebanon, highlighting substantial political support for operations undermining LH’s presence in southern Lebanon. Without substantial assurances that LH will withdraw its forces from locations south of the Litany River in southern Lebanon (likely from third parties), Israel remains unlikely to actively engage in ceasefire negotiations. As such, prospects for a diplomatic de-escalation will likely remain low over the coming days, sustaining risks of a further military escalation.

The shift in operational focus from Gaza will likely allow militants to strengthen their control and recapture lost territory, slightly elevating security risks in central and southern Israel throughout October. While IDF operations continue in Gaza, the lower tempo will likely allow Gazan militants to regroup and exert influence over lost territory. However, the capabilities of Gaza-based militants will likely remain relatively low despite this respite. 11 months of cumulative IDF ground operations have massively undercut the infrastructure available to militants in the area. As such, while there will likely be a slight uptick in the threat of sporadic rocket launches towards southern and central Israel throughout October, particularly around the 7 October anniversary of the Israel-Hamas war, overall risk will remain limited.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

• A successful terror attack by LH and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
• High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
• Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
• Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting LH and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
• Israel re-launches widespread, high-intensity military operations in Gaza
• An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
• US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
• Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
• An IDF-targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)
• An LH strike causes a mass casualty event in Israel
• An IDF strike causes a mass casualty event in Lebanon
• An IDF strike kills civilians in Lebanon
• Russia-Yemen: Possible arming of Houthis likely forms part of wider retaliation. Reports on 24 September claimed that Russia engaged in Iran-brokered negotiations with Yemen’s Houthi militants to transfer anti-ship cruise missiles to the group. Moscow has reportedly yet to reach a final decision on sending ‘dozens’ of Yakhont missiles (also known as P-800 Oniks) to the Houthis. The missiles have a range of about 186 miles (300km). Unspecified regional officials familiar with the talks stated that the Houthis and Russian representatives met in Iran, in the capital Tehran, at least twice this year; further meetings are expected in the coming weeks. The development is highly likely linked to the prospect of Ukraine’s partners authorising strikes against targets inside Russia using Western weaponry. President Vladimir Putin warned in early June that Russia could possibly arm Western adversaries with long-range missiles if Ukraine uses NATO-supplied weapons to strike targets inside Russian territory. While unconfirmed, Russia’s possible efforts to arm the Houthis likely aim at deterring Western decision-makers from offering Ukraine more advanced support. However, if this goes ahead, we assess that Iranian proxies will likely pose a heightened threat to Western assets across the Middle East.

Sept 24.

*Israel-Lebanon: Significant travel disruption will continue in coming days amid escalating hostilities. On 23 September, the Lufthansa Group announced that it is extending its suspension of flights to Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV, Israel) until 14 October. The announcement comes amid a significant escalation in hostilities between Israel and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) and increasing numbers of flight suspensions to TLV and Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY, Lebanon). Air travel disruption is likely to increase over the coming days. More airlines are highly likely to suspend flights to BEY and TLV, and possibly also to restrict the number of flights over neighbouring countries. National carriers El Al (Israel) and Middle East Airlines (Lebanon) will likely struggle to meet demand, further increasing travel delays and reducing the viability of evacuation for international personnel via commercial airlines. We assess this will also elevate the risk of bottlenecks along sea routes, particularly those from Lebanon, further impacting evacuation efforts. Roads from southern Lebanon towards Beirut continue to be congested as thousands of people evacuate from southern Lebanon, sustaining elevated travel and operational disruption risks in the coming days.

KEY POINTS

• The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed top Lebanese Hizballah (LH) commanders in Beirut and called for the evacuation of civilians from southern Lebanon; this comes as LH increased the range and intensity of its rocket strikes, though these remained within northern Israel, signalling managed escalation.
• Gaza-based militants hijacked and looted an aid convoy in Rafah (southern Gaza), before being killed by an IDF drone strike, underscoring continued security risks and operational challenges for NGOs.
• Gaza Strip: Nothing significant to report
• West Bank: The rate of IDF operations has reduced compared to the previous two weeks and continues to focus on the northern West Bank. Clashes between IDF soldiers and Palestinian militants have been primarily concentrated in Jenin (Jenin governorate), Nablus (Nablus governorate) and Tubas (Tubas governorate). These incidents mainly comprised small arms fire exchanges. However, IED detonations were also recorded, underscoring the elevated security risks facing bystanders and assets during IDF operations in militant hotspots in the northern West Bank.
• Israel-Lebanon: LH extended its attacks to include the Lower Galilee region and Haifa district (Israel); this comes as Israel has intensified its strikes against southern Lebanon and killed senior LH commanders in Beirut. On 20 September, Israel conducted an airstrike against the Dahieh neighbourhood in Beirut, killing at least 37 individuals according to Lebanese sources. Among the dead were 14 LH commanders of LH’s elite Redwan Force, which is tasked with defending southern Lebanon as well as launching operations into Israel in the event of an armed conflict. Additionally, the strike killed two top LH commanders: Ibrahim Aqil, the head of LH’s military operations and the acting commander of the Redwan Force, and Ahmed Wehbe, the head of LH’s training unit and the former commander of the Redwan Force. In response, LH intensified its attacks against northern Israel, extending the range of its strikes to Haifa and the Lower Galilee region. On 21 September, LH launched 24 rockets targeting Ramat David military airbase (Northern district), though these were intercepted by air defences. On 22 September, LH launched rockets targeting a Rafael Advanced Defense Systems factory near Haifa; the rockets caused material damage to several houses in Kiryat Bialik (Haifa) and injured three individuals. On 23 September, LH rockets hit a residential home in Giv’at Avni (Northern), causing material damage. Subsequently, Israel also increased the frequency and intensity of its strikes against southern Lebanon, as well as in Baalbek-Hermel and Beqaa governorates. On 23 September, the IDF issued a call for Lebanese residents in population centres across southern Lebanon (and later in Baalbek-Herme and Beqaa governorates) to evacuate areas in proximity to LH assets and weapons caches before strikes are conducted. The statements prompted mass evacuations of civilians from southern Lebanon, causing widespread travel disruption along northbound routes. Given the presence of LH military assets at civilian homes, IDF strikes will drive substantial threats to civilian infrastructure and bystanders. This threat will be compounded by the risk of secondary explosions emanating from strikes on weapons caches hitting residential areas. The IDF and LH both currently appear to be managing the situation, with neither side committing to an all-out escalation. However, current operations have significantly elevated the risk of miscalculation and snowballing escalation leading to ground operations in southern Lebanon and an extension of the armed conflict throughout Lebanon (see FORECAST).
• Israel-Iraq-Syria: There has been an increase in rocket and drone launches against Israel following the uptick of hostilities between the IDF and LH. Since the uptick of hostilities on 20 September, Iranian proxies in the region increased their targeting of Israel. On 22 September, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) claimed five attacks against Israel. The IDF confirmed it intercepted two cruise missiles targeting the southern Golan Heights, as well as one drone targeting southern Israel close to Eilat (Southern district) and another drone flying over the southern Golan Heights. On 23 September the IDF intercepted another drone launched from Iraq while it crossed from Syria into Israel. The increase in attacks by Iranian proxies underscores the elevated risks of conflict on multiple fronts, especially if hostilities between Israel and LH escalate into a full-blown war (or even a limited ground operation). Even if the conflict does not escalate to these levels, security risks emanating from Iranian proxies’ attacks will remain elevated throughout Israel in the coming week.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• Due to significant tensions along the Israel-Lebanon border, the Home Front Command has increased restrictions on public activities in northern Israel, elevating operational disruption risks. On 22 September, the Home Front Command issued guidelines for numerous locations in Haifa and Northern districts, ordering schools to remain closed on 23 September. The guidelines also limit the size of gatherings (ten attendees outdoors and 100 attendees indoors) and state that businesses cannot operate unless an adequate shelter is located nearby. Israel’s aviation authority also announced the closure of the airspace north of the Hadera area (Northern), though this is highly unlikely to impact operations at Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV). The restrictions have been formally extended to at least 25 September and will likely be subject to further extensions depending on the degree of escalation along the Israel-Lebanon border. Businesses with operations in Haifa and Northern are highly likely to continue facing elevated risks of disruption due to guidelines and adherence to rocket sirens, while supply chains through the Port of Haifa (Haifa) will almost certainly encounter operational disruption.
• The IDF released footage of Gaza-based militants attacking and looting aid convoys, underscoring the critical risks facing NGO staff. On 21 September, the IDF released footage of militants hijacking and looting the convoy as it moved through the Rafah area; the IDF subsequently killed the militants in a drone strike. The incident highlights the significant risk of attacks impacting NGO convoys engaged in aid distribution operations in southern Gaza, as well as the elevated threats to staff, particularly drivers. Additionally, the IDF’s targeting of militants in close proximity to aid and humanitarian convoys highlights the significant bystander risks facing staff and civilians throughout Gaza.
• Ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas continue to stall, critically undermining prospects for hostage releases. On 19 September, the Wall Street Journal reported that unnamed White House officials had acknowledged that a ceasefire agreement remains highly unlikely in the short term, citing long-standing tensions over the release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prisons. We continue to assess that a ceasefire agreement remains unlikely in the coming weeks, with increasing tensions along the Israel-Lebanon border likely further undermining progress. Amid faltering negotiations, long-standing domestic pressure on the Israeli government to secure hostage releases will likely continue to drive protest activity within Israel. The scale and frequency of anti-government demonstrations are highly likely to continue increasing in the weeks preceding the one-year anniversary of the 7 October 2023 attacks, increasing the risk of operational and travel disruption throughout Israel.
• In Israel, New Hope party leader Gideon Sa’ar announced that he would not accept the position of defence minister, moderating the immediate threats to government stability. On 21 September, Sa’ar announced that although Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had offered him the position last week (see Israel-Hamas War Update – 16 September 2024), it would be ‘inappropriate’ to accept the offer in light of the ongoing escalation along the Israel-Lebanon border. Although Sa’ar’s statement indicates that threats to government stability will likely remain low in the short term, continued tensions between Netanyahu and incumbent Defence Minister Yoav Gallant will sustain longer-term risks of coalition factionalism and instability.
• Anti-conscription protests continue to drive localised disruption risks as the IDF continues to issue draft orders to ultra-Orthodox men. On 22 September, dozens of ultra-Orthodox men gathered outside an IDF recruitment centre on Yad Vashem Street in Beersheba (Southern district) for an anti-conscription protest, blocking individuals responding to draft notices from entering the centre. Posters distributed by protest organisers indicate that ultra-Orthodox religious figures organised transport for demonstrators from locations including Ashdod (Southern), Beit Shemesh and Jerusalem (both Jerusalem district) to Beersheba, which has a comparatively small ultra-Orthodox population. The transport of activists highlights increasing risks of demonstrations targeting locations (including IDF recruitment offices) beyond ultra-Orthodox population centres, increasing the risk of broader protest-related operational disruption as the IDF issues further conscription notices in the coming months.
• Increasing Iranian concerns over possible Israeli espionage and communications network infiltration highlight significant human rights concerns for foreign nationals. On 22 September, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced that it had arrested 12 individuals across six provinces for allegedly collaborating with Israel and planning ‘acts’ against the country. The arrests highlight Iran’s increasing security posture amid significantly elevated regional tensions and the ongoing escalation along the Israel-Lebanon border. Subsequently, on 23 September, local media sources began reporting that the IRGC had instructed its personnel and all personnel at Iran’s nuclear development facilities to stop using communications devices, including pagers and walkie-talkies. These reports almost certainly reflect the IRGC’s increasing anxieties over potential communications network infiltration following the detonation of thousands of communications devices linked to LH on 15 and 16 September; these were likely carried out by Israel. In the coming weeks, Iran will almost certainly intensify efforts to secure communications networks and identify potential institutional infiltration by Israeli-linked actors. As such, individuals in Iran will likely face elevated risks of detention and surveillance, increasing human rights concerns, particularly for foreign nationals and individuals with any demonstrable or tangential links to Israel and/or the Jewish community.

FORECAST

The risk of hostilities snowballing into IDF ground operations inside Lebanon will remain elevated in the coming days, though at present no party is indicating a willingness for such an escalation. LH has the capability to strike deep into Israel but continues to refrain from doing so. This relative restraint was also reflected in its response to events that risked significantly driving escalation, with LH claiming that the targeting of the Rafael Advanced Defense Systems factory near Haifa comprised part of its retaliation for the exploding pagers. As such, LH appears to be seeking forms of retaliation that allow it to claim to have escalated its response, but which also fall below the threshold for ground operations. The IDF’s decision to close the airspace north of Hadera likely underscores that the IDF recognises this consideration and so has assessed that the main risks pertaining to LH attacks remain concentrated around Haifa and Northern.

However, the risk of miscalculation and misfire leading to civilian casualties and significant damage to Israeli infrastructure will remain heightened, elevating the risk of further escalation snowballing into an unmanaged conflict including ground operations into Lebanon. An Israeli ground operation into southern Lebanon would highly likely cause LH to expand the range of its rocket launches, possibly to include Tel Aviv. There is a realistic possibility, however, that LH will still refrain from striking Tel Aviv and instead rely on support from Iranian proxies to strike Israel, including Tel Aviv. Reliance on Iran’s other proxies to conduct broader strikes against Israel would allow both LH and Israel to limit the conflict to southern Lebanon and northern Israel.

Further Israeli strikes targeting long-range LH missiles in Beqaa and Baalbek-Hermel remain a realistic possibility. Strikes against these missiles, and associated weapons caches, which are likely being reserved in the event of an Israeli attack against Iran, will further elevate the risk of escalation stemming from LH and increase the likelihood of the group extending the range of its strikes into central Israel. Furthermore, such attacks against long-range missiles and missile facilities will elevate the risk of Iranian intervention, primarily through its proxies but also possibly directly. However, we continue to assess that neither Iran nor Israel currently wish to engage in direct war with one another.

Regardless, Iranian proxies, particularly those in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, are likely to increase the rate of their attempted strikes into Israel in the coming days. Such efforts will moderately elevate security risks in central Israel, and consequently also elevate risks of limited Israeli retaliation against militant assets in these countries, expanding bystander risks. Furthermore, in the event of escalation involving Iranian proxies or Iran itself, neighbouring countries, particularly Egypt and Jordan, will be increasingly exposed to misfire and shrapnel risks from missiles and drones aimed at Israel. Additionally, such escalation is almost certain to cause large numbers of flight cancellations and airspace restrictions in the region, significantly elevating travel disruption risks. Under current conditions, flight cancellations and disruption are likely to continue throughout the coming week but will be largely limited to Israel and Lebanon, with the possibility of certain airlines also limiting their flights to and over Jordan and Syria.

Increasing tensions along the Israel-Lebanon border will elevate the risk of a moderate uptick in regional protest activity, though broader direct military intervention remains highly unlikely. There is a realistic possibility of an uptick in regional protest activity in support of Lebanon, particularly in Iran, Jordan and Morocco, though demonstrations are unlikely to surpass the scale of previous pro-Palestine protests. Similarly, protest activity is unlikely to increase significantly in locations that have not seen repeated pro-Palestine demonstrations during the Israel-Hamas war, moderating risks of protest activity and unrest, particularly in the Gulf region. Even so, states maintaining diplomatic ties with Israel will likely face increasing domestic pressure to suspend bilateral agreements, further increasing anti-government sentiment and longer-term unrest risks, particularly Egypt, Jordan and Morocco. However, we continue to assess that broad suspensions of diplomatic agreements with Israel remain unlikely. Direct military intervention by regional parties remains highly unlikely, though Iran’s network of regional proxies in Iraq and Syria will possibly support LH by increasing the frequency of attacks targeting Israel, increasing physical security and bystander risks nationwide. The Yemen-based Houthis are also highly likely to sustain attacks on commercial shipping vessels for the duration of IDF operations along the Israel-Lebanon border, possibly increasing the frequency of attacks if the IDF launches ground operations into southern Lebanon. As such, broader disruption to global supply chains will likely continue, sustaining increased costs for shipping firms and driving inflationary pressures on impacted goods.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

• A successful terror attack by LH and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
• High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
• Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
• Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting LH and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
• Israel re-launches widespread, high-intensity military operations in Gaza
• An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
• US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
• Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
• An IDF-targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)
• An LH strike causes a mass casualty event in Israel
• An IDF strike causes a mass casualty event in Lebanon
• An IDF strike kills civilians in Lebanon

(Source: Sibylline)

26 Sept 24. Israel says it has secured $8.7bn U.S. aid package. Israel said on Thursday it had secured an $8.7bn aid package from the United States to support its ongoing military efforts and to maintain a qualitative military edge in the region.

The package includes $3.5bn for essential wartime procurement, which has already been received and earmarked for critical military purchases, and $5.2bn designated for air defense systems including the Iron Dome anti-missile system, David’s Sling and an advanced laser system.

Israel is currently fighting on two fronts, against the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas in Gaza and the Iran-backed Hezbollah movement in Lebanon.

The aid announcement came after negotiations at the Pentagon between Eyal Zamir, the director general of Israel’s defense ministry, and U.S. defense officials, including acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Amanda Dory, Israel’s Defense Ministry said in a statement.

“This substantial investment will significantly strengthen critical systems such as Iron Dome and David’s Sling while supporting the continued development of an advanced high-powered laser defense system currently in its later stages of development,” it said.

The ministry said the deal underscores the “strong and enduring strategic partnership between Israel and the United States and the ironclad commitment to Israel’s security”, particularly in addressing regional security threats from Iran and Iranian-backed militias. (Source: Reuters)

26 Sept 24. U.S., Allies Call for 21-Day Cease-Fire on Israel-Lebanon Border.  The United States yesterday called for a 21-day cease-fire on the Israel-Lebanon border to prevent an escalation of war and give diplomacy a chance there and in Gaza.

Voicing their support for this plan are Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, British Defense Secretary John Healey, and Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles, who met today in London at the AUKUS defense ministerial meeting.

France and other allies and partners also support this plan.

“The situation in Lebanon and northern Israel is deeply troubling,” Austin said. Lebanese Hezbollah, an Iranian-backed terrorist group, began firing rockets into Israel in an unprovoked attack the day after the Oct. 7, 2023, terrorist assault by Hamas, Austin said.

“Hezbollah has not stopped since. Like any other state, Israel has a right to defend itself. And almost a year later, tens of thousands of Israeli and Lebanese civilians still cannot safely return home, and we now face the risk of an all-out war, another full-scale war, which could be devastating for both Israel and Lebanon, Austin said.

Despite the sharp escalation in recent days, a diplomatic solution is still viable. A diplomatic solution, not a military solution, is the only way to ensure that displaced civilians on both sides of the border can finally go back home,” Austin said.

An immediate 21-day cease-fire will provide time for the diplomacy needed to achieve a durable arrangement that will allow Israeli and Lebanese civilians to return safely to their homes. This time can also be used to conclude and implement a deal to secure a cease-fire in Gaza and to bring all of the hostages home, he said.

“Make no mistake. The United States remains postured to protect our forces and our personnel across the Middle East, and no one should try to exploit this crisis or expand this conflict. So, we will continue to work tirelessly to avoid another tragic war and to find a diplomatic path forward,” Austin said.

“We’ve been committed from the very beginning to help Israel provide the things that are necessary for them to be able to protect their sovereign territory, and that hasn’t changed and won’t change in the future,” Austin said.

Healey and Marles said the cease-fire is the only way to produce a long-term peace. The leaders also urged their citizens in Lebanon to leave while they still have the opportunity. (Source: U.S. DoD)

25 Sept 24. Pentagon Deploys Extra Forces to Middle East as Tensions Rise Between Israel and Hezbollah. The Pentagon announced on Monday that the United States is deploying a small number of additional troops to the Middle East in response to escalating violence between Israeli forces and Hezbollah fighters, as concerns over a broader regional conflict intensify. This move comes amid an increase in cross-border attacks, prompting the U.S. to reinforce its presence in the region and prepare for potential contingencies.

Pentagon Press Secretary Major General Pat Ryder confirmed the deployment but did not specify the exact number of troops or their specific mission, citing operational security reasons. However, a senior U.S. official informed Voice of America (VOA) that the additional personnel would likely be in the “dozens” and would primarily prepare for a potential military-assisted evacuation of U.S. citizens if the conflict expands further.

The additional forces will join the approximately 40,000 American troops already stationed in the region, which includes over a dozen warships and thousands of Marines currently deployed in the Mediterranean Sea. In a related move, the aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman, accompanied by two destroyers and a cruiser, departed from Virginia on Monday for a scheduled deployment to the Mediterranean. This could mean that the U.S. will maintain two aircraft carriers in the region, with the USS Abraham Lincoln already stationed in the Gulf of Oman.

While U.S. officials emphasized that the situation has not yet reached a point where a military-assisted departure is necessary, preparations are underway to respond swiftly if required. Pentagon officials have emphasized the importance of being ready for a variety of contingencies to protect U.S. citizens and interests in the region. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has been in regular communication with his Israeli counterpart, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, discussing efforts to de-escalate tensions and prevent a wider conflict.

The State Department has already issued warnings to American citizens to leave Lebanon.

Pentagon Deploys Extra Forces to Middle East as Tensions Rise Between Israel and Hezbollah. The Pentagon announced on Monday that the United States is deploying a small number of additional troops to the Middle East in response to escalating violence between Israeli forces and Hezbollah fighters, as concerns over a broader regional conflict intensify. This move comes amid an increase in cross-border attacks, prompting the U.S. to reinforce its presence in the region and prepare for potential contingencies.

Pentagon Press Secretary Major General Pat Ryder confirmed the deployment but did not specify the exact number of troops or their specific mission, citing operational security reasons. However, a senior U.S. official informed Voice of America (VOA) that the additional personnel would likely be in the “dozens” and would primarily prepare for a potential military-assisted evacuation of U.S. citizens if the conflict expands further.

The additional forces will join the approximately 40,000 American troops already stationed in the region, which includes over a dozen warships and thousands of Marines currently deployed in the Mediterranean Sea. In a related move, the aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman, accompanied by two destroyers and a cruiser, departed from Virginia on Monday for a scheduled deployment to the Mediterranean. This could mean that the U.S. will maintain two aircraft carriers in the region, with the USS Abraham Lincoln already stationed in the Gulf of Oman.

While U.S. officials emphasized that the situation has not yet reached a point where a military-assisted departure is necessary, preparations are underway to respond swiftly if required. Pentagon officials have emphasized the importance of being ready for a variety of contingencies to protect U.S. citizens and interests in the region. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has been in regular communication with his Israeli counterpart, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, discussing efforts to de-escalate tensions and prevent a wider conflict.

The State Department has already issued warnings to American citizens to leave Lebanon.

(Source: U.S. DoD)

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