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Military And Security Developments
Sep 19.
KEY POINTS
- Exploding pagers in Lebanon have elevated the risks of a major escalation between Israel and Lebanese Hizballah (LH); the latter blames the former for the explosions.
- An adopted UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution and an upcoming debate have elevated reputational risks for Israeli-linked businesses.
- Gaza Strip: The detonation of a rigged building killed four Israel Defense Forces (IDF) personnel in Rafah (Rafah governorate), highlighting significant threats to life in southern Gaza. On 17 September, four personnel died after entering a building rigged with explosives in the Tel Sultan area (Rafah). The IDF later stated that personnel have encountered a significant increase in the number of individually and collectively rigged buildings during operations in Rafah compared to other areas in Gaza. The explosion highlights significant security and bystander risks for civilians and humanitarian staff moving through the Rafah area, particularly given the risks of triggering rigged buildings during overland movement. Also on 17 September, the IDF conducted a drone strike in the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone which killed a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) rocket force commander. The strike highlights militants’ continued presence within designated humanitarian zones, sustaining risks of further airstrikes and driving threats to humanitarian operations therein.
- Israel-West Bank-Jordan: The establishment of the IDF 96th Infantry Reserve Division reflects growing security concerns in the West Bank. On 17 September, Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF had recruited 25% of personnel for the newly established division. The division will likely serve two primary functions: firstly, border defence in the Jordan Valley, and secondly as a rapid response team for attacks on Israeli population centres, particularly in the West Bank. The division will likely become fully operational in mid-2025. The IDF Chief of the General Staff will likely approve the appointment of the division’s five brigade commanders in the coming days. The establishment of a new division focusing on the Israel-West Bank-Jordan border reflects growing concerns over potential cross-border attacks and weapon smuggling into Israel and the West Bank.
- Israel-Iran: The arrest of an Israeli citizen recruited by Iran to assassinate Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other Israeli officials underscores elevated espionage and security risks in Israel. On 19 September, an Israeli court indicted a Jewish Israeli citizen on several security offences, including contact with a foreign agent. According to a Shin Bet and Israeli police joint statement, the authorities arrested the individual in August. He had visited Iran twice in the past five months, once in April and once in August, where he was in contact with Iranian intelligence operatives. He received payment and directions to perform various tasks, including the assassination of Israel’s prime minister, defence minister and head of the Shin Bet. The incident reflects the growing risks of Iranian operations in Israel, elevating risks of sabotage and destabilisation operations as well as physical security risks for bystanders in Israeli cities.
- Israel-Lebanon: A series of communication device explosions has significantly increased the risks of major escalation. On 17 September, approximately 3,000 pager devices held by Lebanese Hizballah (LH) operatives simultaneously exploded, injuring over 2,700 individuals and killing at least 20. On 18 September, over 300 hand-held radios (walkie-talkies) belonging to LH operatives exploded during funeral processions for individuals killed in the previous day’s attack. Although Israel is highly likely to have conducted the attacks, it has not claimed responsibility. LH has publicly attributed the attack to Israel and announced it would respond forcefully. Subsequently, on 18 September, LH fired two rocket barrages towards the Kiryat Shmona and Western Galilee areas (both Northern district); the attacks did not result in any injuries and are unlikely to constitute the entirety of LH’s response. In the past 48 hours, Israel has continued to augment its posture on the Israel-Lebanon border, deploying the 98th Division (previously operating in Gaza) to northern Israel and conducting a military exercise in the Haifa area (Haifa district) earlier on 19 September. Cross-border tensions between Israel and LH remain substantially elevated, significantly increasing the risks of the conflict escalating into war (see: FORECAST).
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- The Israeli government has adopted the return of displaced populations to Northern district as an official war goal, highlighting diminishing prospects for diplomatic de-escalation on the Israel-Lebanon border. On 16 September, the cabinet officially adopted the goal of returning the 60,000 displaced residents to their homes as a war goal. The announcement also comes amid reports that Defence Minister Yoav Gallant is pressuring Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to accept a ceasefire and hostage release agreement with Hamas and shift the IDF’s focus onto operations countering LH. These measures highlight decreasing prospects for a diplomatic de-escalation on the Israel-Lebanon border, elevating risks of a substantial escalation. Furthermore, the arrival of US special envoy Amos Hochstein in Israel on 16 September is unlikely to substantially decrease the risks of escalation.
- Amid elevated regional tensions, numerous commercial airlines have suspended services to Israel and Lebanon, highlighting persistent risks of travel delays. On 17 September, Air France announced the temporary suspension of services to and from Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY) and Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV) due to concerns over a potential escalation between the IDF and LH following the explosion of thousands of LH communications devices. The Lufthansa Group has also temporarily suspended flights to Israel and Iran, citing concerns over regional escalation. As tensions remain high, further flight cancellations and service suspensions are highly likely, disrupting air travel and decreasing the availability of commercial routes servicing Israel and Lebanon. In the event of a significant escalation on the Israel-Lebanon border, reduced commercial airline availability will likely limit the feasibility of evacuation efforts from private providers, substantially increasing risks of travel delays.
- The upcoming United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) general debate highlights increased reputational risks for Israeli-linked firms operating worldwide. On 18 September, the UNGA adopted a resolution calling for Israel to withdraw from the Palestinian Territories. Although UNGA resolutions are not legally binding, the resolution’s passage highlights sustained regional tensions linked to the IDF’s ongoing ground operations in Gaza and continued settlement activity in the West Bank. Continued international condemnation of Israel’s policies vis-à-vis the Palestinian Territories also highlights sustained reputational and corporate governance risks for firms with operations in Israel, particularly those with links to the Israeli government and the IDF. From 24 to 30 September, the UNGA will engage in its annual general debate in New York City (US) with numerous heads of state attending and speaking to the assembly. Numerous regional and international figures will likely condemn IDF operations in Gaza and call for a ceasefire; there is a realistic possibility of the UNGA passing additional resolutions regarding Israeli activity in the Palestinian Territories. As such, reputational risks for Israeli-linked businesses will remain particularly elevated over the coming two weeks.
FORECAST
The risk of a major escalation on the Israel-Lebanon border will remain significantly elevated in the coming days. The recent communication device explosions in Lebanon have substantially disrupted LH communication networks and capabilities, representing a substantial opportunity for Israel to launch a ground operation in southern Lebanon. Furthermore, the continued deployment of IDF forces to northern Israel highlights the increasing risks of such an operation; there is a realistic possibility of ground operations beginning in the coming four days. However, we continue to assess that Israel and LH remain uncommitted to a significant and uncontrolled escalation. Israel will likely intensify its airstrike campaign on LH positions, possibly increasing the frequency of attacks deeper in Lebanon, including near the capital Beirut. Increasing airstrike frequency and range will increase both external military pressure and internal domestic pressure on LH to accept a diplomatic agreement with Israel. However, LH is unlikely to accept such a deal before responding to the recent pager attack. This will sustain elevated security risks in northern Israel in the coming weeks, including in areas further than the common range of LH attacks, such as Haifa (Haifa district) and its environs. There is a realistic possibility of LH targeting key locations such as Haifa Port, offshore gas rigs and power substations. That said, LH will likely aim to minimize critical damage to avoid a broader escalation or IDF ground operation. Even so, risks of miscalculation and misfire will remain high in the coming weeks, sustaining elevated risks of a snowballing escalation leading to a major conflict. The elevated risk environment will also increase risks of travel disruption, particularly for flights going in or out of Israel, Iran and Lebanon in the coming week.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
- A successful terror attack by LH and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting LH and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- Israel re-launches widespread, high-intensity military operations in Gaza
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
- An IDF-targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)
- An LH strike causes a mass casualty event in Israel
- An IDF strike causes a mass casualty event in Lebanon
- An IDF strike kills civilians in Lebanon
- Israel-Lebanon: Secondary attack using hand-held devices points to elevated risk of broader conflict. On 18 September, hundreds of hand-held radio devices belonging to Lebanese Hizballah (LH) detonated across Lebanon, killing at least 20 individuals and injuring around 450 others. This comes after thousands of pagers detonated across the country on 17 September, resulting in thousands of injuries. LH has blamed Israel for both attacks and promised to respond. We assess that LH will almost certainly retaliate and ramp up its attacks against northern Israel in the coming days, possibly increasing the range of such attacks. This would elevate security and bystander risks for population centres close to Haifa (Haifa district, Israel). An intense LH response would significantly elevate the risk of cross-border hostilities escalating into war. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has already deployed its 98th Division to the north of the country, likely in anticipation of further conflict near the border. Prospects of escalation are likely to drive further civilian evacuations from areas south of the Litani River towards central and northern Lebanon, elevating disruption along highways.
Sept 16
KEY POINTS
- The continued uptick in hostilities between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) underscores the growing risks of a major escalation.
- The failure of Israel’s air defences to intercept (fully) a ballistic missile launched by the Iran-backed Houthis reflects sustained security risks across Israel, as well as elevated regional tensions and risks of Israeli retaliation in both Syria and Yemen.
- Gaza Strip: The IDF has increased the frequency of population evacuations in Gaza amid a gradual uptick in cross-border rockets targeting Israel’s Southern district. On 14 September, Gaza-based militants launched two rockets towards Ashkelon (Southern); Israeli air defences intercepted one rocket, while the other fell into the sea. Following the incident, the IDF issued an evacuation order for residents of Beit Lahia in northern Gaza (it determined that the rockets were launched from this area). In recent weeks, there has been a gradual increase in the frequency of rocket launches from Gaza into southern Israel, particularly from northern Gaza. The IDF has in turn gradually increased the frequency of evacuation orders for civilians following such launches. This practice will likely continue in the coming days, sustaining elevated security risks due to IDF operations, as well as operational disruption risks for NGO staff in Gaza due to displacement.
- Israel-West Bank: A stabbing attack in Jerusalem’s Old City reflects elevated radicalisation and attack risks. On 15 September, a sole perpetrator stabbed and lightly wounded an Israeli border guard near Damascus Gate in Jerusalem’s Old City. The Israeli security forces shot and killed the perpetrator. The incident reflects growing ethno-religious tensions and risks of radicalisation in Jerusalem and the West Bank area, as well as the elevated risks of sole-perpetrator and militant attacks. While perpetrators are likely to continue primarily targeting Israeli security force personnel, efforts to neutralise perpetrators (including through the use of live ammunition) will sustain elevated bystander security risks. In the West Bank, Palestinian militants are more likely to target civilians, increasing physical security risks. However, the targeting of civilians in Jerusalem also remains possible.
- Israel-Lebanon: The IDF conducted strikes deep into Lebanese territory, while LH increased the range of its attacks against northern Israel, highlighting major escalation risks. LH continued its targeting of locations in northern Israel. However, it moderately expanded the range of its strikes, with ordinances triggering sirens as far south as Elifelet and Karkom (both Northern district) on 14 September. In response, the IDF conducted intense strikes on 14 September in southern Lebanon up to 96 miles (155km) from the Israel-Lebanon border, including in Baalbek-Hermel and Beqaa governorates. According to Lebanese media, the strikes injured at least four civilians, including three minors. On 15 September, an IDF drone dropped leaflets on Wazzani (Nabatieh governorate) ordering residents to evacuate. However, the IDF later stated that the commander of the 769th Regional Brigade had acted independently when ordering the leaflet distribution. The incident, paired with the sustained uptick in cross-border hostilities, highlights the growing risk of a major escalation. While a full-scale war remains unlikely in the coming two weeks, mass casualty incidents on either side will likely trigger increasing hostilities, elevating the risk of uncontrolled escalation.
- Israel-Yemen: A failed missile interception underscores the sustained elevated security risks amid growing regional tensions. On 15 September, Israel air defences failed to destroy a ballistic missile launched by the Yemen-based and Iran-backed Houthis. The missile broke apart inside Israeli airspace, with shrapnel, including its warhead, falling into open areas in the Ben Shemen Forest, near Kfar Daniel (Central district). Shrapnel from an Israeli interceptor also hit Paatei Modi’in railway station (Central), causing light material damage. The missile triggered rocket sirens across central Israel, including at Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV). The incident underscores continued efforts by the Houthis to attack Israel, as well as the sustained low risk of such attacks targeting areas across Israel, including central parts.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Protest activity in Israel has continued at pace, with counter-demonstrations triggering clashes in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) and underscoring increasing bystander risks. On 14 September, tens of thousands of demonstrators attended rallies calling for hostage releases in population centres throughout Israel. While the police arrested at least 16 participants, the demonstrations remained broadly peaceful nationwide. However, the Tel Aviv police reported an uptick in counter-demonstration activity by pro-government protesters, particularly towards the end of a gathering on Begin Street and Kaplan Street. Demonstrators and counter-demonstrators engaged in low-intensity altercations along Begin Street, where counter-demonstrators also reportedly stole several items from nearby vendors. The increasing frequency of counter-demonstrations and altercations with anti-government protesters highlights the rising tensions within Israel, as well as the moderately elevated physical security and bystander risks facing protest participants, particularly in Tel Aviv. However, we continue to assess that widespread protest-related violence and clashes are unlikely at present. Smaller-scale demonstrations also occurred in Herzliya (Tel Aviv) on 13-14 September after the police arrested three activists for distributing fliers at a synagogue where a Member of the Knesset normally attends religious services. The fliers called for the government to secure hostage releases. These demonstrations highlight the sustained risks of operational and travel disruption linked to increasing anti-government sentiment; developments in the cases against activists will likely trigger further sporadic protests.
- Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir promoted two police officers to high-ranking positions in the West Bank and Jerusalem areas, likely exacerbating ethno-religious tensions. On 12 September, Ben Gvir appointed Major General Amir Arzani as Jerusalem Police Commander. Since July, Arzani has served as the temporary commander of the Jerusalem district. Since 12 August, Arzani has directed police personnel to allow Jewish visitors to enter the al-Aqsa compound to pray and give religious instruction, despite long-standing ordinances prohibiting such practices. Following Arzani’s appointment, these practices are highly likely to continue, exacerbating ethno-religious tensions in the Jerusalem area and increasing the risk of clashes while also driving security and bystander risks. Also on 12 September, Ben Gvir promoted Major General Moshe Pinchi to Police Commander for the West Bank district. Pinchi previously served as Ben Gvir’s security secretary and reportedly ordered police officers to stand by during a protest at the Beit Lid military base on 29 July, during which protesters broke into the base (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 29 July 2024). The appointments highlight Ben Gvir’s increasing influence over police leadership in the West Bank and Jerusalem areas; they will sustain increasing human rights concerns, particularly amid the uptick in ethno-religious tensions between Israeli settlers and Palestinians in the West Bank.
FORECAST
Increasing attempts by the Iran-backed Houthis to target Israel will elevate regional tensions and security risks across Israel, Syria and Yemen in the coming weeks. The Houthi missile attack on 15 September reflects growing attempts to target Israel and a lack of Israeli deterrence following its strike against the Houthi-controlled al-Hudaydah port (al-Hudaydah governorate, Yemen) on 20 July (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 22 July 2024). The attack also likely signals the Houthis’ increasing efforts to gather information on Israel’s air defences through conducting similar attacks. In the coming days, Israel will likely seek to retaliate against continued Houthi attacks by targeting military positions and infrastructure in Yemen. However, there is a realistic possibility that Israel will also target dual-use infrastructure, such as the al-Hudaydah port, increasing physical security risks and threats to supply chain continuity within Houthi-controlled territory. Alternatively, there is a realistic possibility that Israel will conduct a retaliatory strike against Houthi infrastructure in Syria rather than Yemen. This is likely to elevate regional tensions and security risks in Israel, Syria and Yemen in the coming weeks. However, we assess that a sustained and direct armed conflict between Israel and the Iran-backed Houthis remains unlikely, as Israel is unlikely to prioritise a Yemen front over operations in Gaza and along the Israel-Lebanon border.
Rising tensions within Israel’s governing coalition will increase policy stasis and protest activity risks; the threats to government stability will likely remain moderately elevated. On 15 September, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office announced that he would travel to the US on 24 September to attend the UN General Assembly. The trip has moderately increased tensions with ultra-Orthodox parties within the coalition government, which have reportedly pressured Netanyahu to pass legislation exempting ultra-Orthodox men from military service before the Knesset returns from its summer recess (28 July-27 October). Amid elevated coalition tensions, there is a realistic possibility of ultra-Orthodox parties, including Shas and United Torah Judaism (UTJ), withholding votes from government-backed legislation, elevating risks of policy stasis in the coming weeks. Similarly, on 16 September, numerous local media sources reported that Netanyahu has accelerated discussions with the New Hope party leader Gideon Sa’ar to integrate his party into the coalition government. The news comes amid rising tensions between Netanyahu and Defence Minister Yoav Gallant over draft exemption legislation and potential IDF operations in Lebanon. Reports indicate that Netanyahu has offered Sa’ar the position of defence minister in exchange for his support for draft exemption legislation. Although such an arrangement remains highly unlikely at present, increasing tensions between coalition parties and figures will sustain the risk of coalition reformation and government instability. In the unlikely event that Netanyahu dismisses Gallant as defence minister, anti-government protest activity would almost certainly increase in scale and frequency, significantly disrupting overland movement through major urban centres and along key thoroughfares. There would also be a realistic possibility of the Histadrut labour federation, Israel’s largest trade union, calling a general strike, elevating operational disruption and labour flexibility risks.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
- A successful terror attack by LH and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting LH and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- Israel re-launches widespread, high-intensity military operations in Gaza
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
- An IDF-targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)
- An LH strike causes a mass casualty event in Israel
- An IDF strike causes a mass casualty event in Lebanon
- An IDF strike kills civilians in Lebanon
- Israel-Yemen: Failed interception reflects sustained attack, security risks in Syria and Yemen. On 15 September, Israel’s air defences failed to completely destroy an Iran-backed Houthis ballistic missile fired at central Israel, causing parts of the missile, including the warhead, to fall into open areas close to Kfar Daniel (Central district). The missile triggered sirens across central Israel, including at Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV). Shrapnel fell in Paatei Modi’in railway station (Central district), causing light material damage. Israel often intercepts Houthi missiles and drones before reaching Israel’s air space; the incident reflects a sustained, but low, risk of Houthi attacks on Israel. Israel will likely retaliate for the attack, elevating security risks near Houthi positions in Yemen and Syria in the coming weeks. We assess that Israel will likely prioritise strictly military positions due to criticism of its last retaliation. However, the targeting of dual-use infrastructure, including the Hudaydah Port in Yemen, remains a realistic possibility. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Sept 24. Pagers belonging to Hizbollah members exploded across Lebanon on Tuesday, the militant group said, killing at least eight people and injuring more than 2,700 in an apparent sabotage of the low-tech systems it uses to evade Israeli surveillance and assassination attempts. The blasts took place in several areas of Lebanon including the capital Beirut, the southern city of Tyre and the western area of Hermel. Images circulated on social media of explosions and of people with bloodied pocket areas, ears or faces being taken to hospital. Hizbollah said that “at around 3.30pm . . . many messaging devices known as pagers belonging to many of those working in the different Hizbollah units and institutions exploded”. A spokesperson for Lebanon’s health ministry said eight people including a child had been killed in the blasts and at least 2,750 people were injured, 200 of them seriously. Iran’s ambassador to Beirut, Mojtaba Amani, was injured by one of the explosions, an Iranian official told the Financial Times, adding that “his overall condition is good”. The official said no other members of the diplomatic team from Iran, which backs Hizbollah, were harmed. Hizbollah said its “specialised agencies are conducting a widescale security and scientific investigation to determine the reasons that led to these simultaneous explosions. Medical and health services are also treating the wounded in multiple hospitals in different Lebanese regions.” (Source: FT.com)
15 Sept 24. IDF Operations in Rafah Lead to Over 100 Gunmen Killed and Destruction of Tunnels. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported that over 100 gunmen have been killed in the Tel Sultan neighborhood of Rafah in the past few days. The operations, led by the IDF’s 162nd Division, also reportedly uncovered and destroyed key Hamas infrastructure, including weapons caches and rocket launchers.
IDF Brigadier General Itzik Cohen, who oversees the offensive in Rafah, stated that the Hamas Rafah Brigade has been severely weakened, with over 2,300 operatives killed and more than 13 kilometers (8 miles) of tunnels destroyed.
The IDF has located and neutralized over 200 interconnected tunnels in Rafah. Combat engineers are currently finishing investigations into a few remaining tunnels, which are expected to be destroyed in the coming weeks. Among the tunnels found, nine extended into Egypt but were blocked either by Egyptian forces or Hamas prior to the IDF’s arrival. The tunnels have long been a part of Hamas’s smuggling routes, but recent IDF assessments indicate that Hamas now relies more on local production of weapons, including rockets and explosives.
In northern Gaza, IDF officials reported that Hamas’s tunnel networks there were used for senior leadership, whereas in Rafah, all tunnels were interconnected, forming a vast underground city. One key tunnel complex, 40 meters deep, was used by Hamas’s Rafah Brigade commander, Muhammad Shabana. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
16 Sept 24. Austin Urges Israel to Take Diplomatic Path to Reduce Area Tensions. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III spoke with Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant yesterday following the Iran-backed Houthi ballistic missile attack against Israel that day and a barrage of rocket attacks into northern Israel by the Iran-backed terrorist organization Lebanese Hezbollah over the weekend, according to a Pentagon news statement.
During that call, Austin reaffirmed the United States’ ironclad commitment to Israel’s security and Israel’s right to self-defense, said Sabrina Singh, deputy Pentagon press secretary, who held a news conference today.
“The secretary also reiterated the urgent need for a ceasefire and hostage deal,” Singh said. “He stressed that Israel should give diplomatic negotiations time to succeed, noting the devastating consequences that escalation would have on the people of Israel, Lebanon and the broader region.”
In a separate development, the last U.S. military personnel, along with their assets, left Niger yesterday. The withdrawal began May 19.
“The effective cooperation and communication between the United States and Nigerien armed forces ensured that the safe, orderly and responsible withdrawal was completed without complications at the mutually decided date of Sept. 15,” Singh said.
It was also reported that the North American Aerospace Defense Command detected and tracked Russian IL-38 and TU-142 military aircraft operating in the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone over the last several days.
An ADIZ begins where sovereign airspace ends. It is a defined stretch of international airspace that requires the identification of all aircraft in the interest of national security.
“In all cases, the Russian aircraft remained in international airspace and did not enter American or Canadian sovereign airspace,” Singh said.
This Russian activity in the Alaska ADIZ occurs regularly, according to NORAD news releases.
“The U.S. has been tracking these planned exercises for some time and they pose no threat to the U.S. homeland or the NATO alliance. We’ll continue to monitor, as evidenced by NORAD’s activities over the weekend and will remain in close communication with our NATO allies and partners,” Singh said. (Source: U.S. DoD)
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