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Military And Security Developments
Sep 12.
KEY POINTS
- A continued uptick in Israel-Lebanese Hizballah (LH) hostilities sustains elevated risks in northern Israel, southern Lebanon and Syria, particularly close to border areas.
- The intensification of militant activity originating from the southern West Bank will increase the likelihood of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations in the area, elevating security risks.
- Gaza Strip: An IDF airstrike on a school allegedly serving as a Hamas command-and-control centre reflects elevated collateral risks to aid workers. On 11 September, the IDF struck the al Jaouni school complex in Nuseirat refugee camp in central Gaza (Palestinian Territories). The IDF claimed that the complex was a Hamas command-and-control centre and that it took steps to reduce civilian harm, including using precision munitions. However, Palestinian sources claim the attack killed at least 16 people, including six United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) staffers. The target identity reflects a willingness from the IDF to strike any facility deemed to be used by Hamas operatives, driving elevated threats to NGO staff engaged in the distribution of aid throughout Gaza.
- West Bank: An IDF raid on a hospital in the southern West Bank underscores the southern expansion of terrorist activities and elevated security risks. Overnight on 11-12 September, the IDF raided a hospital in Halhul (Hebron governorate) and arrested a Palestinian suspected of terrorism. According to the Israeli security agencies, the individual was wounded in an accidental car explosion near Halul on 15 August and is likely affiliated with Hamas. Also on 11 September, a Palestinian truck driver rammed his truck into a bus stop in Giv’at Asaf Junction (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate), killing an IDF soldier. The attack reflects increasing radicalisation among the Palestinian population and spillover from the northern West Bank to the centre and south of the territory. Furthermore, growing militant activity in the south, particularly around Hebron, will likely drive the IDF to increase its military operations in the governorate, elevating bystander security risks.
- Israel-West Bank: The arrest of a West Bank resident on a key Israeli highway reflects the growing risk of cross-border attacks. On 9 September, the Israeli security forces arrested 13 illegal workers from the West Bank on Highway 6, close to Jaljulia (Central district). One of the arrested was a member of a three-man cell from the Hebron governorate who allegedly planned to launch a terror attack in the near future. The arrest reflects intensifying attempts by militants and radicalised individuals to conduct terror attacks in Israeli population centres, sustaining elevated security risks across Israel, particularly in big cities in the Central district.
- Israel-Lebanon: A continued uptick in cross-border hostilities sustains elevated security risks in northern Israel. On 10 September, an IDF airstrike in the Beqaa Valley (Beqaa governorate) killed Muhammad Qassem al-Shaer, a commander of Lebanese Hizballah’s (LH’s) elite Radwan Force. On 11 September following the strike, LH launched over 60 rockets within an hour, targeting northern Israel and another 40 later that day. The attacks reflect a continued uptick in Israel-LH hostilities over the past week, elevating risks of miscalculation and snowballing escalation.
- Israel-Syria: Israel continues to target militants in Syria, reflecting elevated tensions and security risks in border areas. Earlier on 12 September, an alleged Israeli airstrike hit a vehicle east of Khan Arnabah (Quneitra governorate) and killed two people. The strike comes amid increasing IDF military activity in Syria (See Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 9 September 2024), underscoring elevated security risks in border areas. However, a major armed conflict between Israel and Syria currently remains unlikely.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- The UN announced possible delays to further polio vaccination efforts after the IDF detailed staff travelling in a convoy in northern Gaza, elevating public health concerns. On 9 September, IDF personnel stopped a UN convoy near the Wadi Gaza checkpoint (northern Gaza). UNRWA stated that the IDF temporarily detained staff travelling in a convoy delivering supplies to the ongoing polio vaccination campaign in northern Gaza (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 2 September 2024). The IDF claimed it received intelligence indicating that suspected militants were travelling within the convoy. Subsequently, UNRWA Commissioner-General Philippe Lazzarini stated that the agency was concerned that threats to staff and overland movement would delay efforts to continue vaccination campaigns, highlighting substantial risks of operational disruption for NGOs in Gaza. Despite these concerns, however, UNWRA announced on 11 September that over 530,000 children had been vaccinated throughout the campaign and that operations had partially resumed in northern Gaza, partially mitigating risks of an imminent polio outbreak.
- The International Criminal Court’s Chief Prosecutor called for a decision on issuing warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, elevating pressure on the Israeli government to investigate conduct during the Israel-Hamas war. On 10 September, Karim Khan released a statement calling on the court to decide on whether to issue the warrants with the ‘utmost urgency’ due to critical humanitarian conditions within Gaza. The court remains engaged in deliberations over whether to issue the warrants, with its decision likely delayed due to questions linked to its jurisdiction over Israeli nationals. In the coming weeks, the court will likely continue deliberating, elevating pressure on the Israeli government to launch investigations into Netanyahu and Gallant’s conduct during the Israel-Hamas War. As the ICC only prosecutes individuals if states are unable or unwilling to prosecute relevant crimes within domestic judicial systems, such an investigation would moderate risks of warrants being issued for Netanyahu and Gallant. However, these efforts will likely face significant resistance from Netanyahu and the governing coalition, stalling judicial intervention efforts and undermining prospects for the ICC rejecting the petition. The ICC will likely rule on warrant issuance in the coming weeks, elevating risks of protest activity in The Hague (Netherlands), particularly if it rules against issuing the warrants.
- The US sanctioned several entities in Lebanon and Syria for financing LH, highlighting sustained compliance concerns and sanction exposure risks. On 11 September, the US Treasury Department announced sanctions on seven entities and three individuals accused of engaging in oil and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) smuggling to generate revenue for LH. The US State Department also alleges that the sanctioned entities smuggled LPG to the Syrian government, particularly through the port city of Baniyas (Tartus governorate, Syria). The sanctions highlight increasing compliance concerns for firms engaged in oil and LPG extraction, sales and transfers in Lebanon and Syria, as well as for transport firms operating in southern Lebanon. Over the coming months, the US will highly likely continue expanding sanctions on LH and other Iranian-backed proxies, increasing compliance concerns and due diligence requirements for regionally engaged firms.
- In Jordan, the opposition Islamist Action Front (IAF) party made substantial gains in the parliamentary elections, highlighting increasing regional tensions. Initial results from 10 September indicate that the IAF won at least 32 out of 138 parliamentary seats, highlighting the party’s moderately increased influence. Given the IAF’s association with the Muslim Brotherhood and its public backing of Hamas, its electoral gains highlight significantly elevated tensions linked to the Israel-Hamas war and will potentially trigger further pro-Palestinian protest activity. Protest activity will likely target installations and entities associated with Israel within Jordan, such as the Israeli embassy in the capital Amman, elevating bystander risks. However, in the long term, since King Abdullah effectively retains exclusive executive power and can dissolve parliament at will, the IAF will likely be unable to substantially influence Jordan’s policies vis-à-vis Israel, moderating foreign policy risks.
FORECAST
Increasing militant activity in the southern West Bank will elevate the risks of intensified IDF military activity in the area in the coming weeks. The continued uptick of attacks conducted or planned by Palestinian residents of the southern West Bank will likely prompt the IDF to gradually intensify its operations in the area over the coming weeks. This will likely increase travel disruption and security risks, particularly in Hebron governorate in the coming weeks. Furthermore, IDF operations will likely elevate ethno-religious tensions and radicalisation risks, subsequently increasing risks of attacks and domestic unrest in the southern West Bank. IDF positions, Israeli population centres and roads will remain key risk locations for attacks, elevating bystander security risks.
Cross-border hostilities between Israel and LH will likely remain elevated in the coming days amid growing hostile rhetoric, elevating risks of major escalation. In the past week, Israel increased its airstrike profile, targeting launchers and logistical paths used by LH in Lebanon and Syria. In the past weeks, there have been growing indications that Israel’s minister of defence, Yoav Gallant, is making efforts to reframe the goals of the war to include Lebanon. This coincides with his statements that Hamas’ military formation no longer exists as well as the publication of a Hamas communique, dated before July, detailing the significant deterioration of Hamas militant capabilities and statements. It is possible that Gallant is attempting to shift away from Gaza as the main front of conflict. This, together with the increased hostilities between Israel and LH, will elevate risks of further escalation in the coming weeks. However, we continue to assess that a complete shift of war to Lebanon will likely involve reducing IDF military operations in Gaza, which will likely serve as an early indicator for such a shift.
Low-level protest activity continues throughout Israel, highlighting the likelihood of high demonstration attendance on 14 September. Low-level daily protest activity will likely continue over the coming weeks. Though these daily actions are unlikely to trigger significant travel or operational disruption, they underline anti-government activists’ sustained capacity to continually mobilise supporters. As such, weekly hostage release demonstrations on Saturdays will likely continue drawing significant participation in major urban centres, particularly Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). Large-scale demonstrations will likely restrict overland movement along key routes, particularly Highways 1, 4 and 20, elevating risks of travel and supply chain disruption. Though widespread unrest remains unlikely, instances of protest-related violence will sustain bystander and incidental risks, particularly in the event of counter-demonstrations.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
- A successful terror attack by LH and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting LH and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- Israel re-launches widespread, high-intensity military operations in Gaza
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
- An IDF-targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)
- An LH strike causes a mass casualty event in Israel
- An IDF strike causes a mass casualty event in Lebanon
- An IDF strike kills civilians in Lebanon
Sep 09.
KEY POINTS
- Intense airstrikes against Syria (likely conducted by Israel) reflect increasing spillover risks stemming from Israel-Lebanese Hizballah (LH) hostilities; this in turn will elevate the security risks in Syria.
- An attack by a Jordanian gunman at a land border crossing underscores the elevated security risks facing Israeli border posts, as well as the increased supply chain and travel disruption risks at crossings between Israel and Jordan.
- Gaza Strip: Rocket launches have underscored the elevated threats to shipping near the Israeli coastline. On 8 September, Gazan militants launched two rockets from northern Gaza against Ashkelon (Southern district, Israel). One rocket was intercepted by Israeli air defences; the other landed in the sea close to the city. The rocket that fell into the sea was likely not intercepted, as Israel’s air defences are calibrated to avoid intercepting rockets that fall in open areas, driving collateral risks to shipping. Therefore, as rocket attacks are likely to continue in the coming weeks (at least), persistent attempts to strike the ports in Ashkelon and Ashdod (both Southern) will drive elevated security risks for vessels in close proximity to Israeli seaports, especially when these rockets miss their intended targets.
- West Bank: Ethno-religious tensions and attack risks remain elevated in the northern West Bank following the end of the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) widescale operation. On 6 September, the IDF withdrew its forces from Jenin (Jenin governorate), signalling the end of an intense ten-day military operation in the northern West Bank. The operation, which led to substantial damage to local infrastructure, will have likely increased ethno-religious tensions and the risk of radicalisation among residents. This will sustain elevated attack risks in the northern West Bank in the coming days, particularly along roads, near Israeli population centres and in the vicinity of IDF positions.
- Israel-Jordan-West Bank: A shooting incident at a land crossing reflects the elevated attack risks around border posts, as well as resultant supply chain disruption and socio-economic risks. On 8 September, a Jordanian lorry driver shot three Israeli civilians in the cargo terminal at the Allenby Bridge (King Hussein Bridge) land border crossing between Jordan and the West Bank. The Israeli security forces operating at the bridge returned fire, killing the gunman. Official sources have confirmed the crossing is currently closed. The other two Israel-Jordan land border crossings, namely the Yitzhak Rabin (Wadi Araba) and Jordan River (Sheikh Hussein Bridge) crossings, remain open. However, the Israeli authorities announced the suspension of operations at all cargo terminals along the Jordanian border until further notice. The incident reflects the elevated risk of attacks at all land border crossings with Israel, including Israel-Egypt crossing points.
- Israel-Lebanon: An uptick in hostilities has elevated the security risks in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, though the conflict largely remains within the Israel-Lebanon border area. Over the past few days, LH has increased the intensity and frequency of its strikes into northern Israel. LH continues mainly to target IDF bases, including key bases such as the IDF Northern Command base in Safed (Northern district). However, the security risks in civilian residential areas remain heightened. A drone directly struck a high-rise residential building in Nahariya (Northern) on 9 September, causing light material damage. IDF strikes remain focused mainly within southern Lebanon, though continued tit-for-tat hostilities will elevate the risks of longer-range IDF strikes, particularly against Baalbek-Hermel governorate. Security risks in northern Israel and southern Lebanon will remain elevated in the coming days, as will the latent risk of escalation rapidly snowballing into a broader war.
- Israel-Syria: Intensive Israeli airstrikes targeting a scientific research centre in Hama governorate underscore the growing security risks facing Syria. On 8 September, Israel conducted an intensive airstrike campaign consisting of several waves; it targeted numerous locations in the vicinity of Masyaf (Hama). According to local reports, the main target was a scientific research centre in the city that allegedly manufactures precision missiles and drones with Iranian support. The strikes killed 25 people (five of them civilians) and injured at least 32 others. In addition to the strikes, local media reported that several Syrian interceptor missiles fell in residential areas, including in Tartus governorate (Syria), causing material damage. The strikes likely reflect an effort to weaken LH and pro-Iranian proxies against the backdrop of growing tensions and hostilities between Israel, LH and Iran. Such attacks are likely to continue in the coming months to varying degrees of intensity, sustaining security risks in Syria, particularly its central and border areas.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Qatar announced an increase in funding for the UN agency for Palestinians (UNRWA), though socio-economic concerns remain significantly elevated in the Palestinian Territories. On 8 September, Qatar Red Cresent announced the donation of over USD 4.5 m to UNRWA to support people displaced from Gaza who are currently residing in the West Bank. Since 7 October 2023, approximately 4,400 Palestinians from Gaza have been unable to leave the West Bank, increasing socio-economic health concerns therein. While the funding will likely moderate immediate socio-economic concerns for Gazans in the West Bank, humanitarian conditions in Gaza remain critical and are unlikely to improve substantially in the short term. On 5 September, UN spokesperson Stephan Dujarric announced that continued evacuation orders from the IDF have caused over half of UNWRA-operated kitchens either to close or relocate over the past month, with 1 m individuals receiving no food aid throughout August. Despite ongoing efforts to establish durable humanitarian aid delivery and distribution networks within Gaza, continued clashes between the IDF and Gaza-based militants will almost certainly sustain risks of operational disruption for NGOs, driving substantial humanitarian and food security concerns.
- IDF personnel shot and killed a Turkish-US national during an anti-settlement protest in the West Bank, highlighting the risks facing demonstrators and elevated bilateral tensions. On 6 September, IDF personnel shot and killed Aysenur Ezgi Eygi during an International Solidarity Movement (ISM) anti-settlement protest near an Israeli settlement outpost in the vicinity of Beita (Nablus governorate). The IDF subsequently stated that Eygi was instigating violence by throwing rocks at personnel, highlighting the substantial risks involved when the Israeli security forces employ lethal tactics to disperse protests in the West Bank. Individuals participating in anti-settlement protests, including foreign and dual nationals, will almost certainly continue to face elevated physical security and bystander risks resulting from hostilities with Israeli settlers and security force personnel. Eygi’s death has also further exacerbated diplomatic tensions with Turkey, while the US has called for further investigations. Yet despite elevated tensions, substantial shifts in Israel’s relations with Turkey and the US remain unlikely in the short term.
- In Israel, there was a substantial uptick in the number of people attending protests on 7 September, highlighting increasing anti-government sentiment and pressure to secure hostage releases. In the past week, protesters calling for the government to secure hostage releases have conducted daily demonstrations in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), moderately increasing localised travel delays. During hostage-release protests on 7 September, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators participated in various gatherings, marking some of the largest demonstrations since 7 October 2023. In Tel Aviv, participants temporarily blocked access to the Ayalon Highway and King George IV Street, triggering low-intensity clashes with the police that resulted in five arrests. Protesters also lit several bonfires, highlighting the moderately elevated collateral risks. Tens of thousands of demonstrators also gathered in Haifa (Haifa district), Jerusalem and Kfar Saba (Central district), with smaller-scale demonstrations reported in Netanya, Rehovot, Rishon LeZion (Central), Pardes Hanna (Haifa) and Nahariya, as well as Beersheba and Carmei Gat (Southern district). While the attendance will likely decrease in the coming days, significant attendance at weekly rallies remains highly likely, sustaining operational, travel and supply chain disruption risks. Although protests have broadly remained peaceful, the police in Tel Aviv reported localised altercations between hostage-release protesters and ‘far-right youth’ counter-protesters, highlighting the moderately elevated risks of protest-related violence as tensions over stalling ceasefire negotiations remain elevated.
- Israel’s increased military spending continues to generate an above-average deficit, undermining investor confidence and moderately increasing the risk of credit rating reassessment. On 9 September, Members of the Knesset (MKs) began voting on amendments to the 2024/5 budget amid decreasing growth and increasing government spending. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich proposed the amendments on 3 September, which include approximately NIS 35 bn (USD 9.3 bn) in spending cuts, primarily by freezing public sector salaries and state benefits. MKs will likely vote in favour of the measures over the coming days; while labour unions will likely oppose the cuts, industrial action remains unlikely. Yet despite efforts to cut spending, the state budget deficit continues to increase, undermining investor confidence. On 9 September, the finance ministry stated the monthly deficit increased to 8.3% of GDP in August, above the government’s target of 6.6% for 2024. It is unlikely that proposed spending cuts will sufficiently decrease government spending to mitigate against concerns over the increasing deficit due to ring-fenced military spending and moderately decreased economic activity. As such, sustained fiscal concerns will likely continue undermining investor confidence in the Israeli economy and decreasing growth prospects. Over the coming months, there is also a realistic possibility of international credit ratings agencies again revising Israel’s credit ratings, increasing the risk of moderate capital flight.
- The Canadian and US authorities announced the arrest of an individual planning to attack a Jewish community centre on or around 7 October, highlighting the substantial risk of attacks facing locations associated with Jewish and Israeli communities in the coming weeks. On 6 September, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that the Canadian authorities had arrested a Pakistani citizen in Montreal (Quebec province, Canada) for allegedly planning a mass shooting at a Jewish community centre in Brooklyn (New York, US) in support of Islamic State (IS). The sole perpetrator reportedly planned to conduct the attack in early October to mark the first anniversary of the 7 October attacks. The arrest highlights the substantially elevated risks of sole-perpetrator attacks targeting individuals and installations associated with Israel and the Jewish community in early October, particularly in North America and Europe. Such attacks will elevate physical security risks for Jewish and Israeli individuals worldwide, while attacks against buildings (such as Israeli embassies, Jewish community centres and/or religious institutions) will elevate bystander and collateral risks for proximate entities. Although the authorities are highly likely to adopt elevated security postures in proximity to possible targets in the coming weeks, attacks targeting less protected locations such as those in rural areas also remain possible, sustaining incidental risks.
- Israel-Jordan-Palestinian Territories: Attack on border crossing drives heightened security posture. On 8 September, a Jordanian gunman killed three Israeli civilians at a cargo terminal in the Israeli-controlled Allenby Bridge (King Hussein Bridge) border crossing between the West Bank and Jordan. Israeli security forces operating at the bridge returned fire, killing the gunman. Following the incident, the Israeli authorities announced that the crossing will be closed to passengers on 9 September. Yitzhak Rabin (Wadi Araba) crossing and the Jordan River (Sheikh Hussein Bridge) crossing will remain open to passengers. However, operations at their cargo terminals, including the one at the Allenby Bridge crossing, are halted until further notice. In the coming days, a heightened security posture at land crossings will elevate exposure to stop and search operations, causing delays and travel disruption. We assess that this closure of the cargo terminals will elevate supply chain risks and operational disruption, increasing socio-economic risks in the Palestinian Territories. Against the backdrop of the Israel-Hamas war, risks of attacks at border crossings will remain elevated over the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)
09 Sept 24. Israeli Airstrikes Hit Research Centers With Ties to Chemical Weapons in Central Syria, Reportedly Killing Dozens. Late on Sunday, a series of alleged Israeli airstrikes targeted military sites in central Syria, with Syrian state media reporting at least 14 deaths and 43 injuries. Among the locations hit was the Syrian Military Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC), a facility long associated with the production of chemical weapons, according to Western officials. The strikes, which occurred near Masyaf in Hama province, also reportedly damaged infrastructure and sparked fires across the region.
Syrian state-run news agency SANA reported that the country’s air defenses intercepted some of the missiles but were unable to prevent significant damage. Local sources described the scene of multiple explosions followed by ambulances arriving at the research center, a site where Iranian forces have been said to develop advanced weaponry, including precision missiles and drones.
According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the death toll has risen to 25, with casualties including civilians, Syrian military personnel, and members of Hezbollah. The research center, the target of numerous strikes in recent years, has been linked by Western governments to the Syrian regime’s chemical weapons program, a claim the Syrian government denies.
The attacks occurred amid heightened tensions in the Middle East, fueled by ongoing conflicts between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Israel’s war with Hamas in Gaza. Israel, which has frequently conducted airstrikes in Syria to counter Iranian influence, did not officially comment on the Sunday strikes, adhering to its usual policy of silence regarding military operations in Syria.
These airstrikes are part of Israel’s broader strategy to prevent Iranian military entrenchment in Syria. Israeli officials have often expressed concern about the SSRC’s role in producing advanced missile technology and other weapons supplied to Hezbollah and Iranian proxies, viewing it as a significant threat to regional stability. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
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