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Military And Security Developments
Sep 05.
KEY POINTS
- Ceasefire negotiations continue to stall due to disagreements over the presence of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the Philadelphi Corridor; we assess that an agreement remains highly unlikely in the short term.
- A shooting incident targeting the Israeli consulate in Munich (Germany) underscores the elevated risk of violence targeting assets and locations associated with the Israeli government, driving elevated bystander and incidental risks worldwide.
- Gaza Strip: An IDF strike in the humanitarian zone underlines persistent military activity by both sides in humanitarian-designated areas, driving bystander risks to NGO workers. On 5 September, IDF fighter helicopters attacked a joint Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) command and control centre inside the humanitarian zone in Deir al-Balah (central Gaza). The use of a helicopter, which is more exposed to small arms fire than a fighter jet, likely reflects an effort to mitigate against the risk of collateral damage to civilians, underlining the IDF’s determination to find ways to target these Hamas positions whenever and wherever they are identified. As such, militants’ continued use of humanitarian zones will sustain the attack-related risks facing bystanders regardless of whether more precise ordinance is employed.
- West Bank: The IDF’s continued widescale operations in the northern West Bank are sustaining travel disruption and security risks. High-intensity operations continue to focus on Jenin (Jenin governorate), Nablus (Nablus governorate), Tubas (Tubas governorate) and Tulkarm (Tulkarm governorate). As part of the operations, the IDF is conducting drone strikes against militants with increased frequency, while engineering units are working extensively at street-level to uncover buried explosive devices. Such operations are likely to cause widescale damage to infrastructure in cities, prolonging mobility and operational disruption and elevating radicalisation risks among Palestinian communities.
- Israel-Lebanon: The slight uptick in cross-border hostilities reflects sustained security risks, though major escalation remains unlikely. In the past 72 hours, Lebanese Hizballah (LH) slightly increased the rate of its rocket launches against northern Israel, while the IDF conducted simultaneous strikes across ten areas in southern Lebanon. However, this uptick remains broadly within the established levels of engagement and is unlikely to prompt a major escalation. Nonetheless, security risks in northern Israel and southern Lebanon will remain elevated in the coming weeks. Risks of misfire, misidentification and misjudgement remain present, sustaining the likelihood of snowballing escalation, particularly in the event of a mass casualty incident on either side.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Palestinian Authority (PA), underscoring substantial fiscal pressure on the governing authority. The Jerusalem District Court ordered the temporary seizure of the funds on 4 September following a lawsuit filed on behalf of over 250 individuals killed by Palestinian militants in various terror attacks, including the 7 October 2023 attacks. In March, the Knesset passed legislation allowing families of individuals killed by Palestinian militants to sue the PA for compensation. While the court has yet to rule on the case, the seizure will likely last for several months as litigation continues, substantially increasing fiscal pressure on the PA. Continued delays to financial transfers by the Israeli government have substantially impacted the PA’s solvency and have repeatedly delayed payments for PA employees . In the event of further fund seizures, the PA will likely face increasing financial instability, driving the risks of protests and unrest in the West Bank, including in the Ramallah area (Ramallah and al Bireh governorate).
- Protests calling for the government to secure hostage releases have decreased in size and frequency, though numerous acts of protest-related violence highlight moderately elevated bystander risks. Although the scale of anti-government protests has decreased since 2 September, sporadic demonstrations have emerged in Hod HaSharon and Rehovot (Central district) and Nahalal (Northern district). In Tel Aviv, hundreds of demonstrators have continuously gathered along Begin Street since 1 September, moderately disrupting movement through the city centre. On 4 September, the police attempted to disperse a demonstration after it spread beyond its allotted area, triggering low-intensity clashes and at least three arrests. Demonstrators also lit a bonfire in the protest’s vicinity, highlighting moderately elevated threats to proximate assets. While a significant increase in protest-related violence remains unlikely, continued demonstrations will sustain the risk of localised travel disruption and altercations with the security forces.
- The UK suspended several licenses for arms exports to Israel, highlighting elevated bilateral tensions. On 2 September, UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy announced the suspension of 30 of the UK’s approximately 350 arms export licenses to Israel, citing concerns that exports could be used in ‘serious violations’ of international humanitarian law. The suspension will primarily impact the export of repair parts for drones, helicopters and military aircraft, moderately increasing compliance concerns for manufacturing and export firms in the defence and aviation industries. As the UK exported less than GBP 18.2m (USD 23.9m) in arms to Israel in 2023, the restriction is unlikely to undercut the IDF’s capabilities significantly. Even so, the suspension highlights increasing bilateral tensions following the election of the Labour Party in the UK in July. As the UK government continues to conduct investigations into IDF operations in Gaza over the coming months, there is a realistic possibility of further license suspensions, which will exacerbate diplomatic tensions and potentially undermine co-operation between the UK security forces and the IDF.
- A shooting incident near the Israeli consulate in Munich (Bavaria state, Germany) underscores the elevated risk of violence facing international Israeli assets and installations; this will subsequently drive bystander risks. On 5 September at around 0910hrs (local time), a sole perpetrator reportedly fired shots at police officers using a rifle in front of the National Socialist Documentation Centre near the Israeli consulate in Munich. The German police returned fire and killed the suspect (see Sibylline Alert – 5 September 2024). The attack coincided with the anniversary of the 1972 terrorist attack at the Munich Olympic Games when Palestinian militants killed 11 members of the Israeli Olympic team and one police officer. Although the authorities have not identified the individual, several media outlets have reported that the suspect was an Austrian national affiliated with Islamist extremist networks. The incident highlights the elevated risks of violence facing assets and locations associated with the Israeli government, including embassies, consulates and trade missions, particularly on anniversaries associated with Israel and the Palestinian Territories. Businesses with high-profile links to Israel will face similarly elevated risks of targeting, increasing physical security threats to bystanders and proximate assets, especially as the Israel-Hamas war continues to exacerbate ethno-religious tensions worldwide.
- Norway’s increased ethical standards regarding its sovereign wealth fund will possibly trigger divestment from stocks in Israeli-linked firms, increasing bilateral tensions with Israel. On 3 September, Reuters exclusively reported that Norway’s sovereign wealth fund will possibly divest shares in companies that violate new and stricter ethical guidelines for businesses considered to be aiding Israel’s operations in the Palestinian Territories. The fund’s ethical council reportedly outlined the new stricter standards in a letter to the Norwegian foreign ministry on 30 August and identified at least one unnamed company for divestment. Although the fund’s investments in Israel account for approximately 0.1% of its assets, the move highlights increasing pressure on firms and sovereign wealth funds to divest from certain firms operating in Israel, particularly those associated with military operations in the Palestinian Territories. Israel-related divestments will likely undermine relations with the Israeli government, though unilateral divestment from Israeli companies remains unlikely.
Sep 04.
- Israel: 2025 budget plan elevates domestic unrest, socio-economic risks. On 3 September, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich introduced an initial state budget framework for 2025, aiming for final approval in the Knesset by December. The plan set a deficit target of up to 4% of GDP, standing starkly against July’s deficit of 8.1% of GDP. To achieve this, the plan outlines possible measures such as a freeze of public sector pay and state allowances and a surtax on undistributed company profits (these are tax-exempt to encourage investment). The plan will likely further elevate domestic unrest and anti-government sentiment in the coming months and increase the socio-economic gap within the population. Furthermore, it will increase threats to investor confidence and the risk of capital flight. We assess that the plan will likely face widespread resistance from within coalition parties and trade unions, threatening prospects for its approval in December and elevating government stability risks.
Sep 03.
- Red Sea: Attack on oil tankers is unlikely to signal resumption of hostilities. On 2 September, the Iran-backed Houthis attacked two oil tankers in the Red Sea with two ballistic missiles and one explosive drone; no major damage or casualties were reported. The two vessels, the Panama-flagged and -owned (and Greek-operated) MV BLUE LAGOON 1 and the Saudi-flagged, -owned and -operated MV AMJAD, were sailing near each other at the time of the attack. In recent weeks, the rate of Houthi attacks against commercial vessels in the Red Sea has slightly increased, underlining the growing threat amid currently elevated regional tensions. It is unlikely that the Houthis directly targeted the Saudi vessel. In their announcement, the group claimed that they targeted MV BLUE LAGOON, but did not mention MV AMJAD. As such, a breach in the fragile truce between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis and a resumption of hostilities are unlikely. However, tensions in the Red Sea area will remain elevated in the coming days. Furthermore, we assess that Houthi attacks are likely to increase in the event of a (highly likely) Iranian attack against Israel, sustaining elevated risks for supply chains in the coming months.
- UK: Part suspension of military exports to Israel is highly unlikely to reduce domestic unrest risks. On 2 September, Foreign Secretary David Lammy confirmed that the UK is partly suspending military exports to Israel. The government will suspend 30 of its 350 export licenses (including parts for fighter planes, helicopters and drones) due to concerns that the equipment will be used in violation of international humanitarian law. The decision also follows the former Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn’s announcement of a pro-Palestine parliamentary alliance with four independent MPs. The emergence of the group will drive low-to-moderate polarisation risks. We assess that the partial suspension of military exports to Israel is highly unlikely to reduce domestic unrest risks across the UK. The prominent anti-war activist group Palestine Action (PA) will almost certainly continue its campaign against the defence firm Elbit Systems and affiliated businesses. This will sustain the risks facing a range of sectors, including the financial services, logistics, public relations, real estate and technology. Additionally, we assess that public pro-Palestine demonstrations will likely continue on trend during H2; Birmingham, Glasgow, Leeds, London and Manchester will remain likely hotspots.
Sep 02.
KEY POINTS
- Three recorded attacks involving vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) targeting Israeli civilian populations in the West Bank reflect the increasing security risks and a shift in militant tactics therein.
- Large-scale prisoner release protests and the announcement of a general strike underline the elevated business operational, domestic unrest and travel disruption risks throughout Israel.
- Gaza Strip: An airstrike that hit a vehicle leading an aid convoy highlights the elevated risk of mis-fire, which is likely to persist despite a scheduled pause in military operations. On 29 August, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed four people in an airstrike that hit the leading vehicle of an American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA) convoy in Rafah. The IDF claims the targeted vehicle was occupied by armed militants who had hijacked the convoy. However, according to ANERA, the armed passengers were local Palestinians associated with the transport company contracted by ANERA; they joined the convoy to provide security against looting. The strike highlights the elevated risks of misfire emanating from co-ordination and communication failures, with neither side clarifying the identity of the vehicle prior to the strike. It also highlights the elevated security and misidentification risks for Palestinian staff contracted by NGOs, particularly when armed, as well as the bystander risks facing staff who employ local support. In the coming two weeks, IDF military operations are likely to reduce moderately due to scheduled operational pauses for a polio vaccination campaign throughout the enclave. However, elevated security risks will persist throughout Gaza, including within zones undergoing operational pauses.
- West Bank: The increasing rate of attempted attacks, including those involving VBIEDs, in the southern West Bank reflects the rising attack risks and a shift in militant tactics. On 30 August, a VBIED exploded at a petrol station in Gush Etzion Junction (Hebron governorate) in the southern West Bank. The blast was likely the result of a fault. Several minutes later, a militant driving another VBIED breached the barrier at an Israeli settlement called Karmei Tzur (Hebron). However, the explosive device was detonated by an intercepting security patrol vehicle. On 1 September, Palestinian gunmen opened fire from a passing car at an Israeli police vehicle near the Tarqumiyah checkpoint (Hebron) while driving along road 35, killing the three police officers in the car. On 2 September, the Israeli security forces neutralised a VBIED parked outside Ateret (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate), which is an Israeli population centre. The four incidents were likely attempts to target civilians in mass casualty attacks. The fact that three of these events took place in the southern West Bank reflects the expansion and intensification of militant activity outside the common hotspots in the northern West Bank. Furthermore, it reflects a growing shift in tactics by militants, who are increasingly using explosives and targeting civilians. These trends underline the rising attack risks in the West Bank, particularly near Israeli population centres. Furthermore, IDF operations in and around Hebron are likely to intensify in the coming weeks, elevating travel disruption risks and ethno-religious tensions.
- Israel-Lebanon: While cross-border hostilities remain limited to the Israel-Lebanon border area (reflecting current efforts to contain the conflict), a recent strike has underscored the threat posed by the IDF’s targeting campaign to nearby assets. The IDF has continued striking Lebanese Hizballah (LH) military infrastructure and positions in southern Lebanon; it has also conducted targeted strikes against operatives. On 2 September, the IDF struck a vehicle in Naqoura (South governorate). While local reports indicate the vehicle belonged to a cleaning company contracted by the UN Peacekeeping Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the target was likely one of the alleged passengers, a brother of an LH operative. The strike reflects the elevated security and bystander risks in southern Lebanon facing NGOs and organisations employing family members of LH operatives (either directly or through a third party).
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Israel and Hamas have agreed to several short-term pauses in the fighting at specified locations to facilitate polio vaccination efforts, though transmission risks remain elevated. On 29 August, the World Health Organization (WHO) announced that the IDF and Hamas had agreed to three localised three-day pauses to facilitate NGO efforts to vaccinate individuals against polio. The WHO confirmed a case of polio in central Gaza on 23 August, underscoring the significantly increased risk of an imminent outbreak . On 1 September, the first pause took place between 0600hrs and 1500hrs (local time) in central Gaza, with the Ministry of Health reporting approximately 73,000 successful vaccinations. Similar pauses will take place over the coming days, before the initiative shifts to northern and then southern Gaza. Although the pauses in hostilities will moderate critical security threats facing NGO staff and the risk of disruption impacting the transport of temperature-sensitive vaccines, widespread infrastructural damage will likely continue to hamper supply chain continuity, undermining efforts to increase vaccination coverage significantly in the short term. Additionally, the oral polio vaccine used by NGOs in Gaza requires two doses taken one month apart in order to be effective, necessitating further pauses (to which neither Israel nor Hamas has agreed at the time of writing). Partial immunisation is unlikely to prevent the spread of polio, particularly among vulnerable populations, such as infants. More broadly, as humanitarian conditions in Gaza remain critical due to the widespread damage to healthcare, sanitation and water treatment facilities, further outbreaks of polio and other communicable diseases are highly likely.
- The deaths of six hostages in Hamas custody have triggered a significant escalation in protest activity that has disrupted operational and supply chain continuity throughout Israel. On 1 September, the IDF announced the recovery of six deceased hostages from Gaza; the health ministry subsequently announced that Hamas militants had likely killed the hostages several hours before the IDF launched an operation to secure their release. The announcement triggered immediate protests in numerous locations, particularly in Haifa (Haifa district), Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). Local media reports indicate that around 280,000 civilians attended demonstrations in Tel Aviv, and that around 200,000 attended demonstrations in other cities, highlighting the substantial capacity of protest organisers to mobilise supporters with minimal notice. Although the demonstrations remained broadly peaceful, police efforts to disperse participants triggered numerous low-intensity clashes, driving bystander safety risks. The authorities also reported that at least 30 people were arrested for disorder in Tel Aviv and that five were arrested for rioting in Jerusalem, underscoring the moderate domestic unrest risks in both cities. In Tel Aviv, mounted police clashed with demonstrators blocking the Ayalon Highway. They used batons, pepper spray and stun grenades, highlighting the substantial bystander risks as protest activity continues to proliferate. On 2 September, protest activity continued to grow, with demonstrations involving thousands reported in numerous locations throughout Central, Haifa, Jerusalem, Northern, Southern and Tel Aviv districts (please click here for a map of protest locations reported at the time of writing). Protesters have also targeted key intersections along major thoroughfares (including Highways 1, 4 and 20), disrupting public transport networks in several major cities and underscoring the widespread risk of travel delays. Protests are highly likely to continue over the coming days, particularly in major population centres, sustaining operational disruption risks. Demonstrations targeting major thoroughfares and port facilities will also sustain risks of supply chain disruption, particularly for firms reliant on overland movement. The risk of clashes with the police will also remain elevated, sustaining bystander and incidental risks, though widespread domestic unrest and protest-related violence remain unlikely.
- In conjunction with large-scale hostage release protests, Israel’s largest labour union called a general strike on 2 September, highlighting increasing labour flexibility concerns and the risk of further strike action. On 1 September, the Histadrut labour federation announced a one-day general strike on 2 September due to the government’s failure to secure hostage releases (see Sibylline Alert – Israel – 1 September 2024). Numerous other entities also participated, including members of the Israeli Business Forum, several city municipalities and numerous other unions and federation chapters (including the Teacher’s Union and the Social Workers Union). The strike significantly disrupted operations in the public and private sectors and triggered the temporary suspension of operations at Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV). Staff at the Port of Haifa facility (Haifa) have also conducted a one-day walkout. Although Histadrut called off the strike at 1430hrs after the Labour Court ruled that it was illegal, the demonstration highlights the significant labour flexibility concerns linked to the stalling ceasefire and hostage release negotiations (see FORECAST).
- Anti-conscription protests have continued at pace, with the IDF indicating that it will pursue standard measures to enforce compliance with conscription orders. On 2 September, dozens of ultra-Orthodox men participated in anti-conscription protests outside the IDF recruitment centre in Tel Hashomer (Tel Aviv). The protest highlights the risks associated with sustained anti-conscription sentiment. Demonstrators also tried to block ultra-Orthodox men responding to draft notices from entering the premises. Also on 2 September, an IDF spokesperson confirmed that it will proceed with efforts to conscript ultra-Orthodox individuals in line with standard regulations, likely indicating an escalation in enforcement efforts in the coming months. Under Israeli law, conscription non-compliance is a crime, with repeated refusal to adhere to draft notices resulting in arrest by the military police. Efforts to detain ultra-Orthodox men for non-compliance would almost certainly trigger violent protests, particularly in Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv) and Jerusalem, substantially increasing the risk of domestic unrest and elevating threats to bystanders. As such, the IDF will likely primarily pursue civil measures to enforce conscription orders, such as legal action preventing access to state benefits. Nevertheless, continued efforts to bolster ultra-Orthodox recruitment will sustain the risk of an uptick in the frequency and scale of demonstrations, particularly in central Israel.
- Increasing domestic opposition in Lebanon to LH’s ongoing clashes with the IDF highlights sustained government stability risks. On 1 September, Samir Gaegea, the leader of the largest party in Lebanon’s parliament, the Lebanese Force (a Christian political party), criticised LH’s role in clashes along the Israel-Lebanon border, stating that the group has initiated a war that ‘the Lebanese people reject’. Gaegea also stated that cross-border clashes have significantly exacerbated socio-economic health concerns throughout Lebanon and critically undermined stability in southern governorates. The statements highlight increasingly vocal domestic opposition to LH’s role in ongoing cross-border hostilities, particularly among Lebanon’s Christian community. Although the statement is highly unlikely to moderate LH activity in southern Lebanon, increasing political polarisation linked to cross-border clashes will likely sustain political instability within Lebanon and undermine efforts to form a government, underscoring long-term governance concerns.
- Israel: Nationwide strikes, protests will elevate operational, travel disruption risks. On 2 September, the Histadrut labour federation, Israel’s largest union, began a day-long nationwide strike; it was joined by many other organisations, private companies and municipalities across Israel. The strike comes following the retrieval of the bodies of six Israeli hostages from Gaza on 31 August and reports on 1 September that they were killed by their captors shortly beforehand; these developments triggered nationwide protests (see Sibylline Alert – 1 September 2024). While the Histadrut strike is likely to end at 1800hrs (local time), sporadic strike action in both the private and public sectors remains a realistic possibility throughout the week. Furthermore, large-scale nationwide protests are likely to continue this week, elevating travel disruption risks in big cities, as well as along major highways and at key junctions. Clashes between protesters and the police are likely throughout the week, particularly in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), elevating bystander security risks. Additionally, we assess there is a realistic possibility of sporadic violent clashes between protesters and counter-protesters, further elevating bystander security risks. (Source: Sibylline)
03 Sept 24. IDF Eliminates Hamas Commander Behind October 7 Murder With Airstrike. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) announced on Tuesday the elimination of Ahmed Fozi Nazer Muhammad Wadia, a senior Hamas commander involved in the October 7 massacre in Netiv Ha’asara. Wadia, who commanded the Nukhba company of Hamas’s elite forces, was reportedly responsible for leading the deadly attack on the Israeli community near the Gaza border. The strike, carried out by the Israel Air Force, targeted a compound in Gaza City close to the Al-Ahli Hospital, and also resulted in the deaths of eight other Hamas militants from the Daraj Tuffah Battalion.
On October 7, Wadia, a member of Hamas’s Paraglider Array, allegedly led an assault on Netiv Ha’asara, where he personally oversaw the killing of civilians. According to reports, Wadia entered the home of Gil Taasa, a resident who was murdered during the attack, and drank a coca-cola beverage in front of Taasa’s children after the killing.
In addition to Wadia, another high-ranking member of Hamas was killed in the airstrike. This individual was responsible for the Daraj Tuffah Battalion’s engineering, sniping, and anti-tank operations and had supplied the explosives used to breach the security fence at the Gaza border during the October 7 attack. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
03 Sept 24. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has attacked the UK’s decision to suspend some export licences to the country used for arms in military operations in Gaza as “shameful”. The criticism came after Britain blocked about 30 licences for a range of items including components in military aircraft on Monday, though it insisted the move would not hit Israeli security. The UK announcement followed a government review that found possible breaches of international humanitarian law by Israel in its offensive against Hamas in the strip. “Days after Hamas executed six Israeli hostages, the UK government suspended thirty arms licenses to Israel,” Netanyahu wrote on X on Tuesday. “This shameful decision will not change Israel’s determination to defeat Hamas, a genocidal terrorist organization that savagely murdered 1200 people on October 7, including 14 British citizens,” he added. John Healey, UK defence secretary, said on Tuesday that the UK move would not “have a material impact on Israel’s security” and that Britain remained “a staunch ally” of Israel. “This is not about making a political gesture, this is about following the rule of law,” he told the BBC, adding that the conflict in Gaza “requires the government to review the licences which may be involved”. Britain is the first major western ally of Israel to partially suspend arms sales to the country since the start of the war. The Labour government said on Monday it had concluded there was a clear risk of some items exported to Israel being used in serious violations of international humanitarian law. Although the UK is not a big exporter of arms to Israel compared with the US or Germany, with British arms accounting for only about 1 per cent of Israeli imports, the decision has already had diplomatic repercussions. Israeli defence minister Yoav Gallant said on Monday that he was “deeply disheartened to learn of the sanctions placed by the UK government on export licences to Israel’s defence establishment”. The UK’s chief rabbi, Sir Ephraim Mirvis, wrote on X: “It beggars belief that the British government, a close strategic ally of Israel, has announced a partial suspension of arms licences, at a time when Israel is fighting a war for its very survival on seven fronts.” He added that the decision by David Lammy, UK foreign secretary, “feeds the falsehood that Israel is in breach of international humanitarian law, when in fact it is going to extraordinary lengths to uphold it”. (Source: FT.com)
03 Sept 24. Hamas Must Be Held Accountable for Murdering Civilians, DOD Official Says. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III spoke on Sunday with Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant about the six hostages in Gaza murdered by Hamas, including 23-year-old U.S. citizen Hersh Goldberg-Polin, said Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder at news conference today. Austin passed along his deepest condolences to the families of the slain hostages, and “he expressed outrage at their vicious, illegal and immoral execution at the hands of Hamas,” Ryder said. The secretary affirmed that Hamas leaders must be held accountable for the murder of the innocent civilians, and the defense leaders reaffirmed their mutual commitment to swiftly reaching a cease-fire deal to secure the release of all remaining hostages, the general said.
Also on Sunday, U.S. forces in the U.S. Central Command partnered with Syrian Democratic Forces to capture Khaled Ahmed al-Dandal, an ISIS leader and facilitator who was assessed as helping ISIS fighters after he escaped from a detention facility in Raqqa, Syria, the press secretary said.
“The operation highlights Centcom’s ongoing efforts to support our SDF partners to mitigate threats of future escapes by ISIS detainees from SDF detention facilities in Syria and to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS,” Ryder said.
Yesterday, Iranian-backed Houthis attacked two crude-oil tankers transiting the Red Sea with two ballistic missiles and a one-way attack unmanned aerial system, hitting both vessels. The motor vessel Blue Lagoon 1 is owned by Panama and sails under the Panamanian flag; the operator is Greek. The motor vessel Amjad is flagged, owned and operated by Saudi Arabia.
“These reckless attacks of terrorism by the Houthis continue to destabilize regional and global commerce, while threatening the lives of innocent civilian mariners, as well as maritime ecosystems,” Ryder said.
Currently, salvage efforts are underway in the southern Red Sea for the disabled motor vessel Delta Sounion, Greek-owned, which was attacked by Houthis on Aug. 21 and is still on fire and could develop into a major environmental disaster, according to a Centcom news release.
“The U.S. will continue to work with international partners and allies to protect maritime commerce and mitigate potential impacts to the environment, despite the irresponsible and careless actions of the Iranian-backed Houthis,” Ryder said. (Source: U.S. DoD)
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