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Military And Security Developments
Jul 25.
KEY POINTS
- Lebanese Hizballah (LH) surveillance drone footage of Israel Air Force base elevates risks of short-term uptick in cross-border hostilities.
- Retrieval of hostage bodies from Gaza and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s extended visit to the US will likely elevate anti-government protests in the coming days.
- Gaza Strip: IDF operations in Khan Yunis and Rafah (both southern Gaza) continued on trend. IDF battlegroups from Brigade 7, the Commando Brigade and the Paratroopers Brigade, under the command of Division 98 continue operations in eastern Khan Yunis. IDF battlegroups from Brigade 401 and Givati Brigade under the command of Division 162 also continued clearing operations in Rafah. On 24 July, Hamas launched rockets from the Humanitarian zone in Khan Yunis according to the IDF. The IDF claim these rockets failed to cross into Israel, instead falling within Khan Yunis, with several hitting UNRWA’s Al-Qarara school, killing two civilians and injuring several others. The incident highlights the risks of misfire within the West Bank, sustaining the severe security risks in the Gaza Strip. There is also a realistic possibility Hamas will issue a counter-claim that the school was damaged by the IDF, threatening to exacerbate anti-Israel sentiment. In response there is a realistic possibility that Israel will strike launchpads and militant locations, including within humanitarian zones, sustaining security risks within Gaza humanitarian zones.
- West Bank: The IDF’s killing of two senior militant commanders and a sophisticated attack by Palestinian militants reflects the elevated intensity of West Bank hostilities, sustaining increased security risks. On 23 July, Hamas militants performed a sophisticated multilayered IED attack near the border fence between Jalbun (Jenin governorate) and Kibbutz Meirav (Northern district). The militants detonated the first IED to draw in Israeli security forces, then detonated a secondary IED, lightly injuring two contractor employees of the Ministry of Defence, followed by a third detonation when IDF medics arrived at the scene. Similar attacks have become increasingly frequent over the past several weeks, reflecting evolving militant tactics and capabilities. On the same day, an IDF drone strike in Tulkarm (Tulkarm governorate) killed the head of Hamas’ unit in Tulkarm and the head of the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades in Tulkarm, along with six other militants. Consequently, the IDF will likely continue intensifying operations designed to undercut militant capabilities in the northern West Bank over the coming days, sustaining elevated security risks in the West Bank and on the Israel-West Bank border.
- Israel-Lebanon: IDF-Lebanese Hizballah (LH) cross-border hostilities continued in line with established trends but LH drone footage of Ramat David Air Base highlights the failure of Israel’s air defences and increasing LH capabilities. On 24 July, LH published nine minutes of video footage taken by its ‘Hudhud’ surveillance drone on 23 July, showing Israel Air Force Base Ramat David (Northern district). Ramat David is located approximately 31 miles (50km) from the Israel-Lebanon border, representing one of the furthest LH drone incursions since 7 October 2023. The extended travel distance within Israeli airspace covered by the drone including its return to Lebanon and operation above an active military airbase highlights LH’s evolving capabilities and deficiencies in Israeli air defences.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed the US Congress on 24 July, outlining a broadly consistent approach to the Israel-Hamas war and regional tensions linked to Iranian proxy activity. Regarding the Israel-Hamas war, Netanyahu re-iterated his commitment to securing hostage releases and dismantling Hamas’ military and governance capabilities. He also claimed that Israel will seek to maintain security control over Gaza ‘for the foreseeable future’ but would devolve political administration to a local, non-Hamas authority, in line with previously detailed post-war plans for Gaza (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 5 January 2024). Netanyahu also called for the US to expedite weapons sales to Israel, highlighting latent tensions between the Biden and Netanyahu administrations. However, Netanyahu’s visit to the US and upcoming meetings with both US President Joe Biden, Vice President and presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump highlight the continued strength of the Israel-US relationship. With reference to Iran’s influence in the Middle East, particularly through its network of armed proxy groups (see Sibylline Extremism Watch – Iran and the Axis of Resistance) Netanyahu called for greater regional security co-operation. Despite these statements, however, significantly elevated tensions linked to IDF ground operations in Gaza will likely prevent significant and direct regional security integration in the short to medium term.
- Efforts to pass coalition-backed legislation before the Israeli Knesset breaks for the summer recess (28 July – 27 October) have increased policy risk and fiscal concerns. On 23 July, Members of the Knesset (MK) voted in favour of 18 pieces of legislation preceding the summer recess, moderately increasing short-term policy risks in a variety of sectors. This followed the passage of legislation promoted by the Shas and United Torah Judaism parties (both members of the coalition government). The move highlights increasing efforts from the dominant Likud party to make policy concessions to key coalition partners to consolidate support and moderate government instability risks ahead of the recess. On 24 July, the coalition whip MK postponed voting on a Shas-proposed amendment to the Religious Services Law until 28 July, likely to prevent deadlock before the recess and increase the likelihood of the amendment’s passage through brinkmanship. There is a realistic possibility that the amendment will pass over the coming days, substantially increasing the Religious Services Ministry’s budget and exacerbating fiscal pressure on the Israeli government. However, there is also a realistic possibility that Otzma Yehudit coalition members will oppose the amendment and other coalition-backed bills as part of efforts to pressure Netanyahu into appointing party leader Itamar Ben Gvir to the War Cabinet, increasing risks of policy stasis over the coming quarter (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 11 July 2024).
- Numerous Palestinian political organisations signed a ‘unity declaration’ in Beijing (China), though prospects for long-term reconciliation remain low. On 23 July, 14 Palestinian organisations, including Fatah and Hamas, signed a declaration agreeing to work towards achieving ‘comprehensive Palestinian national unity’ under the framework of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The statement followed two days of reconciliation talks and represents a moderate improvement in inter-group relations amidst increasingly frequent Chinese-mediated talks. However, the statement’s vague wording and inclusion of groups with significantly diverging policies vis-à-vis Israel, the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the administration of the Palestinian Territories will likely undermine progress towards substantive reconciliation. While the declaration also includes a commitment to form a temporary government at an unspecified time, continued factionalism within and between Palestinian political organisations will likely undermine efforts to form a formal political administrative body within the Palestinian Territories. As such, long-term governance concerns are highly likely to remain elevated, moderating prospects for improved socio-economic and operational conditions in both Gaza and the West Bank.
- Australia announced sanctions targeting several Israeli settlers in the West Bank, increasing compliance concerns. On 25 July, the Australian Foreign Ministry announced it would sanction seven Israeli settlers involved in violence targeting Palestinian civilians in the West Bank. The sanctions include asset freezes, financial sanctions and travel bans, moderately increasing sanctions exposure risks for firms with operations in Israel, particularly those servicing settlements in the West Bank. The Foreign Ministry also sanctioned an entity referred to as ‘Hilltop Youth’; no such incorporated entity exists in Israel. Rather, ‘hilltop youth’ is a phrase frequently referring to Israeli settlers involved in settlement expansion, highlighting increasing risks of sanctions without defined targets amidst elevated bilateral tensions. As numerous states and entities such as Australia, the EU, the UK and the US continue to expand sanctions regimes targeting settlers in the West Bank, similarly vague sanctions orders will increase sanctions exposure risks and governance concerns, particularly for firms in the financial sector and those overseeing charitable or non-profit donations within Israel.
Jul 23.
*Israel: Japanese sanctions are unlikely to strain relations, highlight risks of further G7 sanctions. Earlier on 23 July, Japan sanctioned four Israeli settlers accused of violence against Palestinians in the West Bank. This comes after G7 members Canada, the UK, the US, and the EU imposed similar sanctions on settlers and Israeli far-right organisations in recent months. This comes amid escalating tensions over Israel’s settlement policy, recently legalising five new settlements and funding unauthorised outposts in the West Bank. As with previous sanctions, these measures are unlikely to impact relations between Israel and Japan significantly, especially given no members of the Israeli government have been directly sanctioned. Additionally, Japan is unlikely to change its stance on Palestinian statehood or immediate ceasefire resolutions in Gaza, minimising operational fluctuations to Japanese companies operating in Israel. We assess that other G7 countries and observer states will likely continue to impose similar sanctions on Israeli businesses, increasing compliance challenges and reputational risks to firms and individuals associated with settlements in the West Bank.
Jul 22.
KEY POINTS
- An Iranian-backed Houthi drone killed an Israeli civilian in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district); this prompted Israel to strike a key Houthi port in Yemen in response, driving elevated regional security risks and impacting maritime shipping in neighbouring countries.
- The International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion on Israel’s policies and actions in the West Bank is unlikely to lead to a policy change amid increasing ethno-religious radicalisation and security risks in the region.
- Gaza Strip: The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) opened operations in eastern Khan Yunis governorate, reducing the size of the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone and reflecting persistent severe security risks throughout the Gaza Strip. On 22 July, the IDF issued evacuation orders for eastern Khan Yunis residents, including areas of the al-Mawasi zone. According to the IDF, in the past days, Palestinian militants increased their use of the humanitarian zone to launch rockets at Israeli forces and civilian centres. Following the evacuation orders, the IDF began an extensive operation in the area. The operation highlights the IDF’s willingness to enter humanitarian areas when they are exploited by militant groups. As such, ongoing attempts by Palestinian militants to restore their presence in previously cleared areas will sustain severe security risks throughout the Gaza Strip over the coming weeks, including in humanitarian areas. In addition to the operation in Khan Yunis, on 22 July the IDF announced the withdrawal of the Nahal Brigade from Rafah (Rafah governorate), representing a slowdown of operations in the area. In the coming weeks there is a realistic possibility that the IDF will continue reducing its forces in Rafah, diverting them to other areas of conflict in Gaza, the West Bank or Northern Israel.
- West Bank: An attack by Israeli settlers on foreign nationals in the West Bank and thwarted a militant plan to kidnap Israelis reflect elevated radicalisation and security risks. On 22 July, Israel’s Shin Bet confirmed the arrest of a West Bank cell planning to kidnap Israelis. The security agency arrested two cell members, residents of Aqabat Jaber (Jericho governorate), and the Palestinian Authority security forces detained a third member. The cell planned to hide kidnappees in a hole they dug near a member’s home. While the arrests likely happened at least a week ago, the plot reflects a gradual shift in the tactics of militants and radicalised individuals towards an intensified targeting of Israeli citizens, as opposed to IDF service personnel. This trend is being exacerbated by increasing incidents of Israeli settler violence. On 21 July, Israeli settlers attacked foreign nationals and Palestinian human rights activists in Qusra (Nablus governorate), lightly injuring two US nationals and one Dutch national. Previously, on 19 July, Israeli settlers also attacked Palestinian residents of Masafer Yatta (Hebron governorate), moderately injuring two Palestinian individuals. This trend is likely to persist, particularly given limited efforts by Israeli security forces to punish settlers or enforce legislation against them, exacerbating rates of radicalisation among both Israeli and Palestinian communities in the West Bank. These will sustain elevated security and bystander risks in the West Bank in the coming weeks. Israeli settlers’ attacks are likely to elevate reputational risks for businesses operating in the West Bank or affiliated with West Bank entities. Furthermore, Israeli settler violence will elevate the risks of additional sanctions on West Bank individuals and entities by the international community.
- Israel: A stabbing attempt by a Canadian national reflects elevated international radicalisation risks and will likely lead to increased security protocols at Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV). On 22 July, a Canadian national visiting Netiv HaAsara (Southern district) in the Gaza envelope attempted to stab a member of the community rapid response team and was shot dead in the attempt. Following the incident, Israel is likely to increase its border security checks at Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV), elevating risks of delays and the rejection of foreign nationals’ entry into Israel.
- Israel-Lebanon: The sustained uptick of cross-border hostilities on the Israel-Lebanon border highlights managed escalation dynamics, sustaining security and snowball escalation risks. Throughout the monitoring period, cross-border attacks by Lebanese Hizballah remained consistent with the elevated rate observed in recent weeks, comprising larger-scale missile barrages but largely limited in range to border areas of the Northern district. IDF strikes in Lebanon also remained on trend, mostly focusing on southern Lebanon and remaining highly focused on the targeted killing of LH operatives. The maintenance of both sides’ established tactics possibly indicates a shared willingness to manage and maintain a limited conflict, currently reducing prospects for a significant escalation. However, risks of miscalculation and misfire remain elevated, increasing the risk of a rapid series of retaliations, snowballing into a major escalation.
- Israel-Yemen: The Iran-backed Houthi drone attack in Tel Aviv and Israel’s retaliation in Yemen elevate regional security and escalation risks. In the early morning of 19 July, an explosive-laden Houthi drone exploded above the cross between Ben Yehuda and Sholem Aleichem streets in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) approximately 130 meters from the US Embassy branch office in the city. Shrapnel from the explosion killed one Israeli civilian in his home and injured ten additional persons. In retaliation, on 20 July, Israel struck energy and fuel infrastructure in Yemen’s key al-Hudaydah Port (Al-Hudaydah governorate) killing at least four individuals and likely injuring dozens more. This exchange will increase the likelihood of the Houthis attempting further strikes on Israeli territory, driving further gradual bilateral escalation. This will sustain regional security risks and conflict escalation in the Red Sea area, impacting global shipping (see further in the forecast section).
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Health authorities in Gaza have reported the presence of poliovirus in sewage samples, significantly increasing humanitarian and public health concerns. On 19 July, the World Health Organization announced that it had detected polio in six sewage samples collected in central and southern Gaza. Although no infections have been reported at the time of writing, the virus’ presence in sewage significantly increases the risk of a polio outbreak over the coming weeks, exacerbating public health concerns in Gaza. Since the IDF launched ground operations in October 2023, there has been a significant uptick in infectious disease transmission due to critical infrastructure damage, particularly impacting sanitation facilities, and substantial disruption to routine vaccinations for vulnerable populations, including children. Although numerous NGOs have announced plans to increase polio vaccinations over the coming days, inadequate sanitation facilities will drive risks of transmission over the coming weeks. NGO personnel will face elevated risks of exposure to infected water sources as the IDF conducts operations in the al Mawasi humanitarian zone (Rafah governorate), driving public health and humanitarian concerns, particularly in southern Gaza.
- Protest activity continues at pace in Israel, with demonstrations targeting Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV) increasing risks of travel delays over the coming days. On 20 July, thousands of demonstrators attended anti-government protests in locations throughout Israel. In Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), thousands of demonstrators calling for the government to secure a hostage release agreement gathered in the city centre, temporarily restricting access to the Ayalon Highway and Kaplan Street. Following the demonstration, counter-protesters associated with the Brothers in Arms group threw stones at anti-government protesters and engaged in altercations with several participants, highlighting elevated bystander risks. In Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) thousands gathered in Paris Square near Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s official residence. Protesters also held similar demonstrations near Netanyahu’s private residence in Caesarea and the Horev centre in Haifa (both Haifa district). Dozens of protesters also gathered at key junctions in the Northern district to call for the government to stabilise the security risk environment, blocking movement through the Karkur junction on Highway 65 and the Nahalal junction linking Highways 73 and 75. On 21 July, dozens of protesters gathered at Ben Gurion International Airport in Tel Aviv to protest Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to the US, moderately delaying travel through the airport facility. Further protests are highly likely to continue during Netanyahu’s visit to the US, particularly following the IDF’s announcement on 22 July confirming the deaths of two hostages in Gaza. Protest activity will sustain risks of operational and travel disruption in major population centres nationwide while increasing tensions between anti- and pro-government demonstrators will drive risks of sporadic clashes and altercations, increasing bystander risks.
- The International Court of Justice has characterised Israel’s presence in the West Bank as ‘unlawful’, highlighting increasing international tensions. On 19 July, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion (AO) stating that Israel’s continued presence and settlement policies in the West Bank are unlawful. The AO also stated that Israel has acted as an ‘occupying power’ and conducted a ‘de facto annexation’ in violation of international law. The ICJ issued the opinion following a request from the United Nations General Assembly in 2022 to advise on the legality of Israel’s policies vis-à-vis the Palestinian Territories and the Golan Heights. As the AO is non-binding, it does not increase legal burdens on Israel to comply with the ICJ’s suggested measures, including the evacuation of settlements and dismantling of the Israel-West Bank barrier wall. Even so, the AO highlights increasing regional tensions as Israel continues to support settlement activity and expansion in the West Bank (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 1 July 2024).
- The EU announced it would release emergency funding for the Palestinian Authority (PA), though governance risks remain high. On 19 July, the EU announced it would disperse USD 435 m in emergency funding through grants and loans to the PA over the coming quarter. The move comes amid significant concerns over the PA’s long-term solvency due to frequent delays to fiscal transfers from the Israeli government (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 4 July 2024). The funding will likely moderate immediate financial pressure on the PA and allow it to pay public sector employees, moderating risks of operational disruption and domestic unrest linked to socio-economic health concerns. However, the aid is conditioned on the PA adopting several public sector and anti-corruption reforms over the coming weeks, highlighting significant governance risks. Given significant institutionalised corruption and nepotism within the PA, short-term reforms are unlikely to address structural economic and governance concerns, moderating prospects for longer-term improvements, particularly within the public sector.
FORECAST
Security risks to maritime shipping in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea are likely to increase following the Iranian-backed Houthis’ successful attack on Tel Aviv and Israel’s retaliatory strike in Yemen. The al-Hudaydah Port that Israel struck is a key entry point for food, fuel, aid and weapons into northern Yemen. However, strikes on this facility are unlikely to undermine Houthi military capabilities or to significantly deter future attacks. In the coming weeks, the Houthis will launch further drone and ballistic missile attacks on Israel. While Israel’s heightened security posture following the attack on Tel Aviv will likely mitigate successful strikes on civilian targets in Israel, increased interceptions of Houthi ordinance outside of Israeli airspace will elevate bystander and security risks emanating from shrapnel in neighbouring countries such as Egypt. Houthi retaliation will likely also include increased attacks on commercial vessels in the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea, compounding existing threats to shipping regardless of given vessel’s ownership or destination due to the risk of misfire and misidentification. This will sustain elevated insurance premiums for shipping in the area and operational disruption for logistics companies and global trade in the coming weeks. Additionally, an uptick in attacks will elevate the likelihood of regional conflict escalation, with a realistic possibility of the US-led maritime coalition increasing their strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen. Combined with the realistic possibility of further Israeli strikes in the coming weeks, such operations will significantly elevate incidental risks to NGOs and their staff active in Houthi-controlled territory.
The International Court of Justice’s statement that Israel’s presence in the West Bank is unlawful is highly unlikely to change settlement policy, driving ethno-religious tensions and attack risks. In Israel, numerous government coalition and opposition parties have rejected the ICJ’s characterisation of Israel’s presence in the West Bank, indicating that a scaling back of settlement policies remains highly unlikely in the short or long term. Rather, Israeli settlers are highly likely to continue expanding settlements and outposts, exacerbating already-heightened ethno-religious tensions in the West Bank and increasing risks of settler attacks on Palestinians. There is also a realistic possibility of further violence targeting foreign nationals in the West Bank associated with pro-Palestinian activism and advocacy. Increasing inter-communal violence will likely bolster Palestinian militants’ radicalisation and recruitment efforts, increasing the risk of attacks against Israeli civilians, settlements and security force personnel. Broader instability in the West Bank will undermine the security risk environment in both Israeli and Palestinian population centres, increasing physical security and bystander risks.
The broad scope of the ICJ’s AO will likely bolster efforts to condemn Israel at the UN, increasing reputational concerns. Despite requesting the advice, the UN General Assembly is unable to impose binding sanctions on a state without prior authorisation from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Given the US’s veto power in the UNSC, it is highly unlikely that Israel will face wide-ranging sanctions, moderating compliance concerns. However, the General Assembly will likely pass resolutions condemning Israel over the coming weeks, increasing reputational concerns for firms with operations in Israel and those linked to Israeli entities. Firms with links to the Israeli government will also face elevated risks of public condemnation and targeted protests, particularly those fulfilling military and defence contracts. States in the region maintaining relations with Israel will also likely face elevated pro-Palestine protest activity in the coming weeks, elevating operational disruption risks in urban centres, particularly in Morocco and Jordan.
Triggers and indicators for escalation
- A successful terror attack by LH and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting LH and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- Israel re-launches widespread, high-intensity military operations in Gaza
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
- An IDF-targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)
- An LH strike causes a mass casualty event in Israel
- An IDF strike causes a mass casualty event in Lebanon
- An IDF strike kills civilians in Lebanon
*Israel-Yemen: Israeli air strike increases risks of further escalation, elevates energy insecurity. On 20 July, Israeli air strikes against energy infrastructure in the Houthi-controlled port city of Hodeidah (Hodeidah governate) killed at least six people. This comes after a Houthi drone strike killed one person in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) on 19 July, the first of its kind since October 2023. The Israeli attack will likely threaten energy security in Hodeidah, exacerbating existing power supply challenges and elevating operational concerns. In response, the Houthis will likely seek to increase attacks on commercial shipping vessels in the Red Sea and attempt further direct strikes on Israel. This will continue to drive significant disruption to key Red Sea and Gulf of Aden shipping routes, exacerbating increased global supply chain costs. While Houthi strikes in Israeli cities, including Eilat (southern district), Haifa (Haifa district) and Tel Aviv are unlikely to substantially increase in effectiveness, we assess that the strikes will sustain a persistent incidental threat to staff and assets, including from shrapnel following interceptions. (Source: Sibylline)
22 Jul 24. Israel Tests M61 Vulcan Cannon for Drone Defense on Northern Border. Israel is evaluating the M61 Vulcan cannon to counter drone threats along its northern border with Lebanon. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are testing the cannon, among other solutions, but it is not yet in operational use.
The potential deployment of the M61 Vulcan, a six-barrel Gatling-style rotary cannon capable of firing 6,000 rounds per minute, comes amid clashes with Hezbollah. The Lebanon-based militant group has launched numerous drones and missiles toward Israel, with drone attacks rising significantly in recent months.
The Alma Research and Education Center estimates that Hezbollah possesses over 2,500 UAVs for various purposes, including intelligence gathering and attacks. Despite the IDF’s efforts to improve drone detection and interception capabilities along the northern border, including establishing a dedicated unit in the Northern Command, Hezbollah has managed to penetrate Israeli airspace with drones, such as the attack on a military facility in May.
Historically, the M61 Vulcan has been used by the U.S. military on fixed-wing aircraft and by the Israel Air Force since 1975, including a modified version known as the “Racquet.” The weapon was previously mounted on M113 armored personnel carriers, referred to locally as Bardehlas, until its retirement in 2006.
The concept of mounting heavy weapons on vehicles, known as “technicals,” is a familiar aspect of irregular warfare. An example includes a Toyota truck equipped with the Vulcan cannon, demonstrating substantial firepower on a relatively basic vehicle.
In response to the drone threat, the IDF has installed drone-detection systems across the northern border and is testing various counter-drone measures, including the Vulcan cannon. Israeli defense companies Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and Israel Aerospace Industries, known for their counter-drone technologies, declined to comment on the matter.
An IDF spokesperson highlighted that multiple solutions are under trial, both in operational and research phases, as part of the military’s strategy to strengthen its defenses. “The military does not have Vulcan cannons at the moment. It, along with other solutions, is being tested in trials within the defense industries as part of our process of building military strength,” the spokesperson stated. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
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