Sponsored by Bertin Exensor
www.exensor.com
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–
Military And Security Developments
Jul 18.
KEY POINTS
- A series of high-profile Israel Defense Forces (IDF)-targeted strikes against Lebanon is likely to sustain the recent uptick in cross-border hostilities between Israel and Lebanese Hizballah (LH).
- An uptick in West Bank militant attacks targeting Israeli civilians reflects elevated security and bystander risks, particularly in the northern West Bank and Jerusalem areas.
- US sanctions against an ex-IDF soldier previously tried and convicted in Israel signals increasing legal and sanctions-exposure risks for IDF soldiers in the long term.
- Gaza Strip: A militant attack against IDF soldiers within the humanitarian axis has underscored the elevated security risks facing NGO staff therein. On 17 July, Hamas operatives fired a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) at IDF soldiers operating within the axis, moderately injuring one. Following the incident, the IDF temporarily closed the humanitarian axis, effectively stopping aid deliveries for several hours. The incident highlights the elevated bystander security risks facing NGO staff in Gaza, including in areas designated for humanitarian relief and near IDF positions. Furthermore, such attacks are unlikely to stop, sustaining the risk of disruption to aid deliveries in Gaza and worsening the humanitarian situation in the strip.
- West Bank: The uptick in militant attacks in the northern West Bank is likely to continue over the coming days, elevating bystander security risks and ethno-religious tensions. On 16 July, Hamas operatives launched a small-arms attack on an Israeli-plated vehicle near Ramin Junction (Tulkarm governorate), injuring three civilians. Additionally, on 18 July, one Israeli civilian was lightly injured when an IED detonated against his car near Hermesh (Tulkarm). These incidents reflect the growing intensity and frequency of attacks against civilians by West Bank militants. They will likely lead to increased IDF operations in the West Bank, particularly the northern West Bank, in the coming days, elevating bystander security risks and ethno-religious tensions therein. Militant activity targeting both Israeli security personnel and civilians will likely continue in the coming days, sustaining the elevated risk of attacks in the West Bank and Jerusalem areas.
- Israel-Lebanon: A series of targeted strikes in Lebanon and retaliatory attacks by LH will sustain the current uptick in cross-border hostilities. On 15 July, an alleged Israeli strike killed a Syrian businessman, Mohammed Baraa Katerji, on the Lebanon-Syria border, close to al-Sabboura (Rif Dimashq governorate, Syria). Katerji was allegedly involved in weapons transfers and dealings between Iran, Lebanon and Syria. On 18 July, an IDF strike against Beqaa governorate (Lebanon) killed Muhammed Jabara, a Hamas commander. Additionally, Israeli strikes against southern Lebanon on 16 July killed five Syrians, including three children. In response to these IDF strikes against Lebanon, LH increased the intensity and frequency of its cross-border attacks in the past 72 hours. LH is likely to continue responding to these high-profile IDF strikes, sustaining the uptick in cross-border hostilities in the coming days.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Israel will increase aid deliveries to Gaza via the Ashdod port (Southern district), moderating humanitarian concerns but increasing the risk of protests in the port’s vicinity. On 16 July, Israel’s defence minister, Yoav Gallant, announced that Israel would establish a dedicated facility in the Ashdod port complex to replace the dismantled US pier in Gaza (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 11 July 2024). A dedicated facility would likely increase overland aid deliveries into Gaza, though continued clashes between the IDF and Gaza-based militants would almost certainly continue undermining distribution processes, sustaining humanitarian concerns. Additionally, there is a realistic possibility that anti-aid groups, such as Tsav 9, will target aid convoys transiting from the port, including by erecting roadblocks and carrying out violence, increasing threats to NGO staff (including drivers and security personnel) and disrupting supply chain continuity. While Tsav 9 and associated protesters are unlikely to target commercial vehicles actively, elevated risks of misidentification will drive threats to overland movement, particularly for company vehicles and staff moving south from the Ashdod port along Highway 4.
- Increasing pressure on the Israeli government to secure hostage releases triggered an uptick in protest activity, highlighting growing operational disruption risks. On 16 July, dozens of protesters blocked the Ayalon highway at the Hashalom interchange (Tel Aviv district) to call for hostage releases. These protests followed reports that Gallant and IDF Chief of Staff Herzl Halevi are increasingly pressuring Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to accept a hostage release deal within the coming fortnight due to rising concerns over hostage safety and the feasibility of securing their release beyond this timeframe. Similarly, on 18 July, over 1,000 protesters gathered in Tel Aviv to call for Netanyahu to secure a hostage release deal before his address to the US Congress on 24 July. Smaller-scale demonstrations also emerged in Beersheba (Southern), Pardes Hanna-Karkur (Haifa district) and Ramat Hasharon (Tel Aviv). These demonstrations highlight activists’ increasing capacity to mobilise quickly outside established protest times and locations, driving risks of sporadic operational and travel disruption in urban centres nationwide. As pressure to secure an agreement increases over the coming days, protest activity will likely grow in frequency and scale, particularly during hostage release demonstrations on 20 July. Widespread demonstrations will likely disrupt movement and business operations in major urban centres, including Herzliya, Raanana and Rehovot (all Central district), Caesarea and Haifa (both Haifa), Jerusalem (Jerusalem district), Beersheba and Mitzpe Ramon (both Southern), as well as Tel Aviv.
- On 16 July, the IDF announced plans to begin conscripting ultra-Orthodox men on 21 July, driving unrest in the Bnei Brak area (Tel Aviv) and increasing the risk of violent demonstrations in the coming weeks. The IDF will issue 1,000 notices to ultra-Orthodox men on 21 July; a further 2,000 notices will be issued in the coming weeks. Following the IDF’s announcement, dozens of ultra-Orthodox protesters blocked Highway 4 near Bnei Brak for approximately three hours. The police clashed with demonstrators and arrested at least nine participants, highlighting the elevated risk of travel and supply chain disruption. Previously, on 15 July, dozens of ultra-Orthodox protesters in Bnei Brak attacked a vehicle carrying IDF personnel travelling to a seminary (Yeshiva) to discuss efforts to fulfil recruitment targets. Demonstrators threw stones at the passengers, injuring two. The incident underscored the risk of violence targeting IDF recruitment personnel and convoys, particularly in neighbourhoods with significant ultra-Orthodox populations. Despite its efforts to collaborate with ultra-Orthodox religious leaders to reduce opposition to conscription, particularly in the Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox community, the IDF will almost certainly continue facing significant opposition to enforcing conscription notices. On 17 July, the Shas Council of Torah Sages (associated with the Sephardic ultra-Orthodox community) issued a notice stating that Yeshiva students should not obey conscription notices under any circumstances. As such, further instances of protests, unrest and clashes are highly likely in the coming weeks, increasing bystander and operational disruption risks, particularly in central Israel.
- The EU has imposed sanctions on numerous Israeli individuals and entities associated with settlement expansion in the West Bank, driving sanctions-exposure risks for firms with operations in Israel. On 15 July, the EU announced that it would sanction several West Bank outposts and two Israeli settlers over allegations they had violently targeted Palestinian civilians. The sanctions also targeted the anti-aid Tsav 9 group and two individuals associated with the hard-right Lehava group. The announcement follows similar US sanctions, underscoring an increase in international restrictions on settlers and associated entities active in the West Bank. The sanctions will raise compliance concerns for firms with operations in Israel and will drive sanctions-exposure risks for financial firms, agricultural trading businesses and companies providing services to settlement communities in the West Bank.
FORECAST
The US is likely to widen the scope of sanctions against individuals and organisations promoting violence in the West Bank, elevating long-term legal and compliance risks for IDF soldiers and businesses. On 17 July, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced sanctions against a former IDF serviceperson, Sgt Elor Azaria, and his immediate family members, barring them from entry into the US. Azaria was tried and convicted in an Israeli court for shooting and killing a wounded and already incapacitated Palestinian man in 2016. The Palestinian man, Abdel Fattah al-Sharif, had stabbed an Israeli soldier. Azaria was handed an 18-month prison sentence. He served only half this sentence before being released. There is a realistic possibility that the US chose to sanction Azaria in order to deliver a clear signal to the Israeli government (and public), as Azaria is widely known due to the high-profile nature of his trial and sentencing. The case will possibly set a precedent for future sanctions and legal actions by the US (and other countries) against individuals already tried by the Israeli justice system, elevating the risks facing IDF and ex-IDF soldiers involved in the current conflict. Elevated sanction risks will drive compliance risks for businesses affiliated with or providing services for sanctioned persons or entities, particularly financial institutions.
The uptick in cross-border hostilities between Israel and LH is likely to continue in the coming days against the backdrop of LH leader Hassan Nasrallah’s Ashura speech. Nasrallah reiterated that the harming of civilians in Lebanon constituted a red line, warning of expanding LH attacks in response to such incidents during his speech commemorating the Shia holy day of Ashura on 17 July. The uptick in cross-border hostilities, as evidenced by the recent series of IDF strikes and targeted killings in Lebanon, as well as by LH’s retaliation (see MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS above), is likely to continue in the coming days. This will sustain elevated security risks in northern Israel. There is a realistic possibility that LH will expand its attack range beyond IDF assets located near the Israel-Lebanon border. However, we assess that such attacks are likely to be sporadic and to target IDF bases rather than Israeli population centres.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
- A successful terror attack by LH and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting LH and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- Israel re-launches widespread, high-intensity military operations in Gaza
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
- An IDF-targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)
- An LH strike causes a mass casualty event in Israel
- An IDF strike causes a mass casualty event in Lebanon
- An IDF strike kills civilians in Lebanon
Jul 18.
*Israel: Conscription of ultra-Orthodox men will highly likely trigger protests, clashes. On 16 July, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stated that they would begin to recruit ultra-Orthodox men starting on 21 July. The statement comes a week after Defence Minister Yoav Gallant announced that the military would recruit 3,000 ultra-Orthodox men by 2025 (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 11 July 2024). The move will highly likely trigger a major backlash from the ultra-Orthodox community as senior leaders have already called on seminary (Yeshiva) students to disobey any conscription notices. These factions are highly likely to mobilise protests in the coming days (excluding the Shabat from Friday evening to Saturday evening), mainly in Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv district), Beit Shemesh and Jerusalem (both Jerusalem district). Clashes with the police during these protests are highly likely, increasing bystander and collateral risks. Protesters will highly likely target key thoroughfares including Highways 1 and 4, increasing travel, supply chain and operational disruption risks in the coming days; instances of rioting remain unlikely.
Jul 15.
- Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s attempted assassination of Mohammed Deif and Rafaa Salameh, Hamas’ military leader in Gaza and the commander of the Khan Yunis Brigade respectively, highlights severe bystander security risks throughout Gaza. On 13 July, the IDF struck a house near al-Mawasi (Rafah governorate, Gaza) where it believed that Deif and Salameh resided at the time. Following the initial strike, the IDF followed with ‘belt of fire’ strikes – heavy and continuous strikes in the area of the house to prevent the arrival of medical and additional military forces to the area. The IDF then used large payload bunker-buster bombs, targeting the same house, to reach possible underground tunnels or compounds in its vicinity. This attack successfully killed Salameh, however, it is still unclear whether Deif survived. Deif has survived more than seven assassination attempts by the IDF and he is among the highest-value targets for the IDF in Gaza. The Palestinian Health Ministry claims the attack killed 90 people. The attack highlights the IDF’s willingness to accept the risk of a high civilian death toll when attempting to assassinate high-value targets. The IDF is unlikely to change this operational strategy, highlighting severe sustained bystander risks in Gaza, including for those near and possibly within humanitarian areas (please see the forecast section for further analysis).
- Israel: A car ramming in central Israel reflects elevated radicalisation and security risks, particularly near IDF positions and transport hubs. On 14 July, a Palestinian resident of East Jerusalem (Jerusalem governorate) injured four soldiers in a car-ramming attack in Nir Tzvi Junction (Central district) near Tzrifin military base (also Central district). Two of the soldiers suffered serious injuries while the other two only suffered moderate injuries; three Israeli border police on the scene shot and killed the perpetrator. The attack highlights the elevated risks of radicalisation and attacks across Israel, particularly after the assassination attempt of Mohammed Deif in Gaza. Security risks will remain elevated in and around transport hubs, IDF bases, IDF positions and IDF soldiers. Responses from the security forces will compound bystander risks due to the elevated risk of cross-fire.
- West Bank: On 13 July, Hamas called for the intensification of violence against Israeli settlers and the IDF in the West Bank following the attempted assassination of Mohammed Deif, elevating the risk of attacks. On 14 July, Israeli border police arrested a Palestinian woman in possession of a hidden knife at the entrance of the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron (Hebron governorate). Also on 14 July, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in the West Bank claimed it performed a small arms cross-border shooting in the direction of the Israeli village Gan Ner (Northern district), though this couldn’t be confirmed. Attack risks in the West Bank, particularly near IDF positions and Israeli settlements will remain elevated in the coming week. Attempts to attack Israeli settlers will likely further elevate ethno-religious tensions and risks of settler violence against Palestinian communities in proximity to the attacks. A successful attack in a place of religious significance for the Jewish community, such as the Cave of the Patriarchs (Hebron) and Joseph’s Tomb (Nablus governorate), will significantly escalate these risks.
- Israel-Lebanon: Cross-border hostilities remain slightly elevated; however, this is mostly limited to areas close to the Israel-Lebanon border. On 13 July, the Israeli air defences intercepted a Lebanese Hizballah (LH) rocket barrage targeting Kiryat Shamona (Northern district). Shrapnel from the interception injured four soldiers, seriously harming two. During the monitoring period, LH maintained an elevated frequency of cross-border strikes but limited these to areas near the Israel-Lebanon border. The IDF also sustained its increased frequency of targeted killings in southern Lebanon. This pattern of attack and response is likely to continue in the coming week, underscoring elevated security risks close to the Israel-Lebanon border. Risks of miscalculation and misfire will also remain elevated, sustaining risks of rapid and snowballing escalation leading to a major confrontation.
- Israel-Syria: The IDF struck several Syrian Army (SA) positions in response to drone launches from Syria targeting Eilat (Southern district). On 14 July, the IDF announced that it struck Syrian Army positions in the Damascus and Rif Dimashq governorates, including a command centre and air defence systems. According to the IDF, the strike was a retaliation for the launch of two Iranian-made Shahed drones from Syria’s territory which targeted the Israeli city of Eilat on 13 July. The IDF intercepted the drones north of Eilat, triggering sirens in the Shchoret Industrial Zone (Southern district) due to the risks of shrapnel following the interception. Shchoret Industrial Zone is approximately two miles (3.2km) north of Eilat, underlining the growing drone threat to the southern city and the growing capabilities of their operators. Israel continues to hold the Syrian government responsible for any attacks launched from its territory. In the coming weeks, Israel will likely sustain its increased frequency of strikes in Syria to further prevent weapon transfers as well as militant buildup and activity. These strikes will sustain elevated security risks in Syria, particularly around airports, military positions and border crossings.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- In Israel, anti-government protests continued at pace, with the publication of an IDF probe into security failings on 7 October likely sustaining protest attendance. On 12 July, family members of hostages concluded a four-day march from Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) to Jerusalem (Jerusalem district), moderately disrupting movement along Highway 1 and in the vicinity of the Chords Bridge. Protestors numbered in the hundreds. The demonstration coincided with weekly anti-government protests, with thousands subsequently gathering on Gaza Street to call for the government to secure hostage releases. In Tel Aviv, thousands of protesters gathered on Dizengoff Street and Kaplan Street, temporarily disrupting movement through the city centre. Smaller-scale demonstrations also occurred in Caesarea and Haifa (both Haifa district), Beersheba (Southern district) and Herzliya (Tel Aviv district). The demonstrators also blocked various junctions on Highways 1, 4, 57 and 89, highlighting persistent supply chain risks. On 11 July, the IDF released an initial inquiry into security failings in Kibbutz Beeri (Southern district) during the 7 October attacks. Over the coming weeks, the IDF will likely publish similar inquiries related to security failings in the Gaza envelope during the attacks, driving continued protest activity and sustaining risks of demonstration-related operational disruption.
- The Israeli government’s extension of mandatory military service moderately increases labour flexibility and anti-government protest risks. On 14 July, the cabinet voted to extend mandatory service for male IDF personnel from 32 to 36 months until 2029. Defence Minister Yoav Gallant proposed the legislation several months ago due to increasing pressures on the IDF’s capacity as a result of operations in Gaza, the West Bank and the Israel-Lebanon border. The Knesset will vote on the legislation in the coming days and will likely adopt the pending bill, moderately increasing labour flexibility concerns. However, on 14 July, Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara stated the bill would likely face numerous constitutional challenges if the government did not also begin drafting ultra-Orthodox men into the IDF before implementing the extension. Although Gallant announced on 10 July that the IDF would begin issuing conscription notices for ultra-Orthodox men, the IDF will likely face significant challenges in actioning conscription orders due to widespread, anti-conscription sentiment within the ultra-Orthodox community (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 11 July 2024). Continued disparities in military service requirements for ultra-Orthodox men will likely drive further legal challenges to conscription legislation, acting as flashpoints for pro- and anti-conscription protests in major urban centres (including Jerusalem and Tel Aviv) over the coming months.
- The US expanded sanctions targeting Israeli settlers in the West Bank, driving compliance concerns for Israeli and international firms. On 11 July, the US sanctioned three individuals and five entities linked to Israeli settlers accused of violence targeting Palestinians. The sanctions also target individuals associated with the previously sanctioned Tsav 9 group and the hard-right Lehava group (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 12 July 2024). This marks the fifth and largest batch of US sanctions targeting Israeli settlers. The sanctions will moderately increase compliance concerns for firms with operations in Israel, particularly financial firms and agricultural businesses (due to the sanctioning of multiple settlers’ farming businesses). Also on 11 July, the G7 (which includes the US) condemned the Israeli government’s decision to legalise five settlement outposts, highlighting increasing multilateral tensions. Over the coming weeks, G7 members will likely continue expanding sanctions on Israeli settlers, increasing sanctions exposure risks for firms with operations in Israel, particularly those servicing settlements in the West Bank.
- Continued divisions between Hamas and Fatah highlight long-term governance concerns in Gaza, undermining stabilisation efforts. On 13 July, the President of the Palestinian Authority (PA) Mahmoud Abbas, issued a press release stating that Hamas bears ‘responsibility’ for continued conflict in Gaza and resulting civilian casualties. The statement highlights persistent tensions between the Fatah-led PA and Hamas, undermining prospects for reconciliation. On 24 June, both parties indefinitely postponed Chinese-mediated reconciliation talks to create a unified governing authority for the Palestinian Territories. Continued divisions between Fatah and Hamas are highly likely to undermine efforts to advance post-war governance and administrative planning in Gaza, decreasing prospects for a long-term stabilisation in the region.
FORECAST
The IDF assassination attempt against Mohammad Deif will likely complicate ceasefire negotiations. While it is unclear if Deif is dead or alive, he is unlikely to be in a position to manage negotiations or decisions regarding hostage release or ceasefire. Before the assassination attempt, Deif was the senior-most Hamas member to be in contact with Hamas’ political bureau regarding the negotiations. Additionally, following the assassination attempt, Hamas’ leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, who remains in hiding, will likely further reduce communications in the coming days to ensure his own safety. These communication issues will likely complicate ceasefire negotiation efforts and further delay the finalisation of any agreements. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that Hamas will try adding pre-conditions to continue the negotiations following the strike. There is a realistic possibility that any break in negotiations prompted by the strike will compound domestic unrest and anti-government sentiment in Israel, increasing Hamas’ confidence in its negotiating position. This, in turn, would increase the risk of further delays in talks.
The IDF will likely intensify both covert and overt operations near hospitals in Gaza in the coming days, elevating security risks to NGO staff. The IDF will likely seek to confirm proof of life for Mohammed Deif and where he might be being treated. This will elevate security risks around hospitals in Gaza, particularly Gaza City (North Gaza governorate). Additionally, there is a realistic possibility that Hamas operatives will increase their efforts to relocate their command centres further into humanitarian zones where Israel is likely to strike less frequently. However, this will elevate risks of Israeli strikes or operations in these locations over the long term, increasing risks of civilian casualties, including to NGO staff.
Hamas’ calls for mobilisation in the West Bank following the assassination attempt are likely to elevate attack, security and bystander risks across Israel in the coming days. Following this call for action, militant cells in the West Bank will likely seek to increase attacks over the coming days. On 14 July, the Israeli police reported that they had been receiving more security alerts on planned attacks following the assassination attempt. The Israeli police and Israeli security forces are likely to sustain an elevated security posture throughout Israel, particularly in Jerusalem and the West Bank over the coming week. This posture will likely further elevate ethno-religious tensions as well as mobility disruption, particularly in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Security and bystander risks across Israel will remain elevated in the coming week, particularly near IDF positions or any uniformed Israelis. Attack risks, particularly car ramming, shooting and stabbing incidents, remain most elevated in Jerusalem’s Old City and the northern West Bank.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
- A successful terror attack by LH and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting LH and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- Israel re-launches widespread, high-intensity military operations in Gaza
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
- Operations in Rafah escalate significantly in their intensity and breadth
- An IDF targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)
(Source: Sibylline)
16 Jul 24. Israeli Airstrike Kills Sanctioned Syrian Businessman Near Lebanon-Syria Border. A Syrian businessman, Mohammad Baraa Qatarji, widely known as the “godfather of oil” for the Bashar al-Assad regime, was reportedly killed in an Israeli airstrike near the Lebanon-Syria border. The strike targeted Qatarji’s vehicle on the al-Saboura highway near Damascus, according to Syrian state-aligned newspaper al-Watan and various pro-government media sources.
Qatarji, who was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury in 2018 for facilitating shipments of fuel and weapons to the Syrian regime, was recognized for his pivotal role in the trade of oil and other commodities between Assad’s government and ISIS-controlled territories. His company, the Qatirji Group, was designated by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) for providing oil products to ISIS and supporting the Syrian regime’s war efforts.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) confirmed the incident, noting that Qatarji was killed instantly when an Israeli drone struck his SUV. An official from an Iran-backed group corroborated the report, adding that another unidentified individual also died in the attack.
Israel has not officially commented on the strike, which occurred amidst escalating tensions between Israel and Lebanon. The airstrike followed a drone attack on Israel’s southern resort city of Eilat, attributed to Syrian territory. The previous week, another Israeli drone strike on the same road killed a former bodyguard of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.
Qatarji’s death marks a significant blow to the Assad regime’s logistical network. He was instrumental in securing oil from Kurdish-controlled areas of Syria for the Assad regime and was involved in funding pro-Iran militias in Syria. These activities made him a prime target for Israeli operations aimed at disrupting the logistical and financial networks supporting Hezbollah and other Iran-aligned groups in the region. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
16 Jul 24. Hamas Military Commander Muhammad Deif Killed in Israeli Airstrike. The Israeli security establishment unanimously assesses that Hamas’s military commander Muhammad Deif was killed in an airstrike on Saturday in the Al-Mawasi area of the Gaza Strip. Channel 12 reported the conclusion, citing unnamed sources. The IDF and Shin Bet confirmed that Rafa’a Salameh, commander of Hamas’s Khan Younis Brigade, was also killed in the strike.
US Ambassador to Israel Jack Lew mentioned on Monday that there were indications Deif had been eliminated, although there was no official confirmation. The airstrike targeted a compound in Al-Mawasi, which the IDF identified as a designated humanitarian zone. This attack has resulted in significant casualties, with the Hamas-run health ministry in Gaza reporting 141 Palestinians killed and approximately 400 injured since the strikes began on Saturday. Videos and eyewitness accounts described the devastation, likening it to an earthquake.
Deif, a key figure in Hamas’s military operations and considered a mastermind behind the October 7 attacks, has been at the top of Israel’s most wanted list for decades. His death, if confirmed, would mark the highest-profile loss for Hamas since the conflict in Gaza escalated nine months ago. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu noted there was “no certainty” regarding Deif’s death, while Hamas has reportedly taken steps to obscure the results of the strike, including heavily guarding the hospital where the injured are being treated.
Shin Bet head Ronen Bar, visiting troops in Rafah, underscored the significance of these operations, linking them to the October 7 attack and reiterating the commitment to the residents of Gaza border communities. Meanwhile, Hamas officials condemned the strikes, describing them as a grave escalation and signaling Israel’s disinterest in a ceasefire. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
A CNIM Group Company
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-