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Military And Security Developments
Jul 04.
KEY POINTS
- A recent Israel Defense Force (IDF) airstrike killed a senior Lebanese Hizballah (LH) commander and engendered a spike in retaliatory LH missile fire, increasing the risk of snowballing escalation. This raises the likelihood of a significant Israeli aerial campaign or ground operation into southern Lebanon in the coming months.
- The continued expansion of Israeli settler communities threatens to compound escalating intercommunal tensions, elevating the likelihood of clashes between settlers and Palestinians in the West Bank. This will increase radicalisation risks among Israel’s Arab community, driving attack risks.
Gaza Strip: The IDF has expanded the width of the Netzarim Corridor (north-central Gaza), reflecting likely plans to maintain a long-term presence in the area. Over the past weeks, the IDF has expanded the width of the Netzarim Corridor from 1.2 miles to 2.4 miles (2km to 4km). Additionally, the IDF continues to expand and improve infrastructure in the corridor to provide better security and logistical support to soldiers operating in the area. These elements include defensive components protecting against sniper and mortar fire and anti-tank missiles and radar positions in outposts spread out along the corridor. These indicate long-term strategic planning to enable the IDF to entrench their presence in the corridor, likely in preparation for holding the area even after the end of the war.
- West Bank: On 2 July, an assailant shot an Israeli hiker near Nablus (Nablus governorate), prompting IDF operations in the region and likely encouraging retaliatory violence from Israeli settlers in the area; the event highlights elevated ethno-religious tensions. The suspected sniper fire took place around the Har Brakha area, near Nablus, moderately injuring the hiker. Later that day, likely in response to the shooting, Israeli settlers injured three Palestinians while throwing stones at Palestinian vehicles during a riot on Route 60 near Al-Lubban ash-Sharqiya (Nablus governorate), south of Nablus. The incidents reflect growing security risks in the West Bank, particularly the northern West Bank amid rising ethno-religious tensions. This incident demonstrates the gradually increasing risks of settlers’ violence following militant activity.
- Israel: A stabbing attack in Karmiel (Northern district) reflects elevated ethno-religious tensions and radicalisation risks within Israel’s Arab community. On 3 July, an Arab Israeli citizen from the town of Nahf stabbed two off-duty IDF soldiers in a mall in Karmiel (both Northern district) seriously injuring one and killing the other. One of the soldiers shot and killed the assailant. The incident reflects growing radicalisation risks among Israel’s Arab community, increasing risks of attacks within Israel, particularly near areas with large Arab populations, transportation hubs and major cities. Assailants are likely to primarily target soldiers and Israeli officials. However, attacks on Israeli civilians remain a realistic possibility. Radicalised individuals are likely to use cold weapons. That said, responses from the security forces will sustain elevated bystander security risks, due to the possibility of misfires and ricochets.
- Israel-Lebanon: A significant uptick in cross-border hostilities following an IDF strike which killed a senior Lebanese Hizballah (LH) commander underscores elevated miscalculation risks. On 3 July, an Israeli strike killed Muhammad Nimah Nasser near Tyre (South governorate). Nassar was the commander of LH’s Aziz Unit, responsible for Lebanon’s south-western region. On the same day, LH launched over 100 rockets targeting IDF bases in the Upper Galilee and the Golan Heights (Northern district); there were no casualties. LH’s retaliation continued on 4 July, with the launch of over 200 rockets and over 20 drones targeting IDF bases and outposts in northern Israel. During the barrages, shrapnel from an interception fell and caused damage in Acre (Northern district). However, no casualties have yet been reported. Although the barrage is likely designed to provide a short-term uptick in hostilities, the attacks reflect a significant escalation. This will highly likely elevate the risks of the IDF escalating its attacks in Lebanon in response, driving risks of snowballing hostilities and further escalation over the coming days.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Israel will likely connect a water desalination plant in Gaza to mains electricity, improving water security prospects in the short term. On 2 July, unnamed security officials stated that the Israeli government agreed to supply electricity to a water desalination plant in the al Mawasi humanitarian zone (Rafah governorate, Gaza). The desalination plant, which has operated at reduced capacity since early October due to an electricity blockade, will likely produce approximately 20,000 cubic metres of water per day for the humanitarian zone, moderating intensified water security concerns during the elevated summer temperatures. Despite this move, officials have also stated that the electricity supply will be immediately suspended if Hamas and allied groups siphon electricity from the plant. Hamas’ continued control of governance structures in central Gaza and potential access to the plant will sustain risks of service interruption over the coming weeks, driving humanitarian concerns, particularly as temperatures increase in July and August.
- Hamas reiterated its opposition to any ceasefire that does not result in a permanent cessation of hostilities in Gaza, undermining prospects for successful negotiations. On 3 July, Hamas proposed a ceasefire and hostage release deal to Israel following negotiations mediated by Egypt, Qatar and the US. Although the proposal has not been publicised, it almost certainly maintains Hamas’ position that Israel must commit to a permanent ceasefire in exchange for hostage releases. The Israeli cabinet will meet tonight (4 July) to review the proposal. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has reportedly already agreed to send a delegation for further rounds of negotiation. Despite continued diplomatic engagement, however, persistent tensions over whether a ceasefire agreement would establish a permanent or temporary ceasefire undercut prospects for an imminent de-escalation of hostilities in Gaza.
- Despite efforts to dismantle a settlement outpost in the West Bank, the Israeli government’s support for settlement development and expansion will likely drive ethno-religious and regional tensions. On 3 July, Israeli security personnel began dismantling the Tzur Harel settlement outpost (Ramallah and al Bireh governorate), which was built on privately owned Palestinian land. Settlers associated with the Oz Zion and Tzur Harel outposts subsequently attacked Israeli security personnel attempting to evacuate and dismantle the settlement, throwing incendiary devices and rocks. Despite these efforts, on 27 June, the Israeli government legalised five settlement outposts in the West Bank (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 1 July 2024). Similarly, on 4 July, the Israeli government published details for plans to declare approximately 3,000 acres of land in the Jordan Valley as Israeli territory. The government also announced plans to issue permits for constructing over 6,000 new settlement residences across the West Bank over the coming months. Taken together, these legislative moves will likely inspire further settlement expansion and expansion efforts, driving ethno-religious tensions and increasing the risk of clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinian civilians. As such, physical security and bystander risks will likely remain elevated in the vicinity of Israeli settlements, particularly in rural areas. Additionally, the Israeli government’s land appropriation will also likely exacerbate regional and bilateral tensions, including with key allies such as the US.
- The Israeli government authorised the partial transfer of tax revenue to the Palestinian Authority (PA), moderating short-term socio-economic concerns in the West Bank. On 3 July, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich authorised the partial transfer of funds collected on the PA’s behalf, which have been withheld since April (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 13 May 2024). The fiscal transfers constitute approximately 70% of the PA’s revenue. Transfer delays substantially increased concerns that the PA would be unable to pay public sector employees, increasing socio-economic health risks within the West Bank. The resumption of transfers will moderate these concerns. However, continued restrictions on West Bank Palestinians seeking employment in Israel will mitigate prospects for economic stabilisation in the short term.
FORECAST
The escalation in cross-border hostilities elevates risks of a high-casualty event snowballing into major escalation between Israel and LH. The target of the IDF airstrike, Muhammad Nimah Nasser, was among LH’s most senior commanders, similar in rank to LH’s Nasser Force commander, Taleb Abdullah, whom Israel killed on 11 June. Israel was likely prepared for a substantial retaliation from LH in response to the killing of Nasser and, as such, escalation will likely be relatively calculated and limited. However, it is still likely that Israel will conduct further strikes in Lebanon including against longer-range targets such as the Baalbek-Hermel governorate. These will elevate the risks of snowballing escalation and, subsequently, some form of significant operation, including a large aerial campaign or possibly ground operations into southern Lebanon. We continue to assess that a major escalation is an increasingly likely scenario in the coming months. Furthermore, a high casualty event in Israel or Lebanon will significantly increase the risk of such an escalation.
Triggers and indicators for escalation
- A successful terror attack by LH and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting LH and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
- Operations in Rafah escalate significantly in their intensity and breadth
- An IDF targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)
- LH strike causes mass casualty event in Israel
- IDF strike causes a mass casualty event in Lebanon
*Israel-Lebanon: LH rocket attack points to rising tensions, increased risk of incidental physical harm. Earlier on 4 July, Lebanese Hizballah (LH) fired 200 rockets at several Israeli military targets in north-western Israel in response to an Israeli airstrike that killed a senior LH commander, Muhammad Nimah Nasser, on 3 July. This latest exchange marks a notable spike in hostilities between Israel and LH, despite a slight lull in hostilities since Eid al-Adha (15-19 June). Israeli retaliatory strikes are highly likely in southern Lebanon over the coming days, as well as against strategic and defence installations in the Beqaa valley (Baalbek-Hermel governorate, Lebanon). Such strikes will pose incidental risks for bystanders and collateral risks for proximate assets. Further LH strikes will likely target IDF positions such as the Northern Command in Safed (Northern district, Israel) and Mount Meron Air Traffic Control base, possibly temporarily disrupting aerial detection capabilities and raising the risk of drone incursions deeper into northern Israel. We assess that such strikes will raise the risk of a high casualty event or miscalculation resulting in snowballing escalation in the coming weeks.
Jul 01.
KEY POINTS
- The legalisation of several settlements in the West Bank and sanctions against top Palestinian Authority (PA) officials will elevate the risk of international sanctions on Israeli entities in the West Bank and exposure risks for affiliated businesses.
- While a Lebanese Hizballah (LH) drone attack against a base in northern Israel that injured 19 soldiers underscores gradual limited escalation, it is unlikely to prompt significant imminent escalation.
- Israel-Gaza-West Bank: Earlier on 1 July, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) launched over 20 rockets from Gaza against Israeli population centres in the Gaza Envelope, highlighting the ongoing links between PIJ branches in both Gaza and the West Bank. While the barrage was unusually large, it reportedly resulted in no injuries. The launches originated from the Khan Yunis area in southern Gaza, indicating that militants have strengthened their positions in this vicinity following the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from the city in early April. The barrage followed an IDF airstrike on 30 June against the Nur Shams camp (Tulkarm governorate, West Bank), which killed a senior PIJ commander. This highlights ongoing communication and co-ordination between PIJ branches, as well as the growing influence of the militant group across both Gaza and the West Bank. Furthermore, limited IDF operations in Khan Yunis likely reflect both Israel’s belief that Israeli hostages are being held in the area as well as concerted efforts by the IDF to avoid harming them. However, the IDF will likely continue to respond to rocket launches from Gaza by targeting launch sites regardless of their position, sustaining severe security risks throughout the enclave.
- Israel-Gaza-Egypt: The IDF plans to build a buffer zone in the Philadelphi corridor along the Egypt-Gaza border. While the US supports the plan, Egypt has voiced its opposition, as any such buffer zone would reduce Cairo’s control of the border area. The plan likely reflects the IDF’s ambition to maintain a long-term security presence in the area after the operation in Rafah ends.
- Gaza Strip: The IDF is continuing clearing operations throughout Gaza; it is focusing on the Netzarim corridor (north-central Gaza), Rafah (southern Gaza) and Shujaiyya (northern Gaza). In the past week, the IDF uncovered weapons in Shujaiyya. The discovery underscores efforts by militants to rebuild their strength in northern Gaza. This suggests that any ceasefire agreement that includes a mass return to northern Gaza will likely draw the IDF back to this area, sustaining conflict and associated security risks in northern Gaza.
- Israel-Lebanon: On 30 June, an LH explosives-laden drone seriously injured one IDF soldier and lightly injured 17 others in a strike against an IDF base in the northern Golan Heights, reflecting the ongoing limited escalation of hostilities. The drone likely hit the Revaya Training Camp between Gonen and Merom Golan (both Northern district). Following the attack, the IDF responded with airstrikes and artillery fire against LH positions and infrastructure in several locations close to the Israel-Lebanon border in Nabatieh governorate. The targeting of a military position not far into Israeli territory reflects LH’s continued limited escalation against Israel. The incident suggests that LH is focusing on military bases rather than civilian targets. It also reflects a gradual escalation in the intensity of attacks (though this intensity is still lower than it was in early June). The recent drone incident is unlikely to lead to a significant escalation, though the overall risk of escalation remains heightened. It is likely that the IDF will escalate military operations in July, particularly through airstrikes, sustaining the risk of hostilities snowballing. This will increase the security risks across northern Israel and southern Lebanon.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Increasing violence around anti-conscription protests underscores the growing tensions between ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities and the Israeli state. On 30 June, thousands of ultra-Orthodox protesters participated in demonstrations near Malkhei Yisrael Street (Jerusalem district). They attacked the United Torah Judaism (UTJ) leader and Housing Minister Yitzhak Goldknopf’s car and lit fires, prompting clashes with the police. The security forces made several arrests and employed the use of a water cannon. Elevated tensions will likely trigger further protests in the coming days, which will likely block major intersections, including the Geha and Giv’at Shmu’el (Coca-Cola Junction) interchanges on Highway 4 near Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv district). Continued protest activity will sustain the risk of travel and supply chain disruption, while there is also a realistic possibility of further clashes with the police, elevating bystander risks. Despite increasing pressure from key demographics to secure broad conscription exemptions, UTJ is unlikely to leave the coalition government, moderating the threats to government stability (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 27 June 2024).
- Hostage release protests triggered violent clashes on 29 June, highlighting increasing bystander risks amid rising anti-government sentiment. Tens of thousands of demonstrators attended the weekly anti-government protests in Tel Aviv. They mainly gathered in the vicinity of the Ayalon Highway, Begin Street and Kaplan Street. However, hundreds of demonstrators split from authorised rallies to protest outside the Likud party offices and the Histadrut labour union offices, lighting fires and clashing with the police. As protest activity continues to proliferate beyond designated locations, the police are highly likely to employ heavy-handed dispersal techniques, elevating incidental risks to bystanders and proximate assets, particularly in central Tel Aviv. Thousands of demonstrators also gathered in Jerusalem, where the police employed forceful dispersal techniques and threatened attendees, highlighting persistent bystander risks associated with increasing protest activity. Demonstrations also occurred in Beersheba and Mitzpe Ramon (both Southern district), Caesarea and Haifa (both Haifa district) and Rehovot (Central district), though they did not trigger clashes with the police. There was also a substantial uptick in protest attendance at junctions in Israel’s Northern district, where hundreds of protesters blocked movement through the Amiad Junction on Highway 90 for several hours, highlighting the elevated risks of supply chain disruption as demonstrations continue to proliferate.
- Several ethno-religious minority groups in Israel have called for a week of anti-government demonstrations, highlighting increasing domestic tensions. On 30 June, community leaders associated with the Circassian and Druze minorities announced plans for a week of demonstrations to protest against alleged discriminatory government practices. Protesters are calling for the government to increase spending in Circassian and Druze population centres, to reform construction sector legislation and to form a long-term strategic plan to improve inter-communal integration. Over the coming week, demonstrations will likely remain concentrated in Israel’s Haifa and Northern districts, elevating risks of supply chain disruption, particularly through the Acre subdistrict (Northern). The protest campaign will culminate in a large demonstration in Jerusalem on 8 June, elevating risks of moderate travel disruption, particularly around the Knesset and the prime minister’s official residence. However, widespread disruption and unrest remain unlikely, moderating the risks of operational disruption.
- The Israeli government has legalised five settlement outposts in the West Bank, highlighting the growing likelihood of long-term settlement expansion driving unrest and sanctions-exposure risks. On 27 June, the Israeli cabinet approved measures legalising the outposts, transferring civil administration responsibilities from the Palestinian Authority (PA) to Israel for areas in the Judean desert. It also sanctioned several PA figures with measures that include the cancellation of various benefits and exit visas. Subsequently, on 30 July, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich renewed the sanctions waiver that allows Israeli financial institutions to process transfers linked to Palestinian entities. This likely indicates that financial transfers to the PA will resume in the coming days (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 13 June 2024). The legalisation and subsequent sanctions waiver renewal highlights Smotrich’s increasing leverage within the Israeli government to secure concessions on settlement expansion. In the long term, settlement establishment and expansion in the West Bank will likely continue to drive ethno-religious tensions, increasing the risk of clashes and unrest (see our Forecast below).
- The Arab League revoked its terrorist designation of LH, highlighting increasing regional tensions and moderate sanctions-exposure risks for regional firms. On 30 June, the Arab League announced the reversal of the 2016 designation. The reversal highlights substantially elevated tensions between Israel and Arab League member states, including Syria, which was re-admitted to the organisation in 2023 and maintains close ties to LH. There is also a realistic possibility that the move reflects the Arab League’s intention to re-establish formal communication channels with the group. However, as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) continues to designate LH as a terrorist organisation, a substantial rapprochement between LH and key regional organisations remains unlikely. In the long term, however, there is a realistic possibility of increasing contact between LH and regional intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), including with individual member states. This will drive sanctions-exposure risks, particularly as the US continues to expand sanctions on LH and allied groups.
- An attempted attack against the Israeli embassy in Belgrade (Serbia) highlights increasing bystander and collateral risks near Israeli-linked entities worldwide. On 28 June, a sole perpetrator attempted to attack the embassy using a crossbow, injuring one security officer. The Serbian authorities have reported that the perpetrator was radicalised through online forums associated with Islamist terror groups. Although unsuccessful, the incident highlights the elevated risk of attacks targeting Israeli-linked entities (particularly embassies) as the Israel-Hamas war continues to exacerbate ethno-religious tensions worldwide. Persistent calls from militant groups associated with Hamas to attack Israeli-linked assets and individuals will sustain risks of radicalised sole perpetrators and localised terror cells employing targeted violence, sustaining associated bystander and collateral risks.
FORECAST
The Israeli government’s legalisation of five settlements in the West Bank will elevate the likelihood of further expansion efforts and exacerbate the risk of clashes and sanctions exposure. The settlements, located in the north, south and central West Bank, were originally established as outposts, increasing the risk of expansionist Israeli settlers attempting to establish similar irregular outposts in the coming months. These efforts are highly likely to exacerbate ethno-religious tensions, increasing the risk of clashes with proximate Palestinian communities. Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has also indicated that the government has granted provisional approval for the construction of thousands of new residences within existing settlements. In the coming months, there is a realistic possibility that residence construction will trigger an uptick in clashes between Palestinians, Israeli settlers and the security forces, particularly in rural settlements. Throughout the West Bank, increasing ethno-religious tensions linked to settlement expansion will exacerbate the risk of sporadic protests, disrupting overland and supply chain continuity, particularly in areas near settlements. Additionally, in the coming weeks, the UN will likely adopt resolutions characterising the settlements as illegal under international law, increasing reputational concerns for firms with operations in Israel. Furthermore, in the coming months, the EU and the US will likely expand sanctions targeting expansionist settlers and associated entities, increasing sanctions-exposure risks for firms, particularly in the financial, agricultural and construction sectors.
Triggers and indicators for escalation
- A successful terror attack by LH and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting LH and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
- Operations in Rafah escalate significantly in their intensity and breadth
- An IDF targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)
Israel: Anti-conscription protests raise violence risks to bystanders, businesses. On 30 *June, thousands of ultra-Orthodox demonstrators in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) protested the recent ruling from the Supreme Court of Israel on conscripting yeshiva (seminary) students to the military. Protesters attacked Housing Minister Yitzhak Goldknopf’s car and lit fires in the vicinity of Malkhei Yisrael Street in the Geula neighbourhood of north-central Jerusalem, prompting clashes with police, several arrests and the use of a water cannon. Tensions between the ultra-Orthodox community and police will likely remain heightened, especially in the Guela and Mea Shearim neighbourhoods in Jerusalem. Protestors will likely block major highways including Highway 4 near Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv district), especially near the Geha Interchange and Giv’at Shmu’el Interchange, increasing the risk of travel and supply chain disruptions. There is a realistic possibility that protests will become increasingly violent, resulting in further clashes with the police, elevating physical risks to bystanders and raising risks of incidental damage to street-level business assets.
Jun 28.
*Israel-Palestinian Territories: Approved settlements, new sanctions will elevate security risks. On 27 June, Israel’s Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich announced that the security cabinet approved the legalization of five West Bank outposts, namely Adorayim, Evyatar, Givat Asaf, Heletz and Sde Efraim. The cabinet also approved sanctions against Palestinian Authority (PA) officials, including cancelling exit permits and restricting their movement. Furthermore, the cabinet approved increased enforcement against unpermitted Palestinian buildings in Area B of the West Bank. We assess that these decisions will highly likely augment the current ethno-religious tensions in the West Bank, along with elevated security and bystander risks around the authorised settlements. Furthermore, there is a possibility that the sanctions will prompt PA hardliners to call for a complete halt to security co-ordination with Israel, further elevating risks of a resurgence of radical armed elements inside Fatah and other PA-sponsored factions in the West Bank in the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)
02 Jul 24. An adviser to Iran’s supreme leader has warned that if Israel launches an all-out offensive against Hizbollah, it would risk triggering a regional war in which Tehran and the “axis of resistance” would support the Lebanese militant movement with “all means”. Kamal Kharrazi, foreign affairs adviser to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, told the Financial Times that the Islamic republic was “not interested” in a regional war and urged the US to put pressure on Israel to prevent further escalation. But asked if Iran would support Hizbollah — its most important and powerful proxy — militarily in the event of a full-blown conflict, Kharrazi said: “All Lebanese people, Arab countries and members of the axis of resistance will support Lebanon against Israel.” “There would be a chance of expansion of the war to the whole region, in which all countries including Iran would become engaged,” he said in an interview. “In that situation, we would have no choice, but to support Hizbollah by all means.” He added: “The expansion of war is not in the interest of anyone — not Iran or the US.” Tensions between Iran, the US and Israel have soared since Hamas’s October 7 attack and Israel’s retaliatory offensive in Gaza, with Iranian-backed militant groups launching attacks against the Jewish state and US soldiers in the region. Hizbollah has traded almost daily cross-border fire with Israel, Houthi rebels in Yemen have attacked ships in the Red Sea and fired drones and missiles at Israel, and Shia militants in Iraq and Syria have attacked US troops and fired projectiles at Israel. Iran and Israel also launched tit-for-tat missile attacks against each other in April — marking the first direct Iranian strike against Israel from its own soil. However, both sides sought to de-escalate the tension, with the respective strikes considered calibrated and causing limited damage. A drone launched from an unspecified site in Iran as the Islamic republic and Israel engaged in tit-for-tat attacks against each other in April © Tasnim News Agancy/ZUMA Press Wire/dpa But fears of an all-out Israel-Hizbollah war have intensified in recent weeks amid increasingly bellicose rhetoric from both camps, raising concerns in the west about how Iran would react. Iran’s mission to the UN on Friday warned of an “obliterating war” if Israel launched an offensive against Hizbollah, saying “all options’‘ were on the table. Another Iranian official told the FT that Iran would be unlikely to directly target Israel, instead mobilising the network of Iran-backed militant groups across the region that make up the axis of resistance. The concerns come as Iranians prepare for a new government following the death in May of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash. A presidential election run-off is scheduled for Friday after no candidate secured more than 50 per cent of the vote in the first round on June 28. Voters will choose between reformist Masoud Pezeshkian, who wants to re-engage with the west to secure relief from sanctions, including those imposed over Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, and Saeed Jalili, an ideological hardliner hostile to the US. Kharrazi said that while there would be “some differences” in approach depending on who won, the overall foreign policy strategy was determined by Khamenei and would remain the same. The election would create the chance for “new openings” between Iran and the west, he said. But to achieve that, western states would need to retreat “from the current policies and engage in negotiations with Iran based on equal footing and mutual respect”. (Source: FT.com)
28 Jun 24. Yemen’s Houthis Deploy Hypersonic Missile Against Israeli Ship. On June 26, 2024, Yemen’s Houthi forces released footage showcasing the deployment of a “homemade hypersonic missile,” identified as the “Hatem-2,” against an Israeli ship in the Arabian Sea. This operation, conducted in conjunction with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, targeted the MSC Manzanillo in Haifa port, as reported by Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree.
The footage released by the Yemeni Armed Forces depicts the missile launch and claims it accurately struck its target, the MSC Sarah V. This marks the first public revelation of the Hatem-2 missile, which boasts solid-fuel propulsion, an intelligent control system, and high maneuverability. The missile, developed by the Yemeni Military Manufacturing Authority, is said to have multiple generations with varying ranges.
This missile strike represents one of the longest-range attacks executed by the Houthis. Markus Schiller, a missile technology expert, noted the missile’s design similarities to Iranian models, specifically the Fattah family of missiles, which Iran claims can reach speeds up to Mach 13.
The attack on the MSC Sarah V, a Greek-managed vessel, reportedly linked to Israel, was confirmed by the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations, which noted an explosion near the ship’s hull. Despite the damage, the vessel continued its journey, indicating it remained functional.
While the Houthi rebels assert the Hatem-2 is locally manufactured, its advanced features and resemblance to Iranian designs raise questions about the extent of external support. The term “hypersonic” has been used to describe the missile, though experts like Schiller suggest it is more of a buzzword aimed at generating hype.(Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
01 Jul 24. Israeli Forces Advance in Gaza’s Shejaia and Rafah.
Israeli forces have advanced further into the Shejaia neighborhood in northern Gaza and deeper into Rafah in the south, killing at least six Palestinians and destroying several homes, according to local residents. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have reported striking dozens of Hamas sites in Shejaia with drones.
The current reinvasion of Shejaia by the IDF, which began four days ago, aims to eliminate remaining Hamas tunnels that were missed during earlier operations. Israeli tanks have been shelling houses In order to flush out targets. The IDF reports that troops have located weapons, raided booby-trapped Hamas combat complexes, and killed several gunmen.
In Rafah, the IDF’s 162nd Division has also been active, killing several Hamas operatives and demolishing tunnel shafts. This marks the fourth reinvasion of northern and central Gaza since mid-March, with previous operations targeting locations such as Shifa Hospital, Jabalia, and Nuseirat.
IDF sources highlighted a successful operation on Friday, where Division 98 penetrated a makeshift Hamas headquarters inside a school and a pharmacy in broad daylight within 40 minutes. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated the country’s commitment to eliminating Hamas, securing the return of hostages, and ensuring Gaza no longer poses a threat to Israel. Netanyahu stated, “We are committed to fighting until we achieve all of our objectives.”
Despite achieving operational control over Shejaia earlier this year, Hamas has been able to regroup following IDF withdrawals. The IDF acknowledges that fully eradicating Hamas’s extensive tunnel network could take years, and current efforts may not provide sufficient time.
In the Israeli-occupied West Bank, an Israeli strike near Tulkarm resulted in the death of one man and injuries to five others, according to the Palestinian health ministry. The deceased was identified as a member of Islamic Jihad.
Hamas responded with a video showing the production of anti-tank rocket warheads. The IDF announced finding military infrastructure inside a UN school in Shejaia, along with weapons and intelligence documents, during recent operations. Additionally, a “terrorist war room” was discovered in a clinic. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
04 Jul 24. Hezbollah Commander Killed in Israeli Airstrike. A senior Hezbollah commander, Mohammad Nimah Nasser, also known as Hajj Abu Naameh, was killed in an Israeli airstrike in southern Lebanon on Wednesday. In retaliation, Hezbollah launched over 100 rockets and missiles targeting Israeli military positions.
The Israeli military confirmed the strike, describing Nasser as the head of Hezbollah’s Aziz Unit, responsible for directing numerous attacks from southwestern Lebanon. Nasser’s death follows the killing of other high-ranking Hezbollah officials, including Taleb Sami Abdullah in June, and Wissam al-Tawil in January.
In response to the heightened tensions, diplomatic efforts have intensified. US and European mediators have been working to prevent a full-scale conflict. French President Emmanuel Macron and US Envoy Amos Hochstein have been in discussions to de-escalate the situation.
Hezbollah’s deputy leader, Naim Qassem, reiterated that the group would halt its attacks if a full ceasefire is achieved in Gaza. However, he warned that Hezbollah’s response to Israeli aggression would not be limited by any pre-set rules or engagement ceilings.
The ongoing violence has resulted in significant casualties and displacement on both sides. In Lebanon, over 400 people, predominantly Hezbollah fighters, have been killed, while 25 Israelis, mainly soldiers, have also lost their lives. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
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