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Military And Security Developments
Jun 21.
Gaza (Palestinian Territories): Resumption of pier operations is unlikely to improve access to aid. On 20 June, trucks carrying humanitarian aid resumed deliveries across the temporary pier in Gaza (Palestinian Territories) which reopened on 19 June after repairs and relocation due to high seas. While the flow of aid via the pier is likely to increase in the coming days, the UN World Food Programme (WFP) has paused aid distribution over concerns about the safety of its workers after two WFP warehouses were hit by rocket fire on 8 June. As a result, access to humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip will likely continue to be restricted due to the ongoing challenges facing distribution networks. There is a realistic possibility that uncollected aid will fall into militant hands, which in turn could possibly lead to internal violence over ownership, elevating physical risks for NGO workers in the vicinity of warehouses. We assess that the pier will likely cease operations ahead of September, increasing reliance on the Karem Shalom land crossing, which experiences frequent rocket attacks. This would further challenge aid distribution and raise humanitarian risks.
Jun 20.
• Gaza Strip: A Hamas drone incursion into the Gaza Envelope (Southern district) signals a possible slowdown of Rafah operations amid daily tactical pauses. On 19 June, a Hamas drone launched from Gaza triggered sirens in Holit, Nir Yitzhak and Sufa (Southern). The drone fell in the Gaza Envelope without causing injuries or casualties. Additionally, in recent days, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has primarily conducted targeted raids in Rafah. Outside Rafah, the IDF is focused primarily on central Gaza, where it continues clearing operations, particularly near the Netzarim Corridor. Hamas’ capacity to conduct a drone launch possibly indicates that the targeted raids are being carried out amid a slowdown of operations in the Rafah area as part of the IDF’s implementation of a daily tactical pause (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 17 June 2024). This will elevate the risk of increased militant activity, including further cross-border drone launches.
• Israel-Lebanon: Lebanese Hizballah (LH) resumed attacks against northern Israel before the end of Eid al-Adha (19 June), though its strike tempo remains lower than in previous weeks. On 18 June, LH slowly resumed cross-border rocket and drone launches into northern Israel. LH also published footage of Haifa and its port (Haifa district, Israel) from a drone that successfully entered Israeli air space before returning to Lebanon. The IDF claims that the drone was monitored during its trip and was not intercepted due to fear of shrapnel falling on civilians. However, the footage indicates the drone also flew over scarcely populated areas. In addition, the IDF has previously initiated sirens to warn civilians of the risk of falling shrapnel amid interception strikes. As such, and despite the IDF’s latest claim, the incident possibly reflects a detection and warning failure. In recent days, despite the lull in LH attacks, the IDF has continued to target LH positions and operatives throughout Lebanon. LH’s relatively slow resumption of hostilities signals it is possibly looking to reduce tensions (despite its hostile rhetoric) in the context of increasingly belligerent rhetoric from Israel.
• Red Sea: The sinking of a commercial vessel reflects a marginal increase in the threat posed by the Iranian-backed Houthis, despite an increase in US strikes on their positions in Yemen. On 18 June, UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that the Liberian-flagged and Greek-owned commercial vessel Tutor had sunk in the Red Sea. A Houthi uncrewed surface vessel (USV) hit the Tutor on 12 June, prompting the crew to abandon the ship. It marked the first time that the Houthis have used a USV against a commercial vessel and the second occasion in which a Houthi attack sank a vessel since November 2023. It is likely that the Houthis will slowly expand their use of USVs to attack vessels in the Red Sea in the coming weeks. This will elevate security risks and possible supply chain disruption; it will also likely increase the tempo of US operations against Houthi targets, sustaining the risk of gradual escalation.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• Increasing looting incidents in Gaza have substantially restricted aid delivery operations, highlighting the persistent risks of operational disruption. On 20 June, the IDF stated that over 1,000 truckloads of undistributed aid were located on the Gaza side of the Kerem Shalom border crossing. Unnamed UN officials quoted in local media have cited an uptick in looting and violence targeting aid convoys as a significant barrier to aid agencies’ ability to access, transport and distribute supplies to civilian populations. These statements highlight deteriorating governance conditions within Gaza, where food and water insecurity remains critical. The increasing likelihood of violence targeting aid distribution networks highlights the elevated physical security threats posed to NGO staff, as well as the continued disruption risks impacting aid operations throughout the enclave.
• ‘Week of Disruption’ protests have continued throughout Israel, increasing the risk of periodic travel and supply chain disruption. On 18 June, thousands of demonstrators calling for hostage releases and early elections gathered outside the Knesset building in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district); on 20 June, protesters temporarily blocked the Ayalon Highway in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). Although the demonstrations remained broadly peaceful, elevated anti-government sentiment will likely continue driving protest activity over the coming weeks. Continued demonstrations and temporary roadblocks will sustain risks of sporadic disruption to overland movement and supply chain continuity, particularly for businesses with operations in major population centres, including Beersheba (Southern), Haifa (Haifa district), Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.
• Increasing tensions within the Israeli coalition government will elevate the risk of policy stasis, though they are unlikely to increase the threats posed to government stability. On 19 June, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu withdrew the Chief Rabbinate Bill from the Knesset after several Likud Members of the Knesset (MK) announced that they would vote against it. Previously, officials from Shas, the second-largest party in the governing coalition, indicated they would withdraw from the coalition unless the government adopts the bill. The withdrawal comes amid substantially elevated coalition tensions centred on numerous policy disputes. Also on 19 June, several Likud MKs indicated they would oppose legislation reforming conscription exemptions for ultra-Orthodox men unless the legislation undergoes fundamental changes, increasing the likelihood that it will not pass the next Knesset plenum. Similarly, on 19 June, Israeli media reported that National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir reportedly warned Netanyahu that his Otzma Yehudit party would withhold their votes from government policy proposals if Ben Gvir is not afforded greater influence over the administration of the Israel-Hamas war. Taken together, these incidents underline the elevated risks of policy stasis and legislative deadlock. However, as Likud MKs are unlikely to defect to opposition parties and considering Likud remains the largest party in the Knesset, coalition reformation remains unlikely at present, moderating the threats posed to government stability.
• In a speech on 19 June, LH General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah outlined several threats to regional economic activity in the event of a significant escalation in clashes with the IDF. In the speech, Nasrallah indicated that if Israel engages in ‘total war’, LH will conduct air, sea and land attacks on locations throughout Israel, highlighting the long-term security threats posed to staff and assets nationwide. Nasrallah also stated that there would be ‘no rules’, indicating the threat posed specifically to civilian locations. He also threatened to expand hostilities to locations in Cyprus if the Cypriot government allows the IDF to conduct operations from Cypriot airports and military bases. Although such an escalation remains unlikely in the short term, Nasrallah’s speech highlights the significantly elevated regional tensions linked to persistent and long-term escalation risks. Also on 19 June US envoy Amos Hochstein visited Lebanon, where he met with government officials to discuss efforts to de-escalate clashes along the Israel-Lebanon border. Reports suggest that Hochstein indicated to Lebanese officials that the US would support a limited Israeli ground operation into southern Lebanon unless LH decreases the frequency and intensity of attacks against northern Israel in the coming month. While these specific claims cannot be verified at the time of writing, increasing concerns over an uncontrolled escalation along the Israel-Lebanon border will likely raise diplomatic pressure on both parties to decrease the intensity of cross-border clashes, driving regional tensions.
FORECAST
Despite increasingly hostile rhetoric between Israel and LH, we assess that a major imminent armed escalation remains unlikely. LH General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah’s threat to attack Cyprus and Mediterranean shipping in the event of a full-blown war with Israel are unlikely to materialise. Such action would risk a robust international diplomatic and military response against LH, likely impacting Lebanon more broadly and thereby threatening to exacerbate domestic criticism of LH. Instead, the decision to threaten international parties likely signals an attempt to instigate international diplomatic intervention to prevent or delay possible IDF action. Furthermore, despite the resumption of LH attacks against Israel, these remain lower in frequency compared to previous weeks, signalling a possible attempt to reduce tensions and escalation risks. While the IDF’s approval of a plan for operations in Lebanon signals an elevated risk of such a scenario, this plan still needs to be approved by the government. Furthermore, US envoy Amos Hochstein’s visit to Israel and Lebanon this week signals continued US diplomatic pressure on Israel to reduce tensions. As such, the risk of a major escalation remains a realistic possibility in the coming two months, particularly one that takes the form of a limited operation into southern Lebanon. However, an imminent major escalation in the coming weeks remains unlikely at present.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
• A successful terror attack by LH and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
• High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
• Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
• Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting LH and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
• An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
• US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
• Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
• Operations in Rafah escalate significantly in their intensity and breadth
• An IDF targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)
*Canada-Iran: Terrorist designation will sustain bilateral tensions, raise risk of Iranian cyber attacks. On 19 June, the Canadian federal government listed Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organisation under Canada’s Criminal Code. The federal government also voiced its intention to begin investigating and potentially removing former senior Iranian officials living in Canada. The designation is set to elevate already heightened bilateral tensions further, raising the possibility of targeted cyber attacks and/or election interference by Iran-linked actors in the medium-to-long term. Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mélanie Joly warned that Canadians in Iran will now face a heightened risk of arbitrary detention and cautioned all citizens not to travel to the country. Individuals in Canada connected to Iran will likely come under increased scrutiny, since the police will possibly now charge those supporting the IRGC financially or materially. In the near term, we assess that Canada will likely impose targeted sanctions against Iranian officials or assets, particularly following any action taken by the US against Iran.
19 Jun.
• Yemen-Red Sea: Moderate uptick in escalation will sustain security risks for vessels near Yemen. On 18 June, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that it destroyed eight Houthi uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) in Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen, and one unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) over the Gulf of Aden. On the same day, Houthi media reported that coalition airstrikes targeted a government complex in al-Jabin district in addition to the Raymah radio station (both Raymah governorate). The strikes likely came in response to the 12 June attack by an explosive-laden remote-controlled boat which sunk the Greek Coal carrier, Tutor, in the Red Sea. We assess that the latest round of hostilities signals a moderate uptick in escalation in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, sustaining security risks for vessels in the area. We also assess that despite the US-led coalition strikes, the frequency of Houthi maritime attacks is unlikely to abate in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)
21 Jun 24. Israeli Forces Neutralize Two Islamic Jihad Members in Qalqilya. On Friday afternoon, Israeli forces eliminated two wanted individuals in the West Bank city of Qalqilya. According to the Israeli state broadcaster KAN, the individuals were in a car when they were shot by Israeli police. Both were identified as members of the Islamic Jihad terror group, with one of them reportedly planning an imminent attack in the area.
Israeli police stated that officers from the elite Gideonim unit attempted to arrest the suspects. During the operation, the suspects allegedly fired at the officers, prompting the Israeli forces to return fire. Graphic footage from the scene showed Israeli troops extracting the body of one of the Palestinians from the vehicle, which had been shot and crashed. Palestinian state-run media outlet Wafa reported that Israeli special forces had also surrounded a building in the heart of Qalqilya. They claimed that Israeli forces had opened fire on the vehicle, resulting in the deaths of the two wanted men. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
20 Jun 24. Hezbollah Leader Threatens Cyprus Amid Rising Tensions with Israel. Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, threatened Cyprus on Wednesday, signaling the potential for an expanded conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean if war breaks out between Israel and Lebanon. Nasrallah warned that Cyprus, an EU member state and close ally of Israel, could be targeted if it allows Israeli forces to use its airports and bases.
In a televised address, Nasrallah stated, “Opening Cypriot airports and bases to the Israeli enemy to target Lebanon would mean that the Cypriot government is part of the war, and the resistance will deal with it as part of the war.” This marked the first time Hezbollah has explicitly threatened Cyprus, raising concerns about regional stability.
The Hezbollah leader boasted of the group’s capabilities, claiming that “nowhere in Israel would be safe” if a full-scale war erupted. He also highlighted Hezbollah’s ability to strike targets across Israel and the Mediterranean.
Gabriel Haritos, an expert on Cypriot-Israeli relations, stated, “Hezbollah is not far away at all. If they can target the outskirts of Tel Aviv, then they can hit Cyprus. It’s not something that can be excluded.” The potential involvement of Cyprus in the conflict has raised alarms, particularly given its strategic alliance with Israel and the United States.
Cyprus has emerged as a crucial ally for Israel, participating in joint military exercises and serving as a hub for U.S. special forces. The island nation has also positioned itself as a staging ground for humanitarian aid to Gaza. Despite Nasrallah’s threats, Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides maintained that Cyprus is not involved in the conflict, stating, “The Republic of Cyprus is not part of the problem. The Republic of Cyprus is part of the solution.”
Nasrallah’s threats are seen as a reaction to the deepening strategic cooperation between Israel and Cyprus, which includes military drills and energy cooperation. This partnership has been a point of frustration for Hezbollah, especially as Cyprus has aligned more closely with Western interests in recent years. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/
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