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Military And Security Developments
Jun 07.
- Israel: Likely exit of Gantz from ruling coalition will elevate domestic unrest, policy risks. Israeli minister without portfolio and key member of the war cabinet Benny Gantz is likely to exit the ruling coalition on 8 June, as an ultimatum issued by Gantz on 18 May to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will reach its end. The ultimatum requires Netanyahu to commit to six strategic goals relating to the conscription of ultra-Orthodox men, the Israel-Hamas war and post-war plans. While the coalition is likely to retain its majority in the Knesset, Gantz’s exit will increase the power of far-right groups within the alliance. While this is unlikely to affect Israel’s military efforts significantly, it will elevate the risk of policy stasis on non-war related issues. Additionally, the exit of Gantz, together with the failure to return hostages, will likely further decrease the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of large sections of the Israeli population. This will exacerbate ongoing mass protests (particularly in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem) and elevate mobility disruption and bystander risks.
Jun 06.
KEY POINTS
- Hamas rejected Israel’s ceasefire proposal, raising the likelihood of negotiations breaking down and undermining short-term de-escalation prospects.
- A Lebanese Hizballah (LH) drone strike killed one individual and injured 12 others in northern Israel, highlighting the continued uptick in hostilities and likely driving an increase in Israel Defense Forces (IDF) attacks against Lebanon.
- The upcoming Shavuot holiday (11-12 June) will elevate security risks across Israel and the Palestinian Territories, particularly in Jerusalem and the West Bank.
- Gaza Strip: The IDF has increased its operations in central Gaza, underscoring its limited capacity to prevent the return of militants to previously cleared areas. On 4 June, the IDF launched re-clearing operations focusing on eastern Bureij and eastern Deir al-Balah in central Gaza. Additionally, since 3 June, the IDF has increased its military operations in the Netzarim Corridor in northern-central Gaza.
- Gaza Strip: A militant infiltration attempt has underlined the mounting attack risks around border areas; it has also increased the likelihood of a spike in IDF operations around Khan Yunis. On 6 June, a militant squad killed an IDF soldier as they attempted to cross the border from southern Gaza into the Holit and Kerem Shalom area (Southern district, Israel). Attempted border crossings by militants into Israel, primarily from the Khan Yunis area, have escalated in recent weeks. These attempts are often intercepted at least 0.6 miles (1km) away from the border. However, the latest incident highlights the growing threat associated with these attempts, as well as the increased likelihood of the IDF resuming operations in Khan Yunis in the coming weeks. Additionally, the IDF is launching a new counter-terrorism unit to focus on the Gaza border and broader Gaza envelope so as to mitigate against the attack risks.
- Israel: On 5 June, the government increased the maximum quota of active reservists by 50,000 soldiers until the end of August. This will bring the maximum number of active reservists to 350,000 soldiers. The IDF clarified that the decision is not reflective of preparations for war in Lebanon, but rather due to the extension of the Rafah operation.
- West Bank: On 6 June, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) detonated in an open area in Tubas governorate (West Bank), causing no damage; regardless, the incident reflects rising terror threats. The car exploded approximately 0.6 miles (1km) from the IDF’s Tayasir checkpoint. According to the initial investigation, it carried a lower-than-average explosive charge. While the reason for the detonation in a secluded area remains unclear, the incident highlights the growing capabilities of militants in the West Bank, especially against the backdrop of increased financing by terror actors in the region.
- Israel-Lebanon: On 5 June, a Lebanese Hizballah (LH) explosive drone attack in Hurfeish (Northern district, Israel) injured 12 individuals and killed one reserve soldier; notably, no sirens were activated. According to reports, two drones exploded minutes apart at the town’s football field. The second drone struck emergency response teams rushing to the incident. The attack represents the continued uptick in cross-border hostilities between Israel and LH, as well as LH’s growing capacity to avoid IDF air defences. In retaliation, the IDF attacked an LH weapons depot in Wadi Jilou (South governorate, Lebanon) and two other locations in Aadchit El Chqif (Nabatieh governorate, Lebanon). Additionally, the IDF conducted a targeted strike earlier on 6 June, killing an LH operative in Aitaroun (Nabatieh). The IDF is likely to continue increasing its attacks against Lebanon in the coming days, though an imminent IDF ground operation remains unlikely.
- Israel-Syria-Iran: On 3 June, an alleged Israeli airstrike in Aleppo (Syria) killed an Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) advisor. According to reports, the strike also killed 16 other members of Iran-backed groups. On 5 June, the commander of the IRGC, Hossein Salami, vowed to avenge the strike. Despite the threat, any Iranian response is likely to come in the form of an indirect strike by Tehran’s proxies; northern Israel is the most exposed area to such an attack. In the past week, Israel slightly increased the frequency of its strikes in Syria, targeting LH and other pro-Iran targets. This is likely in response to the uptick in hostilities along the Israel-Lebanon border.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Hamas has reportedly rejected Israel’s ceasefire proposal, undermining prospects for further negotiations. On 6 June, local media outlets reported that Hamas officials have rejected an Israeli-proposed ceasefire
, claiming that the agreement would not lead to a permanent ceasefire. Although Israel has not received a formal response at the time of writing, Hamas will likely reject the proposal, significantly increasing the risk of the negotiations breaking down over the coming days. Consequently, IDF operations in Gaza, particularly in Rafah, will almost certainly continue, sustaining critical physical security and bystander risks therein. As Israel is highly unlikely to make further concessions regarding ceasefire terms, additional negotiations are unlikely to result in an agreement, undermining short-term de-escalation prospects.
- Elevated tensions between Egypt and Israel continue to obstruct aid deliveries via the Rafah border crossing, critically disrupting humanitarian operations in Gaza. On 3 June, Egypt announced that the crossing would remain closed until the IDF withdraws from the area and transfers its administration to the Gazan authorities. No aid has been delivered via the crossing since 7 May, when the IDF took control of the facility. Both Israel and Egypt have accused the other of being responsible for the obstruction, highlighting increasing bilateral tensions. Due to the closure and significant disruption at the Kerem Shalom crossing linked to militant activity in the area, the average number of aid deliveries into Gaza has decreased from 169 per day in April to 46 per day in the first week of June. As restrictions to cross-border movement continue to disrupt NGO operations, humanitarian conditions are highly likely to continue deteriorating.
- Increasingly frequent anti-government protests in Israel highlight elevated risks of sporadic travel disruption. On 4 June, hundreds of protesters calling for the government to secure a hostage release deal gathered in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) and temporarily blocked the Kfar HaYarok interchange. Simultaneous demonstrations blocked traffic along Highway 4 at the Raanana Junction (Central district) and along Highway 65 at the Karkur Junction (Haifa district). Subsequently, on 5 June, thousands of demonstrators also gathered in Tel Aviv for a ‘March of Rage’, lighting a bonfire on Begin Street and temporarily blocking Kaplan Street. The increasing frequency of anti-government protests calling for hostage releases highlights the elevated risks of sporadic travel and operational disruption, particularly in the Tel Aviv area.
- On 5 June, the Flag March in Jerusalem triggered localised clashes, highlighting elevated ethno-religious tensions. Tens of thousands of individuals participated in the Flag March in Jerusalem to mark Jerusalem Day. Participants defaced numerous buildings and assaulted several journalists and Palestinian civilians in the Old City and Muslim Quarter, highlighting substantial physical security risks associated with ethno-religious demonstrations in the Jerusalem area. Approximately 1,100 attendees also entered the al-Aqsa Mosque compound, exacerbating ethno-religious tensions. The Israeli security forces detained at least five individuals, one of whom was carrying a knife. The upcoming Shavuot holiday will likely further exacerbate ethno-religious tensions in the Jerusalem area, elevating the risks of attacks and domestic unrest (see: FORECAST).
FORECAST
The Shavuot holiday (11-12 June) will elevate security, attack and domestic unrest risks across Israel and the West Bank in the coming week. The religious holiday will elevate the risks of LH temporarily increasing the intensity and frequency of rocket and drone launches into northern Israel. Cross-border rocket launches towards central and southern Israel by Gazan militants during the holiday remain a realistic possibility, though such incidents will likely be sporadic rather than massed. Furthermore, radicalisation and attack risks in Jerusalem and the West Bank during the week of the holiday will be elevated. In the West Bank, militant attack risks are likely to be particularly elevated around roads, Israeli settlements, religious sites (including synagogues) and IDF checkpoints. The risk of attacks by radicalised individuals in Jerusalem will also be elevated during this period, particularly around East Jerusalem, the Old City and religious sites. Activity by extremist Jewish groups, such as Cozrim Lahar, is also likely to be elevated during this period, elevating ethno-religious tensions in Jerusalem and the West Bank. In Jerusalem, activity by such groups and radicalised Jewish persons near the al-Aqsa Compound and the Western Wall will elevate domestic unrest risks and clashes with the security forces, increasing bystander risks as a result.
Further reconciliation talks between Fatah and Hamas highlight the increasing challenges facing the IDF’s goals for dismantling Hamas’ governance capabilities in Gaza. In mid-June, China will host the third round of reconciliation talks between Fatah and Hamas since March. Discussions will centre on forming a political partnership and restructuring the Palestinian Authority (PA) to facilitate long-term reconstruction in Gaza. Despite continued international efforts to facilitate reconciliation, the talks are unlikely to result in a successful rapprochement. However, the increasing frequency of mediated discussions highlights Hamas’ continual role in the governance of Gaza and the substantial challenges facing the IDF’s stated war goal of dismantling Hamas’ civil administration. As Israel is yet to announce or implement substantive plans for replacing Hamas-linked entities in Gaza, long-term governance concerns will almost certainly remain elevated as ground operations continue. Additionally, a lack of non-Hamas governance structures will likely continue undermining the IDF’s military gains in northern and central Gaza by facilitating the re-infiltration of militants, as well as their continued control of aid distribution networks.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
- A successful terror attack by LH and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting LH and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
- Operations in Rafah escalate significantly in their intensity and breadth
- An IDF targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)
Jun 05.
*Lebanon Attack: Elevated Risks.
Earlier on 5 June, a Syrian gunman attempted to conduct a small-arms attack against the US embassy in the capital Beirut’s northern Awkar suburb. After a brief exchange of fire in the vicinity of the embassy, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF) shot the preparator, who was later apprehended. No fatalities or injuries among security personnel or diplomatic staff were reported in statements released by the embassy and LAF. At the time of writing, no group has claimed responsibility for the attack.
SIGNIFICANCE
- The US embassy is located in a heavily guarded part of Awkar. The LAF and ISF closely monitor the very few angles of approach. The incident therefore marks a notable security failure.
- This is the second attack to target the US embassy in one year; a very similar incident took place in September 2023 when a gunman fired a few shots towards the embassy’s entrance. The assailant on that occasion was also shot and arrested by the LAF.
- While no group has yet claimed responsibility, footage of the shooter was published by Arabic media outlets showing the words ‘Islamic Caliphate’ scrawled with a marker on their vest.
- The shooting has taken place amid a spike in anti-West sentiment in Lebanon against the backdrop of the ongoing Israel-Hamas war. It also comes amid a recent uptick of clashes between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) in southern Lebanon.
FORECAST
We assess there is a realistic possibility that the attacker is affiliated with the Islamic State (IS) group, underlining the rising terror threat facing Western facilities. This is not only due to the words inscribed on the shooter’s vest. IS has previously demonstrated a willingness to attack the LAF and ISF. The attack also comes a day after the LAF arrested a suspected IS member in Akkar governorate who was reportedly preparing to detonate an explosive device against an army patrol.
Wide stop-and-search operations in Beirut, Tripoli and the Beqaa Valley region are highly likely in the coming week, elevating security and bystander risks. In Beirut, the security forces will likely conduct widespread operations, including stop-and-search manoeuvres in Awkar and other northern suburbs. They will also likely operate along main highways, elevating mobility disruption risks in the city in the coming week. There is also a realistic possibility that the ISF will conduct stop-and-search operations and arbitrary arrests in Tripoli where various Salafist Sunni and jihadist groups (including IS affiliates) are still active, likely elevating security and bystander risks in the city in the coming week. Similar security operations are also likely in regions adjacent to the Syrian border, particularly in Beqaa governorate. Furthermore, the security forces will likely augment their posture at all border crossings with Syria, though cross-border movement is unlikely to be severely disrupted.
Given the significant anti-West sentiment present in the region, copycat attacks against US embassies and/or other Western diplomatic missions remain a realistic possibility. This will significantly elevate security risks around these facilities, particularly in Egypt, Iraq and Jordan. In Lebanon, the security posture around Western embassies and companies in Beirut will likely be greatly augmented in the coming month.
Jun 04.
*Iraq: Continued attacks on US businesses will lead to further operational disruption. On 3 June, groups of unidentified individuals attacked two American restaurants on Palestine Street in the capital Baghdad. Security forces dispersed the groups by firing warning shots. This latest incident comes days after militant attacks on US-owned businesses in Baghdad’s al-Jadriya neighbourhood and IED attacks on branches of Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) restaurants in the city. The attacks highlight rising levels of hostility towards Western brands because of their alleged support for Israel in its war with Hamas in Gaza. There is a realistic possibility that this trend will drive further attacks on Western brands and facilities in the coming weeks. An enhanced security posture will likely persist for the rest of the week, with an increased likelihood of arbitrary stop-and-search operations and detentions. The prospect of further unrest will elevate the risk of sporadic threats to bystanders, particularly those in proximity to street-level assets of US businesses and government facilities. Businesses will likely face operational risks including disruption of sales through decreased footfall.
*Egypt: Appointment of new government is unlikely to mitigate domestic unrest risks. On 3 June, President Abdelfattah El-Sisi ordered Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly to form a new government following the cabinet’s resignation. The move comes as an expected consequence of El-Sisi’s pledge of a new vision and wide economic reforms following the launch of his third term in early April. However, we assess that it is unlikely that any major policy shift will occur in H2 2024 or even in 2025 given that policymaking largely emanates from the presidency. Though the new government will likely include a new ministry focusing primarily on boosting foreign investments and the private sector, ambitious economic plans will likely be impeded by the persistent financial crisis, inflation, external debt and the government’s USD shortage. These factors will also continue to augment business operational disruption risks in key economic sectors while driving domestic unrest risks throughout H2 2024.
Jun 03.
KEY POINTS
- US President Joe Biden announced Israel’s ceasefire proposal, highlighting progress in negotiations (while also elevating internal tensions within Israel’s coalition, as well as domestic unrest risks).
- Lebanese Hizballah (LH) extended the range of its rocket attacks, targeting areas further south of Western Galilee, while also hitting Nahariya with a drone for the first time in the war, signalling an uptick in hostilities.
- Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued its operations in central Rafah (southern Gaza) and will likely increase its clearing operations amid ceasefire talks. The IDF continues to operate in several locations within Rafah. In the past few days, the Givati Brigade advanced into Yabna camp (central Rafah), uncovering weapons including anti-aircraft machine guns. Additionally, the IDF confirmed that both the Egoz and Maglan special forces units of the 89th brigade have conducted operations to capture Hamas compounds in Rafah in recent days. IDF operations in Rafah are likely to continue in the coming days, with clearing operations likely to increase in the background of ceasefire talks.
- West Bank: The IDF increased its operations along the border with Tulkarm governorate (West Bank) following a series of cross-border security incidents. On 31 May, Palestinian militants fired small arms across the border towards the Israeli town of Bat Hefer (Central district). The incident marked the third such attack that week, after shootings on 27 and 29 May. Additionally, on 31 May, the IDF arrested 17 Palestinian individuals trying to cross into Israel near Zeita (Tulkarm). This was the second border-crossing incident in the past week (30 Palestinians previously attempted to cross into the Bat Hefer area from Tulkarm). The increasing rate of cross-border incidents near Tulkarm reflects a growing risk of Palestinian militants applying pressure to Israeli border security in an effort to infiltrate Israel. This risk will remain elevated in the coming days despite the increased IDF security posture in the area.
- Israel-Lebanon: Lebanese Hizballah (LH) is likely to extend the range of rocket and drone strikes targeting Israeli population centres amid increased IDF-targeted strikes against Lebanon. Over the past five days, LH rockets and drones have increasingly triggered sirens in Acre and Nahariya (both Northern district). On 2 June, an LH explosives-laden drone hit an open area in Nahariya, causing a fire but no injuries. This is the first direct hit in the city since the start of the war, underscoring LH’s increasing capabilities; the drone also avoided several failed interception attempts. Additionally, on 31 May, an LH rocket barrage triggered sirens in Israeli population centres further south in West Galilee, such as Pekin, representing an extension in LH’s targeting. This rocket barrage came after an IDF targeted strike on LH operatives in Naqoura (South governorate) and Yaroun (Nabatieh governorate) earlier that day. On 1 June, LH downed an IDF Hermes-900 drone above Lebanon using a surface-to-air missile (SAM), prompting the IDF to retaliate on 2 June by striking targets in Baalbek-Hermel governorate. The increased hostilities are likely to continue in the coming days, elevating security risks in northern Israel and southern Lebanon. Such strikes will also compound the heightened risk of wildfires during the upcoming summer months (June-August).
- Red Sea: The UK and the US performed joint strikes on Iranian-backed Houthi militants in Yemen on 30 May. The strikes targeted drone-control facilities, missile launchers (including SAM systems) and command-and-control (C2) centres in al-Hudaydah and Ghulayfiqah (both al-Hudaydah governorate, Yemen). The strikes come after the downing of a US MQ-9 Reaper drone by the Houthis on 29 May. The strikes were likely carried out as a warning against further escalation, particularly escalation that involves the downing of Reaper drones, which cost approximately USD 30 m. The strikes are unlikely to impact the Houthis’ capabilities to hit targets in the Red Sea significantly (or to deter the group from doing so). There is a realistic possibility that the Houthis will prioritise targeting UK and US vessels in the coming weeks in retaliation for the strikes, elevating security risks in the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- On 31 May, US President Joe Biden announced details of an Israeli ceasefire proposal, highlighting potential progress in negotiations with Hamas. Israel has proposed a three-stage ceasefire and hostage-release agreement. Stage one would include a six-week ceasefire agreement in which the IDF would withdraw from major populated areas in Gaza and allow displaced civilians to return to their homes, including in northern Gaza, in exchange for the release of female, elderly and young hostages. Negotiations to establish a permanent ceasefire would continue throughout this time. Stage two would see the implementation of a ‘permanent end to hostilities’ and a complete IDF withdrawal from Gaza in exchange for the release of male hostages, including IDF personnel. Stage three would include the mobilisation of international reconstruction efforts and the release of the remaining hostages. On 3 June, Egyptian mediators stated that Hamas had responded positively to the proposal and will consider its terms in the coming days. While the proposal highlights the moderate progress of renewed ceasefire discussions, negotiations will remain extremely sensitive to political developments to do with Israel’s and Hamas’ requests regarding ceasefire clauses, such as the release of Palestinian prisoners and the timeline for the IDF’s withdrawal from Gaza.
- The ceasefire proposal has substantially increased tensions within Israel’s coalition government, highlighting elevated risks of coalition re-formation in the coming days. On 1 June, right-wing members of the coalition government, including National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, threatened to leave the coalition if Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu supports the agreement. However, the agreement will likely address opposition leader Benny Gantz’s core demands for remaining part of the coalition, moderating the risk of the National Unity party withdrawing on 8 June (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 20 May 2024). Additionally, Yair Lapid, the leader of the opposition Yesh Atid party, has stated that he will temporarily join the coalition to ensure the agreement’s implementation if Ben Gvir’s and Smotrich’s parties defect. Amid elevated inter-party tensions, there is a realistic possibility that the government coalition will reform over the coming days, increasing government stability risks (see FORECAST).
- Protest activity substantially increased in Israel on 1 June, underscoring the significant pressure on the government to secure hostage releases. On 1 June, over 120,000 protesters calling for hostage releases gathered in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), marking the largest demonstration since 7 October 2023. Protesters blocked several key thoroughfares and set fires at the Azrieli junction, highlighting the risk of sporadic travel disruption. Although the demonstrations remained broadly peaceful, the police employed water cannons and clashed with several demonstrators, highlighting the elevated bystander and collateral risks associated with increasing protest attendance. Smaller-scale demonstrations also broke out in Beersheba (Southern district), Caesaria, Haifa (both Haifa district) and Jerusalem (Jerusalem district), restricting movement through the cities. Increasing pressure on the Israeli government to secure hostage releases will likely sustain protest activity in the coming weeks, as well as travel and temporary operational disruption risks.
- An ongoing court case on the conscription of ultra-Orthodox men triggered small-scale protests on 2 June, highlighting the elevated threats to supply chain continuity. On 2 June, the High Court of Justice began a hearing on petitions that would immediately begin conscripting ultra-Orthodox men into the IDF. On 31 May, the Attorney General recused herself from the case, stating that she supports the petitions. This highlights the increasing factionalism within the government. During the hearing, anti-conscription activists gathered in the Bnei Brak area and temporarily blocked Highway 4, restricting overland movement. Also on 2 June, protesters blocked several streets surrounding the High Court of Justice. As the hearing continues, sporadic anti-conscription protests will likely continue to break out in urban centres with large ultra-Orthodox populations, such as Bnei Brak and Jerusalem, particularly along Highways 1 and 4. There is also a realistic possibility of counter-demonstrations, particularly in the Jerusalem area. Ongoing demonstrations will likely disrupt overland movement and supply chain continuity in central Israel, while potential clashes with the security forces and counter-demonstrators will moderately increase bystander and collateral risks.
- France has banned Israeli firms from attending an upcoming arms exhibit, highlighting increasing bilateral tensions and elevated reputational risks for Israeli firms. On 31 May, the French defence ministry announced that it would bar Israeli firms from participating in the Eurosatory arms exhibit that runs from 17 to 21 June in Paris (France) due to ongoing IDF operations in Rafah. The move highlights increasing bilateral tensions between Israel and France. The latter has increasingly called for a ceasefire in Gaza. Elevated tensions will likely sustain risks of moderate operational disruption for Israeli firms in France, particularly those in the defence and technology sphere. Additionally, the ban highlights elevated reputational concerns for events involving Israeli participants, including commercial and industrial exhibitions. (Source: Sibylline)
07 Jun 24. Russia, China wrangle with US over UN resolution on Gaza ceasefire plan. Russia and China, which hold veto powers in the U.N. Security Council, raised concerns on Thursday with a U.S. draft resolution that would back a proposal – outlined by President Joe Biden – for a ceasefire between Israel and Palestinian militants Hamas.
The council’s only Arab member, Algeria, also signaled it was not ready to back the text, diplomats said. A resolution needs at least nine votes in favor and no vetoes by the U.S., France, Britain, China or Russia to pass.
Biden laid out a three-phase ceasefire plan for the Gaza Strip a week ago that he described as an Israeli initiative.
The U.S. is seeking international support for the plan that Hamas is still studying. It circulated a one-page draft resolution to the 15-member U.N Security Council on Monday and a revised version on Wednesday, both seen by Reuters.
The current draft welcomes the ceasefire proposal, describes it as “acceptable” to Israel, “calls upon Hamas to also accept it, and urges both parties to fully implement its terms without delay and without condition.”
It lists some details of the proposal – with “a full and complete ceasefire” in the Gaza Strip as part of phase one and “upon agreement of the parties, a permanent end to hostilities” in phase two.
But some council members have raised questions about whether Israel has actually accepted the plan and want the council to stick to a demand made in March for an immediate ceasefire and unconditional release of all hostages, diplomats said.
Russia proposed amendments to the U.S. text, which were seen by Reuters, that included calling upon both Hamas and Israel to accept the proposal and demanding an immediate, unconditional and permanent ceasefire respected by all parties.
Moscow also wants the draft to stress that the phase one ceasefire will remain in place as long as negotiations continue on phase two, reflecting remarks made by Biden last week. (Source: Reuters)
05 Jun 24. Israeli leaders have threatened to take more “intense action” against Hizbollah after an escalation in cross-border fire, increasing tensions and the prospect of all-out war with the Lebanese militant group. In a visit to the largely evacuated northern Israeli city of Kiryat Shmona on Wednesday, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu referred to the fires that raged across much of the region over the past two days, mostly a result of Hizbollah rockets and drone attacks. “Yesterday the earth was on fire here . . . but it was also on fire in Lebanon. Whoever thinks that they can hurt us and that we will sit idly by is making a big mistake,” Netanyahu said. “We are prepared for very intense action in the north. One way or another, we will restore security to the north,” he added. The long-serving Israeli leader’s comments come after his military chief, Herzi Halevi, warned that a “point of decision” was fast approaching over whether an offensive would need to be launched in Lebanon. “Hizbollah has increased its attacks in recent days and we are prepared . . . to move to an offensive in the north,” Halevi told troops in northern Israel on Tuesday. The Iran-backed Hizbollah began launching strikes on northern Israel a day after the outbreak of war in Gaza last October. The movement’s leaders billed it as a display of support for Gaza and the Hamas militant group, and as a way to divert Israeli forces from the Palestinian enclave. Over the past eight months the Israeli military and Hizbollah fighters have traded near-daily fire, mostly limited to a 20km band of northern Israel and southern Lebanon. The hostilities have forced an estimated 60,000 Israeli and 100,000 Lebanese residents from their homes. More than 300 Hizbollah fighters and commanders have been killed as well as about 80 civilians, along with nearly two dozen Israeli soldiers and civilians. In recent weeks both Hizbollah and Israel have increased the frequency and range of their strikes. Local leaders and residents in northern Israel have grown exasperated by the inability of the Israeli government to restore security and return people to their homes, and have criticised the absence of a timeframe for a resolution to the crisis. Hizbollah officials have said that they do not seek to escalate tensions with Israel, but would not halt strikes as long as the conflict in Gaza continues. “Our decision is not to expand the battle, and we do not want a full-scale war, but if one is imposed on us, we are ready for it,” Naim Qassem, the movement’s second-in-command, told Al Jazeera on Tuesday. “We will not retreat from the field.” Pressure is growing on the Israeli government to act more forcefully against Hizbollah. Apocalyptic night-time images of forests going up in flames have only added to public distress over the loss of security in the north. In a visit to the region, Itamar Ben-Gvir, the far-right national security minister, demanded “war”. (Source: FT.com)
04 Jun 24. Iranian Revolutionary Guards Adviser Killed in Israeli Airstrike in Syria. An Iranian Revolutionary Guards adviser was killed in an Israeli airstrike near Aleppo, Syria, on Sunday, according to Iran’s semi-official news agency SNN. The adviser, identified as Saeid Abyar, was among several fatalities reported by Syrian state media following the attack.
The airstrike, which occurred around 12:20 a.m. local time (2120 GMT on Sunday), targeted sites near Aleppo and resulted in both fatalities and material damage. Syrian state media cited a military source but did not provide specific casualty figures.
This incident follows another Israeli air attack on May 29, which targeted Syria’s central region and the coastal city of Baniyas, killing a child and injuring ten civilians. For years, Israel has conducted airstrikes against Iran-linked targets in Syria, aiming to curb Tehran’s influence, which has grown since it began supporting President Bashar al-Assad in the civil war that started in 2011.
In April, Iran retaliated by launching missiles at Israel after an Israeli strike on the Iranian embassy compound in Damascus, which killed several Iranian officers, including a top general. This marked the first direct Iranian military assault on Israel, raising fears of a wider regional conflict.
Israel did not immediately acknowledge the recent strikes. Historically, Israel has seldom confirmed its operations in Syria, although it has targeted Iranian positions and equipment in the past. The ongoing Israeli actions in Syria coincide with its current military operations against Hamas in the Gaza Strip and separate strikes in Lebanon, where Hezbollah has launched cross-border attacks into Israel. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
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