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Military And Security Developments
May 24.
Earlier on 24 May, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued provisional measures calling for Israel to halt military operations in Rafah governorate (Gaza Strip, Palestinian Territories).
SIGNIFICANCE
- The ICJ issued the measures following an urgent appeal from South Africa as part of its case alleging that Israel’s operations in Gaza violate the 1948 Genocide convention (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 26 January 2024).
- The ICJ ruled that humanitarian conditions have significantly deteriorated in Gaza and that Israel’s efforts to augment aid deliveries into Gaza and evacuate the Rafah area have not sufficiently addressed the severe and increasing threats to civilian life.
FORECAST
We assess that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is unlikely to wind down its operations in Rafah substantially in the coming 48-72 hours, sustaining critical threats to life in southern Gaza; however, it will possibly attempt to boost aid deliveries to counteract the ruling’s claims. At the time of writing, the IDF remains engaged in intense clashes with militant groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in eastern Rafah. As such, an immediate retreat from the Rafah area remains highly unlikely. While there is a realistic possibility of a moderate de-escalation in the peripheral zones of IDF operations in Rafah, continued clashes with militants will sustain critical threats to life. In the coming days, Israel will likely continue efforts to increase aid deliveries into Gaza and to accelerate evacuation measures to demonstrate that it is trying to improve humanitarian conditions. However, ongoing military operations in southern Gaza will likely undermine NGO operations and civilian protection measures, sustaining security risks.
Continued operations in the Rafah area will increase the likelihood of the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopting resolutions restricting Israel’s operations in Gaza. Efforts to enforce the ICJ ruling are highly unlikely until the UNSC meets on 28 May. At this time, UNSC members such as Algeria and/or the UAE will likely propose a resolution condemning Israel and mandating an increase in aid, while also calling for a withdrawal from Rafah. Amid increasing domestic pressure on the Biden administration to moderate Israel’s operations in Gaza, there is a realistic possibility that the US will allow such resolutions to pass, increasing bilateral tensions. There is also a realistic possibility that UNSC members will propose a resolution imposing military and economic sanctions on Israel in the coming days. Although the US is highly likely to veto resolutions imposing broad military and economic sanctions on Israel, there is a realistic possibility that Washington DC would abstain from voting on a resolution applying specific military sanctions if the IDF significantly escalates its operations in Rafah in the coming days.
There is a realistic possibility that the IDF will increase the intensity of its operations in Rafah in the coming days. Such an escalation would likely seek to achieve key tactical goals in southern Gaza (such as an expansion of the IDF’s control of the Philadelphi corridor) before the UNSC possibly imposes sanctions to enforce a cessation of operations. Such an escalation would significantly increase physical security and bystander risks in southern Gaza and would likely drive a substantial uptick in pro-Palestine protest activity across the region, particularly in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. An escalation in Rafah would also substantially exacerbate bilateral tensions between Israel and the US, increasing the risk of further restrictions on Israel’s access to offensive military aid and high payload weapons for use in Gaza.
May 23.
KEY POINTS
- The continued Israel Defense Forces (IDF) build-up indicates a likely expansion of operations into central Rafah, elevating the risk of clashes along the border with Egypt and driving threats to bilateral relations.
- The Israeli defence minister’s decision to authorise the return of settlers to sites near Jenin threatens to exacerbate ethno-religious tensions, while also raising the risk of sanctions and possible clashes between settlers and the IDF.
- Gaza Strip: On 21 and 22 May, the IDF advanced through the Philadelphi corridor while continuing its clearing operations in eastern Rafah to the west of Salah al-Din Road. On 21 May, a fifth IDF brigade joined the operations in Rafah, signalling a likely imminent expansion of ground operations in the coming days, possibly towards central Rafah. In northern Gaza, the IDF continued clearing operations in Jabalia and conducted targeted airstrikes, triggering intense clashes with the remaining militant cells. On 22 May, the IDF announced that airstrikes in Gaza City and Nuseirat camp killed several elite Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters. However, on 21 May, Politico published a report citing an anonymous US intelligence official’s claim that the IDF has killed approximately 30-35% of Hamas’s fighters since October 2023 and that 65% of its tunnels remain intact. These findings indicate that despite continued clearing operations and strikes, Hamas retains combat-effective units in Gaza (according to the US official).
- Israel-Lebanon: Cross-border Lebanese Hizballah (LH) attacks persist, while the IDF continues to target senior members. On 20 May, the IDF conducted a drone strike in Tyre (South governorate) which killed an LH commander (Qassem Saqlawi). On 23 May, another IDF drone strike in Kafr Dajjal (Nabatieh governorate) killed Nasser Farran, a senior LH member and alleged weapons dealer. Although the frequency of LH’s cross-border rocket attacks between 20 and 22 May remained moderate, the drone strike in Karf Dajjal triggered an uptick in rocket attacks on 23 May. These attacks led to a series of fires in Israel’s Hula Valley (Northern district), located approximately 13 miles (30km) from the Israel-Lebanon border. While a significant escalation remains unlikely in the coming days, the latest developments highlight the persistent security risks that are accompanying the increasing range of cross-border clashes and rocket attacks.
- Syria: The IDF has likely conducted new airstrikes inside Syria, reflecting continued efforts to crack down on regional LH activity. On 20 May, Syrian media reported that unidentified military jets targeted an LH vehicle in al-Qusayr, while another airstrike targeted a site near Homs (both Homs governorate). The IDF likely conducted the strikes as part of its efforts to curtail LH and Iranian proxy activity in Syria. Further IDF strikes in Homs are likely in the coming weeks, especially as the governorate functions as an LH logistics hub due to its proximity to the Lebanese border.
- West Bank: IDF operations highlight persistent militant IED-manufacturing capabilities, sustaining threats to bystanders. On 21 May, the IDF launched a 40-hour counter-terrorism operation in Jenin (Jenin governorate), clashing with militants from Hamas, PIJ and al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades at approximately ten locations. Militants employed small arms and IEDs, while the IDF killed at least 12 individuals during the operations. Previously, on 20 May, the IDF announced that it had detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) discovered in Tubas (Tubas governorate). These incidents highlight militants’ persistent capacity to manufacture IEDs and a potential expansion of VBIED use, driving elevated physical security and bystander risks, particularly during clashes with the IDF in northern governorates.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Despite increasing deliveries into Gaza, aid distribution continues to stall, undermining efforts to address critical humanitarian conditions. On 21 May, the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) announced that it had suspended aid distribution efforts in Rafah due to operational disruption and insecurity. The suspension will almost certainly exacerbate food insecurity in southern Gaza, particularly as the IDF continues to expand ground operations in eastern Rafah. Additionally, on 21 May, the US announced that humanitarian organisations were unable to distribute the 560 tonnes of aid delivered via the US-constructed pier in central Gaza due to logistical complications including civilians rushing delivery trucks and looting supplies. Although the UN World Food Programme (WFP) announced that it had delivered limited food aid supplies on 23 May, ongoing clashes between the IDF and Gaza-based militants will almost certainly sustain critical threats to NGO staff and the risks of operational disruption. Consequently, food and energy insecurity will likely remain critical, sustaining humanitarian concerns, particularly in southern Gaza.
- Israel’s defence ministry released a video of IDF personnel being taken hostage on 7 October, triggering protests and increasing pressure to resume negotiations with Hamas. On 22 May, the ministry authorised the release of footage taken by Hamas which shows five female IDF personnel being taken hostage from the Nahal Oz observation base. Subsequently, thousands of protesters calling for hostage releases gathered in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), highlighting the increasing pressure on the government to secure hostage releases through negotiations. Subsequently, the War Cabinet ordered Israel’s ceasefire negotiation team to continue engaging in indirect talks with Hamas, reportedly with newly issued guidelines. Although the resumption of talks will moderately increase the likelihood of an agreement over the coming weeks, we assess that negotiations will remain extremely sensitive to sticking points and will likely stall.
- Efforts to expand and re-establish settlements in the West Bank continue to strain the security forces’ capacity and to exacerbate ethno-religious tensions. On 22 May, Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant authorised Israelis to return to the Ganim, Kadim and Sa-Nur settlements (all Jenin), which were evacuated in 2005. The authorisation is in line with the Knesset’s repeal of the settlement disengagement laws in 2023, which allows settlers to return to evacuated settlements and will likely facilitate efforts to establish outposts and informal expansions. Subsequently, the IDF central command issued an order barring settlers from entering the settlements due to significant security concerns and staff shortages within the IDF. This order highlights moderate issues with Israel’s security force capacity as the IDF continues to augment its posture in both Gaza and along the Israel-Lebanon border. Also on 22 May, the Knesset approved a preliminary reading of a bill defining two existing West Bank settlements as part of the Negev region (Southern district), increasing access to funding for settlement expansion. These developments underscore continued government efforts to support settlement expansion in the West Bank, despite significantly elevated ethno-religious tensions and the risk of clashes.
- The Israeli government’s continued crackdown on Al Jazeera highlights elevated risks of operational disruption for media organisations. On 21 May, Israeli officials seized a camera and broadcasting equipment from the Associated Press (AP), alleging that it was broadcasting footage of Gaza to the Al Jazeera network. On 5 May, the Knesset passed a law shuttering Al Jazeera’s operations in Israel and prohibiting media outlets from providing images to the network. Although the Israeli authorities subsequently returned the equipment to the AP, this incident highlights increasing efforts to regulate activity within the media sector, particularly for entities associated with Al Jazeera and other banned outlets, such as the Lebanon-based Al Mayadeen network. Over the coming months, media organisations and journalists will face elevated risks of asset seizures and temporary operational disruption (though harassment and detention remain unlikely, moderating threats to staff).
- Increasing recognition of a Palestinian state highlights elevated bilateral tensions, potentially undermining the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) access to funds collected by the Israeli government. On 22 May, Ireland, Norway and Spain announced that they would imminently recognise a Palestinian state. Subsequently, Israel recalled its ambassadors from these countries and summoned their respective ambassadors to Israel, highlighting significantly elevated bilateral tensions. In response to the recognition, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich announced on 22 May that he would not authorise the transfer of funds to the PA, including tax revenues that Israel collects on the PA’s behalf. While Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will likely overrule Smotrich in the long term, continued disruption to fund transfers will restrict the PA’s capacity to pay public sector employees, almost certainly sustaining elevated socio-economic concerns and the risk of domestic unrest in the West Bank (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 13 May 2024).
- On 24 May, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) will announce a decision on provisional measures in South Africa’s case against Israel. The ICJ will rule on South Africa’s application for the court to issue provisional measures that halt IDF operations in Gaza, with particular reference to Rafah. The request forms part of South Africa’s case which alleges that Israel’s operations in Gaza violate the 1948 Genocide convention (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 26 January 2024). As the ICJ has previously refused South Africa’s requests to issue provisional measures to this effect, we assess that it is unlikely to rule that Israel must withdraw from southern Gaza.
FORECAST
The IDF will highly likely continue its advance towards central Rafah in tandem with expanding its control of the middle section of the Philadelphi corridor in the coming days. New IDF brigades will likely join the operations in Rafah in the coming days to encircle and destroy militant cells in eastern neighbourhoods while also advancing towards the Yibna refugee camp close to the city centre. The IDF will almost certainly continue its targeted airstrikes against the city centre along with more intense bombing in the outskirts/suburbs before then launching clearing operations in these areas. It is also likely that the IDF will attempt to expand its control over the middle sections of the Philadelphi corridor directly adjacent to the Egyptian border, significantly elevating the risk of misfire hitting the fence and/or Egyptian security forces. Any such incidents would highly likely exacerbate ongoing political tensions with Cairo, which is a crucial mediator in the negotiations with Hamas.
Efforts to expand settlements in the West Bank will elevate risks of ethno-religious violence and sanctions exposure. Despite the IDF central command’s order barring legal access to evacuated settlements, there is a realistic possibility that settlers will attempt to access these sites in the coming days, increasing the risks of clashes with IDF personnel. Given the settlements’ proximity to Jenin, clashes between settlers and Palestinian civilians and militants are highly likely (as are increased bystander risks) in the event that the IDF authorises re-settlement in the coming months. Throughout the West Bank, efforts to expand and consolidate settlement holdings will almost certainly continue over the coming months, exacerbating already heightened ethno-religious tensions. Settler violence targeting Palestinian civilians will likely increase in tandem with settlement expansion, increasing risks of a tit-for-tat escalation of violence in the West Bank. Consequently, efforts to secure settlements and contain clashes will almost certainly increase strain on the IDFs’ capacity. Settlement expansion will also likely increase bilateral tensions with the US, elevating the risk of sanctions targeting settlers and increasing compliance concerns for firms engaged in the Israeli market.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
- A successful terror attack by LH and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting LH and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
- Operations in Rafah escalate significantly in their intensity and breadth
- An IDF targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)
May 20.
KEY POINTS
- The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is gradually expanding its Rafah operation, adding a fourth brigade to its forces in eastern Rafah; this indicates a slow build-up of the IDF’s operational capacity before it advances west towards the centre of the city.
- There is a realistic possibility that Benny Gantz’s National Unity party will withdraw from the government coalition in the coming weeks. In this scenario, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party and associated coalition would continue to hold a majority, reducing threats to government stability (though an increase in protests would be likely).
- Gaza Strip: On 17 and 18 May, the IDF recovered the bodies of four Israeli hostages in Gaza amid ongoing preparations for the expansion of its operations in Rafah. On 18 May, the IDF announced the deployment of the 12th Reservist Infantry Brigade into Gaza. The unit will join the 401, Commando and Givati brigades in operations in eastern Rafah, underlining IDF efforts to increase operational capacity before advancing towards central Rafah. On 19 May, IDF armoured units advanced deeper into Rafah’s Brazil, Jninah and Salam neighbourhoods, while Gaza-based militants continued to fire mortars at IDF positions in the Rafah border crossing area. In northern Gaza, the IDF continued to conduct clearing operations in the Jabalia area, triggering further intense clashes on 19 May.
- Israel-Lebanon: An uptick in the intensity of Lebanese Hizballah (LH) cross-border attacks underscores the sustained security risks in northern Israel, while the IDF continues to target senior militant commanders. On 17 May, an IDF drone strike in Majdal Anjar (Beqaa governorate) killed Sharhabil Sayed, a commander within the Lebanon-based al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyah group who allegedly managed Hamas’ activity in the area. On the same day, the IDF killed a senior drone operations commander in Najjarieh (South Lebanon governorate). Simultaneously, LH intensified its cross-border barrages into northern Israel. On 16 May, LH launched a drone attack against the Israeli town of Metula (Northern district), injuring three soldiers. It has not yet been confirmed if the drone was equipped with explosives or if it was capable of launching missiles, as LH claims (which would mark the first use of such weaponry in the war). On 17 May, LH fired around 75 rockets towards northern Israel, the majority of which were intercepted by IDF aerial defence systems. Barrages from southern Lebanon have subsequently continued, though their frequency has decreased.
- West Bank: On 19 May, a sole perpetrator tried to conduct a stabbing attack at an IDF checkpoint, highlighting the persistent attack risks. The Israeli border police shot and killed the perpetrator who attempted to stab one of the officers manning a checkpoint near Abu Dis (Jerusalem governorate) with a screwdriver. The incident highlights the persistent risk of low-capacity attacks in which assailants use commonplace objects against personnel manning checkpoints and border crossings. Further attacks are highly likely, sustaining elevated bystander risks and the likelihood of travel disruption in the Jerusalem area.
- West Bank: The IDF continues to augment its posture in the West Bank, highlighting the increasing risks of militant activity therein. On 18 May, the IDF killed a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) commander in an airstrike against Jenin. On 19 May, the IDF also announced that it had conducted a training exercise involving the Israeli Air Force (IAF) and Special Units to simulate offensive and defensive operations in response to a complex terror incident amid continued militant activity risks throughout the West Bank. The escalation in strike intensity and operational preparation underscores the IDF’s increasingly assertive posture, driving the likelihood of clashes with militants and increasing the risks to bystanders, particularly in northern governorates.
- Yemen: Houthi attacks persist, but at a lower frequency and scope compared to previous weeks. On 18 May, the Houthis fired an anti-ship ballistic missile at the Greek-owned M/T Wind oil tanker around ten nautical miles (18.5km) off Mokha (Taiz governorate, Yemen) in the Red Sea, causing a limited fire on board but no fatalities. The attack occurred one day after the UK Maritime Trade Operations reported another maritime attack in the Red Sea against a Chinese oil tanker called The Master north-west of Yemen’s al-Hudaydah port (al-Hudaydah governorate) by an unidentified projectile. Despite the relatively low frequency and scale of Houthi maritime attacks, significant security risks continue to face vessels traversing Yemeni waters.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Israeli opposition leader Benny Gantz has threatened to leave the coalition government in an ultimatum. On 18 May, Gantz stated that unless Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu releases a comprehensive plan for managing Israel’s numerous security concerns by 8 June, the National Unity party will leave the coalition. Gantz stated that the plan must detail a long-term governance strategy for Gaza, as well as measures to secure further hostage releases, to return evacuated residents to their homes in Israel’s Northern district and to resolve the legal ambiguity surrounding the conscription of ultra-Orthodox men into the IDF. It is unlikely that Netanyahu will be able to meet these demands, particularly given significant opposition to efforts to reform conscription legislation from key support demographics within the governing coalition. As such, there is a realistic possibility that the National Unity party will withdraw from the coalition over the coming weeks, undermining government stability.
- Protest activity continues to grow throughout Israel, highlighting increasing anti-government sentiment and risks to supply chain continuity. On 18 May, numerous protests calling for hostage releases and a general election took place in cities nationwide, including in Jerusalem, Rehovot (Central district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). In Tel Aviv, the police used water cannons to disperse protesters attempting to block the Azrieli Junction and the Ayalon Highway, highlighting elevated bystander risks. At least one protester also reported being assaulted by pro-government counter-demonstrators, highlighting the moderate physical security risks tied to growing levels of polarisation. On 20 May, demonstrators associated with the Brothers in Arms group attempted to block the Shaar HaGai interchange on Highway One, which links Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Demonstrators clashed with the police, which resulted in at least 13 arrests; the police alleged that demonstrators planned to set several vehicles on fire so as to close the highway temporarily. The incident highlights the persistent risks of travel and supply chain disruption for firms reliant on overland movement amid increasing anti-government sentiment and protest activity.
- Anti-aid protests and settler violence continue to disrupt humanitarian operations transiting the West Bank, increasing the likelihood of the US imposing sanctions against perpetrators. On 17 May, Israeli settlers conducted an arson attack on a truck transiting near the Kochav Hashahar settlement (Ramallah and al Bireh governorate) and attacked the vehicle’s driver. The IDF responded to the incident and clashed with the settlers, resulting in three injuries to IDF personnel. The settlers stated that they conducted the attack on the commercial vehicle as they believed it was part of an aid convoy travelling to Gaza. Subsequently, on 19 May, Israeli settlers targeted a truck transporting aid to Gaza near the Avatar settlement outpost (Nablus governorate). Participants looted the truck and destroyed the aid before conducting arson attacks on several vehicles in the nearby Palestinian village of Yatma (Nablus). Previously, on 16 May, unnamed officials stated to several media outlets that the US was preparing to sanction individuals associated with the targeting of aid convoys in the West Bank. As attacks against convoys continue to escalate, the US will likely accelerate its efforts to sanction settlers and members of the Tzav 9 group, increasing sanctions-exposure risks for firms with operations in Israel and the Palestinian Territories.
- On 20 May, the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) requested arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defence Minister Yoav Gallant and several Hamas officials. At the time of writing, the ICC has not commented on how it will proceed with the request. However, as Israel is not a party to the Rome Statute, the ICC would only be able to exercise its jurisdiction if the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopts a resolution confirming that genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes have occurred. The issuance of warrants outside the ICC’s jurisdiction is contentious among several UNSC permanent members, with China, Russia and the US generally vetoing resolutions that allow the court to exercise its powers in non-member states. The US is highly likely to veto any such resolution, preventing the issuance of warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant. Such a move would elevate the likelihood of protest activity within the US, as well as demonstrations targeting sites associated with the US government across the world, particularly in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. Protest activity targeting US embassies and entities linked to defence and arms manufacturers will elevate collateral risks for nearby assets, while the realistic possibility of clashes with the security forces will sustain threats to bystanders.
FORECAST
Israel is likely to continue advancing slowly westwards from eastern Rafah over the coming days. On 18 May, the IDF issued evacuation orders for Atatra and Karama in northern Gaza; this indicates that imminent clearing operations are likely in these areas in the coming days and also points to a reduced risk of a major Rafah offensive. US pressure to reduce civilian casualties will likely continue to affect the scope of the Rafah operation. The IDF is likely to conduct fewer airstrikes in Rafah to reduce civilian casualties and to mitigate against the risk of possible harm to Israeli hostages. Nevertheless, Israel is likely to continue gradually increasing its forces and the scope of its operations in Rafah in the coming days, sustaining high-security risks in the area.
There is a realistic possibility that Benny Gantz’s National Unity party will withdraw from the government coalition in the coming weeks, threatening to increase protest activity further. It is highly unlikely that Netanyahu will be able to form a plan with broad coalition support that meets Gantz’s requirements to remain within the coalition, increasing the likelihood of his departure. However, as Netanyahu’s Likud party and associated coalition continue to hold a majority in the Knesset, the National Unity party’s departure from the coalition is unlikely to increase the threats to government stability significantly or to trigger a general election. However, such a departure would likely undermine the perceived legitimacy of Netanyahu’s coalition, driving protest activity, particularly in the Jerusalem and Tel Aviv areas. Demonstrations would elevate risks of operational disruption, particularly for firms reliant on overland movement. An uptick in demonstrations targeting Netanyahu’s private residence in Caesarea (Haifa district) would also increase the risk of supply chain disruption for firms using the Haifa port (Haifa) and transporting goods between Tel Aviv and Haifa. However, there is a realistic possibility that even if Netanyahu fails to satisfy Gantz’s policy requests entirely that the National Unity party will remain within the coalition, moderating protest risks. Such a development would likely be contingent on Netanyahu addressing key demands, particularly the development of a long-term governance plan for Gaza with international support and ultra-Orthodox conscription.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
- A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
- Operations in Rafah escalate significantly in their intensity and breadth
- An IDF targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)
*Israel: Destructive operations by Iranian state-sponsored actors elevate operational, security risks. On 20 May, the technology company Check Point Research reported that the Iranian state-sponsored group ‘Void Manticore’ has been targeting Israeli organisations in destructive operations since October 2023. The group has claimed attacks on over 40 Israeli organisations under the guise of an online hacktivist group, ‘Karma’. ‘Void Manticore’ reportedly co-operates with another Iranian group, ‘Scarred Manticore’, to obtain initial access to targeted systems; Void Manticore uses a sophisticated version of the ‘BiBi’ wiper, which deletes key functions from a system’s disk to inhibit data restoration. The group’s tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) align with quick and destructive operations, pointing to its focus on high-impact attacks. Additionally, the use of online personas enables ‘Void Manticore’ to weaponise political tensions, highlighting the group’s use of influence operations alongside destructive attacks. As tensions between Israel and Iran persist, we assess these operations will sustain elevated security and operational risks to Israeli-based organisations.
May 17.
*Iraq: Security risks will remain elevated in Saladin, Diyala governorates following IS attack. On 16 May, local media reported that a major operation by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is currently underway in the border regions between Saladin and Diyala governorates. It follows an Islamic State (IS) attack on 13 May against the al-Aith checkpoint in the area. This incident was likely in response to intensive ISF operations targeting IS over the last three weeks. We assess that the ISF’s heightened security posture in Saladin and Diyala will likely persist until at least the end of May. This will likely increase the prevalence of checkpoints within main cities and along highways, elevating mobility disruption and the frequency of stop-and-search operations and arbitrary arrests. Security and bystander risks are also likely to increase in the next two weeks. Such operations will possibly extend to al-Anbar, Babylon, Kirkuk and Nineveh governorates, with search operations also possibly extending to areas bordering Syria; however, these are unlikely to impact cross-border movement through the al-Qa’im crossing (al-Anbar). (Source: Sibylline)
22 May 24. After Israel defense, US sees chance to entice Gulf allies on missile shield. The United States hopes defense meetings in Riyadh on Wednesday will help advance a long-standing goal of building a regional missile shield, bolstered by Israel’s successful defense against waves of incoming Iranian missiles and drones last month, U.S. officials say.
But it’s unclear whether Gulf allies have the same confidence the U.S. would rush to their defense, or if those allies are willing to take the steps needed to truly integrate their defenses in a region that has longed hedged its bets, according to former U.S. officials and experts.
The May 22 meeting in Riyadh of the U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) comes just over a month after the United States, Britain and other allies helped Israel knock down hundreds of missiles and drones, mostly launched from inside Iran.
The meeting also comes against the backdrop of missile and drone attacks by Yemen’s Houthis against commercial shipping in the Red Sea. Interceptions by U.S. and British warships have also demonstrated the power of Western air defenses.
A senior U.S. defense official, speaking to Reuters on condition of anonymity, said Gulf allies recognized that the successful defense of Israel was a result of years of defense integration among Israel’s partners.
“It is not lost on (U.S. Gulf allies) that the effectiveness of defending against that very substantial, high-end barrage by Iran was not just because of the individual capabilities of the countries – Israel, United States, the UK – but the fact that there is a substantial amount of integration among those countries,” said the official.
RELUCTANCE TO SHARE
The last GCC meeting was in February 2023. It is not clear if the upcoming meeting will produce any agreements.
U.S. officials have long acknowledged that many nations in the Middle East are reluctant to directly share sensitive defense information with each other, including radar data, given that it could reveal vulnerabilities.
Dana Stroul, who was the Pentagon’s top Middle East policy advisor until late last year, said that countries in the Gulf would need to make a political decision on whether to move forward with regional intelligence sharing and investments in secure communications.
But there are also “ongoing doubts about America’s willingness to support the defense of partners beyond Israel,” Stroul said.
“Washington should also make clear to these partners that they can expect the same level of defensive support if Iran attacks them directly,” said Stroul, who is now the director of research at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Iran’s attack by more than 300 missiles and drones caused only modest damage inside Israel. The April 14 strikes were Iran’s first-ever direct attack on Israel and came amid soaring regional tensions over the more than seven-month-old Israel-Hamas war in Gaza.
During an April visit to Amman, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken pointed to the U.S.-GCC working group meetings as he called for greater regional missile defense.
“This attack highlights the acute and growing threat from Iran, but also the imperative that we work together on integrated defense,” Blinken said.
The U.S. delegation will include officials from the military’s Joint Staff, the Missile Defense Agency, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Naval Force Central Command, Air Forces Central and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
All GCC members – which include Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates – will send delegations. Israel will not be sending a participant, a U.S. military official said, speaking on condition of anonymity.
Stroul noted that Gulf allies continue to purchase military systems from a mix of vendors from the U.S., Europe, China and other countries. This has put them at odds with the United States, which has warned that they cannot integrate Russian or Chinese systems with U.S. equipment for integrated air and missile defense (IAMD).
“Hence, if GCC militaries want to pursue IAMD, they must commit to ‘buying American’ or purchasing systems from other trusted sources,” Stroul said.
The senior U.S. defense official, who spoke to Reuters on condition of anonymity, said the US-GCC meetings would hopefully see countries “put aside some of their doubts a little, some of their mistrust, and see the value” of integrated missile defense. (Source: Reuters)
21 May 24. ICC prosecutor seeks arrest warrants for Israel’s Netanyahu and Hamas leaders.
• Summary
• Companies
• Israeli and Hamas leaders denounce his decision
• Biden calls move against Netanyahu ‘outrageous’
• ICC has no power to enforce arrest warrants
The International Criminal Court’s prosecutor said on Monday he had requested arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, his defence chief and three Hamas leaders over alleged war crimes.
ICC prosecutor Karim Khan said in a statement issued after more than seven months of war in Gaza that he had reasonable grounds to believe the five men “bear criminal responsibility” for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity.
He said he had applied for an arrest warrant for Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant as well as for Netanyahu. They have overseen Israel’s offensive against Hamas in Gaza since the Palestinian militant group’s deadly Oct. 7 raid on Israel.
Khan has also applied for arrest warrants for Hamas chief Yahya Sinwar; Mohammed Al-Masri, the commander-in-chief of the military wing of Hamas who is widely known as Deif; and Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ Political Bureau.
A panel of pre-trial judges will determine whether the evidence supports the arrest warrants. But the court has no means to enforce such warrants, and its investigation into the Gaza war has been opposed by the United States and Israel.
Israel and Palestinian leaders have dismissed allegations of war crimes, and representatives for both sides criticised Khan’s decision.
“I reject with disgust the comparison of the prosecutor in the Hague between democratic Israel and the mass murderers of Hamas,” Netanyahu said, calling the move a “complete distortion of reality.”
U.S. President Joe Biden called the legal step “outrageous”, while Secretary of State Antony Blinken said it could jeopardize negotiations on a hostage deal and ceasefire.
Senior Hamas official Sami Abu Zuhri said the prosecutor’s decision to request warrants for the three Hamas leaders “equates the victim with the executioner”. Hamas demanded the arrest warrant request for its leaders be canceled.
NETANYAHU BEARS ‘CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY’
The ICC issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin in March 2023 over alleged war crimes in the Ukraine war, but Monday’s step was the first time Khan has sought to intervene in the conflict in the Middle East.
“Israel, like all States, has a right to take action to defend its population,” Khan said. “That right, however, does not absolve Israel or any state of its obligation to comply with international humanitarian law.”
He said crimes against humanity allegedly carried out by Israel were part of “a widespread and systematic attack against the Palestinian civilian population pursuant to State policy.”
“These crimes, in our assessment, continue to this day,” he said.
Evidence his office collected showed Israel had systematically deprived civilians of “objects indispensable to human survival” including food, water, medicine and energy, he said. Netanyahu and Gallant bore responsibility, he said, for Israel wilfully causing great suffering and for killing as a war crime.
The Hamas leaders face allegations of bearing responsibility for crimes committed by Hamas including extermination and murder, the taking of hostages, torture, rape and other acts of sexual violence.
“Drawing parallels between the leaders of a democratic country determined to defend itself from despicable terror to leaders of a blood-thirsty terror organisation (Hamas) is a deep distortion of justice and blatant moral bankruptcy,” Israeli war cabinet minister Benny Gantz said.
WATERSHED EVENT
The ICC is the world’s first permanent international war crimes court. It 124 member states are obliged to immediately arrest the wanted person if they are on a member state’s territory.
A court of last resort, the ICC steps in only when a state is unwilling or genuinely unable to do so itself. Israel has said alleged war crimes in Gaza are being investigated domestically.
Israel and its main ally the United States are not members of the ICC, along with China and Russia.
Member states have in the past failed to hand over suspects who entered their territory, including Sudanese former President Omar Bashir, wanted since 2005 for war crimes and genocide.
But if warrants are issued against Israeli leaders, court members including nearly all European Union countries could be put in a diplomatically difficult position.
“This is a watershed event in the history of international justice,” said Reed Brody, a veteran war crimes prosecutor. “The ICC has never, in over 21 years of existence, indicted a western official. Indeed, no international tribunal since Nuremberg (against representatives of Nazi Germany) has done so.”
At least 35,000 Palestinians have been killed in the war in Gaza, according to the enclave’s health ministry, and aid agencies have also warned of widespread hunger and dire shortages of fuel and medical supplies.
Some 1,200 people were killed and more than 250 taken hostage in the Hamas-led Oct. 7 rampage, according to Israeli tallies. (Source: Reuters)
16 May 24. House passes bill to undo Biden’s partial Israel weapons hold.
The House on Thursday passed 224-187 a bill aimed at forcing President Joe Biden to reverse his recent hold on a shipment of some 3,500 air-to-ground munitions for Israel.
Biden withheld the munitions transfer, which includes 2,000- and 500-pound bombs, in April in protest of Israel’s decision to move ahead with its ongoing offensive in Rafah, which has already displaced an additional 450,000 Palestinians of the roughly 1.4 m people who have fled to the southern Gaza city since October.
The Israel Security Assistance Support Act, introduced by defense appropriations chairman Ken Calvert, R-Calif., would ban all presidential holds on arms transfers to Israel. It would withhold funds from the offices of the defense secretary, secretary of state, National Security Council and the White House’s Homeland Security Council until Biden certifies the U.S. has transferred the withheld weapons.
The bill also requires the prompt approval and delivery of all weapons transfers to Israel in fiscal 2024 and 2025, “including those for the Ministry of Public Security,” which is headed by far-right politician Itamar Ben-Gvir. Ben-Gvir on Tuesday called for Israeli settlements in Gaza and the expulsion of Palestinians from the strip.
“The Biden administration is defying the will of Congress and withholding weapons shipments to Israel,” House Speaker Mike Johnson, R-La., said at a Thursday press conference ahead of the vote. “We want the president to hear this loud and clear.”
“He said just not long ago that we had to have ‘ironclad’ support for Israel. Well, that’s what he previously proclaimed, but his actions are doing exactly the opposite,” he added. “This is a catastrophic decision with global implications. It is obviously being done as a political calculation.”
Despite a White House veto threat, some House Democrats joined forces with Republicans to vote in favor of the bill.
The White House’s veto threat argued the bill infringes on the president’s constitutional authorities.
“We strongly oppose attempts to constrain the president’s ability to deploy U.S. security assistance consistent with U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives,” the White House said.
“The bill is a misguided reaction to a deliberate distortion of the administration’s approach to Israel. The president has been clear: We will always ensure Israel has what it needs to defend itself. Our commitment to Israel is ironclad.”
The bill is also unlikely to pass the Senate, with Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., declining to hold a floor vote on it.
“The president has already said he’d veto it, so it’s not going anywhere,” Schumer told reporters Wednesday.
Biden told CNN last week “civilians have been killed in Gaza as a consequence of those bombs and other ways in which they go after population centers,” referring to the withheld shipment of roughly 3,500 heavy air-to-ground munitions. He added that he’s “not supplying the weapons that have been used historically to deal with Rafah” as Israel scaled up its offensive and seized the southern border crossing with Egypt.
Other arms transfers continue
Still, Biden continues to provide other offensive weapons as well as air defense systems to Israel. The Biden administration has transferred tens of thousands of munitions to Israel since Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack. Most of those were purchased through direct commercial sales, a portion of which are subsidized with U.S. cash assistance.
For instance, the State Department on Tuesday told Congress it wants to proceed with a roughly $1 bn foreign military sale to Israel consisting of around $700 m in tank ammunition, $500 m worth of tactical vehicles and $60 m of mortar rounds. The Wall Street Journal first reported on the pending sale.
While the delivery would not arrive in Israel for another two to three years, the sale could replenish many of the weapons now being used in Gaza.
Rep. Gregory Meeks of New York, the top Democrat on the Foreign Affairs Committee, has placed his own hold on a separate $18 bn sale of Boeing-made F-15 fighter jets to Israel over the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. If that sale is approved, Israel would not receive the aircraft until the end of the decade.
Meeks told Defense News he is still reviewing Biden’s proposed $1 bn sale for tank shells and armored vehicles, noting he has not yet decided to approve it.
“It’s best for me to go through it before making any comment or anything else,” said Meeks. “I had been concerned, as the president was, about 2,000-pound bombs.”
“That’s not contained therein as far as what they’re looking at. But I take all of these things very seriously.”
The Biden administration submitted a report to Congress last week on Israel’s compliance with international humanitarian law and U.S. human rights laws in its Gaza operations.
The report found Israel may have used U.S.-supplied weapons to violate international humanitarian law, but stopped short of a conclusive determination. A conclusive determination would have required the Biden administration to suspend offensive military aid to Israel, as required under U.S. human rights laws.
Sen. Chris Van Hollen, D-Md., who pushed the Biden administration to issue the report, said “it largely fails to meet the mark” of what was required in the White House’s February executive memorandum seeking assurances all U.S. military aid recipients — including Israel — would comply with human rights laws.
Van Hollen said in a statement the “report also indicates a disturbing pattern where the expertise and analyses of those working most closely on these issues at the State Department and at USAID have been swept aside to facilitate a predetermined policy outcome based on political convenience.”
Congress in April overwhelmingly passed an additional $14bn in Israel military aid. Israel also receives an annual $3.8bn in U.S. military aid via the regular appropriations process.
(Source: C4ISR & Networks)
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