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Military And Security Developments
May 06.
Rafah Update.
On 6 May, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) issued an immediate evacuation warning to the residents of the eastern neighbourhoods of Rafah, as Israeli officials announced they are preparing for a ‘limited scope operation’ in the area. The order instructs residents to evacuate to the Al-Mawasi expanded humanitarian zone.
SIGNIFICANCE
• The evacuation order comes against the backdrop of stalled ceasefire negotiations in relation to the Israel-Hamas war. On 5 May, Hamas fired a rocket barrage from Rafah killing three IDF soldiers in the Kerem Shalom area; this triggered an IDF airstrike in the Rafah area, killing three people.
• Rafah is a densely populated urban area hosting approximately 1.4 million people due to the displacement of the population in Gaza since the war started. The evacuation order will impact approximately 100,000 residents.
• A military operation there will significantly elevate risks to civilian life and NGOs operating in southern Gaza. The Kerem Shalom and Rafah border crossings are currently closed, disrupting aid deliveries and increasing humanitarian concerns.
• A potential operation in Rafah has been highly contested by international parties and received widespread media coverage. During negotiations, Israel has pushed for a temporary ceasefire while Hamas seeks a permanent ceasefire, leading to frequent stalling. Israeli leadership has consistently stated that the IDF will expand operations into Rafah at some point, even if negotiations succeed.
FORECAST
The evacuation warning indicates that the IDF will likely begin expanding ground operations into Rafah in the coming 24-48 hours. Given that a timeline for completing evacuations is not specified, there is a realistic possibility that ground operation(s) will begin over the coming hours. There is a realistic possibility that the threat of an imminent operation into Rafah is an attempt to pressure Hamas into accepting Israel’s ceasefire proposal. Rafah is the last stronghold of Hamas in Gaza and a military operation is likely to face a considerate armed resistance. Although unlikely, it is possible that increased military pressure and restricted aid deliveries will revitalise ceasefire negotiations over the coming days. If a ceasefire agreement is not reached, then there is a realistic possibility that the ‘limited scope operation’ will expand into the rest of Rafah in the coming weeks.
The operation will elevate diplomatic tensions with international partners, particularly the US, as well as fuelling protests internationally. The operation is likely to proceed despite international pressure and last-minute efforts to achieve a ceasefire. This will increase risks for international condemnation and domestic pressure on governments to sanction trade with Israel, particularly on arms supplies. These risks will be particularly elevated in European countries such as the Netherlands, Spain and Belgium. Furthermore, the operations will likely elevate unrest in major urban centres globally, particularly in Iraq, Jordan and the US. Domestic unrest will highly likely persist on university campuses in the US (see Sibylline Alert – 3 May 2024). There is also a realistic possibility that unrest risks will grow in Europe, especially France and the UK.
It is likely that attacks from Lebanese Hizballah and pro-Palestinian militants in Lebanon and Syria will increase over the coming days in response to an operation. Hizballah and allied militants in Lebanon and Syria will likely increase the frequency and intensity of rocket fire targeting IDF positions in northern Israel over the coming hours. This will further increase physical security risks in the Haifa and Northern districts of Israel. Areas in close proximity to IDF positions and bases, such as the Northern Command centre in Safed (Northern district), are most at risk.
There is also a realistic possibility that other pro-Palestine, Iran-linked militant groups in Iraq and Yemen will increase their efforts to conduct drone strikes within Israel. This will further elevate physical security risks in the Northern and Southern districts. Yemen-based Houthis may increase the frequency of missile and drone strikes towards Israel over the coming hours. This will moderately elevate security risks in Eilat (Southern district), though a successful strike remains unlikely. Should ground operations proceed into Rafah, the Houthis will likely escalate attacks on commercial shipping lanes in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea, sustaining significant threats to commercial maritime vessels and crews.
May 03.
- Latin America: Pro-Palestine protests, tensions with Israel will likely escalate in the coming days. In Mexico on 3 May, pro-Palestine protesters began to set up camp at the National Autonomous University in the capital Mexico City. This follows the Colombian government’s decision on 2 May to suspend diplomatic relations with Israel. Colombia’s exports to Israel in 2023 were worth USD 499m. The Israeli government has faced a wave of condemnation by Latin American governments. There is a realistic possibility that other governments in the region will follow suit and suspend trade ties with Israel if a military operation into Rafah (Palestinian Territories) proceeds in the coming days. This will increase regional tensions vis à vis Israel, raising operational and reputational risks for firms conducting business with Israeli or Israeli-linked entities. Additionally, the Rafah operation will raise domestic unrest risks in major urban centres and universities across the region in the coming days, particularly in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. Bystander risks and localised disruption will likely remain elevated in the short term.
- Turkey-Israel: Bilateral trade suspension will impact key industries, elevate tensions. On 2 May, Turkish Trade Minister Omer Bolat immediately suspended all imports and exports to and from Israel until sufficient and the Gaza Strip receives uninterrupted humanitarian aid. This comes after Turkey suspended exports of 54 categories of goods to Israel on 11 April, also citing humanitarian conditions in Gaza. The trade suspension will almost certainly increase already-heighted bilateral tensions over the coming months. Bilateral trade between Turkey and Israel was valued at approximately USD 6.8 billion in 2023, meaning that the move will almost certainly impact business operations in both states. This will reduce revenue and profitability, particularly in the energy, food, machinery and mineral sectors. Legislation enforcing the suspension will also increase compliance risks, particularly for firms operating in both Israel and Turkey, elevating risks of operational disruption. There is a realistic possibility that Turkish businesses will increase engagement in other regional markets in the coming months to compensate, namely Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) member states.
- Lebanon-EU: Financial package will improve border security, but structural reforms remain unlikely. On 2 May, the EU announced it would provide Lebanon with USD 1.07bn in financial aid over three years (until 2027). The package will include around USD 819m to support Lebanon in hosting Syrian refugee communities and other vulnerable groups. Around USD 214m is committed to support border security, essential government services and economic reforms. The EU’s latest decision comes after similar (albeit larger) financial packages were agreed with Egypt, Mauritania and Tunisia this year, indicating a policy trend to control migration to Europe through strengthening the economy and security of the south Mediterranean region. However, while the financial package will likely improve Lebanese border security capacities, weak governance, corruption and political deadlock will likely hinder potential structural reforms in the short term. Additionally, the deal will likely prompt heightened scrutiny by activist groups in the EU as Lebanon has previously used heavy-handed tactics to tackle illegal immigration.
May 02.
KEY POINTS
- Indications that Hamas will reject the ceasefire deal elevates the risk of an operation into Rafah in the coming week. This risk is compounded by reports of Israel constructing a safe zone, likely in preparation for Rafah evacuations.
- The recent Houthi drone attack against a commercial vessel in the Indian Ocean indicates a willingness by the group to expand operations, threatening ships attempting to bypass the Red Sea route. Further attempts are likely in the coming month, driving regional hostilities, with the US Navy likely to increase pre-emptive strikes in Yemen.
- Gaza Strip: On 30 April, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that civilian evacuations from Rafah had begun, highlighting increasing preparation for Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations therein. The IDF is preparing to announce a new ‘safer zone’ close to the Netzarim corridor (central Gaza) despite continued military operations in the area. The new zone is likely to extend south from Wadi Gaza to the outskirts of the Burij and Nuseirat refugee camps. As in the Al-Mawasi ‘safer zone’, the IDF will likely aim to continue operations in this area, sustaining security risks, though partially reducing their scale and pace, keeping these risks comparatively lower than the rest of Gaza. The new zone is likely another preparation for the evacuation of Rafah’s population ahead of a likely operation in the neighbourhood.
- Israel-Lebanon: Cross-border hostilities have continued at a reduced pace compared to the past two weeks. Nevertheless, security risks in northern Israel and southern Lebanon remain elevated and an uptick in hostilities throughout the weekend remains a realistic possibility.
- West Bank: Palestinian students disrupted and attacked EU diplomats during a visit in Birzeit on 30 April. The students protested the involvement and support of EU countries in arming Israel, attacking the diplomats’ vehicles. This incident highlights increased tensions and anti-western sentiment in the West Bank, particularly among younger demographics. These tensions are likely to escalate, driving security risks for foreigners visiting the West Bank.
- Israel: A Turkish tourist stabbed an Israeli police officer near Herod’s Gate in Jerusalem’s Old City on 30 April. Police fatally shot the perpetrator during the attack, and later identified him as a Turkish citizen who entered Israel from Jordan through the Allenby Bridge Crossing earlier that day. The incident highlights elevated bystander security risks in Jerusalem and the growing radicalisation across the region.
- Red Sea-Indian Ocean: On 26 April, Iran-backed Houthis conducted a drone attack on a commercial vessel in the Indian Ocean, the first successful attack in this region. The attack on MSC Orion, 170 nautical miles south-east of Socotra Island (Yemen), caused minor material damage. The strike reflects Houthi willingness to gradually increase the range of their attacks, elevating security risks for ships trying to bypass the Red Sea through an alternative route.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Hamas representatives have indicated they will likely reject the current ceasefire proposal, elevating risks of negotiations breaking down. On 2 May, Osama Hamdan, a Lebanon-based Hamas official, stated that Hamas’ current position on Israel’s ceasefire proposal is negative, indicating that it will likely reject the offer over Israel’s refusal to commit to a permanent ceasefire — a persistent sticking point in negotiations. Although Hamdan stated that negotiations will continue, the announcement underscores increasing tensions between negotiating parties despite moderate progress over the past several days. Although discussions will likely continue, stalling progress will increase the likelihood of the IDF expanding ground operations into Rafah in the short term.
- Protest activity continues in Israel and the West Bank, highlighting elevated threats to overland movement and supply chain continuity. On 1 May, Israeli settlers associated with the Tzav 9 group temporarily blocked the King Hussein Bridge Border Crossing in the West Bank and attacked Jordanian aid vehicles travelling to Gaza. Protesters lightly damaged the convoy and looted aid supplies, highlighting increasing risks to staff and vehicles amid increasingly targeted protest activity (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 25 April 2024). The IDF subsequently imposed a closed military zone in the area and dispersed the protesters, moderately elevating risks of supply chain disruption through the border crossing over the coming days. In Israel, a dozen protesters calling for hostage releases temporarily blocked the Ayalon Highway near Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) on 2 May, highlighting elevated risks of travel disruption amid increasing anti-government protest activity.
- Israeli authorities began evacuating a settlement outpost in the West Bank, highlighting increasing enforcement and policing efforts. On 1 May, Israeli Border Police evacuated and dismantled the Or Meir settlement outpost (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate), arresting six settlers at the site. This marks the third dismantling of the settlement outpost since December 2023. This incident indicates a moderate increase in Israeli authorities’ assertiveness in addressing settlement expansion. Dismantling of settlement outposts will likely continue to exacerbate ethno-religious tensions in the West Bank, driving risks of settler violence and attacks targeting Palestinian civilians.
- Turkey will join South Africa in its case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), elevating bilateral tensions. On 1 May, the Turkish Foreign Minister announced that Turkey would join the case to provide additional evidence in South Africa’s litigation, which alleges that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza. Although Turkey’s contributions to the case are unlikely to significantly influence the ICJ’s findings, the move underscores substantially elevated bilateral tensions, increasing risks of further bilateral trade restrictions.
- Increasing protest activity at university campuses in the US has triggered additional police force deployments, driving risks of clashes and threats to bystanders. On 29 April, violent clashes emerged between pro-Palestine and pro-Israel protesters at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) campus in Los Angeles (California). Police outfitted in tactical gear subsequently began clearing pro-Palestine encampments on the UCLA campus on 1 May, employing pepper spray and rubber bullets (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 2 May 2024). In New York City (New York), the New York Police Department (NYPD) arrested dozens of pro-Palestine demonstrators occupying a building on the Columbia University campus on 30 April. Increasing protest activity linked to the Israel-Hamas War will sustain risks of further clashes between demonstrators, counter-protesters and security forces on university campuses across the US, driving elevated bystander risks. In the event of the IDF expanding ground operations into Rafah, protest activity will likely intensify and there is also a realistic possibility of violence targeting individuals associated with Israel and Jewish students attempting to access campus facilities, elevating physical security risks.
FORECAST
There is a realistic possibility of military operations in Rafah commencing in the coming week, driven by indications that Hamas will imminently reject the current ceasefire offer. The Israeli War Cabinet will meet late on 2 May, likely finalising and approving the IDF’s plans, indicating that a Rafah operation is likely imminent. There is a realistic possibility that Israel will delay a Rafah operation until after the Holocaust Memorial Day (5 – 6 May), though an operation commencing as early as 5 May cannot be ruled out. Such an operation will significantly increase physical security and bystander risks in southern Gaza, including for NGO staff and assets. In Israel, the government’s failure to secure hostag releases will likely trigger an immediate uptick in protest activity, elevating risks of disruption to overland movement and business operations in major population centres including Haifa, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. There is also a realistic possibility of Lebanese Hizballah escalating the frequency and intensity of rocket attacks targeting IDF positions in the northern district, driving elevated collateral risks to assets in proximity to IDF bases and camps. Such an operation will also likely trigger significant international criticism of Israel, elevating reputational concerns for firms with links to Israel, particularly in the military, technology and defence sectors. An expansion of operations will also likely trigger an uptick in pro-Palestine protest activity, elevating risks of domestic unrest and clashes with security forces both regionally and internationally.
There is a realistic possibility that the Houthis will further increase their attacks in the Indian Ocean in the coming month, elevating security risks in alternative routes to the Red Sea. An increase in such attacks will further elevate regional tensions and security risks in the area. Additionally, in the coming week, the Houthis are likely to continue targeting commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea at an increased frequency compared to early April. This is likely to sustain heightened regional tensions and security risks in the area, with the US probably increasing its pre-emptive strikes in Yemen as a result.
Triggers and indicators for escalation
- A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas leadership in Lebanon
- The ongoing IDF ground operation expands into Rafah
May. 01.
*Palestinian Territories: Attack against EU diplomats underscores growing anti-West sentiment. On 30 April, Palestinian students disrupted a meeting of European diplomats in Birzeit (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate). They attacked their cars with stones and chased them from their premises. According to local reports, the main point of contention was the attendance of the German envoy. The students protested against Germany’s alleged support for Israel. The incident underscores growing anti-West sentiment among younger Palestinian generations in the West Bank. This sentiment is primarily directed at US and Western European nations. It highlights the elevated physical threats and/or harassment risks facing Western expats and travellers in Palestinian cities in the coming months, whether in an official or unofficial capacity. These risks are likely to increase in the event of a wider Israeli operation into Rafah. While the Palestinian Authority (PA) is likely to augment the security posture around Western embassies, consulates and NGOs in Ramallah, we assess that the risks facing travellers will remain elevated in the coming weeks.
*Yemen: Houthi drone attack in Indian Ocean will likely prompt increased level, scope of retaliation. On 30 April, the Yemen-based Houthis stated that they conducted a drone attack against the Portuguese-flagged MSC Orion container ship in the Indian Ocean, around 170 nautical miles to the south-east of Socotra Island (Yemen). The Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) confirmed that the vessel sustained only minor damage and that no injuries were reported. Although minor in scale, the attack marks the first confirmed Houthi strike in the Indian Ocean. It also points to the physical threats facing ships in the area (particularly around Socotra), including vessels bypassing the Red Sea via the Cape of Good Hope. The recent geographical expansion of Houthi maritime attacks along with continuous attacks in the Red Sea will likely prompt wider retaliatory strikes by the US-led coalition against Houthi targets and logistics in Yemen in the coming weeks. However, such strikes are unlikely to degrade Houthi military capabilities significantly in the short term and will likely drive Houthi retaliation, sustaining disruption risks to shipping lanes.
*Global: Iranian-backed actors will increase security risks facing non-profit sectors, among others. On 1 May, the cyber security company Mandiant warned that the Iranian state-sponsored group ‘APT42’ (also known as ‘Charming Kitten’) is targeting Western and Middle Eastern NGOs, media organisations, higher education institutions, legal services and activists amid a new social engineering campaign. The group impersonates journalists and human rights activists to trick victims into opening malicious invitations to legitimate events. It then bypasses multifactor authentication (MFA) protections by cloning MFA tokens and accessing victims’ cloud environments. Notably, the campaign leaves minimal forensics, allowing APT42 to avoid detection and to establish prolonged persistence. Although other Iranian-affiliated threat groups have shifted their operations to target Israeli organisations in disruptive and destructive campaigns, APT42 has kept its focus on traditional cyber espionage operations. The group continues to exfiltrate strategic information to bolster Tehran’s wider geopolitical interests, underscoring the sustained security, espionage and phishing risks facing the aforementioned sectors from Iranian state-sponsored actors.
Apr. 29.
KEY POINTS
- Lebanon-based Hamas militants launched over 20 rockets towards Israel on 29 April, highlighting increased risks of proliferating militant activity within southern Lebanon and a continued uptick in cross-border hostilities.
- Ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas have moderately progressed, increasing prospects of an agreement over the coming days. Although discussions remain fragile, continued diplomatic engagement will likely delay the expansion of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) ground operations into Rafah (Gaza) over the coming days.
- Gaza Strip: Overnight from 28-29 April, the IDF conducted targeted airstrikes on three locations in Rafah. The airstrikes follow IDF Chief of Staff, Major General Hertzl Halevi’s confirmation of plans for the expansion of ground operations into Rafah on 28 April. The strikes and deployment of additional reserve brigades to Gaza (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 25 April 2024) indicate increasing preparation for such operations. However, US pressure to moderate operations in Gaza and ongoing ceasefire negotiations will likely delay the operation. As such, the IDF will likely continue conducting airstrikes and targeted raids in Rafah rather than launching a large-scale military operation the coming days.
- Israel-Lebanon: An uptick in cross-border hostilities with Lebanese Hizballah and other, Lebanon-based militant groups will likely continue over the coming days, increasing security risks. On 29 April, Hamas militants launched approximately 20 rockets from Lebanon towards northern Israel. Hamas likely received permission from Lebanese Hizballah (LH) to launch the rockets, and there is a realistic possibility that LH also supplied the munitions. As such, the IDF is likely to retaliate by striking LH positions, with a realistic possibility of launching airstrikes deeper into Lebanese territory, including at the districts of Baalbek and Herme. On 26 April, the IDF drone attacked a vehicle between the Jezzine district (South governorate) and Western Beqaa district (Beqaa governorate), killing two senior members of the Lebanese Islamist movement al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya. The strike highlights the growing activity of diverse militant organisations in Lebanon, underscoring sustained physical security and bystander risks in northern Israel. Furthermore, on 27 April, LH launched dozens of Katyusha rockets towards the Mount Meron Air Traffic Control base (Northern district), highlighting continued efforts to disrupt Israel’s air defence and monitoring capabilities. Continued cross-border clashes will sustain risks of further, moderate escalation over the coming days, increasing physical security and bystander risks in northern Israel and southern Lebanon.
- West Bank: Israeli police arrested five Israeli settlers on 28 April, highlighting elevated ethno-religious tensions amid continued settler violence in the West Bank. Israeli authorities have accused the detainees of participating in attacks on Palestinian communities in the West Bank, following the death of an Israeli minor on 12-13 April (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 15 April 2024). The arrest indicates that the Israeli security forces are increasing efforts to address rising settler violence targeting Palestinian civilians. However, an significant escalation in security force intervention and enforcement efforts remains unlikely over the coming days, sustaining elevated ethno-religious tensions and security risks in the West Bank.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Moderate progress in Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations illustrates improving prospects of an informal agreement over the coming days, though discussions remain highly fragile. On 29 April, a Hamas delegation arrived in Cairo (Egypt) to review a ceasefire proposal from Israel. Unnamed officials cited in numerous media outlets indicate that there has been moderate progress and softening of negotiation positions from both parties, bolstering prospects for an informal agreement over the coming days. Such an agreement would likely entail the release of 20 to 35 Israeli hostages in exchange for a phased, multi-week ceasefire, with the realistic possibility of a temporary and limited IDF withdrawal from certain civilian population centres within Gaza to facilitate the return of displaced civilians.
- Aid deliveries into Gaza continue to face significant disruption, despite the ongoing construction of a temporary pier. On 25 April, US troops began constructing a temporary pier and causeway on the Gaza coastline to facilitate humanitarian aid deliveries through a maritime corridor with Cyprus (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 26 April 2024). Also on the same day, militants targeted the construction site with mortar fire, highlighting significant security risks for security personnel and NGO employees engaged in the use and development of port infrastructure. Continued clashes in central Gaza will sustain risks of operational disruption for NGOs, limiting aid distribution efforts within Gaza. On 27 April, authorities from Guinea-Bissau withdrew permission for the Freedom Flotilla NGO coalition to use two flag-bearing vessels for aid deliveries, citing regulatory compliance concerns. The incident highlights risks incurred by attempting to deliver aid without co-ordination with Israeli and/or US authorities and the resultant disruption to maritime aid deliveries.
- Over 10,000 protesters gathered in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) on 27 April, illustrating increasing anti-government protest activity. Protesters blocked the Ayalon highway, Begin Street and Kaplan Street, temporarily limiting movement through the city. Thousands of protesters also gathered in Jerusalem, with smaller-scale demonstrations in Caesaria, Hadera and Haifa (all Haifa district). Though protests continue to call for the government to prioritise securing hostage releases over defeating Hamas, there has also been a substantial uptick in calls for general elections, too. Protest activity will almost certainly persist as ceasefire negotiations continue, though demonstrations are unlikely to significantly threaten government stability in the short term.
- US Secretary of State Antony Blinken began a regional diplomatic tour on 29 April, underscoring continued efforts to moderate regional tensions. On 29 April, Blinken arrived in Saudi Arabia for discussions concerning the progress of Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations, the improvement of humanitarian conditions in Gaza and the revitalisation of normalisation talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia. The visit underscores increasing US pressure on Israel to accept a ceasefire agreement. On 30 April, Blinken will travel to Israel, likely to review the IDF’s plans to expand ground operations into Rafah and discuss humanitarian concerns with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Subsequently, Blinken will travel to Jordan on 1 May, elevating risks of protests in the capital Amman surrounding the visit.
- Pro-Palestine protests on university campuses continue at pace in the US, with isolated demonstrations worldwide highlighting increasing risks of protest activity. Demonstrations on university campuses have continued nationwide throughout the reporting period, highlighting increasing risks of protest activity and domestic unrest. Local police conducted dozens of arrests at several protests, most notably at Arizona State University (Arizona), Northeastern University (Massachusetts) and Washington University (Washington). Although protests remained broadly peaceful, on 28 April, clashes emerged between pro-Palestinian demonstrators and pro-Israel counter-protesters at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) campus in Los Angeles (California; see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 29 April 2024). As protest activity grows, there is a realistic possibility of clashes between demonstrators, counter-demonstrators and/or police forces, elevating bystander risks. During the reporting period, small-scale protests also occurred on university campuses in London (UK), Paris (France) and Sydney (Australia), highlighting the risks of demonstrations targeting high-profile universities worldwide, particularly those with academic and/or financial links to Israeli entities.
FORECAST
Advances in ceasefire negotiations and continued US pressure will likely delay a military operation in Rafah. As negotiations continue over the coming days, the IDF is likely to increase the frequency of targeted strikes in Rafah to sustain pressure on Hamas to accept a ceasefire proposal. Despite efforts to reduce threats to civilians through targeted strikes, bystander security risks are likely to increase due to Rafah’s condensed urban environment. Further civilian casualties resulting from IDF strikes in Rafah will likely further increase protest activity and domestic unrest in the region leading to localised travel disruption in big cities, particularly in Jordan. However, there is also a realistic possibility that the current round of ceasefire negotiations will break down over the coming days, increasing the likelihood of IDF operations commencing thereafter. Furthermore, a collapse of the ongoing negotiations will likely further increase anti-government protests and risks of domestic unrest within Israel. This could exacerbate bystander risks in key protest hotspots, mainly in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, due to likely clashes with police forces.
Triggers and indicators for escalation
- A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas leadership in Lebanon
- The ongoing IDF ground operation expands into Rafah (Source: Sibylline)
06 May 24. Israel military calls on Palestinian civilians to evacuate Rafah. Israel’s military said on Monday it had begun encouraging residents of Rafah to evacuate the southern Gazan city as part of a ‘limited scope’ operation, but did not immediately confirm media reports this was part of preparation for a ground assault.
Seven months into its offensive against Hamas, Israel has said Rafah harbours thousands of the Palestinian Islamist group’s fighters and that victory is impossible without taking the city.
But with more than a million displaced Palestinians sheltering there, the prospect of a high-casualty operation worries Western powers and neighbouring Egypt.
In what appeared to be the beginning of a civilian evacuation ahead of a ground assault, the Israeli military called on Palestinians in eastern parts of Rafah to move to a nearby “humanitarian area”.
In a statement on Monday, the military said posters, text messages, phone calls and media announcements would be used to “encourage … the gradual movement of civilians in the specified areas”.
Although people were being moved into humanitarian areas that were “safer”, the Israeli military cautioned that Hamas was known to fire from those areas.
It added that it was not setting a timeframe for the Rafah evacuation, however, but would make operational assessments.
It estimated it would need to move 100,000 people from Rafah in the ‘limited scope’ evacuation.
Earlier, an Israeli broadcaster, Army Radio, had said Israel’s armed forces had begun evacuating Palestinian civilians ahead of a threatened assault, although the military did not confirm that report.
Army Radio said evacuations were focused on a few peripheral districts of Rafah, from which evacuees would be directed to tent cities in nearby Khan Younis and Al Muwassi.
The war began after Hamas stunned Israel with a cross-border raid on Oct. 7 in which 1,200 people were killed and 252 hostages taken, according to Israeli tallies.
(Source: Reuters)
30 Apr 24. Residents of northern Israel brace for possible all-out war with Hezbollah.
Summary
- Fears Israel and Hezbollah moving closer to all-out war
- Haifa mayor asks people to stockpile food and medicine
- Some residents say only war can force back Hezbollah
- Israeli army says it has increased readiness for war
HAIFA, Israel April 30 (Reuters) – Eli Harel was an Israeli soldier in his early thirties when he was sent into Lebanon in 2006 to battle fighters from the Iranian-backed group Hezbollah in a bloody, largely inconclusive month-long war.
Now 50, Harel is ready to rejoin the army to fight the same group if shelling along Israel’s northern border turns into a full-blown war with Iran’s most powerful regional proxy. This time Israeli forces would face some of the most challenging fighting conditions imaginable, he said.
“There are booby traps everywhere,” he told Reuters. “People are popping up from tunnels. You have to be constantly on alert otherwise you will be dead.”
Harel lives in Haifa, Israel’s third biggest city, well within range of Hezbollah’s weapons. Haifa’s mayor recently urged residents to stockpile food and medicine because of the growing risk of all-out war.
Israel and Hezbollah have been engaged in escalating daily cross-border strikes over the past six months – in parallel with the war in Gaza – and their increasing range and sophistication has spurred fears of a wider regional conflict.
Hezbollah has amassed a formidable arsenal since 2006.
Like Hamas, the militant Palestinian group battling Israel in Gaza, Hezbollah has a network of tunnels to move fighters and weapons around. Its fighters have also been training for more than a decade with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces.
Hezbollah has so far restricted its attacks to a strip of northern Israel, seeking to draw Israeli forces away from Gaza. Israel has said it is ready to push Hezbollah back from the border, but it is unclear how.
EXILES IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY
Some 60,000 residents have had to leave their homes, in the first mass evacuation of northern Israel, and cannot safely return, prompting increased calls within Israel for firmer military action against Hezbollah. Across the border in Lebanon, some 90,000 people have also been displaced by Israeli strikes.
Eyal Hulata, a former Israeli national security adviser, said Israel should announce a date in the next few months when displaced Israeli civilians can return, effectively challenging Hezbollah to scale back its shelling or face all-out war.
“Israelis cannot be in exile in their own country. This cannot happen. It is the responsibility of the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) to defend civilians. It is what we failed to do on Oct. 7,” he said, referring to the Hamas attack on southern Israel that prompted the current war in Gaza
Hezbollah did not respond to a request for comment. The group’s leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah said in February that residents of northern Israel “will not return” to their homes.
The Israeli military said this month it had completed another step in preparing for possible war with Hezbollah that centred on logistics, including preparations for a “broad mobilisation” of reservists.
A conflict between Israel and Hezbollah would probably result in massive destruction in both countries. In the 2006 war, 1,200 people in Lebanon were killed and 158 in Israel.
Since October, more than 300 people have died in fighting in the border area, mainly Hezbollah fighters.
If war did break out, Israel would probably bomb targets in southern Lebanon before soldiers tried to push at least 10 kilometres across the border. Hezbollah would likely use its estimated arsenal of over 150,000 rockets to target Israeli cities. In 2006 the group fired about 4,000 missiles at Israel.
‘IMMENSE’ DAMAGE LIKELY
Assaf Orion, a retired Israeli brigadier general, told Reuters there was a growing likelihood of war erupting between Israel and Hezbollah, caused either by an unplanned escalation in clashes or by Israel losing patience with people being unable to return home.
Orion said the intensity of bombing in any war could be 10 times greater than in Gaza.
“The damage will be immense,” he said. “Gaza will look like a walk in the park compared to that level of fighting.”
Haifa, a port city built on the slope of a mountain from where it is possible to see the Lebanon border on a clear day, was targeted in 2006. Eight people were killed in the worst attack.
Nasrallah said in 2016 Hezbollah could hit ammonia storage tanks in Haifa, saying the result would be “like a nuclear bomb”.
The mood in Haifa is a mixture of anxiety and fatalism.
Hundreds of evacuated Israelis have moved to the city and many said another war may be the only way to return home.
Assaf Hessed, 35, who lived in a kibbutz two kilometres from the border, said the military has until September to force Hezbollah back or residents will move elsewhere.
“We have to make a decision soon about where we live, we cannot go on like this much longer,” he said. (Source: Reuters)
29 Apr 24. Temporary Pier in Gaza on Track to Be Operational in May. A temporary pier the Defense Department is constructing off the Gazan coast to deliver humanitarian aid is on track to establish initial operations soon, the Pentagon announced today.
“We’re scheduled on track to meet our goal of early May,” said Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh during a news media gathering.
DOD originally announced its mission to construct the Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore, or JLOTS, capability on March 8, with a goal of beginning initial delivery operations about 60 days from that date.
DOD officials announced on April 25 that construction of the pier had begun, and recent satellite imagery from Gaza’s coastline has shown construction activity in the area.
The components of the JLOTS include a floating pier, an approximately 1,800-foot-long causeway that will be attached to the shore, and a group of logistic support vessels and barges that will transport the aid from the pier to the causeway.
“Right now, you’re seeing construction of that floating, temporary pier, and then, you’ll start to see construction of the causeway,” Singh told reporters. “Eventually, that causeway will be … pushed into the coastline and secured by the .”
Since announcing the temporary pier would be used in the humanitarian aid mission, DOD officials have repeatedly emphasized that the IDF will provide force protection on and around the JLOTS. No U.S. boots will be on the ground as part of pier operations in Gaza.
“There is an integrated cell with the IDF and our U.S. military to ensure that there is deconfliction happening,” Singh said. “And that also helps with the coordination of JLOTS and the pier itself. So, we are confident that we are in a good place.”
When the pier is completed, officials anticipate it will initially facilitate the delivery of an estimated 90 daily truckloads of humanitarian aid into Gaza. Once fully operational, that number should jump to about 150 truckloads, or roughly 2,000,000 meals per day.
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