Sponsored by Bertin Exensor
www.exensor.com
——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Military And Security Developments
Apr. 26.
On 25 April, US troops began constructing a temporary pier and causeway on the Gaza coastline (Palestinian Territories) to facilitate humanitarian aid deliveries through a maritime corridor with Cyprus. Around 1,000 US troops are participating in the construction but no boots will be on the ground in Gaza, with the IDF providing logistical and security support for aid delivery operations. However, also on 25 April, an unidentified militant group targeted the causeway with mortar fire, highlighting significant security and bystander risks for aid workers and security personnel engaged in port infrastructure construction and use. While the operationalisation of the pier will likely mitigate critical humanitarian conditions in Gaza, the absence of local governing bodies, a persistent security vacuum and widespread looting will complicate aid distribution, driving food, water and energy insecurity.
Apr. 25.
KEY POINTS
- Recent brigade deployments underline the mounting risk of the expansion of Israeli military operations into Rafah (Rafah governorate) over the coming weeks, threatening to drive an escalation in Houthi maritime disruption in the Red Sea.
- Increasing levels of hostility between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) are likely to continue over the coming days, with a realistic possibility of LH attempting longer-range strikes against northern coastal cities in response to recent IDF strikes.
- Gaza Strip: IDF clearing operations continued in northern and central Gaza, while additional reserve brigade deployments highlight a likely southward expansion. From 22-24 April, the IDF continued clearing operations in northern Gaza, clashing with militants in Beit Hanoun and issuing evacuation orders for Beit Lahia (North Gaza governorate). These operations underscore continued efforts to re-secure previously cleared locations in northern Gaza, amid substantial militant re-infiltration. On 24 April, Israeli Army Radio announced that the IDF is preparing to deploy two additional reserve brigades into Gaza. The 679th Yiftah Armored Brigade and the 2nd Carmeli Infantry Brigade will operate under the command of the 99th Division and were previously stationed on the Israel-Lebanon border. This deployment underscores the IDF’s increasing preparation for expanding operations into Rafah over the coming weeks.
- Israel-Lebanon: The uptick in cross-border hostilities over the past 72 hours will likely persist in the coming days, sustaining elevated security risks. On 22 April, LH launched dozens of rockets towards the Safed area (Northern district), likely targeting the Northern Command base. Additionally, on 23 April, LH explosive-laden drones targeted the Shraga army base near Acre (Northern district). While all drones were intercepted off the coast and no damages were reported, the attack marks one of the deepest attempted LH strikes inside Israel since the Israel-Hamas War began. Shortly after, the IDF conducted airstrikes on two locations in Ayta ash Shab and Blida (both Nabatieh governorate) and claimed to have assassinated two senior LH operatives in Aadloun (South governorate). This trend escalated between 24-25 April with IDF air and artillery strikes increasing across southern Lebanon, including strikes targeting over 40 locations linked to LH in Ayta ash Shab (Nabatieh), as well as a drone strike in Douris (Baalbeek-Hermel governorate).
- West Bank: Elevated ethno-religious tensions continue to drive security incidents, elevating bystander risks. On 24 April, IDF personnel shot and killed a sole perpetrator attempting to conduct a stabbing attack at an intersection near the Kiryat Arba settlement (Hebron governorate). The incident highlights elevated attack risks in proximity to Israeli settlements, driving threats to bystanders and risks of travel disruption. On 24 April, Palestinian Authority (PA) police detained several Israeli civilians attempting to enter the Joseph’s Tomb compound in Nablus (Nablus governorate). Video footage of the detention shows PA personnel kicking the detainees. Allegations of mistreatment will likely exacerbate already-heightened ethno-religious tensions between Israeli settlers and Palestinians in the West Bank, increasing risks of clashes and settler attacks over the coming days, particularly in the Nablus governorate.
- Recent attacks on US bases in Syria and Iraq underscore sustained security risks to US military installations despite a trend of de-escalation since early February. On 22 April, US troops in Iraq shot down two drones near Ain al-Asad air base (Al Anbar governorate). While the US has not stated whether the drones directly targeted the base, the interception comes less than 24 hours after a rocket attack by an unidentified Iraq-based group which also targeted the Kharab al-Jir US military base in Al-Hasakah governorate (Syria). While social media channels affiliated with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) denied that the Iran-backed umbrella group conducted the attacks, there is a realistic possibility of further attacks against US troops in Syria and Iraq by IRI and/or disparate militant elements. Nevertheless, a full-scale resumption of IRI hostilities targeting US forces in the region remains unlikely at present.
- Red Sea: A resurgence in Houthi activity underscores persistent security threats to international shipping lanes. On 24 April, the US Navy intercepted a missile launched by the Yemen-based Houthis, which targeted an undisclosed commercial vessel in the Red Sea. On 25 April, the Greek Navy also intercepted an anti-ship ballistic missile targeting the MV Yorktown, a US-flagged and owned vessel, approximately 16 miles (25km) southwest of the Yemeni capital Aden. The consecutive missile launches likely indicate that the Houthis have resumed targeting commercial shipping vessels in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea. Vessels and crews transiting these areas, including those with a military escort, will be exposed to elevated physical security and collateral risks amid escalating hostilities, driving supply chain disruption.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Widespread demonstrations calling for hostage releases highlight rising anti-government sentiment and protest risks, including vandalism targeting aid convoys. On 24 April, Hamas released a video of an Israeli hostage held in Gaza, triggering protests and moderate unrest in Jerusalem, with demonstrators calling for the government to immediately secure hostage releases. Overnight on 24-25 April, activists associated with the right-wing Tzav 9 group also blocked several key intersections in southern Israel to block aid trucks delivering aid to Gaza. During one such protest, demonstrators stopped and looted a vehicle, destroying its cargo of food aid. Although police had dispersed the protesters by 0700hrs (local time), further demonstrations are highly likely, especially amid increasing anti-government sentiment linked to stalling hostage release negotiations. Road blockages will elevate risks of travel disruption through key urban centres, while aid protests will increase security risks for NGO aid staff.
- Several countries have re-instated funding for the Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), moderately improving prospects for aid delivery. On 24 April, Germany announced it would resume UNRWA funding after a three-month suspension. The move comes after numerous states suspended funding for the agency in January following allegations of links between UNRWA staff and Hamas (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 29 January 2024). Several key donors, including Canada, Japan and Sweden, have also recently resumed funding for the agency, which does not operate with financial reserves. Although the resumption of funding will likely moderately alleviate financial pressure and facilitate increasing aid deliveries into Gaza, the US is highly unlikely to resume funding the organisation in the short to medium term. As the US is UNRWA’s single-largest donor and contributed approximately 26% of its programme budget in 2022, humanitarian conditions in Gaza will almost certainly remain at critical levels.
- Hamas rhetoric underscores risks of increasing pro-Palestine protest activity in Jordan, particularly in the capital Amman. On 23 April, the spokesperson for Hamas’ al-Qassam brigade called on Jordanians to increase protest activity in support of Gaza. Several local activists on social media subsequently called for widespread protests in Amman in the coming days. Further pro-Palestine protests are highly likely in the capital after Friday prayers on 26 April and will likely continue on a weekly basis through May, particularly targeting the Israeli embassy in the al-Rabiah area. There is a realistic possibility of attempts to breach the embassy compound, elevating risks of clashes with police, increasing bystander risks in proximate locations as well as broader travel disruption risks through western Amman.
- New US sanctions against Iran underscore elevated compliance risks facing the cyber technology sector. On 23 April, the US sanctioned two Iranian companies and four individuals involved in cyber activity on behalf of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Cyber Electronic Command (IRGC-CEC). The sanctioned actors targeted more than a dozen US companies and governmental entities, highlighting persistently elevated risks of cyber attacks amid elevated regional tensions. The range of recently sanctioned entities illustrates elevated compliance risks for firms with links to Iran, particularly in the cyber technology sector. Similarly, on 22 April, the EU voted to expand sanctions on Iran to further restrict exports of EU-made components used to produce Iranian drones and ballistic missiles. Ongoing efforts to expand sanctions on Iran will further increase compliance concerns and risks of sanction exposure, particularly for firms in the defence and technology sectors.
- Pro-Palestine protests on university campuses continue to escalate in the US, elevating risks of clashes with security forces. Pro-Palestine protesters have established encampments in and around numerous high-profile universities, including Columbia University (New York), MIT (Massachusetts), the University of Southern California (California), the University of Texas at Austin (Texas) and Yale (Connecticut). Local police have adopted substantially augmented postures in protest locations and have conducted numerous arrests, particularly at Columbia University (see Sibylline Alert – 23 April 2024). There is a realistic possibility of state authorities mobilising additional federal or state security forces, increasing the risk of clashes with protesters. Protest activity will also likely intensify across university campuses over the coming days, increasing bystander and collateral risks, particularly in the cities of Boston (Massachusetts), Chicago (Illinois), Minneapolis (Minnesota) and the capital Washington DC, as well as the states of California, New York and Michigan.
FORECAST
The recent escalation in cross-border strikes and retaliation between LH and the IDF will likely persist throughout the Passover holidays (ending on 29 April) at least. Despite the recent claims by the Israeli Minister of Defence Yoav Gallant that the IDF killed half of LH’s commanders in southern Lebanon, there is currently no evidence that the Iran-backed group’s military capabilities are significantly impacted. LH still retains the ability to strike targets deep inside Israel, beyond the border regions. As such, collateral risks to residents in some northern coastal cities such as Acre (Northern District) and Nahariya (Northern District) remain a realistic possibility over the coming days due to potential drone attacks against military targets in the area (similar to the recent attempted attacks on Acre). Furthermore, heightened security risks to residents and assets in towns along the northern border will be sustained given the current level of tit-for-tat clashes. The IDF will likely continue to retaliate in response to any LH attacks with wider and deeper air, artillery and drone strikes targeting LH logistics, military installations and key commanders in Lebanon’s South and Nabatieh governorates. This will sustain significant bystander risks to civilians. We also assess that further long-range IDF strikes inside Lebanon (beyond the south) remain likely, including into central-eastern regions such as Beqaa Valley (Beqaa Governorate).
The Houthis will likely continue targeting commercial vessels over the coming days, with attacks likely to escalate should the IDF expand ground operations into Rafah. Recent consecutive instances of missile fire targeting commercial vessels indicate that the Houthis still retain sufficient capacity to disrupt international shipping traffic through the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Over the coming days, there is a realistic possibility of the Houthis escalating drone and missile attacks targeting commercial and naval vessels in proximate waters, increasing physical security and bystander risks for vessels and crews. Should the IDF expand ground operations into Rafah, attacks will likely escalate in frequency and intensity, triggering vessel diversions via the Cape of Good Hope (South Africa) and increasing risks of further disruption to global supply chains. Over the coming weeks, the US is also highly likely to continue conducting airstrikes in Houthi-controlled territory, increasing security risks for individuals and assets in the area, particularly in proximity to airfields and infrastructure associated with Houthi militant activity.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
- A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas leadership in Lebanon
- The ongoing IDF ground operation expands into Rafah
Apr. 23.
*Iran-US: New sanctions will exacerbate compliance risks facing cyber technology sector. On 23 April, the US Department of the Treasury sanctioned two Iranian companies and four individuals involved in malicious cyber activity on behalf of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Cyber Electronic Command (IRGC-CEC). The USDT added that the sanctioned actors targeted more than a dozen US companies and government entities through spear phishing and ransomware attacks. Additionally, the US Department of Justice and the FBI have indicted the four sanctioned individuals, who remain at large. These developments come nearly a week after similar UK and US sanctions targeting Iran’s drone, steel and automotive industries. The range of sanctioned entities underlines rising compliance risks facing international companies engaged across the Iranian market, particularly those in the cyber technology sector. We also assess that the risk of exposure to further sanctions will remain elevated in the coming weeks, particularly for Asian and Middle Eastern firms/individuals that deal with Iranian entities.
*Jordan: Hamas calls will likely trigger further pro-Palestine protests in coming weeks. On 23 April, Abu Ubaida, the spokesperson for Hamas’ al-Qassam brigades, called on Jordanians to continue protesting in support of Gaza. Ubaida is a popular figure in Jordan; various other social media activists subsequently called for widespread protests in the coming days. Further pro-Palestine protests are likely in the capital Amman after Friday prayers on 26 April and will likely persist on a weekly basis through May. Protests in Amman will likely focus on the al-Rabiah area (where the Israeli embassy is located), particularly outside the nearby al-Kalouti mosque. Continued demonstrations will elevate the risk of significant traffic disruption in western Amman. Renewed clashes between the security forces and protesters are possible, as is the deployment of heavy-handed crowd dispersal measures (which will increase bystander risks). Limited pro-Palestine demonstrations are also possible in Aqaba (Aqaba governorate), where we assess that an elevated security posture will moderately increase the risks facing supply chain continuity through the Wadi Araba crossing.
Apr. 22.
- France: Hoax bomb alert at Iranian consulate underlines elevated tensions amid Middle East conflict. On 19 April, the authorities detained a man who threatened to blow himself up at the Iranian consulate in the capital Paris. As no explosive material was found on the suspect or in the consulate building, the threat was almost certainly a hoax. According to the Paris prosecutor’s office, the suspect was previously convicted for setting car tyres on fire in the same area in protest against the Iranian government in 2023. The incident comes amid heightened tensions across the Middle East and retaliatory airstrikes between Israel and Iran. At the time of writing there is no indication of any link between the detained man and the current conflict. Nevertheless, the incident underlines the risk of the conflict spilling over into Europe. We assess that France will possibly experience an uptick in hoax bomb alerts in the coming months, particularly ahead of the Paris 2024 Olympic Games. Public transport hubs, schools and government facilities will remain likely targets
- Iraq-US: Stop, search operation in Nineveh will likely continue after rocket attack against US base. On 21 April, an as yet unidentified group fired five rockets from Zummar (Nineveh Governorate) towards Kharab al-Jir US military base in Syria’s Al Hasakah Governorate, with no damage reported. The attack coincided with a statement on a Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) paramilitary group telegrams channel, stating attacks against the US forces had resumed. Other channels quickly refuted the statement. Stop and search operations by Iraqi security forces will likely continue in the Nineveh Governorate in the coming days, particularly in the towns adjacent to the Syrian border. This will elevate security risks for individuals and cause mobility disruption on highways. There is a realistic possibility that the attack was conducted by one of the groups operating under the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) or another clandestine militia. While no indicators currently signal a full resumption of IRI hostilities against the US forces in the region, further attacks on US military and government assets remain a realistic possibility in the coming weeks.
KEY POINTS
- Continued stasis in negotiations will likely drive the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to try to bolster military pressure on Hamas after the Passover holiday (22-29 April), increasing the risk of operations focusing on Rafah in the coming weeks.
- Further direct strikes between Iran and Israel are unlikely following the Israeli strike on a military base near Isfahan (Iran), especially as Iran has so far not openly blamed Israel for that incident.
- Gaza: Clearing operations in northern and central Gaza continue, while an increased frequency of airstrikes in Rafah indicates that an uptick in operations in the south is likely in the coming days. On 20 April, the IDF conducted clearing operations in Beit Hanoun (northern Gaza) after Palestinian militants targeted Sderot with rocket fire. The IDF’s Nahal Infantry Brigade is due to be replaced by a reserve brigade in the Netzarim corridor (central Gaza) to allow all of the division’s forces to prepare for future operations in central and southern Gaza. In Rafah (southern Gaza), Israeli airstrikes continued to intensify. The likely uptick in military operations in the area in the coming days will possibly involve limited incursions and/or raids.
- Iran-Israel: Regional escalation is unlikely following Israel’s strike near Isfahan, though tensions remain elevated. On 19 April, unnamed US and Israeli officials confirmed that Israel conducted an airstrike against Iran. The likely target was a military base near Isfahan (Isfahan province). Iranian officials stated that the strike caused no damage. They claimed that Iran’s air defences downed three drones. Notably, Iran has so far not attributed blame, unlike in the aftermath of Israel’s 1 April strike against the Iranian embassy in Damascus (Syria). Officials have stated that they are investigating the identity of whoever conducted the latest strike and that they have no plans for immediate retaliation.
- Israel-Lebanon: Tit-for-tat clashes continue along the Israel-Lebanon border; we assess that they will persist at similar levels over the Passover holiday (22-29 April). Between 20 and 22 April, the IDF conducted strikes against various locations in southern Lebanon, including Ayta ash-Shab, Naqoura, Majdal Zoun, Jebbayn and Tayr Harfa, killing several Lebanese Hizballah (LH) militants. Additionally, the IDF also targeted LH military installations in Odaisseh and Khiam (all southern Lebanon). On 21 April, LH shot an Israeli Elbit Hermes 450 military drone over southern Lebanon; the claim was later confirmed by the IDF, which in turn struck LH’s surface-to-air missile launch pad.
- Israel: A car-ramming and shooting attack in Jerusalem highlights the elevated risk of attacks during Passover. On 22 April, two unidentified individuals injured three people in a car-ramming attack near a synagogue on Tkhelet Mordechai Street in the Romema neighbourhood. The perpetrators then shot at civilians using a modified firearm before they were apprehended by the Israeli security forces. The attack underscores the elevated risk of attacks in the Jerusalem area, including car rammings, stabbings and shootings, particularly against religious institutions and gatherings during the Passover period.
- West Bank: The IDF’s multi-day operation in Tulkarm governorate underscores continued militant activity and weapons production capabilities, sustaining the likelihood of clashes and attacks. From 19 to 21 April, the IDF clashed with several militant groups during a counter-terrorism operation in the Nour Shams camp. The IDF destroyed at least two explosions-manufacturing facilities and killed at least 14 militants, including a senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) commander. Following the operation, numerous militant groups called for demonstrations, resulting in low-level protests in Nablus and Qalqilya governorates. The operation highlights continued militant activity, mobilisation efforts and IED production capabilities, particularly in the northern West Bank. There was also an uptick in sole-perpetrator and militant attacks targeting Israeli security personnel and positions in the West Bank. On 21 April, two unidentified Palestinians attempted to carry out a shooting and stabbing attack against IDF personnel at the Beit Einun intersection (Hebron governorate), while a sole perpetrator also attempted to conduct a stabbing and shooting attack at a checkpoint near the Bekaot settlement (Tubas governorate). While neither incident resulted in casualties, an uptick in low-capacity attacks against IDF checkpoints underscores the elevated collateral risks during overland movement through the West Bank.
- West Bank: Ethno-religious tensions remain significantly elevated, with continued Israeli settler attacks against Palestinians driving increased physical security and bystander risks. On 22 April, the Israeli security forces announced that they made an arrest in connection to the death of an Israeli minor in the West Bank on 12-13 April. The death intensified already-elevated ethno-religious tensions and triggered an uptick in Israeli settler attacks on Palestinians in Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate. On 22 April, settlers conducted an arson attack against a vehicle in Burqa (Ramallah and al Bireh), resulting in six injuries. As ethno-religious tensions remain heightened, further instances of settler violence are likely, sustaining elevated physical security and bystander risks, particularly in locations close to Israeli settlements in the central West Bank.
- Iraq-US: A rocket attack targeting US forces in Syria is unlikely to signal a full resumption of hostilities, though further similar attacks are possible. On 21 April, an unidentified, Iraq-based militant group fired several rockets towards the Kharab al-Jir US military base in al-Hasakah governorate (Syria); no damage was reported. The attack coincided with an announcement on a social media channel associated with the Kataib Hezbollah (KH) militant group, which underscored that the group would resume its attacks on US forces in the region. However, other KH-linked channels quickly refuted the statement. There is a realistic possibility that the attack was conducted by another militant group operating as part of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), an Iranian-backed umbrella organisation that includes KH. Over the coming weeks, there is a realistic possibility of further attacks against US forces in the region, elevating physical security and bystander risks in the vicinity of US military assets and installations in Iraq and Syria. Nevertheless, a full-scale resumption of IRI hostilities targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria remains unlikely at present.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Despite a high-level IDF resignation related to the 7 October attack, anti-government protest activity will likely continue throughout Israel, sustaining travel disruption risks. On 19 April, protesters calling for hostage releases temporarily blocked Route 1, while large-scale hostage release demonstrations in Caesaria and Haifa (both Haifa district), Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) restricted movement through key thoroughfares on 20 April. Amid stalling hostage-release and ceasefire negotiations, anti-government protests are highly likely to continue, with demonstrators almost certainly continuing to call for a general election and/or change in coalition leadership. On 22 April, Military Intelligence Directorate chief Aharon Haliva tendered his resignation, citing his responsibility for the intelligence failures that led to the 7 October attacks. Although this marks the most senior IDF leadership resignation since the attacks, it is unlikely to moderate protest activity in major urban centres significantly, sustaining the risk of low-intensity clashes between demonstrators and the security forces, as well as localised travel disruption.
- The US announced a third round of sanctions targeting entities associated with Israeli settlers in the West Bank, highlighting elevated compliance concerns and growing bilateral tensions. On 19 April, the US sanctioned two fundraising organisations that financially support Israeli settlers previously sanctioned by the US on 1 February. Expanding US sanctions underscore increasing compliance concerns and risks of sanction exposure for firms with operations in Israel and the Palestinian Territories, particularly in the agriculture, construction and banking industries. Unconfirmed reports also indicate that the US is considering sanctioning the IDF’s 97th Netzah Yehuda Battalion for human rights abuses in the West Bank. This would likely entail restrictions on the unit’s access to US-supplied weapons. These sanctions represent increasing US efforts to deter Israeli settler violence and human rights abuses in the West Bank amid increasing bilateral tensions. Even so, the US approved USD 17 bn in military aid for Israel on 20 April. As such, sanctions restricting the 97th battalion’s access to US weaponry are unlikely to impact the Israeli security forces’ overall capacity significantly (if indeed they are implemented). Consequently, these efforts are unlikely to indicate that a substantial shift in Israel-US relations is imminent.
- On 20 April, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Istanbul (Turkey) amid reports that the group’s political wing is considering relocating to Turkey from Qatar due to stalled negotiations and increased Western pressure on Doha. While Turkish media reported that the pair discussed humanitarian aid efforts and current negotiations, other Western reports claim that Turkey is a candidate relocation destination for Hamas alongside Algeria and Oman. This comes days after the Qatari minister of foreign affairs stated that his country is in the process of a complete re-evaluation of its role in the current negotiations, likely signalling a historic shift in Qatar-Hamas relations.
- Pro-Palestine protests in New York (US) underscore elevated ethno-religious tensions and the risks stemming from university-based activism associated with the Israel-Hamas war. On 18 April, the police in New York City (New York) arrested over 110 pro-Palestine demonstrators gathered at the Columbia University campus. The arrests triggered a substantial uptick in protest activity around the university. Demonstrations have continued through 22 April. On 21 April, New York City Mayor Eric Adams stated that numerous protesters were engaging in antisemitic hate speech; on 22 April, Columbia University announced it would not hold in-person classes that day given the elevated security concerns. On 22 April, the authorities in New Haven (Connecticut) deployed riot police to disperse pro-Palestine protesters gathered at the Yale University campus. The protests highlight sustained ethno-religious tensions and risks of campus-based activism linked to the Israel-Hamas war, particularly at high-profile universities. Although widespread violence remains unlikely, there is a realistic possibility of clashes between protesters, counter-protesters and/or the police. Furthermore, Jewish and Israeli students will face elevated risks of harassment as protest activity continues, particularly if they attempt to access the university campus.
FORECAST
IDF military operations in southern Gaza will likely increase in frequency after Passover, further raising the likelihood of a ground operation in Rafah in the coming weeks. Intensified airstrikes against Rafah in tandem with limited ground incursions/raids in Khan Yunis (southern Gaza) and clearing operations around the Netzarim corridor (central Gaza) are likely to increase in frequency and scope after the Passover holidays. With no signs of progress in the current negotiations, Israel will likely seek to apply further military pressure on Hamas in the coming weeks, including by encircling its main surviving stronghold in Rafah before any major ground operation, elevating the already significant risks for millions of displaced refugees in the area. These refugees will likely be ordered to relocate to new camps adjacent to the coast in southern and central Gaza, which will worsen the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in the strip. We also assess that Israel will likely continue its security co-ordination with Egypt before any major military escalation in Rafah, including in the Philadelphia corridor adjacent to the Sinai border.
Stasis in the current hostage-for-truce negotiations will likely further deepen reported tensions between the Qatari administration and Hamas. In the coming months, the group’s political bureau will likely continue to search for alternative havens in Algeria, Oman, Turkey and possibly even back in Syria. However, Oman’s long-neutral stance will likely inform Muscat’s decision. At the same time, there is a realistic possibility that Turkey’s political environment will impose a notable challenge to any such relocation given the plummeting popularity of the ruling AKP and the growth of the nationalist/secular opposition (such as the CHP). As such, Algeria possibly offers the most realistic relocation option for Hamas (similar to the PLO’s relocation to Tunisia in the 1970s), especially as the group enjoys overwhelming popular support therein. However, there is a realistic possibility that Qatar will postpone Hamas’ relocation until after a permanent ceasefire in Gaza in a bid to diffuse the likely Arabic backlash against Doha.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
- A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
- The ongoing IDF ground operation expands further into southern Gaza
(Source: Sibylline)
25 Apr 24. Royal Navy ship shoots down ballistic missile in combat for first time. HMS Diamond thwarts attack on container ship and US warship by Yemen’s Houthi rebels. A Royal Navy warship has shot down an enemy ballistic missile in combat for the first time, Grant Shapps, the Defence Secretary, has said.
HMS Diamond intercepted the weapon, which was fired by the Iran-backed Houthi rebels at a merchant vessel in the Gulf of Aden, on Wednesday.
The Type 45 destroyer’s Sea Viper missile system swung into action to down the Iranian-made missile after it was fired from nearby Yemen.
It was the first time a Navy warship had shot down a missile of any kind in combat since the Gulf War in 1991, when HMS Gloucester, a Type 42 destroyer, took out an Iraqi Silkworm missile that had been fired at a US warship.
“I want to thank the brave crew of HMS Diamond for her vital role in saving innocent lives and protecting international shipping from illegal Houthi attacks,” Mr Shapps said.
Commander Peter Evans, the commanding officer of HMS Diamond, said: “I’m immensely proud of the ship’s company, whose professionalism meant they were able to react in a split second to defeat the threat today. As ever, Diamond is ready to protect seafarers and ensure the freedom of the seas.”
HMS Diamond has been deployed in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden since March as part of the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian to protect commercial vessels.
The Houthis announced on Wednesday that they had targeted the Maersk Yorktown vessel and an American warship in the Gulf of Aden.
US military officials said the attack had been thwarted by a member of the Western coalition “successfully engaging” an anti-ship ballistic missile.
The intercepted weapon was believed to be either the Iranian-made Fateh-110 short-range ballistic missile or the longer-ranged Zolfaghar, a mobile missile capable of hitting targets at a distance of up to 435 miles. (Source: Daily Telegraph)
25 Apr 24. IDF Says It’s Eliminated 50% of Hezbollah’s Commanders in Southern Lebanon. In a recent update from the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), Defense Minister Yoav Gallant reported to the IDF Northern Command that significant strides have been made in their ongoing conflict with Hezbollah. According to Gallant, Israeli operations in southern Lebanon have successfully eliminated approximately 50% of Hezbollah’s brigade-level commanders.
The IDF disclosed that six brigade-level commanders had been targeted, alongside over 30 battalion-level commanders. Considering that Hezbollah reportedly commands between 50,000 to 100,000 fighters—including various militia groups and the elite Radwan force—the scale of these operations reflects a considerable effort by Israel to dismantle the militant group’s command infrastructure. Estimates suggest Hezbollah might have between 10 to 15 total brigade-level commanders, indicating that the IDF strikes have significantly decimated its senior leadership.
Hezbollah’s structure is notably distinct from other groups such as Hamas, which commands a similar number of forces under a different organizational framework. Sources informed the Jerusalem Post that Hezbollah’s Radwan forces operate with a separate command structure, which could imply a more complex impact of the loss of these commanders. The specific role and influence of brigade-level commanders in Hezbollah also vary, with some holding irreplaceable tactical and strategic importance due to their expertise and leadership roles developed over years of service.
In a detailed recount of recent military actions, the IDF shared footage of a precise strike on a moving vehicle in the Lebanese coastal city of Aadloun. The car, carrying Hussein Azqul—a key figure in Hezbollah’s air defense system—was hit directly, leading to his immediate death. This strike was part of a series of operations targeting high-ranking members within the militant group, including the killing of Muhammad Attiya, a member of the elite Radwan unit, in a separate airstrike. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
24 Apr 24. Satellite Images Show Strike on Iranian Air Defense Radar in Isfahan. Satellite photos taken after a recent aerial attack near Isfahan, a major city in central Iran, indicate that an S-300 air defense radar system was hit. The images, captured by Planet Labs PBC, display burn marks around an area previously identified by analysts as housing a “flap-lid” radar component of the S-300 system, located near Isfahan’s dual-use airport and air base. The strike appears to have caused more substantial damage than the large-scale drone-and-missile assault Iran directed at Israel’s Nevatim Airbase on April 13. The significance of this attack is heightened by the S-300’s role in defending key national infrastructure, including nuclear facilities. Experts suggest that the precision of the strike demonstrates Israel’s capability to penetrate Iran’s sophisticated air defense network. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
23 Apr 24. Hezbollah launches deepest attack into Israel since start of Gaza war. Lebanon’s Iran-backed Hezbollah group said on Tuesday it had launched a drone attack against Israeli military bases north of the city of Acre, in its deepest strike into Israeli territory since the Gaza war began. The Israeli military said it had no knowledge of any of its facilities being hit by Hezbollah, but had said earlier on Tuesday that it intercepted two “aerial targets” off Israel’s northern coast.
The two sides have been engaging in regular exchanges of missile fire and airstrikes since the start of the war in Gaza last October, but have refrained from pushing the conflict into all-out war.
As the strikes have continued, however, fears have grown that an accident or miscalculation on either side could see the conflict could escalate rapidly, possibly drawing in other regional and world powers including the United States.
Hezbollah said it had acted in retaliation for an earlier Israeli attack killing one of its fighters. The group published what appeared to be a satellite photo, with the location of the strike symbolized by a flash with a red circle around it that sat halfway between Acre and Nahariyya to the north.
In response, the Israeli military said fighter jets hit military targets in Ayta ash Shab and Blida and in the area of Markaba in southern Lebanon.
Earlier on Tuesday, the military said Israeli airstrikes killed two Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah later confirmed the death of one of its fighters, Hussein Azkoul, but provided no further details.
A separate Israeli strike overnight Monday to Tuesday killed a fighter in Hezbollah’s elite unit, Radwan Forces, the military said, though Hezbollah has not confirmed his death.
Since October, Israeli strikes have killed about 270 Hezbollah fighters as well as about 50 civilians. Hezbollah’s rocket and drone fire has killed about a dozen Israeli soldiers and half as many civilians. The shelling has displaced tens of thousands on each side. (Source: Reuters)
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company
——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————