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Military And Security Developments
Apr. 19.
- Iran-Israel: Regional escalation is unlikely following strike near Isfahan, though tensions remain high. Earlier on 19 April, unnamed US and Israeli officials confirmed that Israel conducted an airstrike against Iran earlier on the same day. At the time of writing, Iranian state media indicated that air defence systems intercepted several drones targeting an air force base near Isfahan (Isfahan province), but that the base was not damaged. Iranian officials have not accused Israel of conducting the attack. These statements indicate that Iranian retaliatory action directly targeting Israel is unlikely in the coming hours, tempering risks of significant escalation. Further Israeli strikes on Iran are also unlikely, particularly during the Passover holiday (22-30 April). However, Israel will likely escalate strikes against Iranian proxies in Lebanon and Syria in the coming days. There is also a realistic possibility that Israel will strike proxies in Iraq and Yemen, increasing security risks therein. We also assess that the Yemen-based Houthis will possibly intensify their attacks against vessels in the Red Sea, elevating the risks facing commercial shipping and crews.
- Iran-US-UK: Sanctions will drive compliance risks in banking, energy, technology sector. On 18 April, the US and the UK announced new sanctions targeting Iranian individuals and entities linked to Iran’s drone industry, its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its defence ministry. Additionally, on the same day, the president of the European Council stated that the EU intends to expand its sanctions on Iran. The new sanctions will elevate compliance risks for companies involved with Iranian technology and defence firms, including those producing dual-use products such as carbon fibre and drone replacement parts. The risk of exposure to further sanctions will remain elevated in the coming weeks, including for other Asian and Middle Eastern firms/individuals that deal with Iranian entities. Furthermore, we assess that new US sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports will likely be approved by the Senate in the coming weeks, further elevating compliance and secondary sanctions risks. These are likely to be particularly heightened for businesses facilitating financial transactions between sanctioned Iranian banks and Chinese financial institutions. (Source: Sibylline)
Strike against Ishfaha. At around 0400hrs (local time) on 19 April, witnesses in Isfahan (Isfahan province, Iran) claimed to hear several explosions. Iran then temporarily restricted flights over its major cities. Unnamed US and Israeli officials subsequently confirmed that Israel conducted an overnight attack against Iran.
SIGNIFICANCE
- While Isfahan is home to a nuclear facility, the strike likely targeted a military airbase and appears to have been very limited in scale; it was likely designed to preserve (publicly) Israel’s policy of deterrence following Iran’s drone and missile barrage on 13-14 April, while also mitigating the threat of escalation (see Sibylline Alert – 14 April).
- Claims that Israel was involved in the strike have raised concerns about Iranian retaliation, prompting the US to restrict the travel of its diplomatic staff in Jerusalem; Australia has advised its citizens to leave Israel.
- However, Iran has so far not attributed blame, unlike in the aftermath of Israel’s 1 April strike against the Iranian embassy in Damascus (Syria); officials have stated that they are investigating the identity of whoever conducted the latest strike and have no plans for immediate retaliation.
- Iran has also stated that the explosions were the result of air defences intercepting three drones and that they caused no damage.
FORECAST
We assess that further conflict escalation between Iran and Israel remains unlikely in the immediate term. Iran’s current refusal to blame Israel for the attack likely indicates a willingness to de-escalate the situation, lowering the likelihood of direct Iranian retaliation. Further Israeli strikes inside Iranian territory also remain unlikely throughout the Passover holiday (22-30 April), reducing the risks of further armed escalation between Iran and Israel in the coming week.
We assess that further Israeli attacks against Iranian proxies across the region are likely in the coming days, elevating regional security risks. Israel will most likely escalate its attacks against Iranian proxies in Lebanon and Syria. However, there is also a realistic possibility of further attacks against proxies in Iraq, such as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), as well as the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen. This will sustain security risks throughout the region in the coming days. Nonetheless, retaliation-related security risks will be moderated due to the Houthis’ and IRI’s limited capacity to launch successful strikes on Israel. Regardless, security risks in Israel will remain particularly heightened during Passover Eve (22 April) due to likely rocket barrages launched by Lebanese Hizballah (LH) and militants in Gaza against northern and central Israel, respectively. Despite the increased likelihood of further Israeli attacks against Iranian proxies, it is unlikely that these groups will retaliate against US troops in the region. However, an augmented US military posture in the region will likely persist in the coming days.
We assess that Israeli strikes against Iranian proxies will sustain regional tensions, driving maritime security risks in the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea; Iran will possibly conduct further ship seizures as an indirect form of retaliation. As with the 15 April hijacking, these attacks and seizures will likely focus on vessels linked to Israeli companies. Such operations will likely be matched by an uptick in Houthi maritime attacks in Yemeni waters in the coming weeks. This will exacerbate the threat to ships navigating both the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Strait of Hormuz, driving disruption risks for major supply chains. The US-led coalition’s posture in the region will remain heightened in the coming weeks. The coalition is increasingly likely to conduct further pre-emptive attacks against Houthi missile and drone launch sites inside Yemen. However, there is also a realistic possibility that Iran will refrain from additional maritime seizures in pursuit of further de-escalation in the coming days, mitigating the disruption risks facing supply chains in the Strait of Hormuz.
Apr. 16.
*US: House passes financial measures against Iran; aid to Israel likely to face policy stagnation. On 15 April, the House of Representatives passed a series of bills aimed at imposing financial penalties on Iran in response to its unprecedented drone and missile attack against Israel on 13 April. Three separate bills were fast-tracked to a vote and were met with majority bipartisan support. The bills will terminate the tax-exempt status of nonprofit organisations linked to terror groups, disrupt the Chinese purchase of Iranian oil and further restrict the Iranian government’s access to the US financial system. On the same day, House Speaker Mike Johnson announced plans to introduce separate bills for aid to Israel and Ukraine with a vote to be held on 19 April. The financial penalty bills will likely be passed swiftly into law. However, policy stagnation risks will increase concerning a standalone aid bill, as both Congressional Democrats and the White House have expressed a preference for the Senate-approved USD 95 bn national security supplemental (which includes aid for Israel, Taiwan and Ukraine). In the near term, a high degree of partisanship will sustain policy risks for US involvement in international conflicts.
Apr 15.
KEY POINTS
- The uptick in Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations in Lebanon is likely to continue in the coming days as part of Israel’s retaliation for Iran’s recent strikes, further driving the risk of uncontrolled escalation, as well as elevated security risks in northern Israel and southern Lebanon.
- Israel’s response to Iran is likely to materialise in the coming weeks. International pressure and condemnation of Iran will likely encourage Israel not to launch direct strikes, though regional tensions will remain elevated and operations will drive bystander and security risks across Lebanon, Iraq and Syria.
- Gaza: IDF operations continue at pace in Gaza, with renewed operations in previously cleared areas underscoring persistent re-infiltration risks. IDF ground operations continue in Nuseirat and Shujaiya, highlighting likely militant re-infiltration following limited IDF clearing operations in January 2024 and December 2023, respectively. On 11 April, the IDF also conducted an airstrike against Jabalia which killed Radwan Muhammad Abdallah Radwan, who led Hamas’ internal security forces in the city. Radwan’s presence in Jabalia underscores Hamas’ continued efforts to rebuild and maintain its policing and governance capabilities in northern and central Gaza.
- Israel-Iran: On 13-14 April, Iran launched approximately 300 drones and missiles towards Israel; although the majority of ordinances were intercepted, significantly elevated regional tensions persist. The Iranian armed forces launched two waves of ordinances that involved one-way attack drones, as well as cruise and ballistic missiles. The IDF intercepted almost all the munitions with assistance from France, Jordan, the UK and the US. While most projectiles did not enter Israel’s airspace, strikes against Nevatim Air Force Base in Negev (Southern district) resulted in light damage. Interceptor debris seriously injured a child in the Arad area (also Southern). At the time of writing, Israel’s rhetoric regarding retaliation remains relatively muted, though regional tensions remain heightened (see Forecast below).
- Red Sea: On 13-14 April, the Houthis launched over 80 drones and six missiles towards Israel, underscoring the threat of Iran and its proxies co-ordinating their attacks. The US intercepted the ordinances, which did not reach Israel’s airspace. The attacks, which were highly likely launched to coincide with Iran’s attacks, highlight the responsiveness of the Houthi militants to developments in Israel, particularly to tensions between Israel and Iran. Risks of further co-ordinated attacks involving the Houthis and other Iranian proxies, such as Lebanese Hizballah (LH) and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), remain elevated. As such, physical security and bystander risks in southern Israel, particularly in the vicinity of naval bases in Eilat (Southern) will remain elevated as hostilities persist.
- Israel-Lebanon: On the night of 14 April, the IDF conducted limited operations between tens and hundreds of metres inside Lebanon. The development comes amid an uptick in IDF activity ever since Iran announced its intention to attack Israel. On 15 April, Israeli news outlets claimed that an explosion in Lebanon during an IDF operation injured four soldiers, confirming for the first time limited IDF ground operations within Lebanese territory. LH took responsibility for the explosion, indicating that a major escalation due to the ground incursion is unlikely. It is likely that the IDF has previously conducted sporadic ground operations into Lebanese territory. Furthermore, since Iran threatened to retaliate, there has been an uptick in IDF operations in Lebanon, though these have mainly consisted of airstrikes and artillery barrages. This uptick was likely aimed at further degrading LH’s capacity to support an Iranian operation. Regardless, the uptick in hostilities is likely to continue in the coming days in retaliation for Iran’s attack on 13-14 April. The hostilities will sustain elevated security risks in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, driving the likelihood of uncontrolled escalation.
- West Bank: The death of an Israeli minor in Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate resulted in numerous clashes, highlighting increasing ethno-religious tensions. On 13 April, the IDF discovered the body of an Israeli minor near the Malachei Hashalom settlement outpost (Ramallah and al-Bireh) and stated that he had been ‘murdered in a terror attack’. Searches for the perpetrator(s) continue at the time of writing. Israeli settlers subsequently launched shooting and arson attacks against numerous Palestinian villages in Ramallah and al-Bireh, killing two Palestinians and injuring at least 20 others. Settlers also injured an Israeli journalist documenting the rioting. The attacks significantly underscore the elevated risks of violence in the West Bank amid rising ethno-religious tensions. The Israeli security forces have deployed additional personnel to the area and erected numerous checkpoints in and around settlements, elevating the likelihood of overland movement disruption. There is a realistic possibility that this elevated security posture will trigger clashes involving Palestinian civilians and/or militants across the governorate, raising physical security and bystander risks. In the broader West Bank, there is also an elevated risk of retaliatory violence being carried out by Palestinian militants; on 13 April, the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades conducted shooting attacks against an IDF checkpoint and an Israeli settlement in Tulkarm governorate in response to the settler violence in Ramallah and al-Bireh.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Hamas has rejected a US-proposed ceasefire, highlighting continued sticking points in negotiations. On 13 April, Hamas rejected the agreement, which would have established a six-week ceasefire in exchange for the release of 40 Israeli hostages. Hamas has stated that it will not accept an agreement unless it results in a permanent ceasefire and the withdrawal of IDF troops from Gaza, as well as clauses facilitating the return of displaced Palestinians to northern Gaza, an increase in humanitarian aid deliveries and reconstruction efforts. Israeli negotiators have repeatedly rejected these demands, underscoring the low probability of a ceasefire agreement in the short term. Although negotiations continue with Qatari mediation, numerous sticking points and persistent tensions between negotiating parties will likely continue hampering progress towards an agreement.
- Following increased settler violence in the West Bank, numerous militant organisations have called for increased mobilisation, driving risks of militant activity and sole-perpetrator attacks. Following the settler attacks on 12 and 13 April, the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade announced a general mobilisation of all fighters in Tulkarm governorate and called for civilians to join the organisation. Similarly, Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine have called for a mobilisation of civilians and increased attacks on Israeli settlements. Although a significant, intifada-style mobilisation of civilians in the West Bank remains unlikely, increasing militant calls for retaliation against Israeli settlers will likely further exacerbate ethno-religious tensions and increase risks of inter-communal violence. There is also a realistic possibility that continuous tensions with Israeli settlers will drive militant recruitment and radicalisation efforts, increasing the likelihood of militant and sole-perpetrator attacks targeting Israelis in the West Bank and Jerusalem areas.
FORECAST
Israeli retaliation against Iran is likely in the coming weeks; it will likely be aimed at proxies and IRGC positions. International pressure on Israel to contain its response will likely moderate Israeli retaliation against Iran, reducing the risks of significant regional escalation. International condemnation of Iran, accompanied by likely further trade restrictions and sanctions, will further help to moderate the Israeli response. Such sanctions are likely to focus on Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes, as well as its energy sector, though further restrictions on trade remain a realistic possibility. These will elevate compliance risks for companies and businesses active within Iran and those involved in supply chains feeding the country with material and technology. As such, while Israeli retaliation (particularly retaliation targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities) remains a possibility, it is more likely to focus on clearing and reducing the capabilities of pro-Iran proxies in the region. Any such effort is also likely to include the targeting of Iranian officials and IRGC personnel and commanders in the coming weeks. Furthermore, a covert attack aimed at sabotaging the Iranian nuclear programme remains a realistic possibility; any such move would possibly involve the employment of cyber attacks against Iran and businesses supporting or connected to the IRGC. The US will likely support Israeli strikes against Iranian proxies, though likely primarily with intelligence provision. However, there is also a realistic possibility of US forces initiating strikes against Iranian proxies, particularly in Syria. These will likely elevate security and bystander risks in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria in the coming days and increase the likelihood that affected proxies will resume strikes on US positions.
There is currently a high likelihood of further Israeli settler violence in the West Bank exacerbating ethno-religious tensions and armed retaliation by Palestinian individuals. Further attacks on Palestinian communities, including incidents of arson and physical assault, are particularly likely in the area close to the Malachei Hashalom settlement. Such incidents will exacerbate domestic unrest and radicalisation within Palestinian communities, driving the risk of further sole-perpetrator and militant attacks in the West Bank in the coming days. Such incidents will likely include shootings, stabbings and car-ramming attacks; they will primarily target the Israeli security forces and their positions, as well as transport infrastructure (including bus stations and roads), religious sites and Israeli settlements. Passover eve on 22 April will likely act as a key flashpoint for attacks in the West Bank, particularly those targeting settlements during the traditional Passover dinner
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
- A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
- The ongoing IDF ground operation expands further into southern Gaza
Executive summary
- As the Israel-Hamas war continues, the primary concerns regarding an escalation of the current fighting pertain to the possibility of greater involvement by Lebanese Hizballah and/or the US; likely resulting in substantial knock-on effects for Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.
- Countries in the region, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, are more likely to escalate via diplomatic means rather than through military action; though a heightened deterrence posture vis-à-vis heightened stability risks cannot be ruled out.
- Continued Iranian direct attacks on Israel and/or US forces remain an unlikely scenario at present, though Iranian-affiliated actors, including in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, are likely to increase rhetoric and actions against US and Israeli targets as the latter develops its operations against Hamas.
*Iran-Israel: Limited damage during attack on Israel has likely moderated regional escalation risks. Overnight on 13-14 April, Iran launched approximately 300 drones and missiles (cruise and ballistic) towards Israel. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted almost all the projectiles. The IDF was assisted by France, Jordan, the UK and the US. Concurrently, US forces intercepted approximately 90 drones and missiles launched towards Israel by the Yemen-based Houthis, which were almost certainly linked to Iran’s attack. Although regional tensions remain heightened, we assess that Israel is unlikely to conduct large-scale, direct strikes against Iran in the coming days. Rather, Israel is highly likely to escalate strikes against Iranian proxies in Lebanon and Syria, and possibly also in Iraq. There is also a realistic possibility that the IDF will co-ordinate strikes against proxies in Syria and Iraq with the help of US forces. In the unlikely event of a direct strike against Iran, we assess that the IDF will likely target small-scale military installations to moderate the risks of escalation. The US stated that it will not join such action. While direct kinetic strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities are highly unlikely, cyber-attacks and/or attempts to sabotage enrichment practices are possible.
*Iran-region: Rising tensions with Israel point to elevated likelihood of further hijackings. On 13 April, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) seized the Portugal-flagged MSC Aries (a container ship associated with Israel’s Ofer Family) near the Strait of Hormuz. While the incident marks the first Iranian seizure of a foreign vessel since January, Iran has often conducted vessel seizures during moments of heightened tension with the US and the West. Israel is likely to pursue a non-escalatory response to Iran’s recent drone and missile barrage, possibly through increased strikes against Iranian proxies in the region. There is a realistic possibility that this would drive further Iranian hijackings of Israeli-linked vessels, as such action would be perceived as a non-direct form of retaliation. These tactics are likely to compound maritime disruption caused by the Yemen-based Houthis’ strikes in the Red Sea, impacting shipping around the Gulf and threatening supply chains.
*US: House will likely pass Israel aid bill amid heightened tensions with Iran, domestic unrest risks. On 14 April, House Speaker Mike Johnson stated he will work to pass an Israel aid bill this week following Iran’s unprecedented direct attack against Israeli territory. Johnson refused to comment on whether the aid package would include funds for Ukraine. Meanwhile, in a phone call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, President Joe Biden reiterated the US’ ironclad commitment to support Israel’s self defence. However, Biden explicitly stated that the US would not participate in an Israeli counter-offensive against Iran, underscoring that the US does want to engage in direct conflict with Iran. Despite two previous failures to pass a standalone aid bill for Israel, the latest attack has increased the likelihood that Congress will pass a further aid bill in the short term. In the short-to-medium term, we assess that the Iranian strikes and Israel’s eventual response are highly likely to increase pro-Israel and pro-Palestine activism, sustaining domestic unrest risks in major urban centres (where possible clashes will raise bystander risks). (Source: Sibylline)
20 Apr 24. US military strategy tested as Iran-Israel warfare comes out of shadows. The U.S. military’s success helping Israel stop a massive wave of Iranian missiles and drones last weekend might suggest Washington is well prepared militarily for whatever comes next as Iran and Israel move from shadow warfare to direct confrontation.
But current and former U.S. officials say U.S. forces are not positioned for a major, sustained Middle East conflict and the Pentagon may have to revisit assumptions about military needs in the region if the crisis deepens.
“I don’t think we have all the forces that we would want to support Israel if there was a direct war between them and Iran,” said Michael Mulroy, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East under the Trump administration.
Though Tehran has indicated it had no plans to retaliate for an apparent Israeli strike on Friday, the tit-for-tat attacks have raised fears of an unpredictable regional war that the United States has sought to prevent.
In the months since an attack by Hamas militants on Israel triggered a war in Gaza that has ignited unrest throughout the Middle East, the United States has rushed thousands of U.S. service members to a region that had seen a steadily declining U.S. presence over years.
But many of those new U.S. troops are on warships and aircraft that move in and out of the region, and are only temporarily deployed. That U.S. strategy to rely on surge forces could be tested now Iran and Israel have broken the taboo of open military strikes against each other.
From embattled Asian currencies to earnings reports from European banks, these are the business and finance stories to look out for in the week ahead.
“What it means for the U.S. military is that I think we have to revisit this idea of what are the necessary, sustainable (military) capabilities that we have to maintain in the region,” said Joseph Votel, a retired four star Army general who led U.S. troops in the Middle East.
SUSTAINED FOCUS
Votel and other former officials said the U.S. military’s success in downing Iran’s drones and missiles last Saturday was presumably aided by detailed U.S. intelligence that allowed the Pentagon to anticipate the timing and targets of Iran’s attack.
“I think the bigger concern is our ability to be responsive over a sustained period of time,” Votel said.
U.S. officials say Iran does not appear to want an all-out war with Israel, and Tehran has played down Friday’s strike. Still, experts warn the situation is unpredictable, particularly as long as the Israel-Hamas conflict rages.
U.S. Army General Michael “Erik” Kurilla, the current head of Central Command, told lawmakers last month that he had requested more troops than the Pentagon had sent to his region, which President Joe Biden’s administration has said is a lower priority than the challenge from China, for example.
In written testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, Kurilla said a dangerous shortfall in U.S. intelligence assets, targeting expertise and linguists “contributes to gaps and seams in our ability to detect and disrupt plots, increasing freedom of movement” for violent extremist organizations.
Although Kurilla’s comments appeared more focused on Afghanistan, some intelligence shortfalls have already affected U.S. strategy since the start of the war in Gaza.
For example, a lack of detail about Houthi weapons stockpiles before the Iran-backed group started attacking commercial shipping in the Red Sea has made it hard to determine the effect of months of strikes on the group’s arsenal of missiles and drones, said officials.
Still, sending more U.S. troops to the Middle East and bolstering intelligence assets longer-term could prove difficult, officials say.
“Troops are spread around Europe (and) those that aren’t are going through overdue maintenance cycles,” one U.S. official said, speaking on condition of anonymity.
“And Asia is supposed to be the focus.”
Another official said it was still unclear whether the U.S. military was prepared to pull forces from Asia or Europe, despite the increase in tensions.
Prior to October, the last time the United States surged thousands of troops into the Middle East was under former President Donald Trump, during a series of escalatory actions that culminated in the U.S. killing of Iran’s top general and a retaliatory missile attack by Tehran on a U.S. base in Iraq.
The first U.S. official noted that the surge of troops in 2019 and 2020 was possible because, unlike today, Washington did not have to dedicate so many personnel and resources to Europe — a new reality following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
Mulroy said the United States should strengthen its position in the Middle East without abandoning its China-first focus.
“We need to deploy forces based on the current threat environment. And the current trend … is obviously a potential for a broader nation-on-nation conflict in the Middle East,” Mulroy said.
(Source: Reuters)
18 Apr 24. UK and US sanction leading Iranian military figures and entities following the attack on Israel.
Today (Thursday 18 April) the UK has sanctioned a further 7 individuals and 6 entities who have enabled Iran to conduct destabilising regional activity, including its direct attack on Israel.
This adds to the 400 plus sanctions already imposed on Iran. Previous sanctions include the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in its entirety and many of those responsible for the attack on Israel.
In a coordinated package with the US, leading Iranian military figures have been sanctioned in response to Iran’s dangerous direct attack on Israel on 14 April. The UK and US have also announced a range of sanctions to tighten the net on key actors within Iran’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and missile industries and further limit Iran’s ability to destabilise the region.
The Foreign Secretary announced these sanctions during his attendance at the G7 Foreign Ministers meeting in Capri, where the UK and our allies reaffirmed support for Israel’s security and the security of all our regional partners.
Prime Minister Rishi Sunak said: “The Iranian regime’s attack against Israel was a reckless act and a dangerous escalation. Today we have sanctioned the ringleaders of the Iranian military and forces responsible for the weekend’s attack.2
These sanctions – announced with the US – show we unequivocally condemn this behaviour, and they will further limit Iran’s ability to destabilise the region.
Foreign Secretary David Cameron said: “At a time of great tension in the Middle East, Iran’s decision to launch hundreds of drones and missiles towards Israel carried with it a serious risk of thousands of civilian casualties and wider escalation for the region. The sanctions announced today alongside the US demonstrate our unequivocal condemnation of Iran’s attack on a sovereign state. ”
The MSC Aries and its crew should be released immediately, and Iran should halt its reckless and unlawful behaviour. Further escalation is in no one’s interest.
The UK has condemned Iran’s dangerous attack on a sovereign state, which has further inflamed tensions in the Middle East and served to further isolate Iran on the world stage. Today’s designations have been made under the UK’s new Iran sanctions regime, which enables the UK to target Iran’s hostile behaviour.
Further sanctions have been imposed on:
- Armed Forces General Staff: directs and coordinates Iran’s armed forces
- The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy: 1 of Iran’s 2 naval forces
- The Khatemolanbia Central Headquarters (KCHQ): responsible for operational command and control of Iran’s armed forces
- Major General Gholamali Rashid, Commander KCHQ: responsible for operational command and control of Iran’s armed forces, reports directly to the Supreme Leader
- Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, Minister of Defence Armed Forces Logistics: Iran’s Defence Minister, responsible for supporting and equipping the Iranian armed forces
- Seid Mir Ahmad Nooshin, Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) Director and 4 further individuals related to AIO
The individuals sanctioned are subject to a travel ban and asset freeze. The entities are subject to an asset freeze.
The IRGC Navy was involved in seizing the civilian ship MSC Aries in international waters and has threatened military action against Israel. The UK has continued to call for the immediate release of the ship and its crew.
In 2023 alone, the UK made 154 new designations. The UK continues to tighten the net on actors involved in the Iranian UAV and missile industries. Last year the UK introduced trade measures prohibiting the export of specific UAV components and services to Iran. The UK has also designated a wide range of companies involved in production of Iranian UAVs, including the Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 drones – models which Iran has supplied to Russia. These types of drones were also used by Iran in its attack on Israel.
The UK is continuing to work closely with our partners in the G7 as we consider further measures to hold Iran’s regime to account. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
19 Apr 24. Iran’s Nuclear Threats Escalate Amid Rising Tensions with Israel. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has issued a stern warning that it might attack Israel’s nuclear sites and even reconsider its nuclear policy if Israel strikes at Iran’s nuclear facilities. This development follows statements from Israeli officials promising retaliation for Iran’s attacks last week, which were themselves in retaliation for the suspected Israeli targeting of Tehran’s consulate in Syria.
Brigadier General Ahmad Haghtalab of the IRGC was quoted on the Tasnim news website stating, “The nuclear facilities of the Zionist enemy have been identified and all the necessary information from all targets is at our disposal.” He further emphasized the readiness of the IRGC to respond strongly, noting, “Our fingers are on the trigger of firing strong missiles to destroy the designated targets in response to a potential attack by them.”
This marks Iran’s most explicit threat yet of potentially abandoning its long-stated policy against pursuing nuclear weapons. Haghtalab added, “If the fake Zionist regime wants to use the threat of attacking the nuclear centres of our country as a tool, reconsidering the doctrine and policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and deviating from previously stated considerations would be likely and imaginable.”
The backdrop of this escalation includes several sabotage attacks against Iran’s key nuclear facilities, particularly the Natanz site in central Isfahan, which have been blamed on Israel. These incidents are part of a shadow war spanning over a decade, which also saw the assassination of several Iranian nuclear scientists. Despite these provocations, Israel has not directly attacked Iranian soil.
In the context of ongoing tensions and failed negotiations to revive the 2015 nuclear deal following the United States’ withdrawal in 2018, Iran has ramped up its uranium enrichment. Currently, Iran enriches uranium up to 60 percent purity, just short of the over 90 percent required for a nuclear weapon, and has amassed sufficient fissile material for several bombs, making it a threshold nuclear state.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and U.S. intelligence currently assess that Iran has not taken further steps towards the actual construction of a nuclear bomb.
The threats and preparations come as Iranian political and military leaders assure a swift response if Israel proceeds with its attacks. Meanwhile, discussions between Tehran and Washington to rejuvenate the nuclear pact have been stagnant, with the international community closely monitoring the situation. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
19 Apr 24. Israel has reportedly struck a number of sites in Iran. Defense Priorities Fellow Daniel DePetris issued the following statement in response: “Israel’s airstrike against Iranian military targets in Isfahan is an unmistakable escalation. It is also unnecessary and potentially dangerous, particularly for the tens of thousands of U.S. troops stationed in the Middle East who are now at risk of Iranian retaliation. While Israel has the right to make its own decisions, President Biden was correct to push for immediate deescalation after Iran’s reprisal attack against Israel last weekend. Operationally speaking, that attack was a failure, with 99% of the Iranian drones and missiles shot down and the damage limited. Ideally, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would have accepted this situation as the visible victory it was, refrained from further strikes and gotten back to the status-quo. Instead, he has chosen a second round.
“If the U.S. military didn’t have such a heavy force presence in the region, perhaps the tit-for-tat between Israel and Iran would be of little consequence. But this simply isn’t the world we live in. Iranian officials have already telegraphed to Israel, the U.S., and Arab governments that any further Israeli action will produce an even harsher response. U.S. policymakers will now have to prepare for a range of escalatory scenarios, up to and including additional drone and rocket attacks from Iranian-backed proxies on U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria after a two-month hiatus.
“President Biden should be abundantly clear: The U.S. will not engage in offensive action against Iran. Another war in the Middle East is the last thing the U.S. needs or wants. The most effective way to reduce the chances of one is to pull out of Iraq and Syria and bring U.S. objectives in the region in line with our legitimate interests.” (Source: defensepriorities.org)
19 Apr 24. Iran’s air defences shot at incoming targets in the early hours of Friday amid reports of explosions, the first indications that Israel has taken retaliatory action for last week’s drone and missile attack by Tehran. Following the reported explosions in the cities of Isfahan, in central Iran, and Tabriz in the north west, Iranian state media played down the damage from the suspected attacks and Iran lifted flight restrictions imposed overnight. Separately, Syrian state media reported that Israeli missiles had targeted air defence positions in its southern region, adding that the strike had inflicted material losses. Israel has made no official comment. However Israeli politicians indicated that the country had struck Iran. The US’s ABC News reported that a senior US official had told it that Israel had launched missiles in a retaliatory strike against Iran early on Friday morning. CBS News also reported that two US officials had confirmed to it that an Israeli missile had hit Iran. Isfahan houses both an Iranian military air base and an important site in Iran’s nuclear programme, which Tehran insists is purely peaceful but which the west fears could put the Islamic Republic on the threshold of weapons capacity. Tasnim news agency, which is close to Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guards, reported that the air base and nuclear facility near Isfahan were safe and rejected reports of any attack from outside the country. A senior military official in Isfahan told state media that air defences had fired at unidentified objects and there was no damage. The International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN’s nuclear watchdog, said on Friday it could “confirm that there is no damage to Iran’s nuclear sites”. It added in a post on the social media platform X that it “continues to call for extreme restraint from everybody and reiterates that nuclear facilities should never be a target in military conflicts”. But Tally Gotliv, a lawmaker from the ruling Likud party, wrote on the platform that Israelis should have their “head . . . held high with pride” over its strength, adding: “May we regain our power of deterrence”. In a more cryptic post, Itamar Ben-Gvir, Israel’s far-right minister for national security, who had called for a “crushing attack” against Iran, wrote on X: “Weak!” Oil futures jumped following the reports. Futures for Brent crude, the international oil benchmark, rose as much as 4.2 per cent to $90.75 per barrel while West Texas Intermediate, the US marker, gained as much as 4.3 per cent to $86.28 per barrel. (Source: FT.com)
18 Apr 24. US imposes new curbs on Iran’s access to ‘low-level’ tech after attack on Israel. The U.S. is further restricting Iran’s access to “low-level technology,” in response to Iran’s April 13 attack on Israel and its military support for Russia, according to a posting Thursday by the U.S. Department of Commerce. The U.S. is adding to the list of items that require a license for export or re-export to Iran, including items made abroad with U.S. technology, the posting said. The new restrictions build on the Commerce Department’s February 2023 action targeting Iran’s involvement in supplying drones to support Russia’s war on Ukraine. They also add to the comprehensive export restrictions on Iran under U.S. law, and restrictions on Russia, Belarus and the occupied Crimea region of Ukraine. The additional export controls come as the United States announced new sanctions on Iran targeting individuals and entities enabling Iran’s drone production, including engine types that power Iran’s Shahed variant unmanned aerial vehicles, which were used in the April 13 attack. (Source: Reuters)
17 Apr 24. Israel’s Cost to Intercept Iranian Drones and Missiles Is Put at Over $550m. The cost of Israel’s interception of Iran’s missile and drone barrage on Saturday was estimated at 2.1 bn Israeli shekels, or more than $550m. The estimate–by Yehoshua Kalisky, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies, a think tank in Tel Aviv–takes into account expenses associated with intercepting half of the Iranian missiles and drones, including the use of the David’s Sling air-defense system, and also takes into account the cost of keeping 100 Israeli warplanes in the air for six hours, including fuel and weapons.
“These are enormous costs,” said Kalisky, who added that they were comparable to costs in major wars fought by Israel such as the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Saturday’s price tag was unlikely to have an immediate or long-term negative impact on Israel’s economy, Kalisky said. (Source: UAS VISION/Wall Street Journal)
17 Apr 24. Cyber Warfare Looms Between Israel and Iran. In the aftermath of Iran’s drone and missile attack on Israel on Saturday, the prospect of cyber warfare has intensified as both nations prepare for potential retaliatory measures. The attack, a rare direct confrontation, has led Israeli military leaders to consider a variety of responses, including cyber warfare. This sector has been a battleground for the two countries for years, reflecting their strained relations and history of covert operations.
The attack marked the first time Iran launched a missile from its territory directly targeting Israel, signifying a major escalation in their long-standing conflict. Andrew Borene, executive director for global security at Flashpoint, highlighted the shift to a more overt state-on-state confrontation, which could prompt more aggressive cyber and physical responses.
Experts note that both Israel and Iran possess sophisticated cyber capabilities. They have previously engaged in cyber warfare, targeting each other’s critical infrastructure and civilian services. For instance, Iran has been implicated in various cyberattacks against Israeli organizations during the ongoing conflict with Hamas. Similarly, Israel has been linked to cyber operations aimed at Iran’s nuclear program and other critical sectors.
The Israeli National Cyber Directorate has not reported any abnormal online activities during the missile attack. However, the threat level remains high, as both nations have the capability to deploy destructive malware, ransomware, and other cyber threats. This scenario is further complicated by the involvement of international hacktivist groups and politically motivated hackers, some of whom have connections to Russia. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
17 Apr 24. Israeli Airstrike Kills Senior Hezbollah Commander in Lebanon. On Tuesday, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed that an airstrike targeted and killed Ismail Yusaf Baz, a commander of Hezbollah’s coastal sector, in Ain Ebel, Lebanon. The IDF described Baz as a senior figure within Hezbollah, involved in orchestrating rocket and anti-tank missile launches towards Israel. According to the IDF, Baz played a significant role in the planning and execution of attacks against Israel, particularly during heightened periods of conflict. In response to the airstrike, Hezbollah launched explosive-laden drones towards northern Israel, triggering rocket sirens across the region. The IDF’s operation in Ain Ebel was part of a broader military response to ongoing rocket fire from Hezbollah. Additional strikes were reported in other towns in southern Lebanon, including Ain Baal and Shihabiya, where further casualties were reported by Lebanon’s state-run National News Agency. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
16 Apr 24. Israel, U.S., Partners Neutralize Iranian Airborne Attacks. Last weekend, Iran and its proxy groups launched more than 300 airborne weapons at targets in Israel, but the U.S., Israeli and partner forces destroyed a significant portion of them before they reached their targets. Among the weapons launched from locations in Iran, Syria and Yemen were over 110 medium-range ballistic missiles, more then 30 land-attack cruise missiles and over 150 uncrewed aerial vehicles. The attack began in Israel late Saturday evening and ended early in the morning on April 14. U.S. Central Command forces, supported by the U.S. Navy destroyers USS Arleigh Burke and USS Carney, destroyed more than 80 one-way attack UAVs and at least six of the ballistic missiles, said Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder during a briefing yesterday.
“As our actions demonstrated, the U.S. support for the defense of Israel is robust,” Ryder said. “It also demonstrates the long-standing security cooperation relationship that the United States has — not only with Israel, but with countries throughout the region — when it comes to addressing regional threats. Those kinds of things don’t happen overnight. Those kinds of relationships and the ability to work together, to interoperate together all played out and saved many lives.”
The general said that since the attack ended, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III has discussed the situation with international partners, allies, Air Force Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. CQ Brown, Jr., senior Defense Department leaders and U.S. European Command and Centcom commanders.
The defense secretary has also been in contact with his counterpart, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, Ryder said.
“During their most recent call … , the two leaders reviewed the successful combined operation by the United States, Israel and their partners to defend Israel from these unprecedented attacks by Iran and its proxies,” Ryder said.
In a statement released following the attacks, Austin commended the efforts of U.S. forces and allies, condemned the attacks, and reiterated both the U.S. right to defend its forces in the Middle East and the U.S. commitment to Israel.
“I am grateful for the professionalism and the skill of the brave U.S. troops who took part in today’s actions and who continue to stand guard to prevent further conflict or escalation,” Austin said. “We condemn these reckless and unprecedented attacks by Iran and its proxies, and we call on Iran to immediately halt any further attacks — including from its proxy forces — and to deescalate tensions. We do not seek conflict with Iran, but we will not hesitate to act to protect our forces and support the defense of Israel.” (Source: U.S. DoD)
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