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Military And Security Developments
Apr 04.
KEY POINTS
- An Israel Defense Forces (IDF) drone strike against an NGO aid convoy in Gaza highlights the misidentification and security risks for NGOs in Gaza, as well as the elevated likelihood of worsening humanitarian conditions and food insecurity due to disrupted aid operations.
- An alleged Israeli airstrike in Damascus (Syria) that killed top IRGC generals has raised regional instability risks, as well as physical and cyber attack risks in Israel and for Israel-linked entities worldwide. However, Iran is likely to use its proxies to retaliate (a direct Iranian attack is unlikely)
- Gaza: A deadly IDF strike against NGO aid workers highlights the substantial misidentification risks in Gaza. On 1 April, an IDF drone strike against a World Central Kitchen (WCK) aid convoy in Gaza killed seven workers. The strike highlights co-ordination issues between aid organisations and the IDF/Israeli government and the resultant misidentification and security risks. These risks will remain heightened in the coming days until Israel constructs better co-ordination and communication mechanisms to work with NGOs in Gaza to prevent further incidents.
- Israel-Lebanon: Hostilities along the Israel-Lebanon border continue, but at a reduced pace compared to the previous monitoring period. However, the Israeli strike in Syria on 1 April (see below) has elevated the risk of another uptick in hostilities, including rocket and missile strikes in northern Israel. Such escalation would drive the possibility of an expansion of this threat to central Israel, particularly around IDF bases and critical infrastructure, such as electricity substations.
- Israel-Iran-Syria: The alleged Israeli strike against the Iranian embassy complex in Damascus (Syria) killed three high-ranking Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officers, elevating regional security risks. The strike killed two generals and one major general, including General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, the head of Iran’s operations in Syria and Lebanon. Iran and LH have blamed Israel and vowed to retaliate. However, Iran remains unlikely to attack Israel directly and will likely seek to retaliate through its proxies, such as LH and pro-Iran Iraqi militants. Such retaliation attempts will elevate security and cyber risks in Israel and worldwide in the coming weeks, especially for Israeli and Israel-linked entities, particularly around Israeli diplomatic missions.
- Israel: A drone launched by pro-Iran Iraqi militants successfully hit the IDF naval base in Eilat (Southern district) on 1 April, highlighting Iranian proxies’ increasing capabilities. The drone struck a hangar at the IDF naval base, causing no injuries or casualties. Regardless of its limited impact, the drone’s ability to evade aerial defences and hit a military target underlines the increasing military capabilities of Iranian proxies and their capacity to strike Israel. Further attempts are likely in the coming days, particularly after the Israeli strike in Syria (see above), elevating security risks across Israel.
- Israel: Increasing rates of attempted and successful attacks highlight elevated security risks emanating from militant groups and sole perpetrators across Israel. On 31 March, two separate sole-perpetrator stabbing attacks took place. The first sole perpetrator targeted an IDF officer at Beersheba Central Bus Station (Southern district) and caused minor injuries. The second sole perpetrator targeted civilians in a mall at Gan Yavne (Central district) and killed one civilian while wounding two others. The developments come amid reports that the Israeli security forces have arrested 11 people who were allegedly planning terror attacks in recent months. These include a relatively sophisticated operation involving small arms, explosives and multiple layers of attack in Kiryat Arba (Hebron governorate, the West Bank) and a planned assassination (by RPG) of Israeli Minister of National Security Itamar Ben Gvir. Additionally, in the past month the Israeli security agencies arrested two IS supporters who planned a shooting attack against a police station in East Jerusalem and a bombing attack on the Teddy Stadium in Jerusalem. The frequency of relatively low-level sole-perpetrator attacks and the number of sophisticated potentially high-impact terrorist plots highlight increasing security and bystander risks across Israel. Additionally, the identity of the assailants and those who were arrested, several of whom were residents of the Arab Bedouin city Rahat (Southern district), underscore the rising rates of radicalisation within Israel’s Arab population.
- West Bank: The trend of gradually increasing levels of militant activity and IDF operations in the West Bank continues, with northern areas of the West Bank remaining a militant hot spot. Jenin, Tulkarm and Tubas governorates experienced the most intense clashes between the IDF and Palestinian militants in the past week, with multiple recorded uses of IEDs. This trend is likely to continue, with increased militant activity in the West Bank further elevating attack risks, particularly near IDF positions, Israeli settlements, bus stations and roads.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Several NGOs have suspended their operations in Gaza following the IDF strike against the WCK vehicle, highlighting increasing food insecurity risks. Following the strike, both the WCK and Anera NGOs announced that they would temporarily suspend operations in Gaza given critical security threats to staff. Subsequently, on 2 April, the UAE announced it would pause humanitarian aid deliveries through the Cyprus-Gaza sea corridor until the IDF provided further safety guarantees for NGO staff. These suspensions highlight elevated risks of operational disruption; NGO staff and assets continue to face critical physical security risks throughout Gaza. As combat operations continue to obstruct aid deliveries, restricted access to food aid will almost certainly sustain critical levels of food insecurity, particularly in northern and central Gaza.
- Hamas continues to target non-aligned Palestinian figures in Gaza, underscoring significant long-term governance concerns. On 31 March, Hamas’ internal security services announced the detention of ten Palestinian Authority (PA) security personnel accused of collaborating with the IDF while facilitating aid deliveries within Gaza. This incident highlights Hamas’ ongoing efforts to undermine competing aid distribution networks and governance structures within Gaza (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 14 March 2024). Violence and arrests targeting non-Hamas aid distribution operations underscore long-term governance challenges within Gaza and highlight significant concerns over the IDF’s capacity to achieve its stated war aims of dismantling Hamas’ governance capabilities and replacing them with a non-aligned civil administration.
- Egyptian state media indicated that Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations resumed on 31 March, though prospects for an agreement remain low. Negotiations continue to stall between Israel and Hamas due to disagreements over plans for managing the return of displaced civilians to northern Gaza. Reports indicate that Israel has proposed allowing a gradual, month-long return of approximately 60,000 minors, women and elderly individuals to northern Gaza to be housed in tents. Hamas has reportedly rejected this proposal, highlighting continued sticking points and a lack of progress in ceasefire negotiations.
- Anti-government protest activity continues to proliferate in Jerusalem, underscoring elevated risks of domestic unrest and clashes with the security forces. From 1-3 April, thousands of anti-government protesters demonstrated in Jerusalem calling for elections and hostage releases. On 2 April, demonstrators breached the security cordon of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s official residence on Azza Street, obstructed traffic and marched with lit torches. The police dispersed protesters using water cannons and arrested at least five people, resulting in moderate physical altercations. On 3 April, protesters also entered the Knesset, defacing the visitors gallery. Israel’s security services (Shin Bet) subsequently issued a warning against violent protest activity, underscoring the elevated risks of domestic unrest as anti-government sentiment continues to rise.
- Amid increasing coalition tensions, opposition leader Benny Gantz has called for an early general election, moderately elevating long-term government stability risks. Gantz’s statement on 4 April highlights significant tensions within the unity government that are likely driven by a lack of progress in ceasefire negotiations. This has exacerbated protest activity and disputes over drafting ultra-Orthodox men into the IDF (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 28 March 2024). While an election remains highly unlikely in the short term, there is a realistic possibility of a snap election in late 2024. Increasing tensions between coalition partners will likely sustain elevated policy risks in the short-to-medium term, while increasing domestic opposition to Netanyahu’s leadership will likely elevate threats to government stability in the event that an election is called.
FORECAST
Over the coming weekend, International Quds Day (5 April), which coincides with the last Friday of Ramadan and comes amid recent Iranian threats of retaliation, will be marked by increased security risks across Israel. Iran will likely retaliate following the attack on its consulate in Damascus (Syria) by increasing support for its regional proxy network, increasing physical security and bystander risks throughout Israel. In the coming weeks, Iranian proxies, including the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) and LH, will likely escalate the frequency and intensity of attacks on Israel, elevating physical security and bystander risks nationwide. Although IRI and LH attacks will likely continue primarily targeting IDF positions, security risks for civilians will remain heightened across Israel. Additionally, there is a realistic possibility that Iranian-aligned groups with operations in Lebanon and Syria will also escalate their attacks against Israeli population centres in northern Israel. In the coming weeks, Iran will likely escalate its efforts to form and expand proxies in Jordan, elevating the likelihood of cross-border weapons smuggling and militant crossings into the West Bank. These will drive militant activity, particularly in the northern West Bank, as well as attack risks across Israel, particularly in its Southern district.
However, a direct Iranian attack on Israel resulting in a confrontation between the two countries remains unlikely. Regardless, the Iranian perception that the US supported the attack in Syria through intelligence or logistics (despite US denial) will elevate regional instability risks. There is a realistic possibility that Iranian proxies will re-escalate their operations and attacks against US forces in the region in the coming weeks, particularly in Syria and Iraq, elevating security risks near US positions.
Beyond attacks on Israel, Iran will likely direct its proxies to conduct attacks on assets and installations associated with Israel worldwide, elevating global security and collateral risks in the coming weeks. Such attacks will likely primarily target Israeli government assets and personnel (including embassies, consulates and diplomatic staff) and/or high-profile business assets with demonstrable links to Israel (e.g. trade missions). However, while they are unlikely, attacks targeting lower-profile assets without clear links to Israel remain possible, particularly in countries with a significant proxy presence, namely Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. Iran will also likely escalate cyber attacks on Israeli government entities and businesses via its state-sponsored cyber threat actors, elevating the risks of service disruption and data leaks in the coming weeks. Similarly, there is a realistic possibility that the Yemen-based Houthis will escalate attacks against international shipping lanes through the Red Sea in the coming days, increasing threats to commercial vessels and crews, particularly those traversing the Bab el Mandeb strait.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
- A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
- The ongoing IDF ground operation expands further into southern Gaza
*Israel: GPS disruption, elevated security risks will likely continue in coming days. On 4 April, citizens in central Israel reported that GPS disruption affected navigation apps. GPS disruption became common in northern Israel following the 7 October Hamas attack and the elevation of hostilities with Lebanese Hizballah (LH), but not in central Israel. The disruption is likely related to preparation efforts ahead of pro-Palestine gatherings and possible violence around International Quds Day on 5 April, particularly after the Israeli airstrike against the Iranian embassy complex in Syria on 1 April. It highlights the security forces’ heightened alertness and their anticipation of Iranian retaliation. While a direct Iranian strike remains unlikely, missile and drone attacks by its proxies, mainly LH and pro-Iranian Iraqi militias, remain likely. We assess that such attacks would elevate security risks across Israel, particularly near critical infrastructure such as electricity substations and high-profile military bases. GPS disruption is likely to continue intermittently across the weekend, though disruption to flights is unlikely.
*Iran: Augmented security posture is likely after overnight attack; cross-border strike risks are limited. On the night of 3-4 April, the Sunni Jaish al-Adl militant group killed five Iranian security officers and wounded ten others during attacks against facilities in Chabahar and Rask (both Sistan and Baluchestan province). Jaish al-Adl frequently conducts attacks in Sistan and Baluchestan; the latest incidents come shortly after an attack against a civilian convoy on 26 March which killed two people. As such, we assess that the most likely response will involve a spike in the security posture across the province, particularly in the vicinity of Chabahar and Rask, disrupting movement and increasing the threat of arbitrary detention. However, following the 1 April assassinations of senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) personnel in Syria, the Iranian authorities will possibly seek a more forceful response. As such, there is a limited possibility of strikes against Jaish al-Adl bases in Pakistan. This threat will be partly moderated by pledges to co-operate with Pakistan on counter-terrorism efforts following the last exchange of cross-border strikes in January
Apr 02.
*Armenia-Azerbaijan: Further provocations, troop deployments along border will elevate conflict risks. Earlier on 2 April, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that Armenian forces fired on Azerbaijani positions in the Nakhchivan exclave. However, the Armenian MoD refuted the allegations and instead stated that Azerbaijani forces fired on Armenian positions in Gegharkunik and Syunik provinces (both Armenia). Baku accused Yerevan on 31 March of amassing troops, armoured vehicles and firepower along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border; Yerevan and the EU’s border-monitoring mission in Armenia dismissed these claims. The latest developments reflect elevated regional tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan. On 18 March, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan warned of the possibility of a new conflict in the near term if Yerevan does not return disputed border villages to Azerbaijan. Ultimately, we assess that further alleged or genuine border provocations will likely increase the risk of armed conflict in the coming weeks.
*Kyrgyzstan: Russian-style foreign agent bill will elevate risks facing Western-funded NGOs, media. On 2 April, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov signed into law a bill on foreign representatives that was approved by the parliament on 14 March. The bill imposes auditing requirements for NGOs and media outlets categorised as ‘foreign representatives’ and engaged in activities deemed to be ‘political’. It defines foreign representatives as entities that receive funding from abroad. It also imposes criminal liability for entities that fail to register. On 25 March, 90 international NGOs petitioned Japarov to withdraw the bill, claiming that it threatens their operating environment. Japarov stated that the bill will not result in the persecution of NGOs and that it primarily aims to impede foreign interference in Bishkek’s domestic politics. However, like Russia’s foreign agent law passed in 2012, the law adopts a vague definition of political activities; this will allow the authorities to crack down on Western-funded NGOs and media outlets deemed critical of the government, which in turn will raise operational and compliance risks facing these Western-funded outfits. We assess that the bill underscores the continued deterioration of governance standards under Japarov’s rule.
*Global: Likely Israeli strike against IRGC commanders will raise retaliation risks across region, world. On 1 April, a likely Israeli airstrike against a building adjacent to the Iranian embassy in Damascus (Syria) killed three senior commanders of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The strike followed a successful drone attack against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)’s naval base in Eilat (Southern district, Israel) by Iranian-backed Iraqi militants earlier that day (the attack against the naval base caused no casualties). Among those killed in the Damascus strike was General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, the IRGC’s senior-most commander in Syria and Lebanon. This is the most significant killing of a top Iranian IRGC commander since the US assassination of Qasem Soleimani in 2020. We assess that attempted Iranian retaliatory attacks are highly likely around the world in the coming weeks, and that these will elevate security and bystander risks around Israeli-associated assets, individuals and organisations (particularly in areas with a substantial Iranian proxy presence, such as Iraq). Cyber attack risks facing Israeli institutions and businesses in Israel will also likely increase. Iranian proxies will also likely attempt to conduct additional drone and rocket strikes into Israel, sustaining already elevated attack risks across the country. (Source: Sibylline)
*Europe region: Weapons cache indicates Hamas likely has access to arms in Europe. On 3 April, Germany’s Der Spiegel reported that investigators discovered a suspected Hamas weapons cache in an undisclosed location in southern Bulgaria. The limited publicly available information indicates that the cache comprises pistols. The discovery is linked to ongoing investigations into an alleged Hamas-directed terrorist plot in Europe that was thwarted in December 2023. Suspected Hamas members arrested in Berlin (Germany) and Rotterdam (Netherlands) were accused of receiving orders to locate the weapons in order to carry out attacks against Jewish institutions, possibly in Berlin. The discovery is therefore highly notable as it indicates that Hamas possesses (or at least has access to) weapons in Europe. It is unlikely, however, to indicate that Hamas has any notable presence in Bulgaria, which has long been a ‘transit’ country for illicit trafficking into the EU via Turkey. The suspects also reportedly travelled to Poland multiple times. We assess that the risk of Islamist terrorism in Europe is likely to remain elevated while the Israel-Hamas conflict persists.
*Israel-US: Persistent challenges facing aid deliveries will likely sustain threats to bilateral relations. On 4 April, US President Joe Biden warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that the US’ policy on the Israel-Hamas war will be determined by Israel’s actions vis-à-vis the bolstering of humanitarian aid and the safety of aid workers. The call follows the deaths of seven foreign aid workers from the World Central Kitchen (including a US citizen) in a drone strike on 1 April. Following the call, Israel confirmed that it would reopen the Erez crossing into northern Gaza (closed since 7 October), as well as (temporarily) the port at Ashdod (Southern district) for humanitarian imports; it will also facilitate increased Jordanian aid through the Kerem Shalom crossing. However, protesters demanding the return of hostages have previously targeted aid crossing into Gaza from Israel. Furthermore, distribution capacity within Gaza is limited. As such, there remains an elevated threat facing the provision of aid, which will undermine efforts to address the mounting humanitarian crisis. We assess that such disruption will sustain the likelihood of tensions rising between the US and Israel, though a significant shift in policy around weapons shipments remains unlikely.
*Syria: Killing of senior jihadist will elevate security risks, localised clashes amid Islamist infighting. On 4 April, a suicide bomber killed Abu Maria al-Qahtani (also known as Maysr al-Jabouri) at his home in Sarmada (Idlib governorate). Qahtani was one of the founders of the al-Nusra Front which later formed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Sunni Islamist armed political group. HTS claimed that Islamic State (IS) conducted the bombing, though IS has yet to claim the attack. Qahtani was previously in conflict with HTS; the group imprisoned him for treason in August 2023. He was released in March following mounting domestic unrest against HTS in Idlib and calls for the release of detainees. We assess there is a realistic possibility that HTS, which faces increasing factionalism and internal divisions, ordered the killing of Qahtani. We also assess there is a realistic possibility that his death will increase the likelihood of jihadist infighting, and that this will escalate into a localised armed conflict between HTS factions, exposing local staff in Idlib (particularly NGOs) to incidental attack risks.
05 Apr 24. Houthi Rebels May be Depleting Weapon Stocks, US Commander Indicates. Lt. Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, the commander of U.S. Air Forces Central, noted a reduction in the frequency of Houthi rebel attacks in strategic maritime zones. This observation leads to speculation that the Iran-backed group may be facing shortages in their stocks of drone swarms and anti-ship ballistic missiles. The decrease in attack frequency is partly attributed to consistent U.S. retaliatory actions against the militia, which have impacted their operational capacity. The Houthi rebels, operating from Yemen, have targeted both commercial and military vessels with drones and missiles, causing disruptions in a vital shipping route. The United States and its allies have escalated their naval presence and conducted retaliatory strikes on Houthi weapon caches in response. Despite these measures, the exact extent of the depletion of Houthi weapon supplies remains unclear, complicated by the lack of a baseline intelligence assessment of the group’s initial arsenal and continuous Iranian resupply efforts. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
05 Apr 24. Israel Suspends Military Leave and Calls Up Reservists in Response to Airstrike Fallout with Iran.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced a halt on leave for all combat units and initiated a call-up of reservists to bolster air defenses, in response to heightened tensions with Iran. The situation escalated following an Israeli airstrike in Damascus, which resulted in the death of a senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander, Mohammad Reza Zahedi. Iran, through its President Ebrahim Raisi, has vowed a “heavy price” for Israel’s actions.
IDF spokesperson R.-Adm. Daniel Hagari emphasized that Israeli soldiers are strategically deployed and ready for various scenarios, underscoring the preparedness of the IDF across all fronts without altering the Home Front Command’s guidelines. Despite this reassurance, air-raid sirens have been activated multiple times in northern Israel and communities bordering the southern Gaza Strip, indicating a heightened state of alert. In response to attacks, the IDF has targeted Hezbollah launch sites in southern Lebanon and engaged terrorist cells in central Gaza.
Amidst these military actions, Israel has implemented GPS blocking across central areas to disrupt missile and drone targeting, a defensive measure that has affected civilians’ use of location-based services. This unusual tactic, described as “spoofing,” has led to widespread signal interference, prompting advisories for residents to manually adjust their location settings for accurate rocket attack alerts.
As Quds Day approaches, a day marked by pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel rallies, Israeli officials anticipate possible retaliatory actions from Iran. Amidst these military preparations and electronic countermeasures, IDF spokespeople have urged the public against panic buying.
The developments come as Israel faces international scrutiny over the recent killing of seven aid workers in Gaza, an incident that has intensified calls for a ceasefire and measures to mitigate civilian harm and humanitarian suffering. The U.S. has also expressed concerns, with President Joe Biden urging Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu towards immediate action to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
05 Apr 24. Strike on Iran’s consulate in Syria is ‘turning point’, Hezbollah head says. The head of Lebanon’s armed group Hezbollah said on Friday that Israel’s strike on Iran’s consulate in Damascus this week marked a “turning point” since Oct. 7, when Palestinian group Hamas launched an attack on Israel that has led to escalating regional tensions.
The Damascus strike on Monday killed seven Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps members, among them a senior Quds Force commander, Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi. Iran has vowed revenge.
Iran-backed Hezbollah has said it supports Iran’s right to “punish” Israel, and in televised remarks on Friday, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah said the response was coming.
“Be certain, be sure, that the Iranian response to the targeting of the consulate in Damascus is definitely coming against Israel,” he said.
Israel has braced itself for the possibility of a retaliatory attack, cancelling leave for all combat units and mobilising more troops for air defence units.
Speaking to Israeli forces at an air base on Friday, Defence Minister Yoav Gallant said Israel was attacking enemies wherever it decided to do so.
“It could be in Damascus and it could be in Beirut,” he said. “The enemy is badly hit in all places and is therefore looking for ways to respond. We are ready with a multi-layered defence.”
Until now, Iran has avoided directly entering the fray, while supporting a slew of attacks on Israeli and U.S. targets by its allies across the region in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Iraq.
00:21UN chief hopes Israel quickly boosts Gaza aid access
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Diplomats and analysts say Iran’s clerical elite does not want an all-out war with Israel or the U.S. that might endanger its grip on power, and would prefer to keep using its proxies to carry out selective tactical attacks on its foes.
Hezbollah, as well as its ally Amal and Palestinian groups based in Lebanon, have been trading fire with Israel across Lebanon’s southern border since Oct. 8.
On Saturday, an Israeli strike on the town of Marjayoun killed three Amal fighters, according to security and medical sources. Nearly 270 Hezbollah fighters have also been killed.
Nasrallah on Friday said his group still had weapons and forces that it had not yet used against Israel.
(Source: Reuters)
06 Apr 24. US on high alert for Iran threat in region after Israeli strike in Syria. The United States is on high alert and preparing for a possible attack by Iran targeting Israeli or American assets in the region in response to Israel’s strike on the Iranian embassy in Syria, a U.S. official said on Friday.
“We’re definitely at a high state of vigilance,” the official said in confirming a CNN report that said an attack could come in the next week.
Suspected Israeli warplanes bombed Iran’s embassy in Damascus on Monday in a strike that killed an Iranian military commander and marked a major escalation in Israel’s war with its regional adversaries.
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has said that seven Iranian military advisers died in the strike, including Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a senior commander in its Quds Force, which is an elite foreign espionage and paramilitary arm.
Iran has said it reserves the right “to take a decisive response.”
U.S. President Joe Biden discussed the threat from Iran in a phone call on Thursday with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
“Our teams have been in regular and continuous contact since then. The United States fully supports the defense of Israel against threats from Iran,” a senior Biden administration official said.
(Source: Reuters)
04 Apr 24. Danish frigate suffered weapon system failure in Red Sea combat, captain says. A Danish frigate deployed to the Red Sea as part of a U.S.-led operation suffered malfunctioning of its weapon systems when attacked by drones operated by Houthi militants last month, the captain said on Thursday as the ship arrived in Denmark.
The failure, which until Thursday had only been reported by local defence media Olfi citing a confidential report by the ship’s captain, prompted the government to dismiss its top military official Flemming Lentfer on Wednesday.
Defence Minister Troels Lund Poulsen said the dismissal was a result of a breach of trust, after Lentfer failed to inform the ministry in detail about the incident on March 9 when the frigate Iver Huitfeldt was attacked by Houthi militants.
Despite the malfunction, the frigate shot down four drones, the vessel’s captain and commanding officer Sune Lund told Reuters.
“We had some system failure, or system degradation, which challenged a bit our engagement,” Lund said without elaborating.
“But at no time during the engagement were we left defenceless. We had redundancies on board, so we were able to continue fighting and neutralising the threats.”
The armed forces posted a dramatic video, opens new tab on social media showing the downing of the drones, the first time a Danish warship had been in direct combat since 1943.
The frigate, which returned to Korsor naval base on Thursday, had been deployed as part of the U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian to help safeguard commercial sea traffic in the Red Sea. It was recalled early from the mission.
00:28Biden tells Netanyahu to protect Gaza civilians
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Defence Minister Troels Lund Poulsen and head of the Danish Navy Command Henrik Ryberg had on departure assured that the ship was ready and capable of the mission.
“Leaving the naval base, everything was good,” Lund said, adding that the reason for the failure was still being investigated.
“I feel confident that all steps have been taken in order to mitigate the challenges that we faced during the night,” he said.
Separately, an activated but faulty missile launcher on another Danish navy vessel docked next to Iver Huitfeldt on Thursday triggered the closure of airspace and shipping traffic in the Great Belt strait, one of the world’s busiest sea lanes and the main maritime access to the Baltic Sea.
A founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Denmark scaled back its military capabilities after the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s.
The Nordic country has announced a major boost in military spending to achieve a NATO target of 2% of gross domestic product, from 1.4% last year. (Source: Reuters)
04 Apr 24. Israeli AI Program Lavender Commands Airstrikes with Minimal Human Oversight. A groundbreaking investigation by +972 Magazine and Local Call has unveiled “Lavender,” an artificial intelligence program developed by the Israeli army, which plays a significant role in conducting airstrikes in Gaza with minimal human oversight. Lavender is engineered to identify and mark tens of thousands of Gazans, including those associated with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, as assassination targets. This AI system, highlighted for its capability to process vast data sets to generate potential military strike targets, has been pivotal in the operational strategy of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), particularly during the initial phases of the ongoing conflict. According to firsthand accounts from six Israeli intelligence officers, Lavender’s influence is profound, treating its target suggestions with the same regard as human decision-making. In the war’s early weeks, the IDF heavily relied on Lavender, marking as many as 37,000 Palestinians and their residences for possible airstrikes. The reliance on AI for such critical decisions marks a significant shift in military tactics, emphasizing efficiency and speed over traditional verification processes. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
04 Apr 24. Austin Calls for ‘Rapid Increase’ of Aid Into Gaza Through All Crossings. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III spoke yesterday with Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant. The two discussed the ongoing conflict in Gaza, Israeli efforts to ensure the defeat of Hamas and the need to secure the release of all hostages, said Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder during a briefing today.
Also part of the discussion was the need for an increase in humanitarian aid to Gaza, Ryder said.
“Secretary Austin again raised the need for a rapid increase of aid coming through all crossings in the coming days, particularly to communities in northern Gaza that are at risk of famine,” Ryder said.
The Gaza Strip, which is about 25 miles long, lies entirely inside Israel and shares a border to the south with Egypt. There are three locations along its border where humanitarian supplies could move into Gaza from either Egypt or Israel. Those locations include the Erez crossing in northern Gaza and the Kerem Shalom crossing in southern Gaza. Both of those crossings connect Gaza to Israel. The Rafah crossing is on the Gaza border with Egypt.
Right now, all three crossings are either closed or have limited availability.
The U.S. has continued to press the Israeli government to allow more aid to flow though all available land crossings.
Meanwhile, the U.S. is planning a maritime route from the Mediterranean Sea onto the shore of Gaza using the Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore capability, also called JLOTS.
Using JLOTS, DOD will build a floating pier and then push it onto the shore of Gaza. Once that capability is in place and is fully operational, it’s expected as many as 2 m humanitarian aid meals per day could be delivered into Gaza.
The ships carrying the JLOTS equipment and the service members who will assemble it are now en route to the Mediterranean Sea.
“We expect to achieve … full operations capability by the end of the month early May,” Ryder said. “Of course, we are working to move as quickly as we can on that front. Once operational, … the capability that that will provide is the ability to send upwards of 2 m meals per day into Gaza.”
Ryder said the department is “on track” for getting the JLOTS capability in place.
The department, he said, is also working with partners in the region to discuss how aid delivered via the JLOTS pier will be offloaded in Gaza and distributed. Security is also a concern, he said.
“Israel has committed to providing security on the shore for that effort,” he said. “When it comes to the receiving and then onward distribution of that aid, we’re working with USAID and others to finalize those details.”
Since March 2, 2024, U.S. Central Command, sometimes in coordination with the Royal Jordanian Air Force, has conducted 23 humanitarian missions to airdrop aid into Gaza. Since that time, more than 680,000 meals or meal equivalents have been provided. (Source: U.S. DoD)
01 Apr 24. Israeli Airstrikes Hit Iranian Consulate in Syria, Killing Top IRGC Commanders. Three high-ranking IRGC officials were killed in what is suspected to be an Israeli airstrike targeting a diplomatic annex near the Iranian Embassy in Damascus, Syria. Iran state media confirmed the identities of the deceased as follows:
- Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, the Force Commander for Syria and Lebanon.
- General Hossein Amanullah, the Force Chief of General Staff for Syria and Lebanon.
- Major General Haj Rahimi, designated as the Force Commander for Palestine.
The strike, which occurred Monday, marked one of the most notable attacks against Iran’s military leadership since the killing of Qassem Soleimani in 2020. This incident further intensifies the shadow conflict between Israel and Iran, characterized by covert operations, airstrikes, and reciprocal threats.
The Syrian interior and foreign ministers were observed at the site of the attack. This incident comes just five days after Iran confirmed the loss of several officers in previous Israeli airstrikes within Syrian territory. Iran has pledged a “harsh” response against Israel, raising concerns about potential retaliatory measures. Analysts speculate that Iran’s response could include missile strikes against Iraqi Kurdistan or escalated attacks against American forces in the region by Iran-backed militia forces.
The Iranian government has attributed the attack to Israel, reporting that the airstrike was conducted by six missiles launched from Israeli F-35 warplanes targeting the consulate facility adjacent to the Iranian embassy. The building suffered significant damage, as evidenced by photographs showing the leveled structure and subsequent footage of fires and extensive destruction. Iran’s ambassador to Syria, Hossein Akbari, noted that embassy staff and military advisers were among the casualties.
While the Israel Defense Forces have not issued a direct statement regarding this incident, they have described the targeted establishment as a military base for the Quds forces, negating its diplomatic status. This stance is consistent with Israel’s policy of conducting preemptive strikes against perceived threats from Iranian-backed forces in the region. Iran’s Foreign Ministry and Syria’s Foreign Minister have accused Israel of violating international norms, specifically referencing the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. This incident underscores the ongoing and complex geopolitical conflict between Israel and Iran, highlighting the fragile security situation in the Middle East and the potential for further escalation. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company
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