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Military And Security Developments
Feb 29.
KEY POINTS
- The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) shooting of Palestinian civilians approaching an aid convoy will likely elevate international pressure on Israel, while also raising domestic unrest risks in regional countries.
- A shooting near an Israeli settlement in the West Bank will increase security and bystander risks in the coming days; there is a realistic possibility of Israeli settler violence and riots in Palestinian towns.
- Gaza: Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) militants fired rockets from northern Gaza towards Ashkelon (Southern district) on 27 February; the strikes resulted in material damage but no casualties. In response, the IDF conducted intense airstrikes against eight identified sources of fire. The launches further underline the gradual return of militants to northern Gaza and the persistence of militant factions other than Hamas in the strip. The persistence of these militant factions will raise concerns about which groups will seek to take control of Gaza in the event of a power vacuum and/or challenge the stability of a new (and weak) government.
- West Bank: IDF operations continued on trend; the IDF killed the commander of PIJ’s Tubas battalion during an operation in Fara camp (Tubas governorate) on 27 February. Following the operation and on the same day, Tubas residents conducted a general strike and PIJ operatives launched rockets towards Ashkelon (see above). The developments reflect the sporadic threat of spikes in violence and retaliation in the immediate aftermath of operations in which senior militants are killed, as well as the close relations between PIJ factions in the West Bank and Gaza. Given the operational familiarity between the two branches, the recent rocket barrage against Ashkelon will likely prompt the IDF to escalate its operations against PIJ members in the West Bank in the coming days, elevating bystander security risks, travel disruption and ethno-religious tensions.
- West Bank: On 29 February, two Palestinians shot dead two individuals at a petrol station near Eli, an Israeli settlement. A similar shooting took place at the same gas station in June 2023, underscoring a heightened attack threat in this area. Following the latest shooting, an elevated security force posture is likely across the West Bank, particularly in Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate (see the Forecast below).
- Israel-Lebanon: In the past 72 hours, Lebanese Hizballah (LH) increased the frequency and intensity of its cross-border launches; it mainly targeted IDF bases. In response, the IDF increased the frequency of its attacks in southern Lebanon, hitting targets outside its usual strike range. On 26 February, and following an IDF strike north of Beirut (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 26 February 2024), LH launched several substantial rocket barrages towards Israel; one consisted of over 50 rockets. During the barrages, one rocket hit the command base of Division 210, near Ortal, causing no significant damage or casualties. Additionally, on 26 February, the IDF used an attack drone to assassinate a senior LH figure, Hassan Hussein Salami. Subsequently, LH continued launching barrages on 27 February, hitting Highway 89 and narrowly missing civilian vehicles; it also hit the IDF Air Traffic Control Base at Mount Meron (Northern district). The IDF confirmed damage was caused to the base, though reiterated that it remains operational. The uptick in hostilities, particularly the targeting of Highway 89, highlights the elevated bystander security risks facing northern Israel; these will likely persist through at least the coming week.
- Syria: On 28 February, Israel struck three locations in Sayyidah Zaynab (Rif Dimashq governorate, Syria); the attacks targeted Iranian-affiliated compounds and killed an unspecified number of LH members. Since the start of the Israel-Hamas war, the IDF has targeted the town of Sayyidah Zaynab on several occasions; as such, the strikes are consistent with the area’s already elevated security and bystander risk profile. However, the risk of strikes in Syria is likely to increase in line with mounting hostility between the IDF and LH (the IDF identifies Syria as an acceptable target for retaliation in response to LH operations).
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- On 29 February, hundreds of Palestinians rushed an aid truck convoy in northern Gaza; the incident resulted in a stampede and numerous deaths. The IDF opened fire on individuals whom it subsequently claimed endangered IDF personnel. A preliminary IDF investigation reported that IDF personnel shot and killed ten individuals; the incident also resulted in numerous crush-related injuries. Reports indicate that as individuals began looting aid trucks, truck drivers attempting to evacuate the scene killed numerous civilians with their vehicles. By contrast, the Hamas-controlled health ministry reported that IDF gunfire killed at least 80 civilians. This incident highlights the significant operational risks facing humanitarian organisations attempting to deliver aid in Gaza as humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate, particularly in northern Gaza.
- The Israeli government has reportedly rejected measures that restrict Israeli-Arab access to the al-Aqsa mosque compound over Ramadan, though ethno-religious tensions remain elevated. On 28 February, the War Cabinet rejected National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir’s proposals to restrict Israeli Arabs’ access to the al-Aqsa mosque compound during the Ramadan period (11 March-9 April). The proposal’s rejection will likely moderate elevated ethno-religious tensions in Israel, as well as risks of protest activity in cities with significant Arab populations, such as Haifa (Haifa district). However, the cabinet is yet to reject proposals to restrict West Bank Palestinian civilians’ access to the compound during Ramadan. As such, ethno-religious tensions and the risk of attacks targeting Israeli security personnel and/or civilians in the Jerusalem area will remain elevated, in line with previous assessments (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 5 February 2024).
- On 28 February, family members of Israeli hostages began a three-day march from the Gaza border to Jerusalem, driving elevated mobility disruption and increased protest activity. The march began in Kibbutz Reim (Southern district) and its participants are currently walking to Jerusalem via Sderot, Kiryat Gat, Beit Guvrin, Beit Shemesh and Kibbutz Tzora (in that order), disrupting overland movement via Routes 1 and 38. As the participants approach Jerusalem, the march will likely attract additional participants, elevating risks of disruption to travel into and out of the city, particularly along Route 1. The march will conclude in Paris Square in Jerusalem on 2 March, coinciding with the weekly hostage release protests in the city.
FORECAST
The IDF shooting of Palestinians approaching a humanitarian aid convoy will likely elevate regional tensions and international pressure on Israel. Conflicting reports on the number of casualties are likely to elevate domestic unrest in neighbouring countries such as Egypt and Jordan. In particular, there is a realistic possibility that domestic unrest will drive the Jordanian government to degrade its economic and diplomatic relations with Israel even further. However, we assess that major actions, such as the cancelation of peace treaties or the Abraham Accords, remain unlikely. Furthermore, the incident is likely to increase international pressure on Israel, particularly from the US, to reduce the intensity of operations and to relax restrictions on aid deliveries. However, persistently heightened security risks facing aid convoys, including looting, will increase the likelihood of organisations cutting aid due to operational risks. There is a realistic possibility that the incident will further enflame tensions during ceasefire negotiations; there is a realistic possibility of Hamas hardening its stance and Israel refusing to lower its demands despite increased pressure. Consequently, if negotiations fail, this will further elevate the likelihood of the IDF extending its operations into Rafah during Ramadan (11 March-10 April).
Attacks near Eli will elevate the risks of Israeli settler violence across the West Bank, particularly in Salfit (Salfit governorate), Turmus Ayya (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate) and Yatma (Nablus governorate) in the coming days. Previous attacks at the same petrol station sparked Israeli settler riots in Palestinian towns in the ensuing days, including arson attacks targeting residences and stone throwing against vehicles. As such, and despite anticipated efforts by the Israeli security forces to prevent riots, the risks of violent domestic unrest will be elevated in the coming days. The shooting, as well as the likely settler backlash, will further elevate ethno-religious tensions in the West Bank ahead of Ramadan (11 March-9 April), exacerbating the likelihood of Palestinian attacks against Israeli settlements and in the Jerusalem area during the holiday period, increasing security and bystander risks.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
- A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
- The ongoing IDF ground operation expands further into southern Gaza
*Israel-Palestinian Territories: Israeli government will likely limit access to al-Aqsa over Ramadan. On 28 February, the War Cabinet rejected proposals to restrict Israeli Arabs’ access to the al-Aqsa mosque compound over Ramadan (11 March-9 April). This comes after National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir proposed restricting Palestinians’ and Arab Israelis’ access to the compound in the coming weeks (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 5 February 2024). The proposal’s rejection will likely moderate elevated ethno-religious tensions in Israel, as well as protest activity in cities with significant Arab populations. Nonetheless, we assess that the Israeli government will still likely limit West Bank Palestinians from accessing the compound over Ramadan. As such, there is a realistic possibility of a significant uptick in protest activity and sole-perpetrator and/or militant attacks targeting Israeli security personnel and civilians in the Jerusalem area and the broader West Bank. The Israeli security forces will almost certainly maintain an elevated security posture around the compound over Ramadan, elevating the likelihood of localised clashes and disruption to overland movement.
Feb 26.
- Gaza and West Bank: IDF ground operations across Gaza remained consistent with previously observed trends; Israeli troops engaged in intense fighting in western Khan Yunis (southern Gaza). IDF operations in the West Bank remained consistent with previously observed trends, with armed clashes primarily concentrated in northern parts.
- Israel-Lebanon: The uptick in hostilities between the IDF and Lebanese Hizballah has continued. Lebanese Hizballah downed an IDF drone over Lebanon on 26 February using a surface-to-air missile (SAM); the IDF retaliated with strikes north of Beirut (Lebanon). The IDF confirmed that it struck compounds housing Lebanese Hizballah air defence systems in Beqaa Valley, near Baalbek (Baalbek-Hermel governorate), located around 60 miles (97km) from the Israel-Lebanon border. These strikes, while uncommon, remain broadly consistent with the IDF’s gradual escalation of operations against Lebanese Hizballah. As such, they are unlikely to prompt a significant escalation in major ground operations. A continued uptick in tit-for-tat hostilities is likely in the coming weeks, sustaining elevated risks in northern Israel and southern Lebanon.
- Yemen-Red Sea: On 24 February, the UK and the US coalition struck 18 Houthi targets in eight locations across Yemen. The coalition strikes followed a gradual uptick in Houthi attacks. They targeted underground weapons storage facilities, missile storage facilities, drones and air defence systems in Houthi-controlled areas. The strikes are unlikely to have negated the Houthis’ capacity to continue targeting military and commercial vessels in the Red Sea. There is a realistic possibility that the Houthis will escalate their attacks following the strikes, increasing their frequency and focusing further on US and UK commercial vessels. However, we assess that a major escalation remains unlikely. Any significant escalation in Houthi operations will likely be announced by spokespersons in advance, as both sides likely want to control the escalation levels. As such, we assess that the security risks in the Red Sea will be sustained at their currently elevated levels.
- Yemen-Saudi Arabia: Houthi-affiliated news claimed that Saudi Arabia participated in joint strikes against targets in Houthi-controlled territory on 23 February, though this has yet to be verified. Since November 2023, Saudi Arabia has called for de-escalation as part of an effort to maintain its truce with the Houthis; any such strike would therefore mark a significant shift from this position. We assess it is unlikely that the claim indicates that the Houthis are planning to conduct a retaliatory strike against Saudi Arabia, as such an attack would increase the likelihood of active Saudi participation in the strikes against Yemen; this would open up an additional front for the Houthis to contest. As such, the Houthi-affiliated claim was likely made to pressure Saudi Arabia to distance itself from the strikes and increase international pressure on the US to reduce its attacks against the group. However, we will continue to monitor Houthi claims and announcements that indicate a possible shift in the group’s targeting patterns and/or intent.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- On 26 February, Palestinian Authority (PA) Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh submitted his government’s resignation, elevating government instability and policy risks in the West Bank. The resignations come amid rising international pressure, particularly from the US, for the PA to engage in substantial reforms with a view to assuming governance of Gaza after the Israel-Hamas war concludes. President Mahmoud Abbas is highly likely to accept the resignations and to pursue the formation of a new government in the coming weeks. The new cabinet will likely be led by Mohammed Mustafa, who currently leads the PA’s investment fund and previously oversaw the implementation of numerous World Bank-recommended reforms in his roles as deputy prime minister and economy minister. While Shtayyeh’s cabinet will remain in power until Abbas formally appoints a new government, the resignations highlight the increased risks facing government stability and policy making in the West Bank.
- Protests calling for hostage releases triggered violent clashes in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district, Israel) on 24 February, highlighting rising anti-government sentiment and the risk of domestic unrest. Thousands attended the protest, the latest in a series of weekly demonstrations calling for the Israeli government to secure immediate hostage releases during negotiations with Hamas. Protesters gathered on Kaplan Street in Tel Aviv; they restricted access to Democracy Square, triggering violent clashes with mounted police who injured at least 11 protesters. The police made at least 21 arrests and employed a water cannon to prevent demonstrators from blocking the Ayalon Highway. On the same day, hundreds of protesters rallied outside the President’s House in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district), calling for immediate hostage releases and a change in government. The increasing numbers at protests underscore rising anti-government sentiment in Israel, though we assess that the risks facing government stability remain low. Additionally, the police’s increasingly assertive dispersal techniques underscore the elevated physical security and bystander risks near demonstrations, particularly for participants.
- Hearings at the Supreme Court on the issue of conscripting ultra-Orthodox men into the IDF continue to drive protest activity in Jerusalem, underscoring elevated ethno-religious tensions. The case aims to remove broad government exemptions from military service for ultra-Orthodox men; these exemptions enable them to continue full-time religious studies. Reforms to conscription practices are highly contentious, driving ethno-religious tensions and protest activity among both the ultra-Orthodox and secular communities. Earlier on 26 February, protesters gathered outside the home of Minister Yitzhak Goldknopf (who leads the United Torah Judaism party) in Jerusalem, calling for his primarily ultra-Orthodox supporters to serve in the military. Also on 26 February, approximately 1,000 protesters in favour of ultra-Orthodox conscription gathered in front of the Supreme Court in Jerusalem; a small group of counter-protesters demonstrated nearby.
- US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s opposition to West Bank settlement expansion highlights increasing compliance and reputational risks. On 23 February, Blinken stated that Israel’s planned expansion of several West Bank settlements is inconsistent with international law and is counterproductive to peace efforts. The statement follows Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich’s announcement on 22 February that Israel will seek to expand settlements in the West Bank following a shooting attack on Highway 1 near the Maale Adumim settlement (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 22 February 2024). Blinken’s statement underscores rising tensions in US-Israel relations, particularly as US President Joe Biden faces increasing domestic pressure to moderate support for Israel ahead of November’s US election. While substantial changes to diplomatic and economic relations remain unlikely, we assess that settlement expansion will likely trigger additional sanctions being imposed on extremist settlers in the West Bank, driving elevated compliance risks for firms with operations in Israel, particularly financial institutions. Additionally, Blinken’s statement highlights significant reputational concerns for businesses affiliated with Israeli settlements in the West Bank, such as construction, banking and transport firms.
- In the US, high-visibility acts of protest and civil disobedience continue to elevate bystander risks near Israeli diplomatic buildings and associated business assets. On 25 February, a US military service member self-immolated outside the Israeli embassy in Washington DC (US), underscoring that some individuals opposed to the Israel-Hamas war are liable to engage in activity designed to maximise international attention. Such acts will possibly prompt other anti-war protesters to carry out headline-grabbing acts, including those that elevate bystander and collateral risks for individuals and assets near Israeli embassies and/or locations associated with Israel and the Jewish community, particularly in North America.
*Israel: US stance on settlements’ legality will increase operational, reputational risks for firms. On 23 February, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that Israel’s expansion of settlements in the West Bank was inconsistent with international law and counterproductive to reaching an enduring peace. Blinken’s statement was in response to an earlier announcement by Israel’s finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich, on a planned expansion of settlements following a shooting attack on 22 February. The statement signals a shift from the US’ policy during the Trump administration and highlights the elevated tensions between the Biden administration and the current Israeli government. These tensions have elevated the likelihood of further US sanctions on West Bank-based entities, assets and individuals in the coming weeks. There is also a realistic possibility that other countries will follow the US and increase their legal actions against settlements in the West Bank. Such measures are likely to raise compliance, operational and reputational risks for businesses affiliated with Israeli settlements in the coming month. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Feb 24. DOD Takes Steps to Restore Stability in Red Sea Area. While the Defense Department supports the overall aim of de-escalating tensions and restoring stability in the Red Sea, it will not hesitate to defend civilians and protect the free flow of commerce in one of the world’s most critical waterways, said the deputy assistant secretary of defense for Middle East policy. Daniel B. Shapiro testified today before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia and Counterterrorism. Since Nov. 19, the Houthis have conducted at least 48 attacks against commercial shipping and naval vessels in and around the Red Sea through which 15% of all global trade flows, he said. They have used antiship ballistic missiles, antiship cruise missiles, unmanned aerial systems on surface vessels, and in one instance a helicopter-borne seizure, he said.
“Despite the Houthis’ claims, these attacks are almost entirely unrelated to Israel and Israeli affiliated shipping, and to be clear, any such attacks would be entirely illegitimate anyway. These are indiscriminate attacks that are as much an affront to maritime commerce as is piracy,” Shapiro said.
They’ve affected the interests of more than 55 nations and threatened the free flow of commerce through the Red Sea, a bedrock of the global economy. These attacks have prompted more than a dozen major shipping operators to suspend transit of the Red Sea, causing a spike in insurance rates for vessels in the region and, more importantly, putting the lives of innocent mariners and U.S. service members at risk, he said.
These attacks are also driving up prices and causing delivery delays in critical humanitarian items, such as food and medicine, in places where they’re needed most. This is adversely affecting people in need of assistance around the world, including residents of Sudan, Ethiopia and in Yemen itself, he said.
“It’s clear that these Houthi attacks represent an international problem that affects all nations committed to the exercise of navigational freedoms and the free flow of commerce. These attacks, which affect the entire region and nations across the globe, cannot go unchallenged. And this problem demands a broad-based and collective response,” Shapiro said.
The U.S., in coordination with allies and partners, is taking military, diplomatic and economic steps to impose costs on the Houthi leadership and degrade their ability to conduct attacks on commercial shipping, he said.
Since December, more than 20 countries have joined increased maritime patrols in the area to safeguard commercial shipping, he said.
On Saturday, U.S. strikes hit Houthi targets that include underground weapons storage facilities, missile storage facilities, unmanned aerial systems, air defense systems, radars and a helicopter, he said.
Over the past few weeks, U.S. forces have struck over 230 targets in Houthi-controlled Yemen through both deliberate and self-defense strikes, likely destroying hundreds of Houthi weapons. That’s not including the dozens of Houthi missiles and unmanned aerial systems that U.S. and partner naval vessels have intercepted and shot down over the Red Sea, he said.
In addition to DOD’s efforts to degrade and destroy Houthi capabilities, U.S. forces have interdicted Iranian vessels carrying lethal aid to Yemen, he said.
“We’ve made it very clear to Iran that we hold it accountable for attacks by its partners and proxies and believe Iranian leaders are aware of the consequences should these attacks result in U.S. casualties,” he said. (Source: U.S. DoD)
27 Feb 24. The UK and US sanction Houthi enablers. A UK sanctions package, coordinated with the US, targets those that support or enable the work of the Houthis across the Middle East. Enablers and supporters of the Houthis are today sanctioned by the UK and US.
- UK sanctions package, coordinated with the US, targets those that support or enable the work of the Houthis across the Middle East and around the Red Sea.
- UK and US sanctions both include key units within the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and the Deputy Commander.
- Foreign Secretary warns the UK and our partners ‘will not hesitate to act’ to protect regional stability and maritime security in the Red Sea.
Today the UK and US have announced a number of sanctions against those that support, enable or deliver work of the Houthis, the Iran-backed proxy group in Yemen responsible for widespread attacks against commercial shipping in the Red Sea.
The UK will today sanction two individuals and three organisations for their role in providing financial or military support to the Houthis, in order to expose and disrupt their efforts to undermine regional stability across the Middle East. The UK will also sanction a Houthi security minister for threatening the peace, security and stability of Yemen by supporting attacks against shipping in the Red Sea.
Today’s announcement follows the commitment laid out by the Prime Minister on the 23 January to cut off the Houthis financial resources. It is the second tranche of recent sanctions targeted at the Houthis or those that enable their activity and follows additional pre-existing sanctions against 11 Houthi individuals and two entities.
Foreign Secretary David Cameron said:
The attacks by the Iran-backed Houthis are unacceptable, illegal and a threat to innocent lives and freedom of navigation.
As I have made clear to the Iranian Foreign Minister, the regime bears responsibility for these attacks due to the extensive military support it has provided to the Houthis.
All those who seek to undermine regional stability should know that the UK, alongside our allies, will not hesitate to act.
Over recent weeks, the Houthis have continued to carry out a number of dangerous attacks against commercial shipping in the Red Sea.
Iran has supported the Houthis to carry out these attacks, by providing intelligence, missiles and drones.
The individuals and entities that are subject to UK travel bans and/or asset freezes today including:
- Mohammad Reza Fallahzadeh: Deputy Commander of the IRGC Quds Force, also designated by the US today.
- Sa’id al-Jamal: Iran-based financier who heads a network of front companies and vessels that generate revenue for the Houthis. Previously designated by the US.
- IRGC Quds Force Unit 190: in charge of transferring and smuggling weapons to organisations, groups and states that are allied with Iran.
- IRGC Quds Force Unit 6000: in charge of operations on the Arabian Peninsula and has personnel on the ground in Yemen supporting Houthi military activity.
- IRGC Quds Force Unit 340: in charge of research and development and providing training and technical support to groups backed by Iran.
- Ali Hussein Badr Al Din Al-Houthi: Undersecretary of the Interior and Commander of the security / police forces.
The IRGC Quds Force is the branch of the IRGC responsible for foreign operations and has provided extensive support to the Houthis, Hezbollah, Hamas and Iran aligned militia groups based in Iraq, in recent years.
To date, the UK has more than 400 sanctions designations in place on Iranian individuals and entities, including those that seek to use malign influence regionally and internationally.
A majority of today’s designations sit under the UK’s new Iran sanctions regime, which came into effect in December 2023 and provides new powers to hold Iran and those who undertake its hostile activity to account.
In addition to this, one designation also sits under the Yemen sanctions regime. Introduced as autonomous regulations in the UK in 2020, it enables the UK to hold individuals or entities to account where they threaten peace, security or stability in Yemen.
Last month, the UK and US sanctioned key Houthi figures to disrupt their ability to carry out attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea, acts which undermine the peace, stability and security of Yemen. This was the first set of UK sanctions against the Houthis since the attacks in the Red Sea began in November. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
26 Feb 24. Israeli Airstrikes Target Hezbollah Deep into Lebanon in Retaliation for Downed Drone. Israeli forces conducted two airstrikes against Hezbollah positions in the Bekaa Valley, near the city of Baalbek, resulting in the deaths of two Hezbollah operatives. Roughly 60 miles away from the Israeli border, the operation marks the first incursion into Eastern Lebanon since the conflict began. The strikes hit an area roughly 11 miles outside the city of Baalbek, which is known for its Roman ruins. The area is also a political stronghold of the Shi’ite Hezbollah group. The airstrikes came after Hezbollah forces successfully shot down an Israeli Hermes 450 drone over southern Lebanon, which was captured on video, and later confirmed by the IDF. Israeli officials told AFP that the strikes were targeted at Hezbollah “air defense systems” in retaliation of the downing of the Israeli drone. In response to the IDF’s successful airstrikes, Hezbollah reportedly fired over 60 rockets toward an Israeli military base located in Golan Heights. No casualties were reported from this counter-attack.(Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
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